B. N. KRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THESE two criminal appeals arise from a common judgment delivered by additional sessions judge, Bangalore rural district, Bangalore in S. C. no. 28 of 1986 and S. C. No. 53 of 1983. Criminal appeal No. 443 of 1988 arises from S. C. No. 28 of 1986 and criminal appeal No. 502 of 1988 arises from S. C. No. 53 of 1983. ( 2 ) IN S. C. No. 28 of 1986, there were 4 accused and the learned sessions judge framed charges under Section 324 read with Section 34 and Section 326 read with Section 34, IPC that in furtherance of common intention of all these accused, hurt was caused to charge-sheet witness No. 3-shivappa by means of iron rod and grievous hurt was caused to charge-sheet witness No. 2-puttegowda by a gandu kodli. ( 3 ) IN S. C. No. 53 of 1983, there were 6 accused and charges had been framed against them under sections 143,147,341,326 read with Section 149, Section 324 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of IPC. The incidents in both the cases are stated to have taken place on 1-5-1983 at mottedoddi village of ramanagaram taluk. If it is the case of the prosecution in S. C. No. 28 of 1986 that the incident took place at 7 a. m. its case in S. C. No. 53 of 1983 is that the incident took place at 7. 30 a. m. ( 4 ) P. WS. 1,2, 3 and 4 examined in S. C. No. 28 of 1986 are respectively accused nos. 1,3,2 and 4 in S. C. No. 53 of 1983. P. ws. 2,6 and 7 examined in S. C. No. 53 of 1983 are respectively accused nos. 4,3 and 1 in S. C. No. 28 of 1986. ( 5 ) LEARNED sessions judge recorded evidence in each of these cases separately but disposed of both the cases by a common judgment he held that guilt of the accused in s. c, No. 28 of 1986 for the offence under Section 324, IPC had been established and therefore convicted them and sentenced them to undergo r. i. for 3 months. So far as S. C. No. 53 of 1983 is concerned, he acquitted accused nos. 5 and 6 and also acquitted accused nos. So far as S. C. No. 53 of 1983 is concerned, he acquitted accused nos. 5 and 6 and also acquitted accused nos. 1 to 4 in respect of the offence punishable under Section 307, CPC. However, he convicted them for offences under sections 324 and 326, IPC and sentenced them to undergo r. i. for a period of 6 months. The respective accused who have been convicted in these two cases by the learned sessions judge by this common judgment have preferred these two appeals. ( 6 ) LEARNED Advocate for the appellants in crl. A. No. 443 of 1988 urged that the procedure adopted by the learned sessions judge in delivering a common judgment in respect of two cases is highly illegal and therefore the convictions and sentences awarded should be set aside and that the matter should be remitted back to the learned sessions judge. Learned Advocate for the appellants in crl. A. No. 502 of 1988 though did not urge for remand of the case, conceded that the procedure adopted by the learned sessions judge in delivering a common judgment in respect of the two cases is illegal. Learned high court government pleader also stated that the procedure adopted by the learned sessions judge in delivering a common judgment has vitiated the conviction and sentence awarded in both the cases and therefore the matter should be remanded after setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded in the two cases. ( 7 ) A perusal of the judgment of learned sessions judge indicates that for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion in each of the cases, he has freely made use of the evidence adduced in the other case. This aspect of the matter could not be disputed by any of the learned advocates. There was absolutely no scope for the learned sessions judge while disposing of one sessions case, to be in any way be influenced by the evidence adduced in the other case unless that is brought on record in the particular case. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Nathulal and others v State of U. P. and another, 1990 SCC (cri.) 638 has laid down the procedure that has to be adopted in respect of the trial of cross cases. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Nathulal and others v State of U. P. and another, 1990 SCC (cri.) 638 has laid down the procedure that has to be adopted in respect of the trial of cross cases. It has been observed as hcreunder:"we think that the fair procedure to adopt in a matter like the present where there are cross cases, is to direct that the same learned judge must try both the cross cases one after the other. After the recording of evidence in one case is completed, he must hear the arguments but he must reserve the judgment. Thereafter he must proceed to hear the cross case and after recording all the evidence he must hear the arguments but reserve the judgment in that case. The same learned judge must thereafter dispose of the matters by two separate judgments. In deciding each of the cases, he can rely only on the evidence recorded in that particular case. The evidence recorded in the cross case cannot be looked into. Nor can the judge be influenced by whatever is argued in the cross case. Each case must be decided on the basis of the evidence which has been placed on record in that particular case without being influenced in any manner by the evidence or arguments urged in the cross case. But both the judgments must be pronounced by the same learned judge one after the other. "even in an earlier decision reported in Mithulal and another v State of MP, AIR 1975 SC 149 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had based its conclusion not only on the evidence recorded in the case against the appellants but also had taken in to account evidence recorded in the cross case the Supreme Court has pointed out that procedure adopted by the high court was clearly impermissible and this is what has been observed by the Supreme Court at page 151. "this was clearly impermissible to the high court. It is difficult to comprehend as to how the high court could decide the appeal before it by taking into account evidence recorded in another case, even though it might be what is loosely called a cross-case. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in civil cases this cannot be done unless the parties are agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in the other. Much more so in criminal cases would this be impermissible. It is doubtful whether the evidence recorded in one criminal case can be treated as evidence in the other, even with the consent of the accused. But here there was clearly no consent of the appellants to treat the evidence recorded in the cross-case against ganpat and rajdhar as evidence in the case against them. The high court was, therefore, clearly in error in taking into consideration the evidence recorded in the cross-case against ganpat and rajdhar. The high court ought to have decided the appeal before it only on the basis of the evidence recorded in the present case and ought not to have allowed itself to be influenced by the evidence recorded in the cross-case against ganpat and rajdhar. It is regrettable that the high court should have fallen into such an obvious error. The judgment of the high court must, therefore, be set aside. " ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is clear that learned sessions judge was wholly in error in proceeding to dispose of both the cases by a common judgment and thereby falling into an error of being influenced in each of the cases by the evidence adduced in the counter case. Hence it is clear that the convictions and sentences awarded by the learned sessions judge in the two cases should be set aside and the two matters should be remitted back to the file of the learned sessions judge with a direction to dispose of the two cases only on the basis of the evidence placed on record in each of these cases without being influenced by the evidence or arguments in the cross-case as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision adverted to already. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, it may be noted that as the acquittal of accused nos. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, it may be noted that as the acquittal of accused nos. 5 and 6 in S. C. No. 53 of 1983 has not been challenged by the state, there is no scope to set aside their acquittal and after remand, there is no scope for the learned sessions judge to secure their presence or proceed to examine whether they are guilty or not. ( 10 ) IN the result, the convictions and sentences awarded to the appellants are seta side and the two cases are remitted back to the trial court with a direction to dispose of the cases according to law, in the light of the observations made above. ( 11 ) AFTER remand, if the prosecution or the accused seek for permission to adduceany fresh evidence by recalling the witnesses already examined or by examining any further witnesses, they are at liberty to make that request before he learned sessions judge and such a request shall be considered on merits of the same, by the learned sessions judge. ( 12 ) THE appeals are allowed only to the extent indicated above. --- *** --- .