Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. These four applications have been heard together ns they involve common questions of Jaw. The question for consideration is whether and in what manner a third party stranger to the decree can challenge the decree for possession of immovable property. It would be worthwhile to briefly notice the facts of each case first. 2. In C. R. Nos. 1526 and 1481 of 1988, the material facts as these. Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 purchased 6 kathas land of Plot Nos. 982 and 983. On 12-4-1971 Opposite Party No. 2 sold 1 katha to the petitioner under a registered sale deed. Later, Opposite Party No. 1 instituted Title Suit No. 79 of 1972 against Opposite Party No. 2 for partition of the land without impleading the petitioner. The petitioner learned about the suit at a very late stage after the decree had already been passed. He, in the circumstances, filed an application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (In short, the Code) which was rejected. The petitioner moved this Court in C. R. No. 774 of 1986 which was dismissed with an observation that the petitioner may file a separate suit of his own. Accordingly, he filed Title Suit No. 182 of 1586. In the meantime, final decree was prepared in Title Suit No. 79 of 1972 in which portions of the aforesaid two plots were alloted to Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2. The decree was put to execution in Execution Case No. 1 of 1987. The petitioner filed an application for injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code in Title Suit No. 182 of 1986 to restrain the Opposite Party from demolishing the shop and disturbing his possession in execution of the final decree. He also filed an application in Execution Case No. 1 of 1987 for stay of delivery of possession till disposal of Title Suit No. 182 of 1986. While disposing of the injunction matter in the suit, the court found that the petitioner had prima facie case. However, on the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, adverse findings were recorded. The court also held, in effect, relying on 1987 BLJR 504 --Patna Public School V/s. Dr. While disposing of the injunction matter in the suit, the court found that the petitioner had prima facie case. However, on the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, adverse findings were recorded. The court also held, in effect, relying on 1987 BLJR 504 --Patna Public School V/s. Dr. Sharda Ranjan Prasad Sinha, that as the petitioner was not party in Title Suit No. 79 of 1972 the suit was not maintainable and he could not obstruct execution of the decree passed in that suit by an order of injunction. Accordingly, it rejected the petition on 15-7-1988. The order was upheld in appeal on 4-8-1988. The appellate court also, inter alia, placed reliance on 1987 BLJR 504 , These orders have been challenged in C. R. No. 1481 of 1988. The aforesaid stay petition filed in Execution Case No. 1 of 1987 also was rejected on 15-7-1988 holding that the petitioner had no locus standi in the matter. A learned Single Judge of this Court at the time of admission of C. R. No. 1526 of 1988 expressed doubts about the correctness of the decision in 1987 BLJR 504 and accordingly, directed the revision application to be heard by a Division Bench. Later C. R. No. 1481 of 1988 also was admitted for hearing along with C. R. 1526 of 1988. 3. In C. R. No. 1458 of 1989 the petitioner obtained a decree for specific performance of contract in Title Suit No. 11 of 1974. In course of time the sale-deed was executed by the court concerned in Execution Case No. 10 of 1979 and registered. The Opposite Party obstructed delivery of possession and later filed an application, purportedly under Rules 97, 97 and 98 of Order XXI and Sec. 151 of the Code for setting aside the sale. The application was registered as Misc. Case No. 38 of 1985. By the impugned order dated 20-6-1989 the Misc. Case has been allowed holding that the said Opposite Party was the owner of the suit premises and the petitioner had no right to claim the relief in the execution case against him the decree (for specific performance) itself was not binding on him. Case No. 38 of 1985. By the impugned order dated 20-6-1989 the Misc. Case has been allowed holding that the said Opposite Party was the owner of the suit premises and the petitioner had no right to claim the relief in the execution case against him the decree (for specific performance) itself was not binding on him. The court, inter alia, relied on a Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bhagwat Narain Dwivedi V/s. Kasturi -- , which has held that the executing court had no jurisdiction to effect delivery of possession by removing a person who is bound by the decree. At the time of admission of the revision, the learned Judge observed that a Single Judge of this Court had also taken a similar view following the decision in Bhagwat Narain Dwivedi in the case of Kumar Krishnanand V/s. Babulal, 1987 BLJ 306 . As the question regarding the maintainability of the claim of a third party, at his instance, under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code had been referred to Division Bench in C. R. No. 1526 of 1988, this case also directed to be heard along with that case. 4. In C. R. No. 1817 of 1988, the petitioner claims to the owner of the land as widow of one Sukhdeo Shaw. Defendent Opposite Party No. I obtained decree with respect to the suit land in Title Suit No. 46 of 1972 on the basis contract of sale by and between Late Kishun Shaw and himself. The decree was put to execution in Execution Case No. 3 of 1978. The petitioner filed application, purportedly under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code, in the execution case for temporary injunction restraining the principal defendant from taking possession of the property. The application, registered as Misc. Case No. 5 of 1980, was rejected by the court on 24-5-1985. The appeal preferred against that order also was dismissed on 19-8-1987 relying, inter alia on 1987 BLJR 504 . This revision application, accordingly, was also directed to be heard by a Division Bench along with C. R. No. 1526 of 1988 in which, as noticed above, the correctness of that decision had been doubted. This is how all these four cases have been listed for hearing before this Bench. 5. The relevant provisions may be noticed at this stage. This revision application, accordingly, was also directed to be heard by a Division Bench along with C. R. No. 1526 of 1988 in which, as noticed above, the correctness of that decision had been doubted. This is how all these four cases have been listed for hearing before this Bench. 5. The relevant provisions may be noticed at this stage. They are to be found in Rules 97, 99, 101 and 103 of Order XXI of the Code. They read as follows: 97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.-- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under Sub-rule (1) the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. (Emphasis added) 99. Dispossession by decree holder or purchaser.-- (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (3) Where any such application is made the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provision herein contained. (Emphasis added) 101. Question to be determined.--All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. (Emphasis added) 103. Orders to be the treated as decrees.--Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. (Emphasis added) 103. Orders to be the treated as decrees.--Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. These rules occur under the heading "Resistance to delivery of possession to Decree holder of Purchaser" of Order XXI. They and the other provisions occurring thereunder, which have not been quoted in order to avoid verbosity envisage different situations which may arise in execution of decree for possession of immovable property on account of resistance or obstruction caused to the decree-holder/auction-purchaser or on account of actual dispossession of the judgment debtor or any other person. It would appear from the scheme contemplated by these rules that where decree-holder or auction purchaser is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make a complaint. The Court thereupon will proceed to determine all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property between the parties to that proceeding and pass appropriate order directing that the applicant be put in possession of the property or dismissing the complaint or such other order as it may deem fit. Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property, he may also make an application complaining of such dispossession and the Court shall thereupon hold a similar enquiry and pass appropriate orders as in the case of complaint at the instance of the decree-bolder or auction-purchaser indicated above. The adjudication of the application made upon the aforesaid complaint shall have the force of decree. No separate suit for the purpose shall lie between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives involving any question relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between them. 6. Order XXI, Rule 67 in terms enables only the decree holder or the auction purchaser to file application complaining of resistance of obstruction (by any person). The expression any person would obviously include the person other than the judgment-debtor but ex facie does not contemplate making of any application by such person who resists or obstructs the execution of the decree for possession. The expression any person would obviously include the person other than the judgment-debtor but ex facie does not contemplate making of any application by such person who resists or obstructs the execution of the decree for possession. However, the question as to whether application by a third party stranger to the decree is maintainable under Order XXI, Rule 97 or Sec. 151 before his actual dispossession from the property has been subject-matter of consideration in various authorities and there appears to be a sharp divergence of opinion on the point. 7. In Nitvananda V/s. Pala Dei -- , a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court on consideration of various decisions held that having regard to the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Code, the Court cannot anticipate the situation contemplated by Order XXI, Rule 97 and investigate the claim of the prospective registers. The Court could not exercise any such anticipatory jurisdiction to enquire into the question of title of the third party prospective obstructor in an application by him before he is, in fact, dispossessed. In the words of Jagannadha Das, C. J.: The third party objector does not at all come into the picture at that stage and can have no right at the time to compel the decree-holder or the auction purchaser to submit to an investigation into his title and possession. The Court further rejected the contention as to the applicability of Sec. 151 to such cases. In Kesvaan Padmanabhan V/s. Neelkantan Narayanan AIR 1955 Trav Cochin 225 following an earlier Division Bench decision reported in AIR Trav Cochin 123, a Full Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court held that the only occasion when a stranger to the decree can approach the Court is contemplated by Rule 100 (now Rule 99) after he is dispossessed. It was also observed that resistance or obtruction within the meaning of Rule 97 is not symbolic but can take place only when the officer of the Court goes to the spot to effect actual delivery and not prior to that. It was also observed that resistance or obtruction within the meaning of Rule 97 is not symbolic but can take place only when the officer of the Court goes to the spot to effect actual delivery and not prior to that. Usha Jain v, Manmohan Bajaj AIR 1980 MP 146 is another Full Bench decision wherein after discussing various authorities of different High Courts on the point including AIR 1952 Orissa 120, it has been stated: The executing court has no jurisdiction to start an enquiry suo motu or at the instance of a third party other than the decree-holder/ auction purchaser under Order XXI, Rule 97. Order XXI Rule 97 was merely permissive and not mandatory so that the decree-holder/ auction purchaser need not resort to it against his will and may apply for fresh warrant under Order XXI, Rule 35 Civil P. C.... The remedy of such third party under Order XXI, was only after dispossession, under Order XXI, Rule 100, Civil Procedure Code, Order XXI, Rule 97 being merely an enabling provision for the benefit of the decree holder/auction purchaser. The Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken in AIR 1974 MP 26 , It should be kept in mind, while referring to decisions rendered in cases prior to the 1976 an amendments (Act 105 of 1976) that old rule 100 now corresponds to Rule 99 with some changes. 8. The Lahore High Court in Nilikhi Ram V/s. Basant Singh AIR 1931 Lahore 686, the Calcutta High Court in Kiran Sosi Dasi V/s. Official Assignee AIR 1933 Cal 246, the Nagpur High Court in Jagmnath Brijraj V/s. Khaja Faisuddin AIR 1935 Nag 212 and the Kerala High Court in K. A. Prabhakaran y. Kuttian Prakashan AIR 1985 Ker 204 have taken the same view. 9. So far as this Court is concerned, as early as in AIR 1919 Pat. 9. So far as this Court is concerned, as early as in AIR 1919 Pat. 425 a Full Bench in the case of Raghunandan Prasad Misra V/s. Ramcharan Manda, held that the provision of Order XXI, Rule 97 is not mandatory and even if the execution of the decree is resisted he can apply for fresh warrant under Order XXI, Rule 35 without applying under Order XXI, Rule 97, Said Coutts J., with whom the other Judges agreed: The words of Rule 97 are that the holder of the decree or the auction purchaser "may" apply under the rule if he is constructed, not that he "must, apply. The rule in the present as in the previous codes is permissive, not mandatory; it merely provides an alternative remedy without barring any remedy which would otherwise be open and there is nothing in this rule or in any other rule which would bar either a decree holder or an auction purchaser who does not choose himself of this procedure from making an application for a fresh writ of possession. It would seem clear then on a consideration of the wording Rule 97 itself and also of the corresponding provisions of the previous Code of Civil Procedure that either a decree holder or an auction purchaser may apply for a fresh writ for possession without making any application under Rule 97. In other words, in the event of obstruction or resistance, it is not obligatory for him to necessarily file application complaining of such obstruction or resistance. Later, Wort, J. in Daroga Prasad V/s. Bhagwati Prasad AIR 1935 Pat 253 observed: There is no jurisdiction in the Judge to determine in the form of an anticipatory application, a matter of this kind. It is only when the person is dispossessed, that an application of this kind came before the Judge and he certainly could not make such an order as he has done under Order XXI, Rule 100. Again in Janki Mahan V/s. Dr. It is only when the person is dispossessed, that an application of this kind came before the Judge and he certainly could not make such an order as he has done under Order XXI, Rule 100. Again in Janki Mahan V/s. Dr. S. S. Samaddar -- a Division Bench comprising of Ramaswami C. J. and Untwalia J. (as he then was) ruled: Unless and until the decree holder makes such an allegation under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code, there is no locus standi on the part of the petitioners to move the executing Court for adjudication of their claim of title or possession over the disputed property. It was also held that since Order XXI, Rule 97 contains specific provisions as to the manner in which claims of third party are to be determined, inherent powers of the Court under Sec. 151 cannot be invoked and in my view, the application was premature. Recently, in Brijraj Kishan Das V/s. Sahida Begum, 1991 (1) BLJR 309 S. B. Sinha, J. stated the law on the point in the following words: From a plain reading of Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would be evident that the same becomes applicable only when dalivery of possession was going to be effected and obstruction or resistance to obtain possession of such immovable property has been made. An application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure can obviously be made by the decree holder only if an occasion therefor as contemplated under the said provision arises. By necessary implication it excludes filing of any application by the judgment debtor or any other person who alleges that he is not bound by the degree. In terms of Order XXI, Rule 97, C.P.C. when such an application is made, the Court is to adjudicate as to whether the person resisting or obstructing the delivery of possession of immovable property has been set up by the judgment debtor or not. In terms of Order XXI, Rule 97, C.P.C. when such an application is made, the Court is to adjudicate as to whether the person resisting or obstructing the delivery of possession of immovable property has been set up by the judgment debtor or not. It is, therefore, in ray opinion, impermissible to read the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 97 and Order XXI, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure in such a manner so as to enable the executing court to adjudicate that question on an application filed by a third party, as to whether he is or is not bound by the decree or to make an enquiry in respect of the plea of the decree holder as to whether he has been set up by the judgment debtor or not or he is in possession of the property in question under the judgment debtor or not. It was also observed that if the right of a third party to get his right adjudicated is read into the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 35 or 36 Order XXI, Rules 97 and 98 of the Code, the same may amount to conferring a new right upon a third party which was not contemplated by the legislature. 10. In support of the proposition that application by a third party stanger is not maintainable either under Order XXI, Rule 97 or Sec. 151, the leading argument was advanced by Mr. Asgar Hussain. He placed reliance on Smt. Tahera Sayeed V/s. M. Shanmugam -- , Kuldip Singh V/s. Charon Singh AIR 1986 Del. 297 and of course Kumar Krishnanand V/s. Babulal Sah 1987 BLJ 306 . The decision in Tahera Sayeeds case rendered by a Single Judge rests on Order XXI, Rule 35 which, in terms, provides for removal of any person bound by the decree. According to the learned Judge, since the property in execution of decree is effective only against the person bound by the decree, it does not bind a third party who has independent right, title or interest in the property. According to the learned Judge, since the property in execution of decree is effective only against the person bound by the decree, it does not bind a third party who has independent right, title or interest in the property. He can protect his independent right, title or interest before he is actually dispossessed by filing application under Order XXI, Rule 97 which: must be treated to be an intimation to the court as caveat to the decree holder or purchaser or a person claiming through him and the Court is to treat it as a complaint or counter in opposition as an application for the purpose of Order XXI, Rule 97 and to adjudicate under Rule 98 or Rule 101. Alternatively, Sec. 151 was also held to be applicable. 11. Rule 35 merely provides for the manner of delivery of possession of immovable property in favour of the decree-holder or any other person on his behalf. At this stage, the only thing which is to be seen is whether the decree-holder is entitled to get delivery of possession or not. It does not contemplate any further enquiry much less at the instance of the third party stranger. At that stage, a third party cannot ask the executing court to decide his claim or rights and intersts, if any. It is open to a third party claiming to be in possession of the property to obstruct the delivery of possession if he thinks that he has any such right to do so. If the provision of Rule 35 does not contemplate any enquiry and if Rule 97 is only permissive or enabling in nature with the decree-holder having the option to tile application complaining of such obstruction or to apply for fresh warrant, these being the settled position in law, it would be difficult to hold that any person professedly not bound by the decree in terms of Order XXI, Rule 35, may get his claim adjudicated upon even though the decree holder or auction purchaser has not preferred to make any application complaining of obstruction or resistance and applied for fresh warrant, treating the same as an anticipatory application or as counter in opposition to an application which the decree holder/auction purcharer is not obliged to file and is not filed at all. 12. 12. The judgment in Tahera Sayeed (supra) takes into account the hardships of a third party stranger in possession of the property. It, however, does not take into consideration the hardships of the decre holder/auction purchaser in getting possession of the property. If right of a third party stranger to maintain application under Order XXI, Rule 97 or Sec. 151 is conceded, it would amount to holding that till such claim is not finally adjudicated, delivery of possession in favour of the decree holder/auction purchaser will have to remain stayed even though the claim is vexatious made one after another by spurious claimants. It is to be kept in mind that as per the amended provisions of Order XXI the investigation is no longer summary in nature but shall encompass all questions including question relating to right, title or interest of the parties to the proceeding. That would cause greater hardship to the decree-holder auction purchaser. That may deprive him of the fruits of the decree and possession of the property even during whole of his life time. On the other/hand, a third party cannot only get his claim decided after dispossession under Order XXI, Rule 99 but may also if he so likes, institute an independent suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and apply for injunction therein to protect his possession. His hardship, therefore in my opinion, far less than that of decree holder/action purchaser. 13. As regards the argument based on Sec. 151 of the Code, it is not necessary to discuss the scope of the inherent powers of the Court under that section in detail for the scope and the limits of the powers are now so well settled by judicial authorities. But I do feel inspired to quote the following passage from Sasi Bhusan V/s. Radha Nath, 20 Cal L. J. 433 at page 439 in the pen of the celebrated Justice Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee: The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent powers by a Court were explained (by Justice Woodroffe) in the case of Hukum Chand V/s. Kamlanand Singh in 33 Cal 927. It was pointed out that the Code of Civil Procedure binds all courts so far as it goes but the Code is not exhaustive and in matters with which it does not deal, the Court will exercise its inherent power to do that justice between the parties which is warranted under the circumstances and which the necessities of the case require. On any point specifically dealt with by the Code, the Court cannot disregard the letter of the enactment according to its true construction.... (words in bracket added) The different provisions of the Code, Sec. 47 and the rules of Order XXI, provide in specific terms for the situations that might usually arise when in the course of execution and delivery proceedings interests of bona fide third parties are affected and resistance or dispossession results. The Code having so specifically provided for that situation, there is no room for invoking any inherent jurisdiction by way of anticipation in these circumstances. See AIR 1952 Orissa 120 (FB). It is well settled that inherent powers of the Court are meant to be exercised ex-debito jutitiae to do justice between the parties in situations not contemplated or provided for by the Code. Exercise of the inherent powers by conceding to a third party the right to lodge a claim before dispossession and ask for its investigation, keeping the delivery proceeding in abeyance in the meantime, would cause more hardship and injustice to the decree-holder or auction-purchaser than the hardship or injustice, which may occasion to a third party if this is not done. Far from being in the ends of justice it would be an abuse of the process of law. For all these reasons and with due respect, I am unable to agree with the views of the learned Judge in Tahera Sayeed (supra). 14. In all fairness, I must say, the decision in Tahera Sayeed is not the lone voice in favour of the third party. Other decisions taking more or less the same view are Abdul Aziz V/s. Chokkan AIR 1935 Madras 803, Mahabir Prassad V/s. Delhi Traders: -- and Ramchandra Verma V/s. Manmal Singh AIR 1983 Sikkim 1. In Abdul Azizs case, the objection raised by the third party was only as to his share i. e. portion of the property. Other decisions taking more or less the same view are Abdul Aziz V/s. Chokkan AIR 1935 Madras 803, Mahabir Prassad V/s. Delhi Traders: -- and Ramchandra Verma V/s. Manmal Singh AIR 1983 Sikkim 1. In Abdul Azizs case, the objection raised by the third party was only as to his share i. e. portion of the property. A Full Bench of the Court held that the possession of the rest could be delivered to the decree-holder. An observation was no doubt, made that "but in such a case the third party may object and on account of third parties objection physical possession of the property cannot be given. In such a case, it is the duty of the Court to note the fact and to order delivery of such possession as the matter may then be capable of so far as the judgment-debtor is concerned" (emphasis added by me). In my opinion, this observation cannot be construed as laying down the law that under Rule 97 third partys claim before dispossession is maintainable and even it is held to have done so, I record my respectful disagreement. In Mahabir Prasads case, on facts the application filed by the decree-holder was held to be one under Order XXI, Rule 97. Ram Chandra Vermas case (supra) no doubt supports the plea in favour of the third party. In view of my discussion on the different aspects, made above, I cannot but disagree with the view of the learned Single Judge. 15. In Kuldip Singh (supra), it was held that where the decree-holder seeks decree for injunction instead of decree for possession, issue of warrant for delivery of possession in execution of such a decree is not justified since the decree was not executable. In that contest, it was held that third party in possession of the property should not necessarily be compelled to file a separate suit which may be a delayed and long winding affair. This decision, therefore is an authority on an entirely different point. 16. Kumar Krishna Nands case, 1987 B.L.J. 306, had arisen put of an order refusing to injunct the defendant from executing the decree passed in a previous suit. The suit was instituted on the plea that the defendant had no right in the suit property and the plaintiff was not bound by the eviction decree passed in the previous suit. 16. Kumar Krishna Nands case, 1987 B.L.J. 306, had arisen put of an order refusing to injunct the defendant from executing the decree passed in a previous suit. The suit was instituted on the plea that the defendant had no right in the suit property and the plaintiff was not bound by the eviction decree passed in the previous suit. The learned Judge held that the suit was not maintainable because of the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 101. However, it was also said that: In my view, the appellants are not entitled, for the reasons to be stated hereafter, to maintain a suit and protection from injurious affectation is available under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the consequences thereafter. Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code provides protection to a party, who is not or could not be a party to a suit and the decree, from any injury intended to be affected at the hands of a decree-holder by the execution of the decree against such a party. The observation appears to have been made rather too widely, but on facts, it would appear that after the execution of the decree was resisted by the plaintiff-appellant, the decree-holder has filed a petition for police help. Some decisions have taken the view that a petition of that kind would provide locus to a third party to file application under Order XXI, Rule 97. However, this question was not directly in issue in that case. It is well settled that a judgment is an authority of what it decides and not what logically follows from it. The only point which fell for decision was as to the maintainability of the suit by a third party in view of the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 101 and so far as this is concerned, in my respectful opinion, the decision cannot be said to be correct. 17. Order XXI, Rule 101 has been quoted above. Prior to 1976 amendment, an order passed under (unamended) Rules 98,99 or 101 was subject to regular suit. In other words, a party to those proceedings could challenge the order in a separate suit. 17. Order XXI, Rule 101 has been quoted above. Prior to 1976 amendment, an order passed under (unamended) Rules 98,99 or 101 was subject to regular suit. In other words, a party to those proceedings could challenge the order in a separate suit. As per amended Rule 101 read with Rule 103, all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property have now to be determined by the Court i.e. the executing Court deciding the application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 itself, the decision of the Court having the force of decree and not by way of separate suit. However, as would appear from the words emphasised (see quotation above) the bar as to separate suit created under Rule 101 is only applicable and confined to or between the persons who are parties to the proceeding i.e. proceeding under either Rule 97 or Rule 99. In no proceeding is initiated upon any application under Rule 97 or Rule 99, either by the decree-holder when the execution of the decree is resisted by a third party or by a third party when he is dispossessed of the immovable property, respectively as there is no such bar between them. In that view of the matter, the finding of the learned Judge that "the bar to the suit is absolute in terms of Order XXI, Rule 101" cannot be said to be correct in law. To the same effect is the decision rendered by the same learned Judge in Patna Public School V/s. Dr. Sharda Ranjan Prasad Sinha, 1987 BLJR 504 wherein after making an observation that execution of the decree cannot be stayed at the instance of a person who is not a party to the decree, it was held that "the final aspect of the matter is that the terms of Order XXI, Rule 101 Code of Civil Procedure says that a suit in order to establish claim of person who is not a party to the decree is not maintainable." 18. It would appear that while the decision in the case of Patna Public School (supra) has been rendered in just one paragraph without noticing any previous judgment whatsoever, in the other case, namely, Kumar Krishna Nand (supra) reference was made to AIR 1962 Patna 403 and AIR 1978 Gauhati 56. It would appear that while the decision in the case of Patna Public School (supra) has been rendered in just one paragraph without noticing any previous judgment whatsoever, in the other case, namely, Kumar Krishna Nand (supra) reference was made to AIR 1962 Patna 403 and AIR 1978 Gauhati 56. With due respect to the learned Judge, he interpreted the decision in AIR 1962 Patna 403 as an authority for the proposition that the remedy of a third party was available under Order XXI, Rule 97 and, therefore, the application under Section 151 of the Code and, by analogy, the suit was not maintainable. The decision has been noticed by me. It would appear that the point decided in the case was that not only application under Order XXI, Rule 97 by a third party was not maintainable before his dispossession but any such application under Order XXI, Rule 97 by a third party was not maintainable before his dispossession but any such application under Sec. 151 also was premature and not maintainable. Similarly AIR 1978 Gauhati 56 is a case on an eqtirely different point and need not be discussed at all. There are direct authorities on the point and need not be discussed at all. There are direct authorities on the point that independant suit by a third party, not being, party to proceeding under Order XXI, Rule 97 or Rule 99, is maintainable. I respectfully endorse that view. Reference may be made to AIR 1980 Madhya Pradesh 146 (FB); AIR 1985 Kerala 204 (DB) and 1991(1) BLJR 390 . In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the learned Single Judge in both 1987 BLJ 306 and 1987 BLJR 504 does not lay down the law on the point correctly and deserves to be overrulled. 19. My conclusions, thus, are (a) a third party who is stranger to the decree for possession of immovable property may resist the delivery of possession in execution of the decree. Where the decree-holder or auction-purchaser files application complaining of such resistance or obstruction, the court executing the decree will decide all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property between him and the obstructor in a fullfiedged manner. The decision of he Court will have the force of decree. Where the decree-holder or auction-purchaser files application complaining of such resistance or obstruction, the court executing the decree will decide all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property between him and the obstructor in a fullfiedged manner. The decision of he Court will have the force of decree. The suit by either party in such an event will not be maintainable; (b) where the decree holder does not file any such application, a third party cannot file any anticipatory application under Order XXI, Rule 97. He may well ignore the decree and sit tight or, if he so likes, may file a suit against the decree-holder and apply for injunction in accordance with law. Such suit will be maintainable between the parties and the bar created under Rule 101 will not be applicable; (c) in the event a third party is dispossessed of the property, he may file application under Order XXI, Rule 99 and get his claim adjudicated by the executing court itself. In that situation also, like application by the decree holder Rule 97, all questions relating to right, title or interest of the parties in the property will be decided in the proceeding and not by way of separate suit between the parties and the decision will have the force of decree. 20. Coming to individual cases in C.R. Nos. 1526 and 1481 of 1988, the court refused the prayer for injunction on the ground that the suit was not maintainable. It is an admitted position that no application in terms of Order XXI, Rule 97 or Rule 99 had been filed and no proceeding as envisaged under Rule 101 was pending between the parties. The bar as to the maintainability of the suit under Rule 101 cannot, therefore, be applicable. The order of the court holding the suit as not maintainable, therefore, cannot be said to be in accordance with law. 21. In C. R. No. 1458 of 1989, the court below has allowed the claim of a third party and also purported to set aside the sale (of property in execution of decree for specific performance of contract). The application was described as one under Rules 90, 97 and 98 of Order XXI and Sec. 151, Rule 90 is obviously misconceived since no auction sale has taken place. The application was described as one under Rules 90, 97 and 98 of Order XXI and Sec. 151, Rule 90 is obviously misconceived since no auction sale has taken place. So far as Order XXI Rule 97 and Sec. 151 are concerned, it is an admitted position that no application by the decree-holder, as provided under Order XXI, Rule 97 has been filed. There was no occasion, therefore for the third party to lodge any claim thereunder. Rule 98 only deals with the, effect of the order passed under Rule 101 and its reference in the application was meaningless. The impugned order passed in the case allowing the objection and purporting to set aside the sale cannot, therefore, be said to be in accordance with law. 22. In C. R. No. 1817 of 1988 the petitioner, a third party, sought to resist the execution of the decree for specific performance by filing application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 in the execution proceeding instead of filing a separate suit. The court below rejected the application, inter alia relying on 1987 BLJR 504 . The petitioner is admittedly not a party to the aforesaid decree. I fail to understand how he could file application for injunction in the execution proceeding to either under the provisions of Order XXXIX, or claim any such relief under any of the provisions of Order XXI. Counsel for the petitioner referred to Order XXI, Rule 26. However, other questions apart, that provision enables the judgment-debtor to file application for stay of execution in circumstances and for the purpose mentioned therein. The application was clearly not maintainable and, therefore, the order rejecting the same cannot be said to be erroneous. 23. In the result, C. R. Nos. 1526 and 1481 of 1988 are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The court below will consider the application of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders C. R. No. 1458 of 1989 is also allowed. The impugned order is set aside C. R. No. 1817 of 1988, however, is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost in any of these cases. 24. I agree.