ORDER The petitioners who are a private limited company and two of its directors have filed these right revisional application heard together, to quash eight prosecutions pending against them, five of which are under s. 276 CC read with s. 278 B of the Income-tax Act and the remaining three under s. 276 D also read with S. 278 B of the said Act. 2. Mr. Sanyal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the revisional applications has argued that mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence punishable under s. 276 D of the Act and therefore “juristic person” like a private limited company, the present petitioner no. 1 is incapable of committing such an offence. He has stated that even though the definition of the expression “person” as given in s. 2(31) of the Act is of sufficiently large amplitude to include juristic person, still it could not have been used in its sense of s. 279-D, as such a person cannot have any mens rea. There is good deal of force in this argument and as there is no doubt that it is only a willful failure to produce accounts and documents which has been made punishable under s. 276 D. It follows at once that the other two petitioners who are the directors cannot also be prosecuted for vicarious liability for the offence committed by the company for the simple reason that no offence at all is committed by the company. In other words, the three prosecutions of the petitioners being case no.C 723/87 and C 729/87 are liable to be quashed. 3. The other five prosecutions were started under s. 276 CC of the Act for alleged failure of the company to furnish the return of income Inspite of service of a notice under s. 142 of the Act. Here the company Is sought to be punished for the offence under s. 276CC and ? the Directors for the vicarious liability for such offence in accordance with the provisions of s. 278B of the Act. Reference to s. 276CC would show that it is only wilful failure to furnish return of income which has been made penal and Mr. Here the company Is sought to be punished for the offence under s. 276CC and ? the Directors for the vicarious liability for such offence in accordance with the provisions of s. 278B of the Act. Reference to s. 276CC would show that it is only wilful failure to furnish return of income which has been made penal and Mr. Sanyal has argued here again that since it is not possible for a corporate body like a company to wilfully commit an act or omission, it cannot commit any offence punishable under s. 276 CC. He has then argued that from this position it follows that the Directors cannot also be held guilty for any vicarious liability in this regard. Mr. Talukdar learned Counsel opposing the applications has urged that the expression "wilfully" occurring in s. 276 CC applies only in the case of failure to furnish return of income in due time but it does not apply to failure to file return in spite of notice under s. 142 of the Act. In other words according to Mr. Talukdar while mena rea may be of ingredient of an offence of failure to furnish the return of income in due time, it is not so for the offence of failure to file return of income inspite of service of a notice under s. 142 of the Act, I am unable to appreciate this contention as I find no reason to restrict the operation of the expression "wilfully" only to failure to file return of income in due lime and it seems to me to be a normal interpretation that it applies as much to failure to file return of income pursuant to a notice under s. 142 of the Act. Therefore, mens rea may be held to be an ingredient of any offence punishable under s. 276 CC of the Act. In such circumstances, it must be held that a company like the petitioner no.1 is incapable of committing an offence punishable under this section arid consequently its directors cannot also be held to be vicariously liable for such alleged offence for the simple reason that no offence at all is committed by the company. 4. Regarding these five prosecutions, Mr. Sanyal has also argued from another angle. In support of his contention that the prosecutions are liable to be quashed. 4. Regarding these five prosecutions, Mr. Sanyal has also argued from another angle. In support of his contention that the prosecutions are liable to be quashed. Offence punishable under s. 276 CC of the Act requires imposition of rigorous imprisonment in addition to fine and therefore it has been argued that since he company cannot be committed to prison, the expression "person" as occurring in this section does not include a corporate body. in this regard he has cited two Bench decisions of this Court reported in 1989 Cr.L.R. (Cal) 171 which has followed an earlier decision in 1980 (2) CHN 326 In both these decisions. it was held by Their Lordships that even though the definition of 'person' was wide enough to include a company or any juristic person the word 'person' could not have been med by Parliament in s. 277 in that sense because imprisonment was made compulsory for an offence under the section and a company or a juristic person could not be sent to prison. Although these were cases in which Their Lordships were considering 'whether the word 'person' occurring in s. 277 of the Act included a juristic person. It appears that the analogy applies with equal force in the present case because the ground for interpretation that person does not include B company applies equally in B case under s. 276CC where imprisonment is a compulsory punishment. Therefore, these five prosecutions against the petitioners under s. 276CC read with s. 278B of the Act are liable to be quashed. 5. For the reasons aforesaid, the revisional applications succeed and all the eight prosecutions pending against the petitioner being complaint case no. C 723/87 to C 730/87 are quashed. Let xerox C0PY of this judgment be made available to the parties upon compliance of the necessary undertakings. Revisional applications succeed; all the eight proceedings quashed.