S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in the present revisional application, dated 31st March, 1988, moved a writ application, challenging the order of the respondent No. 1, refusing their application for temporary permit as communicated by the letter of the said respondent, dated 30th May, 1988 CO. No. 12899 (W) of 1988 was issued and in connection therewith a temporary permit, was granted on 6th March, 1989. Since thereafter, by moving the Courts of Writ, the petitioners continued with temporary permits, granted from time to time, upto 4th July, 1989, whereafter an application for renewal of the last temporary permit was made and rejected by the respondents. The respondent No. 4 was moved against the said order of refusal, embodied in the resolution through an appeal, being STA Appeal No. 19 of 1989, which had been pending till 27th February, 1992, and was dismissed on that date on the ground of non-filing of the certified copy of the impugned resolution. Till the date dismissal of the appeal, as aforesaid, temporary permits in favour of the petitioners were being granted under the orders of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the petitioners substantial ground, which had been pressed before the Tribunal, was that in spite of an application and reminder the respondent No. 1 failed to deliver the certified copy of the impugned resolution, which was challenged in the said appeal. The present revisional application has been moved, challenging the aforesaid order of dismissal of the appeal and prayer has been made for an interim injunction seeking to restrain the respondents from interfering with the plying of the vehicle of the petitioners. ( 2 ) BY production of records it has been argued by the State Transport Authority that the appeal in question had been preferred upon an assumption of rejection of the petitioners' prayer for temporary permit, though due to shortness of time, intervening between the application for such permit and the alleged data of rejection, no resolution could be passed or had been passed and as such no question of delivery of certified copy could arise on the date of filing of the appeal. The appeal, thus, according to the respondents, was misconceived. The appeal, thus, according to the respondents, was misconceived. Secondly, it was argued that on the basis of an imaginary rejection the petitioners went on enjoying the benefits for temporary permits for period of time more than that envisaged by statutory provisions as the life of temporary permit. Thirdly, it was argued that the statutory condition of section 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act not having been fulfilled, no claim for temporary permit could be maintained. ( 3 ) WE have considered very carefully the arguments made by Mr. Bihani on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Seth on behalf of the respondents Admittedly, the petitioners' application, culminating with the present proceeding, had been made on or about 21st of June, 1989 and till the last date of dismissal of the appeal the petitioners enjoined the benefits of temporary permits granted from time to time. ( 4 ) CONSIDERING the said factual position, we are of the view that to remand the appeals and allow the same to remain pending on a technical basis by holding that no dismissal could be made for non-filing of an unavailable certified copy of the impugned resolution would be really an abuse of process of law. At the same time, we feel that any pronouncement of our views on the rival contention of the parties, at this stage, would not only be merely academic and futile but may result in causing serious prejudice to the cause of either of the contesting parties. We desire justification for the said view on the application of the well-settled legal position, as far as grant of temporary permits or ad hoc permits in terms of the order of a Court, is concerned. The large number of decisions, cited at the Bar, unequivocally lends support to the above standpoint of ours. It is already well-settled that the Motor Vehicles Act is a complete code and the property of the decisions of the statutory authorities established under the said code cannot be tested by the High Court as a Court of Appeal. The large number of decisions, cited at the Bar, unequivocally lends support to the above standpoint of ours. It is already well-settled that the Motor Vehicles Act is a complete code and the property of the decisions of the statutory authorities established under the said code cannot be tested by the High Court as a Court of Appeal. It is also well-settled that the factors requiring consideration for grant of temporary permits are different from those in case of permanent permits and the concept of renewal of temporary permits is not contemplated by the Motor Vehicles Act, instead of repeating grants of temporary permits, the authority should Consider the case as one for a permanent permit and High Court could not assume the power or authority to grant temporary permits. By way of precedents, references may be made to the following decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court :- air 1952 SC 192 ; Gandha Transport Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab. AIR 1964 SC 1245 ; Basant Roadways v. S. T. A. Tribunal, AIR 1987 sc 116 ; A. Viswanathan v. S. T. A. Tribunal, Pondicherry, AIR 1987 sc 731 ; S. T. A. and Ors. v. Nirmalendu Das and Ors. , AIR 1989 Cal. 392 ; Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443 . ( 5 ) APPLYING the aforesaid principles, we do not propose to interfere with the order of dismissal nor do we propose to express any view on the merits or demerits thereof as it would not only be academic but improper. The revisional application is, therefore, dismissed. ( 6 ) WE are informed that of late the petitioners have made application for permanent permit and before parting with the case, we keep on record our desire that the statutory authorities should be diligent in disposing of such application for permanent permit according to law and on merit expeditiously and preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order. Let xerox copies of the order be delivered to the learned Advocates for the parties on their usual undertakings to apply for and obtain urgent certified copies. A. K. Bhattacharji, J. , I agree. Petition dismissed.