Judgment :- Thomas,J. Union of India (appellant) has filed this Writ Appeal against the judgment of a learned single judge dismissing the Original Petition filed by the appellant. The Original Petition was filed to quash Ext. P2 judgment of the District Court, Thiruvanan-thapuram. As per Ext. P2 judgment, learned District Judge modified certain awards passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Payments under the provisions of the sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 - Act 57 of 1974 (for short 'the act). 2. A short resume of the facts would be necessary to dispose of this Writ Appeal. Management of M/s. Vijayamohini Mills was taken over under the provisions of Sick Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act 1972 -Act 72 of 1972 and from the appointed day (31,-10-72) the management of the Mills vested in the Central Government. The above Act was superseded by Act 57 of 1974 which came into force on 1-4-74. The right, title and interest of the owner of the Mills stood transferred to and vested in the National Textile Corporation (for short'the Corporation'). The Act permitted those persons who had claims against the Mills, to move the Commissioner of Payments appointed under S.17 of the Act for appropriate reliefs. Some claims were preferred pursuant thereto. Corporation also was one of the claimants. Assistant Commissioner of Payments disposed of all the claims. A portion of the claim made by the Corporation was allowed, but the claims made by others were rejected in toto. Appeals were preferred by all the claimants (including the Corporation) before the District Court under S.23(7) of the Act. Ext. P2 is the common judgment in the said appeals. 3. Learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition on merits. But he did not specify whether the Original Petition was entertained under Art.226 or only under Art.227 of the Constitution. We may assume that learned single judge would not have exercised jurisdiction under Art.226 since a writ of certiorari is not maintainable in respect of a judgment or order passed by a civil court. A Division Bench of this Court (M.S. Menon, C.J., and P. Govindan Nair, J. - as he then was) has held in Nallya Koya v. Administrator (1968 KLT 60) that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. This was followed by another Division Bench in Pareed v. Spl. Deputy Collector (1973 KLT 996). 4. A Division Bench of this Court (M.S. Menon, C.J., and P. Govindan Nair, J. - as he then was) has held in Nallya Koya v. Administrator (1968 KLT 60) that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. This was followed by another Division Bench in Pareed v. Spl. Deputy Collector (1973 KLT 996). 4. Learned counsel for the appellant made an endeavour to persuade us to deviate from the aforesaid decisions for which he sought support from Supreme Court decisions (vide Md. Shafi v. Addl. D&S. J., Allahabad - AIR 1977 S.C. 836 and State of M.P. v. Babu Lai - AIR 1977 S.C.1718). He also cited a later Supreme Court decision reported in Harbans Lai v. Jagmohan Saran ((1985) 4 SCC 333). True, in the said decision (rendered by a bench of two judges of the Supreme Court) there is an observation that "a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued only if the order of the inferior tribunal or subordinate court suffers from an error of jurisdiction, or from a breach of the principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law" The said observation has been highlighted by the learned counsel to support his contention. Neither in Md. Shaft's case (AIR 1977 SC 836) nor in Babu Lai's case (AIR 1977 SC 1718) nor even in Harbans Lai's case (cited supra) is there a reference to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Naresh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 1). A Bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court in the said decision considered the question and in the majority judgment delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England has been quoted with approval and pointed out that the ultimate proposition is set out in the terms that certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction. It was the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court which led the Division Bench in Nalla Koya's case (1968 KLT 60) to restate the law that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. We have to follow the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges in preference to the observations made in the other decisions rendered by benches of lesser strength. 5. We have to follow the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges in preference to the observations made in the other decisions rendered by benches of lesser strength. 5. If the judgment under challenge in this appeal was passed in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution, no appeal would lie therefrom before a Division Bench under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (videArumugham Chettiar v. Joseph -1961 KLT 823). In Umaji v. Radhikabai (AIR 1986 SC 1272), Supreme Court held that no appeal would lie against a single judge's order or judgment passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution. Supreme Court considered in the said case the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The reasoning is that since jurisdiction under Art.227 is supervisory in nature the resultant order cannot be treated as the product of exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court. It will be pertinent to point out that similar was the reasoning which weighed with the Division Bench of this Court in Arumugham Chettiar's case. So the position can be held as well settled now. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the appeal as not maintainable.