M. S. PARIKH, J. :, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision application under section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the act) arises from the concurrent judgments of posssession of the suit premises passed in H. R. P. Civil Suit No. 1899/80 by the ld. Judge of Small Causes Court, Court no. 5, Ahmedabad on 23-1-1989, and in civil Appeal No. 44/89 by a bench of small Causes Court, Ahmedabad on 29-8-1991. ( 2 ) XXX xxx xxx. ( 3 ) XXX xxx xxx. ( 4 ) XXX xxx xxx. ( 5 ) IN this revision application some submissions of facts as arising in respect of the grounds of acquisition of suitable residence and non-user of the suit premises are concerned, have been made. It has been noticed from the evidence that the defendants went to reside in the newly acquired property which is in the same locality where the suit premises is situated. That property consists of ground floor, first floor and second floor and according to the Commissioners report some rooms in the first floor and second floor were absolutely vacant and unoccupied. Even the courts below have come to the conclusion that the property was large enough to accommodate all the members of the family including the petitioner. Mr. Shah went through the judgments of both the courts below. It clearly appears that there is no illegality committed in the appreciation of evidence. As a matter of fact, no question of law has been urged with regard to both the aforesaid grounds on which decree for eviction has been passed. The relevant grounds available to the respondents-landlord are contained in section 13 of the Act which may be reproduced. It would be necessary for dealing with the first part of the provision while appreciating the submissions made on the question of notice. The relevant grounds available to the respondents-landlord are contained in section 13 of the Act which may be reproduced. It would be necessary for dealing with the first part of the provision while appreciating the submissions made on the question of notice. "section 13 (1) - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (but subject to the provisions of Section 15 and 15-A), a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied - (k) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; or (1) that the tenant, after the coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. " ( 6 ) XXX xxx xxx. ( 7 ) AT the outset it may be noted that neither the Trial Court nor the appellate court had proceeded to consider relief for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. It is an admitted position that both the courts below have rejected the landlords case under Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. Still however, a question of law is sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents suit was not maintainable at law in absence of statutory notice both under Seciton 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as well as under Section 12 (2) of the act. Mr. Sandip Shah, Ld. Advocate for the petitioner firstly relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Abdulgani @ Gam Ismail v. Jaiswal Chimanlal maneklal reported at 20 (1979) GLR page 107 wherein the division bench held that a suit by a landlord to recover possession of the suit premises from his tenant on the ground of arrears of rent must be preceded by two valid notices, one under section 106 of the Transfer of Property act and another under Section 12 (2) of the Act. Mr. Shah, however, when required to go through the full bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai animal reported at AIR 1979 SC 1745 , he submitted that although notice under section 106 of the T. P. Act was not required, one under Section 12 of the act was necessary. Mr. Shah, however, when required to go through the full bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai animal reported at AIR 1979 SC 1745 , he submitted that although notice under section 106 of the T. P. Act was not required, one under Section 12 of the act was necessary. The ratio of Supreme court decision was required to be dealt with by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Babubhai Jayantilal kalyanbhai and Ors. v. Shah bharatkumar Ratilal and Ors. reported at 21 (1980) GLR page-103. The following propositions as emerging from the supreme Court decision have been set out by the Full Bench:" (A) No notice as envisaged under section lll (g) of the Transfer of Property act, which provides for forfeiture of the tenancy, is legally obligatory when the forfeiture takes place under State Rent acts of a right of a tenant to continue in occupation of the property, save and except where a specific provision is made in that behalf for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent such as the one under the Bombay Rent Act or the West Bengal rent Act; (b) whereas the right of a lessor to obtain possession under the Transfer of property Act can arise only on the determination of the tenancy as provided under Section 111 thereof, the right to possession of a lessor under the State rent Act can only arise when the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted are established. Consequently, therefore, notice for determination of contractual tenancy is obligatory under Section lll (h) if a tenancy is not determined otherwise as provided under Section lll (a) to (g ). Consequently, therefore, notice for determination of contractual tenancy is obligatory under Section lll (h) if a tenancy is not determined otherwise as provided under Section lll (a) to (g ). However, the question of determination of a tenancy by notice would not arise under State Rent Acts which either in one language or the other has provided that a tenant can be evicted only on the grounds prescribed therein; (c) the jural relationship between a landlord and a tenant as defined in the rent Act would come to an end only when an order or a decree of eviction is made and not on determination of a tenancy by a notice since according to the definition of word "tenant" under the state Rent Acts a person continuing in possession even after determination of the tenancy is included in the meaning of the word "tenant"; (d) the determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property act is unnecessary and mere surplusage; (e) if protective umbrella is extended by State Rent Acts against the eviction to a tenant who is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases and his observing and performing the other conditions of tenancy consistent with the Act, it is wholly unnecessary to import the contractual law engrafted in the Transfer of Property Act to the landlords seeking eviction under the Rent Acts. " ( 8 ) AFTER quoting several passages from which the above premises were sorted out, the full bench observed in para 23 as under:"the passage which we have set out above pointedly indicate that under State rent Control Acts the concept of contractual tenancy has lost much of its significance and force, and that the restricted area under the various State rent Acts has done away to a large extent with the requirement of the Law of contract and Transfer of Property Act. The sum total of these observations is that having regard to the definition of word "tenant" where a person continuing in occupation after determination of contractual tenancy with or without the assent of the landlord, a person continuing in occupation accordingly is entitled to continue in occupation on the same terms and conditions as before till an order of eviction is made against him under the relevant provisions of a State Rent Act. In our opinion, so far as the restricted area under the State Rent Acts is concerned, the distinction between a contractual tenancy and a statutory tenancy is done away with and the extent of the tenancy under the State Rent control Acts would be the same irrespective of the fact whether the contractual tenancy subsists or is terminated. If that is so, and we do not feel doubt in view of what we have extracted above from the Full Bench decision of the Surpreme Court in dhanpals case (supra), there is some estate or interest in a tenancy under the bombay Rent Control Act which will be heritable on the demise of the original tenant. If that is so, the conclusion is inescapable that all the heirs of an original deceased tenant would be entitled to succeed to that estate or interest which is protected by the Rent Act till the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is snapped by an order or decree of eviction made under the relevant provisions governing the question of eviction. " ( 9 ) IT can, thus, be seen that the decision in the case of Abdul Gani (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) has observed with regard to the provisions contained in Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, in para-9, as under:"adverting to the provisions of the bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act, 1947, it would be found from the definition Section 5 that any person remaining in the building after the determination of the lease is a tenant within the meaning of Clause (11 ). Section 12 of the Bombay Act says that the landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the conditions mentioned in sub-Sec. (1) are fulfilled nor any suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the happening of the events mentioned in sub-Sec. (2) until the expiration of one month next after the notice is served on the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property act, as required by the said sub-section. Section 13 provides that a landlord may recover possession on certain grounds. Section 13 provides that a landlord may recover possession on certain grounds. Is it not plain then that on the happenings of the events or on the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in Sections 12 and 13, etc. the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession from the tenant, otherwise not. It will bear repetition to say that under the. Transfer of Property act in order to entitle the landlord to recover possession determination of the lease is necessary as during its continuance he could not recover possession, while under the State Rent act the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the rigour of law provided therein. Otherwise not. He cannot recover possession merely by determination of tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. Under the State Rent Control Acts the concept of the contractual tenancy has lot much of its significance and force. "in fact, the Supreme Court held that giving of notice under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act was not necessary in order to enable the landlord-respondents to get an order of eviction against the defendant-appellant. ( 10 ) MR. Shah, therefore, concentrated upon the provision contained in Section 12 (2) of the Act. It would be necessary to reproduce Section 12 (1) and 12 (2) of the Act, at this stage. "section 12 (1 ). A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882 ). " ( 11 ) BEFORE the provision contained in section 12 (2) is dealt with, it may be noted that in support of the submission to the effect that a notice under Section 12 (2) is essential before institution of a suit for eviction, Mr. Shah cited the following authorities: (i) Pradesh Kumar Bajpai v. Binod behari Sarkar reported at AIR 1980 SC page, 1214; where the lease was governed by the provisions of U. P. (Temporary) control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947), it was held that the terms of provisions of Transfer of Property Act to that extent would not be applicable. In that case, the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and a notice of demand was served on the tenant. The tenant, however, did not pay the rent to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice. Under such circumstances, it was held that inasmuch as the lease was governed by the Rent Act, even if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for over 2 months, the landlord could not enter into possession forthwith without notice. (ii) Nahar Damodar Wani v. Narmadabai T. Nave, reported in 1984 (1) Rent Control Reporter, p. 544: in this case, division bench of the Bombay high Court assumed that a notice under section 12 (2) was required and held that the refusal of landlord to receive the entire amount of rent as was demanded by the notice must be treated for the purpose of sub-Sees. (1) and (2) of Section 12 (2) as being equivalent to payment and on this finding no suit for recovery of possession for non-payment of these arrears could have been filed by the landlord and no decree for possession could have been asked for by him in his favour. (iii) Kashibai and Ors. v. Dagdu basling Korpe reported in 1989 (2) Rent control Reporter, p. 648. Mere a Single judge of the Bombay High Court assumed that notice under Section 12 (2) of the rent Act was sufficient to start ejectment proceedings. (iv) Tarabhai Datalraya Babrat and ors. v. Dayaneshwar Keshav Kamble and Ors. (iii) Kashibai and Ors. v. Dagdu basling Korpe reported in 1989 (2) Rent control Reporter, p. 648. Mere a Single judge of the Bombay High Court assumed that notice under Section 12 (2) of the rent Act was sufficient to start ejectment proceedings. (iv) Tarabhai Datalraya Babrat and ors. v. Dayaneshwar Keshav Kamble and Ors. reported at 1986 (2) Rent Control reporter, p. 634: Here also a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court assumed that notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act was necessary for the purpose of compliance of the provision contained in section 12 (2) of the Act in order to claim decree for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. (v) Dinkar S. Vaidya v. Ganpal S, gore and Ors. reported at AIR 1981 Bombay 190: In this case, a Single Judge of the bombay High Court held that category of grounds upon which an eviction decree can be obtained against a tenant are exhausted by the provisions of the Rent act. It was further held that no decree for ejectment from the premises rented to him can be passed, unless his acts fall either under Section 12 or 13 of the act. In para 10b it has been held that section 12 deals with the liability of the tenant for eviction, if he commits default in the matter of payment of rent; but before such a decree can be obtained, it is incumbent upon the landlord to give a statutory notice to the tenant under section 12 (2) of the Act giving him locus penilentiae to pay all the arrears of rent then due within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. (vi) Khimji Bhimji Majithia v. Tarabehn Lalji Son, reported at 23 (2) 1982 GLR p. 114: Division Bench of this court was required to consider the provisions contained in Section 12 (2) of the Act. In para-4, the following observations appear in that respect:"the landlord has in very emphatical language been told by sub-Sec. (2) of section 12 that before he can proceed to institute a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, he shall extend an opportunity to the tenant to make good the lapse or lapses committed by him till then. This special obligation is cast on the landlord in the negative text and it is one of the well-known canons of construction that when the Legislature expresses its intent in a negative tone, disabling one of the parties, that direction is mandatory in character. When the Legislature says that the suit for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of rent shall not be instituted by the landlord unless requirement of that sub-Sec. (2) of section 12 is complied with, it is clear that the provisions of this sub-Sec. (2) are mandatory. The purpose behind employing this mandatory language is not far to seek. As said by us above, the legislature being conscious of the comparative lack of information and comparative low economic level of the tenant as compared to the proverbially higher economic and intellectual level of landlords, has very categorically provided that unless that obligation is met with and discharged by the landlord, his suit for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent shall be incompetent. "all the above decisions speak of requirement of notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act for filing a suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent under section 12 of the Act. ( 12 ) ADDED to the aforesaid citations referred to by Mr. Shah for the petitioner, there is a recent decision in the case of kulkarni Patterns Pvt. Ltd. and Ors v. Vasant Baburao Ashtekar and Ors. reported at JT 1992 (1) SC p. 194. The supreme Court, in this case, was concerned with a suit for possession on the ground of default in payment of rent as available under Section 12 of the Act. reported at JT 1992 (1) SC p. 194. The supreme Court, in this case, was concerned with a suit for possession on the ground of default in payment of rent as available under Section 12 of the Act. In the context of such ground for possession, the Supreme Court has held that the requirement of sending a notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act is to be done in the manner prescribed under para-2 of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act which reads as under:"every notice under this Section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to the party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. " ( 13 ) IN the submissions of Mr. Shah for the petitioner, a notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act is a condition precedent for bringing a suit for eviction also on any of the grounds stated in Section 13 of the Act. We, in the alternative, submitted that in any case if a suit for eviction was filed on the ground of arrears of rent clubbing therewith any of the grounds available under Section 13 of the act, and if a notice under Section 12 (2) is not given to the tenant, the suit of the landlord must fail. Both these submissions cannot be accepted on a plain reading of the provisions contained in section 12 (2) of the Act reproduced hereinabove. Even a combined reading of Section 12 (2) and Section 13 (1) clearly indicates that no notice as directed under section 12 (2) of the Act would be necessary for filing a suit for eviction on the aforesaid grounds available under section 13 of the Act. What Section 12 says is that no suit for recovery of possession can be instituted on the ground of non-payment of standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiry of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner as aforesaid. What Section 12 says is that no suit for recovery of possession can be instituted on the ground of non-payment of standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiry of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner as aforesaid. I find that a notice is a must for a suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. However, no such provision is made by the Legislature while enacting section 13. As a matter of fact, the legislature has amply made clear that if any of the provisions of Section 13 are satisfied, the landlord shall be entitled to possession of the rented premises. The provisions contained in Section 13 (1) begins with a non-obstante clause that is to say that Section 12 (2) neither can be incorporated in Section 13 nor can be read as providing a condition precedent for availability of grounds set out in section 13. Therefore, it is clear that if any of the grounds under Section 13 is/or are available to the landlord, a decree for eviction can be passed in his favour irrespective of whether a notice under section 12 (2) is given or not. The submission that a consolidated suit, namely on the ground available under section 12 as well as on the ground available under Section 13, is not maintainable for want of notice under section 12 (2), has no force on the face of it. The landlord cannot be directed to file a separate suit; one for the ground available under Section 12 of the Act and another on the grounds available under section 13 of the Act. The submission of Mr. Vyas that Section 12 (2) of the act comes into operation only on the ground of non-payment of arrears of standard rent or permitted increases due, holds good and he is right when he submitted that Section 13 is not steered by Section 12 (2) of the Act. ( 14 ) IN the above view of legal position as it plainly appears, the present petition has to fail. (NVA) Petition dismissed. ( 15 ) MR. Shah prayed for six months time to enable the petitioner to vacate the premises in case he chooses not to take the matter higher-up. Mr. ( 14 ) IN the above view of legal position as it plainly appears, the present petition has to fail. (NVA) Petition dismissed. ( 15 ) MR. Shah prayed for six months time to enable the petitioner to vacate the premises in case he chooses not to take the matter higher-up. Mr. Vyas for the respondent has objected to the grant of any time to the petitioner to vacate the suit premises. It appears that some reasonable time should be granted in order to enable the petitioner to vacate the premises. The petitioner, however, is granted time upto June 30, 1992 to vacate the suit premises on condition that she files an undertaking in this Court to the effect that all the arrears of rent if any shah be paid or deposited in the Trial court on or before March 31, 1992 and that she or any of the defendants would not transfer the suit premises to anybody else and the suit premises shall be peacefully vacated and possession thereof shall be handed over to the respondents on or before June 30, 1992. ( 16 ) PETITION is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to cost. .