JUDGMENT 1. 1. A short but interesting question which arises for determination in this case relates to the scope and interpretation of section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. In short the facts of this case are that a first information report was lodged against the petitioners and others on 10.4.1990 in Police Station, Bajaj Nagar. A case under sections 307, 147, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioners and other accused persons. They were arrested by the police on 10.4.1990 and were also released by the Station House Officer, Police Station, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur, on that very day. The higher police authorities intervened in the matter and directed that the investigation be made afresh. After making investigation it was found that a case under sections 147 and 323, I.P.C., was prima facie made out against the accused persons and a charge-sheet dated 30.7.1990 was prepared. The Station House Officer, who had released the accused persons under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was found guilty of dereliction of his duty by the higher authorities in an inquiry which was made by higher authorities against him. The accused persons made complaints/petitions against the conduct of investigation by the officers of Police Station, Bajaj Nagar. After examination of these complaints the higher Police authorities found that the investigation had been made correctly. They were also of the opinion that the charge-sheet prepared on 30.7.1990 was correct. A challan was ultimately filed against the petitioners in the court under sections 147 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code on 12.11.1991. 3. Two applications, one under section 91 and the other under Section 167(5), Code of Criminal Procedure were filed by the accused petitioners before the learned Magistrate. In the application filed under section 167(5) it was alleged that in summons cases the investigating agency (.... illegible) complete investigation within six months and then only the court can take cognizance. In the instant case, the accused persons had been arrested on 10.4.1990, whereas, the challan had been filed on 12.11.1991. by the Police. It was clearly beyond the time limit prescribed by the statute. Therefore, the accused were entitled to be discharged and the proceedings were liable to be dropped. In the instant case, the accused persons had been arrested on 10.4.1990, whereas, the challan had been filed on 12.11.1991. by the Police. It was clearly beyond the time limit prescribed by the statute. Therefore, the accused were entitled to be discharged and the proceedings were liable to be dropped. In the other application filed under Section 91, Cr.P.C. the accused persons claimed that the complainant had filed an application in the Police Station, Bajaj Nagar to the effect that the accused persons had not assaulted him. On that basis the accused persons were released on bail bonds. Therefore, it was necessary to summon that application and the report prepared by the authorities of Police Station, Bajaj Nagar under Section 169, Cr.P.C. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor, the learned Magistrate observed that although in the summons cases cognizance cannot be taken on the basis of investigation made beyond the limitation of six months, in the present case, the investigation had in fact been completed within six months of the arrest of the accused persons and the challan had also been prepared on 30.7.1990. Thereafter, the accused persons themselves submitted petitions and representations, one after the other against officers of Police Station, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur alleging that the police had not properly prepared the challan. These petitions had resulted in delay in filing of challan. The accused persons were, therefore, not entitled to take advantage of the delay occasioned by their own actions. On that premises learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate held that the application filed by the petitioners under Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. is liable to be rejected. He, however, allowed the application filed by the petitioners under section 91,Cr.P.C.,by the complainant on 10.4.1990 and the report prepared by the police under Section 169, Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the investigation in the present case cannot be treated as having been completed within a period of six months because the challan was submitted in the court on 12.11.1991. i.e.much after the expiry of period of six months counted from the date of arrest of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the investigation in the present case cannot be treated as having been completed within a period of six months because the challan was submitted in the court on 12.11.1991. i.e.much after the expiry of period of six months counted from the date of arrest of the petitioners. The Police had initially submitted the final report under Section 109, Cr.P.C. On the directions of the higher officers the matter was investigated and challan has been submitted much after the expiry of the period of six months.Therefore, it cannot he said that the investigation had completed within a period of six months of the date of arrest. By referring to the decision of Guwahati High Court in State of Tripura v. Niranjit Singh and another, 1988 (1) Crimes 732. Shri Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the learned Magistrate was legally bound to stop further investigation after the expiry of period of six months. Instead of stopping investigation, the learned Magistrate has, arbitrarily ejected the application filed on behalf of the petitioners for dropping the proceedings. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that the petitioners themselves were responsible for delay in the filing of the challan. Challan had in fact been prepared as early as on 30.7.1990. This was clearly within the limitation of six months as specified in Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. If, on the basis of the efforts made by the petitioners, the filling of challan was delayed the petitioners cannot take advantage of the delay in filing of the challan. 7. In order to appreciate the question raised in this petition it will be proper to examine the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure in the matter of investigation/inquiry, filing of challan, taking of cognizance by the Court. 8. 7. In order to appreciate the question raised in this petition it will be proper to examine the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure in the matter of investigation/inquiry, filing of challan, taking of cognizance by the Court. 8. Section 167, 169 and 468, 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as under : "S. 167-Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. Provided that:- (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter. (b)- no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him; (c)- no Magistrate of the second class, not specifically empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. Explanation 1.- For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.Explanation II.- If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention. (2A.)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate, or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate and on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order and where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) : Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (5)-If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons- case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6)- Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matter as he may specify." "S. 169 - Release of accused when evidence deficient - If, upon an investigation under the Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the Police Station that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, and to try the accused or commit him for trial." "S. 468 - Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be -(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only. (2) The period of limitation shall be -(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only. (b) one year, if the offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation,in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment." "S. 469 - Commencement of the period of limitation.- (1) The period of limitation in relation to an offender, shall commence:- (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded." 9. Section 157, Cr.P.C. gives powers to the Investigating Officer in a cognizable offence to proceed with the investigation forthwith and also to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. He is also required to furnish a report to the concerned Magistrate. Other provisions in this Chapter from Sections 158 to 167 are in connection with other powers of the Police Officers in calling the attendance of witnesses for enquiry, recording their statements, for conduction searches and seizures of concerned documents and properties and for recording confession, etc. The Chapter then proceeds to Section 167 which deals with the procedure when investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. This provision has been drastically amended in 1973 and 1978 with a view to expedite the investigation in cases where the person arrested is detained in custody. It gives the powers to the Police and the Magistrate with regard to the continuation of the detention of the accused either under police custody or under Magistrate custody. This provision has been drastically amended in 1973 and 1978 with a view to expedite the investigation in cases where the person arrested is detained in custody. It gives the powers to the Police and the Magistrate with regard to the continuation of the detention of the accused either under police custody or under Magistrate custody. It is in this section that sub-section (5) is introduced. A perusal of the scheme of Section 167, Criminal Procedure Code shows as in the opening clause, 'Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within ......", that the provision relates to a person "arrested and detained in custody". It is for this reason that in sub-s. (2) also the powers of the Magistrate to continue "detention" either in "police custody" or in "Magisterial custody" is prescribed and further if within a period of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not complete, the accused shall be released on bail. However, Explanation (1) further says that the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 167 also refers to forwarding the accused to the Executive shall before the expiry of the period of further extension transmit the record of the case to the Judicial Magistrate for authorising "further detention" of the accused with a proviso that the Executive Magistrate shall before the expiry of the period of further extension transmit the record of the case to the Judicial Magistrate Sub-section (3) of Section 167 also refers that "a Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police, shall record his reasons for so doing." It is in the light of this phraseology used in various provisions and in particular the opening clause, that it is apparent that Section 167 is mainly intended to see that no person is kept languishing in custody, police or Magisterial, for continued period of investigation. Sub-section (5) of section 167, Cr.P.C. relates to summons cases in particular and says that if the investigation in such case is not concluded within six months from the date of the arrest of the accused, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence. Sub-section (5) of section 167, Cr.P.C. relates to summons cases in particular and says that if the investigation in such case is not concluded within six months from the date of the arrest of the accused, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence. At this stage, also the officer making the investigation can satisfy the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice continuation of investigation beyond six months is necessary. Sub-section (6) of section 167 says that inspite of the order of stopping further investigation by a Magistrate under sub-sec. (5) the Sessions Judge may if he is satisfied on an application made to him that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, he may vacate the order passed by the Magistrate under sub-sec. (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such direction with regard to bail and other matters. To my mind, it is apparent from the last clause of this sub-section which says, "subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters" that the detention of any accused person during investigation for a summons case should not exceed six months and if the investigation is directed to be continued beyond that, directions regarding bail of the detenu should be specified. 10. Next comes the provision of Section 169. It is in this section that, if upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer incharge of the Police Station that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond with or without sureties as such officer may direct to appear, if and when so required before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. It, therefore, applies only in cases where the person accused is in custody and the Police Officer is enjoined upon releasing him on executing bond, if it appears to him that there is not sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to the Magistrate. 11. Section 468, Cr.P.C., contains a bar against taking of cognizance after lapse of period of limitation. Section 469, Cr.P.C. provides for the commencement of period of limitation in relation to an offender. 12. 11. Section 468, Cr.P.C., contains a bar against taking of cognizance after lapse of period of limitation. Section 469, Cr.P.C. provides for the commencement of period of limitation in relation to an offender. 12. Section 167, Cr.P.C. has been enacted with the object of avoiding harassment to a citizen through the machinery of law under the cover of protracted investigation. The provision has been enacted so that a person against whom a report is made, may not indefinitely be kept under the shadow of the police inquiry. While this object of enacting Section 167 is laudable it cannot be ignored that it is the duty of the State and of every citizen to bring the offender to justice. The interest of society, which the State is bound to protect, wants that persons, who committed offence are brought to book. The legislature never intended to interfere with the duty of the State to bring the offender to interfere with the duty of the State to bring the offender to book. The Court cannot be oblivious to larger interest of the society while interpreting as provision of law and an interpretation of law which tends to bring about the frustration in the mind of the people towards the law enforcing agency has to be avoided. Therefore, an attempt must be made to interpret the law in such a manner as to produce a balance between a right of individual not to be harassed on account of mala fide and delay investigation and the right of the society to see that offenders do not escape from the cluches of law merely by prolonging the investigation by polluting the functioning of the investigating agency. Keeping in view this principle of interpretation if the provisions of Section 167 (5) are considered in the light of Section 468 and 469, Cr.P.C. it becomes clear that while imposing an obligation on the prosecution to make every effort to ensure the detection and punishment of crime quickly, the court had clothed the Magistrate with the duty to stop the proceedings if investigation is not completed within six months. However, this power of stopping the investigation after the expiry of six months, the Legislature has intentionally empowered the Magistrate to permit continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months, if the investigating officer satisfies the Magistrate about the existence of special reasons for continuation of investigation and the concerned Magistrate feels satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to do so. Even if the Magistrate stops the proceedings by virtue of Section 167 (5), Cr.P.C., the Section Judge can direct that further investigation into the offence should be made. He can vacate the order made under Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. on an application made to him or otherwise and he can direct that the investigation be made. The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence can be traced only under Section 468, Cr.P.C. and there is nothing in the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of which it can be said that by the provisions contained in Section 167(5), Cr.P.C., the period of limitation specified in Section 468, Cr.P.C., for taking cognizance of an offender is rendered redundant. Clearly Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. does not begin with a non-obstante clause and, therefore, it cannot be given an over-riding effect as against Section 468, Cr.P.C. An analysis of two provisions with reference to the Chapters in which these provisions have been included clearly show that there are two independent provisions and the period of limitation specified under Section 468, Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance of an offence cannot be ignored. If a cognizance is taken within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468, Cr.P.C. even on the basis of investigation which has not been completed within six months cannot be quashed by the court only on that ground. 13. Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. has come up for interpretation before different High Courts. If a cognizance is taken within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468, Cr.P.C. even on the basis of investigation which has not been completed within six months cannot be quashed by the court only on that ground. 13. Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. has come up for interpretation before different High Courts. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has in Ram Kumar v. State, 1981 Cr.L.J. 1288 , held that, where a case is registered by the Police against the accused triable by a Magistrate as a summons case and the investigation is not completed within six months from that date, Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. gives a mandate to the Magistrate to make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer can satisfy the Magistrate that continuation of investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary for special reasons and in the interest of justice. The power given to the Magistrate has to be exercised before the expiry of six months and any direction or continuation of the investigation given under Section 167 (5), Cr.P.C., after the statutory period will be without jurisdiction. The Division Bench further held that, in case the Investigating Officer is not able to succeed in unearthing a case triable as a warrant case or a sessions case against the accused before the period specified is Section 167(5), Cr.P.C., is over, the police can suo motu register a case and investigate into the same. 14. A leaned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Babu Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cr.L.J. 1001, held that the provision contained in Section 167 (5) is mandatory. After making a reference to a number of decipions including those reported in Panney Singh & Others v. The State of Rajasthan, 1979 WLN 377 Hasan Ali v. State of Rajasthan, 1979 WLN 151 Supreme Court in Hussainara khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 and Hussainara v. Home Secretary, AIR 1979 SC 1377 the learned Single Judge held : One of the objects sought to be achieved by the new Cr.P.C. 1973 was to avoid delay in investigation and trial while ensuring a fair trial to the accused on the principles of natural justice. It was a notorious fact that under-trials remained behind the bars for long periods even without a charge-sheet being filed against them as many of such accused were unable to furnish bail or were not granted bail, Section 167(5), Cr.P.C., was enacted to avoid delay in investigation which was harmful not only to the individuals but also to the Society and the under-trials were languishing in detention even though accused of offences comparatively minor in nature triable as summons case. After expiry of six months from the date of arrest of an accused in a summons case if proper care is not bestowed upon Section 167(5) and the investigation is allowed to drag beyond this period in the absence of special reasons and the interest of justice an accused would still be in detention if he was unable to furnish bail. This is not warranted by law because once the investigation is stopped the accused has to be released even though he is unable to furnish bail, as the power of detention and remand under Section 167 is only while the investigation is going on. It comes to an end as soon as the charge-sheet is filed or the investigation is stopped. Viewed in this context it appears that Section 167(5) is mandatory in character and it is the duty enjoined upon the Magistrate to see that no investigation is continued in a summons case beyond -six months from the date of the arrest of the accused without his permission." 15. That was a case in which the petitioner was arrested on 28.1.1979. The charge-sheet was not filed within six months from the date of arrest. Learned Single Judge held that since the investigation had not been completed within six months, order of the Magistrate taking cognizance against the petitioner was liable to be quashed. 16. A learned ShIgle Judge of Calcutta High Court has, in Ram Kriksha v. State of West Bengal, 1983 Cr.L.J. 39, has taken the view that a challan submitted 180 days after the commencement of the investigation was illegal and the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on challan submitted as a result of delayed investigation. 17. 16. A learned ShIgle Judge of Calcutta High Court has, in Ram Kriksha v. State of West Bengal, 1983 Cr.L.J. 39, has taken the view that a challan submitted 180 days after the commencement of the investigation was illegal and the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on challan submitted as a result of delayed investigation. 17. In State of Tripura v. Jiranjit Singh (supra), a learned Single Judge of Guwahati High Court while accepting the views expressed by the Rajasthan High Court and Calcutta High Court and at the same time, expressing disagreement with the views expressed by the Delhi and Madras High Court, held that the investigation must be completed within six months and any application for extension of time must also be made within a period of six months. That was a case in which a vehicle was driven in rash and negligent manner which resulted in grievous hurt being caused to a woman on 10.1.1984. After investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet. On an application filed by the accused non-petitioners, the Magistrate quashed the charge-sheet. On a petition filed by the State of Tripura, the learned Judge of Guwahati High Court held that the charge-sheet submitted after six months of the arrest of the accused persons was rightly quashed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. 18. In State v. Jai Bhagwan, 1985 Cr.L.J. 932, a Division bench of Delhi High Court dealt with the scope of Section 167(5) at length. That was a case in which the High court had suo motu taken a cognizance of an order of acquittal passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in a case under section 279/338/304 A, I.P.C. The Delhi High Court differed with the views expressed by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Court on the interpretation of Section 167 (5) and observed: "But what is important to emphasis is that the mere fact of investigation having continued beyond a period of six months without the permission of the Magistrate does not automatically nullify the continuance of the trial. The only result in that (5),case is that the Magistrate will only look into the material which had been collected within a period of six months and will ignore the other material and then decide whether to take cognizance or not. The only result in that (5),case is that the Magistrate will only look into the material which had been collected within a period of six months and will ignore the other material and then decide whether to take cognizance or not. So the question of prejudice being occasioned would not arise because cognizance would be on the basis of investigation which had been conducted legally and within the time permitted. The trial court in ignoring this aspect has patently committed an illegality". The Court further observed : "We do not read Section 167(5) of Code to mean that no permission could be sought from the Magistrate once a period of six months has expired. It is evident, that before the Magistrate will pass an order stopping further investigation he must give an opportunity to the Police to satisfy him that there are any special reasons for continuing the investigation beyond a period of six months. This matter will thus come up for consideration only after six months have run-out and if the reasoning of the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts was to be followed it would lead to a peculiar situation that he could not pass an order for continuing the investigation, even if he was of the view that it was in the interest of justice to do so. This would make section 167(5), Cr.P.C., otiose an unacceptable situation. To take an illustration, an application is filed a few days before the six months have expired, as indeed it cannot but be only a few days before, as the investigating agency may not itself know sufficiently in advance whether it will be able to complete the investigation within six months or not. In such a case surely there seems to be no logic in saying that though an application is moved within six months, but Magistrate has no authority to pass an order because 6 months have expired by then as these authorities seem to lay down. Moreover, sub-section (6) of Section 167 shows itself the intention of the legislature when it empowers the Sessions Judge in revision to permit further investigation vacating the order passed by the Magistrate in refusing continuation of investigation passed under sub-section (5). That order of Sessions Judge necessarily will be passed after six months period has run out. Moreover, sub-section (6) of Section 167 shows itself the intention of the legislature when it empowers the Sessions Judge in revision to permit further investigation vacating the order passed by the Magistrate in refusing continuation of investigation passed under sub-section (5). That order of Sessions Judge necessarily will be passed after six months period has run out. This obviously means that the Legislature never contemplated that simply because a period of six months in section 167(5) has run out the power of the Magistrate to permit investigation to continue beyond the period of six months has become inoperative. The scheme of Section 167 (5) and (6) has to be read harmoniously namely (a) investigation will be completed within a period of six months: (b) if, however, there are special reasons and the interest of justice require the Magistrate may permit the continuation of investigation beyond a period of six months and (c) if, however, the Magistrate does not so permit the Sessions Judge may do so." 19. In State of Maharashtra v. P.C. Tatyaji, 1986 Cr.L.J. 332, a Learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court held that taking of cognizance of an offence of delayed charge-sheet is not illegal. The bar of limitation against taking of cognizance is to be traced only in Section 468 Cr.P.C. The Bombay High Court was of the view that the provisions of Section 167 Cr. P.C. do not contain a limitation on the power of the Court to take cognizance and, if the cognizance is taken on the basis of a charge-sheet filed after the period specified in section 167, the Magistrate will have to satisfy that no miscarriage of justice is caused to the accused persons. 20. In C. Bhaskaran Nair v. State of Kerala, 1987 Cr.L.J. 170, the case arose out of an incident which took place on 12.11.83. A case was registered under sections 279, 387 and 304-A IPC read with section 89 (a) and (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The accused surrendered before the Court on 21.11.83 and he was enlarged on bail. The investigation was completed on 24.4.84 but, the chargesheet was filed on 4.6.84. It was clearly beyond the period provided under Section 167 (5). After the cognizance was taken the accused filed a petition for dropping of the proceedings. His contention was accepted by the learned Magistrate and the proceedings were dropped. The investigation was completed on 24.4.84 but, the chargesheet was filed on 4.6.84. It was clearly beyond the period provided under Section 167 (5). After the cognizance was taken the accused filed a petition for dropping of the proceedings. His contention was accepted by the learned Magistrate and the proceedings were dropped. The complainant then filed revision petition before the High Court. After taking note of the divergent views expressed by the Calcutta High Court, Madras High Court. Rajasthan High Court, Delhi High Court and also a Single bench of Kerala High Court, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court proceeded to hold that "Merely because the investigation has continued beyond six months, it will not affect the competence of the procedure relating to cognizance and trial. Cognozance is not under section 167(5) and that sub-section does not provide any bar to cognizance. If the ingredients constitute the offence and offences are made out on the police report and no other legal bar is involved, the Court may be entitled to take cognizance irrespective of the question whether there was any irregularity or illegality in the investigation. Such an invalid or irregular report may still be filed under section 190 (1)(a) or (b) and, in any case, cognizance so taken is only in the nature of an error in proceedings antecedent to trial and it is only curable. The illegality in investigation cannot effect the competence and jurisdiction of the Court for trial. Otherwise, a malafide investigator can achieve the desired result by committing some illegalities during investigation. Any defect relating to investigation under Chapter- XII cannot project under Chapter-XIV or the other Chapters dealing with the inquires or trials. Investigation involves collection of evidence and placing accused for trial on the basis of material, if they make out commission of offence or offences. Illegality in the matter of collection of such material unless it result in miscarriage of justice cannot stand in the way of cognizance of the offence being taken and the offender being tried. Only when the court comes to the conclusion that the illegality or irregularity in the investigation has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, the court can quash the proceedings. Only when the court comes to the conclusion that the illegality or irregularity in the investigation has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, the court can quash the proceedings. Paras 10 and 12 of this decision also deserve to be quoted, these are; "A reading of Section 167(5) will satisfy anybody that if special reasons and interests of justice demand, the legislature wanted investigation to continue beyond six months also. It is the right as well as duty of the State and the citizen to bring offenders to justice. It is so because the interest of State and Society demand it. We do not think that the legislature wanted to forestall that right or duty to the detriment of the society for technical reasons. At the same time citizen is entitled to protection against harassment through the machinery of law under the cover of malafide and protracted investigation. Section 167(5) is intended only as a compromise between these two sights. That means in deserving. cases the continuance of investigation beyond six months, in spite of the possible harassment is not precluded under Section 167(5). It is true that Section 167(5) is intended as a mandate to the investigators to complete investigation in summons cases within six months of the arrest of the accused except in cases where the continuance beyond six months is necessary for special reasons and in the interests of justice. The authority to decide the existence of those special reasons and interests of justice is not the investigating agency but the magistrate. It is always the duty of the investigating agencies wherever they feel that investigation cannot be completed within the prescribed period and special reasons and interest of justice demand continuance of investigation beyond six months, to bring those reasons to the notice of the Magistrate and get orders for extension of time". "Investigation conducted after six months without an order from the Magistrate at any rate, will not vitiate that part of the investigation, in the absence of prejudice or miscarriage of justice being shown. From the wordings of Section 167(5) we were not able to read a legislative intent that the investigator can approach the Magistrate for extension of time or the Magistrate can order extension of time only before the expiry of six months and not thereafter. Such an interpretation will defeat the very purpose of investigation and bringing offenders to justice. From the wordings of Section 167(5) we were not able to read a legislative intent that the investigator can approach the Magistrate for extension of time or the Magistrate can order extension of time only before the expiry of six months and not thereafter. Such an interpretation will defeat the very purpose of investigation and bringing offenders to justice. So also simply because six months have expired there is no question of the Magistrate being divested of jurisdiction to extend time in deserving cases. It is the judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate that has to decide whether continuance of the investigation has to be allowed due to existence of special reasons and in the interests of justice or stopped due to absence of these reasons. Such an order is justifiable also. That shows the anxiety of the legislature to have a further judicial scrutiny on the decision of the Magistrate in stopping investigation. section 167(6) authorises the.Sessions Judge on application or otherwise to vacate the order stopping investigation and direct further investigation if he is so satisfied. The provision is not intended as a technical bar to investigation or as a technical defence to the accused. It is intended only by way of public policy to avoid harassment to the accused by unnecessarily delayed investigation." 21. In Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.V. Sangam Pratap Reddy, 1988 Cr.L.J. 1057 , a learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that, section 167(5) does not prescribe any time limit for filing the charge-sheet. It only states a dead line of six months period for completion of investigation in a summons case from the date of arrest of the accused. The only relevant section prescribing the period for filing charge-sheets is section 468(2) (b) and (c) and they should be filed in accordance with these provisions. Section 167(5) cannot over-ride Section 468 Cr.P.C. The limitation prescribed under Section 167(5) does not bar filing of the charge-sheet beyond the period of six months and the Magistrate cannot refuse to take cognizance of the case, on the basis of the charge-sheet duly filed as per Section 468, Cr.P.C., merely on the ground that investigation was not completed within a period of six months. The Magistrate can look into the material which is collected within a period of six months. 22. The Magistrate can look into the material which is collected within a period of six months. 22. From the perusal of the above decisions it is clear that while Rajasthan, Calcutta, Guwahati High Courts have held that the provisions contained in Section 167(5), Cr.P.C., are mandatory and in a summons case the Magistrate has a legal duty to stop investigation, if it has not been completed within six months and cognizance cannot be taken on the basis of challan filed after six months, Bombay, Delhi, Madras, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh High Courts have taken the view that even if the provisions contained in Section 167(5) is mandatory the Court is competent to take cognizance of the case on the basis of a charge-sheet filed on the basis of the investigation continued beyond a period of six months in summons cases. These courts have held that the bar of limitation in the matter of cognizance is contained in Section 468, Cr.P.C. and that section is not controlled by the provisions contained in Section 167, Cr.P.C. It is significant to notice that in the judgments of the learned Single Judge of Rajasthan, Calcutta and Guwahati High Courts as also the Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court do not make any reference to the provisions contained is Section 468, Cr.P.C., which specifically deal with the question of limitation in the matter of taking of cognizance. 23. In Hasan Ali v.State of Rajasthan and others, 1979 WLN 151 , a learned single judge of this court has considered Section 116(6), Cr.P.C. and held that inquiry envisaged by that Section cannot be continued beyond the period specified and the proceedings automatically come to an end. In that case, there is no discussion regarding the provisions of Section 167 or Section 468, G.P.C. In Panney Singh v. State of Rajasthan: 1979 WLN 377 , cognizance taken by the Magistrate beyond the period of limitation specified under Section 168 (sic 468) Cr.P.C. was found to be illegal and was quashed by a Single Bench. In that case a report was filed for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 323, IPC., on 19.10.1974 and the chargesheet was filed after 3 years i.e. on 15.2.1978. The court held that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on the basis of such charge-sheet. 24. In that case a report was filed for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 323, IPC., on 19.10.1974 and the chargesheet was filed after 3 years i.e. on 15.2.1978. The court held that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on the basis of such charge-sheet. 24. In the case of Babu Lal v. State of Rajasthan (supra) the learned judge has taken notice of the fact that the petitioner was arrested on 28.1.1979. The chargesheet was not filed within six months from the date of arrest and it appears that the investigation has not been completed. There is no specific mention of the date of completion of the investigation and the learned Single Judge had proceeded on assumption that the investigation had not been completed within six months. Likewise from the judgment of the Guwahati High Court it is not possible to point out as to when the investigation had been completed. 25. The judgments rendered by the Single Judges of Rajasthan and Guwahati High Courts as well as two judgments of Calcutta High Court cannot be treated as laying down correct law because in none of these cases the Courts have examined the provisions of Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 468, Cr.P.C. Apparently, no argument was advanced before the courts in the context of Section 468, Cr.P.C. 26. On the basis of what has been observed above the following propositions emerge:- (i)- the provisions contained in Section 167(5), Cr.P.C. require that a summons case triable by a Magistrate the investigation must ordinarily be concluded within a period of six months; the Magistrate shall make an order for stopping of further investigation in case the investigation is not completed within six months. (ii)- However, if on the basis of an application submitted by the Investigating Officer the Magistrate is satisfied that there are good reasons and that the interest of justice warrants, he may order continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months. (iii)- Ordinarily application for extension of the time should be made before the expiry of six months. But even if an application is made after six months, and the Magistrate feels satisfied about the existence of special reasons and also that interest of justice warrants, he can order continuation of the investigation. (iii)- Ordinarily application for extension of the time should be made before the expiry of six months. But even if an application is made after six months, and the Magistrate feels satisfied about the existence of special reasons and also that interest of justice warrants, he can order continuation of the investigation. (iv)- Even on the basis of the investigation which had continued beyond six months if cognizance is taken within the period of limitation specified under Section 468, Cr.P.C. such cognizance cannot be quashed by the superior court only on the ground that investigation had not been concluded within a period of six months. In that situation the court has to find out whether any miscarriage of justice had been occasioned or the accused has been pre-judicially effected by delay in the investigation. The Court is always free to proceed on the basis of the material collected by the Investigating Agency. (v)- Once the investigation is completed within six months mere fact that the chargesheet is not filed within six months, cannot afford sufficient ground for quashing of cognizance taken on the basis of such charge-sheet. 27. In the light of these principles if the order of the learned Magistrate is scrutinised, it is clear that the investigation was complete as early as on 30.7.1990 i.e. within a period of less than four months. The challan had been prepared on 30.7.1990. On account of the petitions and representations preferred by the petitioners, the filing of the chargesheet was delayed for long time. Clearly the petitioners were making an effort for hosing up of the matter by approaching the higher authorities in the Police Department and others. The learned Magistrate, in my opinion, has very correctly appreciated the position of law and declined to quash the proceedings on the application of the petitioners. Once the investigation is held to have been completed within six months there could be no justification whatsoever in the claim of the petitioners that the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate be quashed and the proceedings be ordered to be dropped. That apart it will clearly be an abuse of process of law if in such like case the proceedings are dropped on the ground of alleged delay of filing of chargesheet. That apart it will clearly be an abuse of process of law if in such like case the proceedings are dropped on the ground of alleged delay of filing of chargesheet. Any such order would encourage people who have approaches at the higher levels to obstruct the investigation by manipulations and manoeuvring and then approach the court with the prayer to quash the proceedings. The interest of society warrants that the offenders are brought to book and no person can be allowed to take advantage of a situation which is his own creation. 28. I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. A copy of this order be sent to the Home Commissioner and Director General of Police Rajasthan, so that they may issue instructions to the police authorities for taking of precautionary measures in the context of requirement of Section 167(5), of the Code of Criminal Procedure.Petition dismissed. *******