N. J. PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) ALL these matters are filed at pre- execution stage of an orders under the gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act,1985 (hereinafter referred to as "pasa" ). In all the matters the orders have: been passed to detain the respective petitioners as property grabber, a term defined under sec. 2 (h)of the PASA. ( 2 ) THE matters being at pre-execution stage, the scope of the petition itself is very much limited. For this purpose, Supreme Court decisions are relied on by the respective counsels of the respective petitioners. The matters having been admitted, in its return, the state in all the matters has also concentrated on the fact that the scope of the petition is, indeed, limited. The leading case in the field is of Alka Gadia reported in Judgment today 1991 (1) Supreme Court page 549. This is followed by a decision in M. K. Bapnas case reported in Judgment Today 1992 (4) Supreme Court page 49. ( 3 ) FIVE catagories have been carved out by the Supreme Court in Alka Gadias case and the paragraph containing these details has been quoted in M. K. Bapnas case also at page 52. The five categories of the type of cases thus, enunciated are as under: (1) That the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed. (2) That it is sought to be executed against a wrong person. (3) That it is passed for a wrong purpose. (4) That it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. (5) That the authority which passed it, had no authority to do so. ( 4 ) INCIDENTALLY, it may be mentioned that there is a Full Bench Decision of this Court reported in 28 (2) GLR page 1345 where also more or less in the year 1987 same categorisation has been enunciated; In that Full Bench decision, it has been laid down that the order not having been served, the State authorities cannot be compelled to disclose the grounds of detention and this precisely is the view taken by the Supreme Court in ALKA gadia and other Cases. ( 5 ) THE net result, therefore, is that though there are five categories of cases which could be dealt with at pre-execution stage where the Courts are prima facie satisfied about all or any of these situation, effectively category no. 3. as to wrong purpose and category no. 4 as to vagueness etc. will very rarely be available. No doubt, in the latter case i. e. Bapnas case, the Supreme Court did enter into the question whether the alleged activity would amount to smuggling or not, but that was a largely because, the learned Judges of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, while dealing with an appeal from the order of the learned single Judge, had considered certain factual aspects. ( 6 ) IN any case, in the petitions before us, we find that the petitioners have confined their case to categories 1,4 and5 as per grounds No. Kandl at page 25 of Special cr. Application No. 1598 of 1992. ( 7 ) IT may be mentioned here that Special Criminal Application No. 1598 of 1992 was the petition first in point of time to be filed by a proposed detenu and other petitions have followed it and therefore, arguments have been heard in this petition treating it to be the main petition. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the arguments were advanced on categories No. 1,4 and 5. To an extent, categories nos. 1 and 5 will be overlapping and it will be seen later on of necessity, category no. 4 will have to be confined to the factual aspect of the case to the extent it would be permissible to enter into the factual aspect on the basis of the record of the petition. ( 9 ) CATEGORY No. l. is pressed into service on the ground that admittedly when the order is passed by the District Magistrate Rajkot, it could have been passed under the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA, as an authorised Officer on whom powers are conferred by the State Government. According to the petitioners, in all the matters sub-section (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is, therefore, required to be struck down. (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA, as an authorised Officer on whom powers are conferred by the State Government. According to the petitioners, in all the matters sub-section (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is, therefore, required to be struck down. The challenge to this section therefore, is as to its validity and on the challenge being accepted, according to the petitioners, this section will go away from the statute and will become non est. In that view of the matter the detention order can never be said to have been passed under the PASA under which it is purported to have been passed. Corresponingly, therefore, there could have been confirment of power and the authority namely, the District Magistrate that passed it, did so, without any authority, which is category no. 5. ( 10 ) INDEPENDENT of category no. 1, category no. 5 is sought to be pressed into service on the basis that the Notification issued under sec. 3 (2), assuming that the said statutory provision is valid, itself is bad in law. If the Notification is struck down, obviously, the power derived therefrom by the District Magistrate, will cease to exist in eye of law from the beginning and therefore, the order would be without any authority. ( 11 ) SO far as the contention that the order is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant ground is concerned, a case is sought to be built up on a show cause notice issued to the petitioner of the main petition by the Resident Deputy Collector, Rajkot on 17-8-1992 Annexure C page 32 onwards. ( 12 ) NOW, we will be taking up category or ground no. 1 as to the validty or otherwise of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 of PASA. A case is sought to be built up on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court render in A. K. Roys case reported in 1982 (1) Supreme Court Cases page 271. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with group of matters under Article 32 of the Constitution where validity of the National Security ordinance 11 of 1980 and certain provisions of the National Security Act 65 of 1980 which replaced the Ordinance was challenged. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with group of matters under Article 32 of the Constitution where validity of the National Security ordinance 11 of 1980 and certain provisions of the National Security Act 65 of 1980 which replaced the Ordinance was challenged. Shri A. K. Roy, in whose name the Report stand, was a Marxist Member of the Parliament and was detained under the Ordinance by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad on the ground that be was indulging in activities which were prejudicial to public order. 10 Members of the Parliament, one as independent and other belonging to various political parties in opposition, applied for permission to intervene in the writ petition, as according to them, Ordiance making power of the President is required to be defined and its scope is required to be determined This intervention was allowed and so was the intervention by the peoples union of Civil liberties, the Supreme Court Bar Association and the State of Jammu and Kashmir which was interested in the upholding of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. ( 13 ) THE petitoners in the matters before us, are relying on paragraph 72 of the judgment at page 322 of the said Report. In order to appreciate these arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners, we feel it proper to reproduce herein the entire paragraph 72; "we have already dealt with the argument arising out of the provisions of Section 3 (2) read with the Explanation, by which power is conferred to detain persons in order to prevent them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. In so far as sub/section (3) of Section 3 is concerned, the argument is that it is wholly unreasonable to confer upon the District magistrate or the Commissioner of Police the power to issue orders of detention for the reasons mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of section 3. The answer to this contention is that the said power is conferred upon these Officers only if the State Government is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of these Officers, it is necessary to empower them to take action under sub-section (2 ). The answer to this contention is that the said power is conferred upon these Officers only if the State Government is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of these Officers, it is necessary to empower them to take action under sub-section (2 ). The District Magistrate or the commissioner of Police can take action under sub-section (2) during the period specified in the order of the State Government only. Another safeguard provided is, that the period so specified in the order made by the State Government during which these Officers can exercise the Powers under sub-section (2) cannot, in the first instance, exceed three months and can be extended only from time to time not exceeding three months at any one time. By sub-section (4) of Section 3, the District magistrate or the Commissioner of Police has to report forthwith the fact of detention to the State Government and no such order of detention can remains in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime,, it has been approved by the State Government. In view of these in-bailt safeguards, it cannot be said that excessive or unresaonable power is conferred upon the District Magistrate or the commissioner of Police to pass order under sub-sec (2 ). " ( 14 ) LEADING the team of lawyers appearing on behalf of the petitioners in all these matter, L. A. Shri Kotwal developed a case that sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the national Securities Act was upheld because, it contained 3 safeguards. Firstly, there has to be a satisfaction on the part of the State Government having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of those Officers when alone they may be empowered. The second safeguard noted by the learned Judges is that under the statute particularly sub-section (2), the confirmation of power is restricted to a period specified in the order of the State government conferring the power which in the first instance cannot exceed 3 months and can be extended only from time to time not exceeding 3 months at any one time. The third safeguard noted is that the authorised officer on exercising his power as to reported forthwith the fact of detention to the State Government and no such order of detention can remains in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless in the mean time, it has been approved by the State Government. ( 15 ) SO far as Section 3 (2) of PASA which is under challenge in the present proceedings is concerned, of the aforesaid three safeguards, nos. 1 and 3 are very much to be found in sub-section (2 ). The only thing missing is that there is no period specified in sub-sec. (2) during which alone, the powers conferred can remain with the authorised officer. Under the circumstances, there is no question of the order being a scope for it being extended not exceeding a particular limit at any one time. In order to appreciate this submission and the case built up on the basis of the absence of this provision sub-section (2) of Section 3 of PASA is reproduced hereunder: if having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the said sub- section. " sub-section (1) is the usual provision to be found in detention law whereby the State government is empowered to pass a detention order if it is satisfied as per the requirements specified in the Act It being an Act for prevention of Anti-Social Activities,. it concentrates on the maintenance of public order and the activity complained of is required to be made out as the one leading to an event in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 16 ) SUB-SEC. (3) of Sec. 3 of PASA does contain the requirement of the authorised officer reporting the order of detention forthwith and it is not to remain in force for more then 12 days provided it is approved by the State Government during that period. ( 16 ) SUB-SEC. (3) of Sec. 3 of PASA does contain the requirement of the authorised officer reporting the order of detention forthwith and it is not to remain in force for more then 12 days provided it is approved by the State Government during that period. ( 17 ) AS noted above, therefore, except for specifying the time limit for conferment of powers, the existence of safeguards 1 and3 in our opinion is indentical with the one found in connection with the provision of the National Security Act, as considered in A. K. Roys case. ( 18 ) SHRI Kotwal had submitted that, but for the existence of all the three safeguard found by the learned Judges in A. K. Roys case, sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the national Security Act could not have been upheld. Frankly speaking, it is difficult to find the basis of this submission from A. K. Roy s case. ( 19 ) THE learned Judges in A. K. Roys case were dealing with a specific provision in para 72 and in the case itself, they were dealing with several provision of the National security Act as well as corresponding provision of the ordinance that preceded it and the fact of the issune of the ordinance itself. When the challenge as to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the National Security Act was considered, on analysis it was found to contain these three safeguards and thereafter, it was delcared to be valid. However, merely because 3 safeguards in fact were found thereunder, and as against that in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of pasa one of which namely the period for which the order could in the first instance be made, is not specified on the basis of the decision in A. K. Roys case, in our opinion, it cannot be said that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. In our opinion, when a challenge is mounted on a piece of legislation either entire or one or some of its provision, the act bas to be considered on its own merits. The reason is that the legislation is the response of the Executive and the Legislative limbs of the State to the prevalent state of affairs. In our opinion, when a challenge is mounted on a piece of legislation either entire or one or some of its provision, the act bas to be considered on its own merits. The reason is that the legislation is the response of the Executive and the Legislative limbs of the State to the prevalent state of affairs. In our opinion, therefore, Shri Kotwal had rightly gone to be preamble of PASA and had advanced his arguments that the Act having been enacted to provide for preventive detention of boot-leggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabers for preventing there anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order the challenge to sub-sec. (2) in the manner stated above, in our opinion, is also to be evaluated in the light of this requirement sought to be fulfilled by coming out with this enactment. ( 20 ) INCIDENTALLY, each of the terms mentioned in the preamble like boot-leggers, dangerous persons, at et-al have been defined from Sec. 2 clause (b) onwards going upto clause (b) thereof. Clause (i) relates to the definition of unauthorised structure, which has a direct bearing on the definition of property grabber, as contained in Cl. (h) of Sec. 2 clause (i) therefore is virtually a subsidiary definition further explaining the concept of property grabber as defined in clause (h ). . ( 21 ) IN our opinion, the premable indicates that when the Ordinance was issued followed by this Act, a sitution was found prevailing in the State in the 1985 where the impact of the activities of various persons mentioned in the preamble with reference to their respective activities has heightened from being anti social and dangerous activities to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is, with a view, therefore, to curb the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order that, this piece of legislation was brought about. Necessarily, therefore, the activities of these different persons and the overall impact felt at about the time when the Act came into force, will have to be considered and borne in mind while dealing with the aforesaid submission of Shri kotwal. ( 22 ) OF necessity, the submission as to the validity of sub- section (2) of Sec. 3 of pasa as well as validity of the Notification issued thereunder are overlapping. ( 22 ) OF necessity, the submission as to the validity of sub- section (2) of Sec. 3 of pasa as well as validity of the Notification issued thereunder are overlapping. The notification is annexed to the petition at page 30 as Annexure A. it is not necessary to reproduce the entire Notification, but, the main part thereof namely the first 2 paragraphs are required to be reproduced in order to appreciate the submission on behalf of the petitioners. "whereas having regard to the circumstances prevailing/likely to prevail/in the area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of each of the District Magistrate specified in the schedule annexed hereto, the Government of Gujarat is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Ordinance, 1985 (Guj. Ord. II of 1985), the Government of Gujarat hereby direct that each of the District Magistrate specified in the said Schedule may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of the said section 3 exercise within the local limits of his jurisdiction, the powers conferred by the said sub-section (1 ). The two paragraphs quoted above are followed by the schedule which may be said to be covering the entire State because, in connection with each revenue district of the State, their respective District Magistrates are conferred upon with the power under PASA. ( 23 ) WORDS "circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail" are there in sub-section (2) of Section 3 and those words except "or" are to be found in the Notification Annexure A also. The submission made in this connection will now be considered in relation to the challenge to the validity of the statutory provision as well as Notification issued thereunder. ( 24 ) SHRI Kotwal took us through various decisions and some statutory material also in order to gather the meaning of the words "circumstances" with its legal implication. The supreme Court had an occasion to pronounce on this in the year 1950 itself when the question of preventive detention was agitated before it, the statutory material being the preventive Detention Act,1950. From this judgment onwards time and again, both the apex Court as well as various High Courts have noted with a note a sadness that need for preventive detention is a harsh reality. From this judgment onwards time and again, both the apex Court as well as various High Courts have noted with a note a sadness that need for preventive detention is a harsh reality. While whole haretedly subscribing to the ideal of individual liberty and the goal that is to be achieved for the better of the citizens of the country, as per the blue print of the Constitution, time and again, in response to the challenge to the constitutionality of the detention law, by and large the Courts have come out in favour of the legislative exercise. In A. K. Gopalans case reported in AIR 1950 SC 27 first such occasion had arisen and while upholding the validity of the Preventive dentention Act, 1950 in para 35 at page 45, the Warned Judges have dwelt upon the implication of the word "circumstances". As stated therein, word "circumstances" would ordinarily mean events or situation extraneous to the actions of individual with a common aim or idea. Further on, in that very paragraph it has been stated that determinable may be according to the nature of the object also. It is obvious that the Clssification can be by grouping the activities of people or by specifying the objective to be attained or avoided. ( 25 ) THESE very observations and statements are to be found in the later Supreme court decision given in Sambhu Nath Sarkar reported in AIR 1973 SC 1425 , the relevant paragraph being 30 at page 1439. According to Shri Kotwal therefore, when the word "circumstances" has been given this legal connotation, activities of an individual, however, reprehensible it might be, would not justify the State Government in delagating its power, but the situation existing extraneous to the activities will alone justify the exercise of the power. ( 26 ) THEREAFTER he had cited 1986 Criminal Journal 1149 where the learned Judges of patna High Court dealing with the Bihar Dentention Law in Bhimsinghs case had held that delegation is an exception and Rule is for the State Government to exercise the power on its own. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the Bihar Dentention Law time limit for delegation and the period for which could be delegated was specified. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the Bihar Dentention Law time limit for delegation and the period for which could be delegated was specified. It has also been held in this decision that the State Government exercising its power of delegation should apply its mind on each of the occasions and should not delegate it in a routine manner. ( 27 ) ON the same line is the case of Bhupendra Joshi vs. State of M. P. reported in 1988 Cr. L. J. 1603, where under National Security Act delegation of power was found to be mechanically exercised without there being any reference to satisfaction as to need to delegate. Thereafter, the learned Counsel Shri Kotwal had cited a Madras High Court decision given in Vela @ Velangani vs. State of T. N. reported in 1991 Law Weekly (Criminal) Page 596. There, the circumstances, calling for the delegation were indicated in the delegation order and the earlier delegation order which was to expire on 17-10-1990 was sought to be extended after 18-10-1990 by a Government Order dated 15-10-1990. It was felt by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court that far from there being any indication as to the circumstances prevailing when the exercise in future, there is no indication of circumstances likely to prevail. ( 28 ) 1991 Maharashtra Law Journal page 586 is one more case in this regard, where again, it was found that the conferment of power was bad as the power was found to have been exercised without application of mind and the order of confirmation was found containing words "circumstances" prevailing or likely to prevail" bodily lifted from the statutory provision. In the opinion of the learned Judges, the Government must opt for either of the two situations that in its opinion, is to hold the field as to whether circumstances are prevailing or as to whether they are likely to prevail. ( 29 ) ON the same line is a Supreme Court decision in Ambulkars case reported in AIR 1991 SC 397 . There also, circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail these words are reproduced in the order of delegation without any exercise of deciding as to which of the situations, in fact, is to be taken care of. ( 29 ) ON the same line is a Supreme Court decision in Ambulkars case reported in AIR 1991 SC 397 . There also, circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail these words are reproduced in the order of delegation without any exercise of deciding as to which of the situations, in fact, is to be taken care of. ( 30 ) INCIDENTALLY, it may be mentioned that this decision in Ambulkars case is made the foundation of arguments under category no. 5 of Alka Gadias case as to attack the validity of the Notification Annexure A page 30 which will be dealt with later on. ( 31 ) ALTER this development of his arguments with regard to the import and the meaning of word "circumstances" Shri Kotwal referred to the affidavit of the Deputy secretary filed in the case at page 37 onwards. This affidavit is by Shri A. H. Sutaria, deputy Secretary, Home Departmcnt,government of Gujarat. He has adverted to the fact that there is a phenominal rise in criminal activities in the State and Crime figures reported for the State under different important heads of crime like Murder, attempted murder, decoity, robbery, were found to be on increase There being Prohibition Act in force in the State, boot- legging and other related activities was rampant. Likewise, there was increase in drug trafficling, gambling and other anti-social activities. Shri Kotwal has brushed aside this stand of the State Government by referring to the aforesaid situation as being a problem of law and order and not a public order. According to him, therefore, firstly, there is no justification whatsoever, of delegation. Even if there be justification, so far as sec. 3 (2) of PASA is concerned, it suffers from vice of excessive delegation. ( 32 ) THE aforesaid submission in relation to A. K. Gopalans case and other cases, would mean that the circumstances, which are sought to be taken care of, must be extraneous to the activities of the persons whose different activities as defined in PASA has to be taken care of by resorting to preventive detention. The moment this situation is examined in that light with reference to the activities that are defined in connection with persons indulging in the activities like boot-legging, immoral trafficling, dangerous persons etc. The moment this situation is examined in that light with reference to the activities that are defined in connection with persons indulging in the activities like boot-legging, immoral trafficling, dangerous persons etc. obviously, by very nature, these activities would spill over and will give rise to a situation which is extraneous to the actions of the individual concerned. If the activities of boot-legging, what is defined as activity of dangerous person, immoral trafficling etc. have become widespread, obviously, collectively they would result into event of situation extraneous to the action of the individual concerned. There will be a sort of synergy coming into play. More of which will be dealt with lateron. When the word circumstances which arc prevailing or likely to prevail in the statutory provision of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 of PASA is understood in light of the aforesaid various decisions, as also in relation to the statute where they occur namely PASA, the propose of its enactment cannot be overlapped and would operate from the preamble when we look to the various activities in the light of the definitions that are sought to be curbed by exercising preventive detention power which is accepted to be in the nature of suspicion jurisdiction, the comment upon the affidavit on behalf of the State that it narrates only problem of law and order and not that of public order will have to be rejected. If the activities which are defined in sec. 2 of PASA are not only existing but are shown to be in ascendency and on the increase, obviously, the situation and event extraneous to the activities of the individual has come about. ( 33 ) IN this background when Shri Kotwal attacks sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3. saying that the enactment being subsequent to A. K. Roys case decided on and after 5th March 1981 for want of one of the sagfeguards namely period for delegation being specified, in our opinion, it cannot, be struck down. The challenge boils down only to this that in a. K. Roys case Sec. 3 (2) providing for delegation was help only because there were 3 safeguards. This does not appear to be correct. No where in paragraph 72 thereof in the judgment, is to be found that these 3 safeguards are must for any provision as to delegation to survive the challege of consitutionality. This does not appear to be correct. No where in paragraph 72 thereof in the judgment, is to be found that these 3 safeguards are must for any provision as to delegation to survive the challege of consitutionality. ( 34 ) TIME and again, when detention law was challenged the validity was tested on the basis of articles 21 and22 of the Constitution. After Maneka Gandhis case reported in air 1978 SC page 597 the scope of article 21 has been expanded to include within the scrutiny of the Court the procedure that has been prescribed under the law resulting into detention and it has to be decided whether the procedure is just fair and reasonable. ( 35 ) IN that light, if we see sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of PASA, except for which the order of delegation is to remain in force, the requirement as to the Governments satisfaction as to the "circumstances" and report by the authorised officer to be sent promptly and to be approved within a period of 12 days, is to be found in Sec. 3 (2) and sub-sec. (3) ( 36 ) SHRI Kotwal was mindful of this position and therefore, in addition to what he had stated in connection with A. K. Roys case and other decisions in that regard, he had also tried to make out a case that absence of the period would lead to total anarchy in the sense that in the field of detention under PASA, in fact, thate will be two authorities functioning at the same time, namely, the State Government and the authorised Officer. This will be the position, even if a period is prescribed, but, in that case, atleast for the citizens there is a hope that periodically the situation will be reviewed and in a given case in relation to a particular District, the District Magistrate or the Police Commissioner, as the case may be, may not be conferred with any power. For want of any period under PASA and particularly Under Sec. 3 (2) the situation could be and according to Shri Kotwal, in fact, it is, that the District Magistrate and the Police Commissioner stand conferred with power for all time to come and thus, get equate with the State Government as long as the provision of PASA exists. At first blush, this argument may appear to be very attractive. At first blush, this argument may appear to be very attractive. However, in the background of the situation which is found to be extraneous to the individual activities carved out from the affidavit of the Deputy Secretary, as also with reference to the aforesaid definition clauses under the PASA, if this material is taken into consideration, obviously, on closer scrutiny, the submission loses much of its substances. ( 37 ) PREVENTIVE detention law, if its need is accepted, is required to be permitted to operate in its own way because, it is designed to take care of a situation which was a felt need of the society at a given time and the legislature while enacting the Act was doing nothing else but was reflecting the need so felt by the population of the State as is expected of the Honourable Members of the Legislature in any representative democracy. If in their wisdom, the legislature has decided not to fix any period for which a power could be conferred when tested in light of the provisions of Article 21 and Article 22, if the Act itself stands the test, want of the period, in our opinion, cannot result into voice of excessive delegation. ( 38 ) ALL the three safeguards referred to in A. K. Roys case in para 22, when the third one namely that of approval within a stipulated period is being scrupulously followed, as made out from the said affidavit of Shri Sutaria, it is quite obvious that the procedure is shown to be reasonable, fair and just from the limited point of view of challenge to the delegation as mounted in the petitions. We are using the words limited point of view" because in the petitions, there is challenge not only to this position and not to the entire act. The decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 746 para 3 relied on by Shri Kotwal and AIR 1986 SC 180 paragraphs 40 and 41 will not help the petitions. In both these decisions the respective detention laws were tested in light of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of india and in the first of the two, Maneka Gandhis case was also referred to and relied on. In both these decisions the respective detention laws were tested in light of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of india and in the first of the two, Maneka Gandhis case was also referred to and relied on. ( 39 ) NOW, concentrating on the challenge to the Notification, as also the two challenges being overlapping with reference to the first challenge also to the statutory provision, it will be proper at this stage to quote the remarks in Mrs. Harpreet Kaur hrvinder Singh Bedi vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in AIR 1992 Supreme court 979. Our attention to para 17 thereof was drawn by Shri Altaf Ahmed, the learned addl. Solicitor General appearing for the respondents, which reads as under: crime is a revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilization of the day. Order is the basic need of any organized civilized society and any attempt to disturb that order affect the society and the community. The distinction between breach of "law and order" and disturbance of "public order" is one of degree and the extent of reach of the activity in question upon the soceity. In their essential quality, the activities which affect law and order and those which disturb public order may not be different but in their potentiality and effect upon even tempo of the society and public tranquillity there is a vast difference. In each case, therefore, the Courts have to see the length, magnitude and intensity of the questionable activities of a person to find out whether his activities are prejudicial to maintenance of "public order" or only "law and order". Paragraph 17, quoted above, in our opinion, indicates the situation that has come about after the word "circumstances" was analysed for the first time on promulgation of the situation in A. K. Gopalans case (Supra ). No doubt the observations in A. K. Gopalan s case and other cases that followed, are quite helpful and they do hold the field, but paragraph 17 in Harpreets case indicates the situation that has developed by the passage of about 4 decades and little more. This is bound to happen as complexity of day to day life has increased. No doubt the observations in A. K. Gopalan s case and other cases that followed, are quite helpful and they do hold the field, but paragraph 17 in Harpreets case indicates the situation that has developed by the passage of about 4 decades and little more. This is bound to happen as complexity of day to day life has increased. To this is added vast variety of economic activities that are on the increase both of reputable and not so reputable character, as also the speed with which one can travel and even faster is the methods of communication. From Horse carriage days that the Indian Penal Code was conceivled and drafted, not only there are jets, planes, rockets and satellites, but also information explosion and ever expanding communication net work with ligthing speed resulting into crumbling of national frontier all over the globe. Persons minded to indulge into hourable activities, if not outright criminal activities can do so with almost impunity and this could be the situation with regard to the persons indulging in any activities less than honourable activities which are outright criminal and they though pursued by individuals will have by operation of synergy direct impact on the society at large. This precisely is what has been noted in paragraph 17 in Harpreets case (Supra ). ( 40 ) IN this background of a harsh reality, if we try to judge the provision of Sec. 3 (2), obviously, the challenge would not survive. With regard to the Notification, no doubt, shri Kotwal is right in pointing out that in first of the two paragraphs quoted above, the word "or" is not at all to be found anywhere in the Notification and likewise, there is no user of word "and" as suggested by the Deputy Secretary in his affidavit or by the learned counsel Shri Altaf Ahmed. Instead what we find is that a (/) stroke has been placed between "circumstances prevailing" and "circumstances likely to prevail". Once again there is a stroke at the end of the last phrase. Then there is a refernce to the area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of each of the District Magistrates. . Instead what we find is that a (/) stroke has been placed between "circumstances prevailing" and "circumstances likely to prevail". Once again there is a stroke at the end of the last phrase. Then there is a refernce to the area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of each of the District Magistrates. . ( 41 ) IT may be noted here that Notification Annexure A page 30 / dated 28-5-1985 and the Ordinance No. 11 of 1985 under which the Notification Annexure A came to be issued, is dated 28/5/1985. This was followed by the Act which was enacted on 2-8-1985 and it was given retrospective effect from 27th May 1985, the date of the Ordinance. After the enactment substituting the Ordinance, no new Notification has been issued and accordingly, the accepted position is that a Notification under the Ordinance is holding the field. ( 42 ) SHRI Kotwal, therefore, had strongly urged that when provision of the Ordinance as well as the provision of the Act are read together in both Sec. 3 (2) is found containing the disjunctive word "or" between the circumstances prevailing likely to prevail. According to him, therefore, the Notification when issued, could not have contemplated any situation other than the two mentioned in the portion and by very nature, if one is existing, the other cannot. According to Shri Kotwal, circumstances prevailing necessarily means the situation in the present till and likely to prevail would mean in future. The State Government must therefore come out clearly as to which of the two situations is in existence, whether circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail. According to him, the Notification is still worse. Leaving aside the aforesaid requirement, it refers to both and has omitted the use of the word "or" completely. According to him, therefore, the Notification is hastily issued without any application of mind mechanically using the words of the statute. ( 43 ) AS against that, in the affidavit in reply Shri Sutaria has taken a stand, which has been reiterated by Id. Counsel Shri Altaf Ahmad that the first stroke between the phrases circumstances prevailing and likely to prevail is to be read as "and". Promptly came the reply from Shri Kotwal that this is not permissible because both under the Ordinance and under the Act, sub-sec. Counsel Shri Altaf Ahmad that the first stroke between the phrases circumstances prevailing and likely to prevail is to be read as "and". Promptly came the reply from Shri Kotwal that this is not permissible because both under the Ordinance and under the Act, sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 uses the word "or" and Government therefore, has to decide between the two and it cannot be permitted at this stage to make out a case of stroke (/) meaning "and". Further according to Mr. Kotwal, the Act itself does not permit this. According to him, had this been the position, there would have been the use of word and/or in the Act itself. ( 44 ) TO borrow the words used by Shri Kotwal, he has come with a need question of law and he is not entering into the facts while challenging the validity of statutory provision and the notification thereunder. Precisely, therefore, there is no factual avernment as to malafide. To the challenge that no period is specified in the Notification, the simple answer given by the learned Addl. Solicitor General Mr. Altaf Ahmed is that there is no provision in the Act. According to Shri Kotwal, this is begging the issue, as absence of the period itself would render the statutory provision namely sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 invalid. As he has developed the case with regard to this question on the basis of a. K. Roys case, what it amounts to is that absence of any time limit would render ihe said sub-section invalid. The question required to be inquired into therefore, is whether absence of a provision as to length of time for which an order of confirmation can operate would render it invalid. ( 45 ) HE thereafter, referred to said Amhtilkars case (Supra) reported in AIR 1991 SC 397 . It was a case under National Security Act and the question was conferment of power by the State Government under sec. 3 (3) thereof. Incidentally, this was one of the provisions scrutinised in A. K. Roys case more particularly in para 72 of the judgment. ( 46 ) WHILE conferring the power in its order dated 6-1-1990 reproduced in its entirity at page 399 of the judgment, the State Government was found using words "circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail". 3 (3) thereof. Incidentally, this was one of the provisions scrutinised in A. K. Roys case more particularly in para 72 of the judgment. ( 46 ) WHILE conferring the power in its order dated 6-1-1990 reproduced in its entirity at page 399 of the judgment, the State Government was found using words "circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail". In the course of the discussion, in paragraph 7 the learned Judges have observed that the use of the aforesaid phrase is no more than a reproduction of the terms of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3. On analysis, according to the learned Judges, sub- sec. (3) of Sec. 3 referred to two independent circumstances namely (1) the prevailing circumstances and (2) the circumstances that are likely to prevail. The formerly, evidently means the undisputed circumstances in futuro. According to the learned Judges, the Government should record its satisfaction with either of these two situations and cannot be permitted to take recourse to reproducing the provisions in terms and delegate the power. It has been observed that this indicates non application of mind and obscurity of thought, the latter was held to be inexorably leading to obscruity in language as held in the later part of para 8 of the judgment. ( 47 ) HOWEVER, in this paragraph 8 itself, the possibility of there being a situation where circumstances are prevailing and based on that a possibility of likely to prevail has been accepted and therefore, it has been observed that however, it is not to say that the power cannot be exercised for a future period by taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing on the date of the order as well as the circumstances likely to prevail in future. The latter may stem from the former. For example there may be disturbance on the date of the order and the same situation may be visualised at a future date also, in which case, the power may be conferred on the subordinate officer keeping both the factors in mind, but in that case, the two circumstances would have to be joined by the conjunctive word "and" and not the dijunctive word "or". ( 48 ) THESE remarks, in our opinion, clearly indicates that in the field of detention, while conferring the power, if the State Government is faced with a situation where based on the existing circumstances, it can reasonable feel that the situation is likely to continue by using conjunctive word and and it can take care of the two circumstances and the order of conferment can very well read the circumstances prevailing and likely to prevail. This is precisely the stand of the State Government is in the cases before us. ( 49 ) WHILE making out this case, the learned Addl. Solicitor General Shri Altaf ahmad had gone a step further and had said that in the peculiar set of circumstances prevailing in the State of Gujarat, the use of the words circumstances prevailing in notification Annexure A page 30 would have been enough and further use of the phrase "likely to prevail" is an added onus taken upon itself by the State Government for no reason whatsoever. ( 50 ) IN this connection, it was submitted by the learned APP Shri Raval that the State of Gujarat has to face a situation which on comparision will be found to be different from most of the States of Union. Firstly, the State is enforcing total prohibition, one of the directives of the Constitution under the Chapter of Directive Principle of the State Policy. Moreover, on one hand it was a very long sea-coast and on the other, it has an international border with Pakistan. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that vast quantities of lethel arms are sought to be brought into the State from across the border and as a part of smuggling activities, drugs are also being brought in, the activities sought to be curbed by the PASA except for the property grabber and to an extent immoral traffic probably assume altogether a different diamention. In this background, even if there is no time limit prescribed in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 and if the Notification, contains only a stroke (/) and not the word "or", it must be read as "and" and the Notification, therefore, must be held to be valid. In this background, even if there is no time limit prescribed in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 and if the Notification, contains only a stroke (/) and not the word "or", it must be read as "and" and the Notification, therefore, must be held to be valid. According to Shri Kotwal, even if the submission of the other side is accepted that at the time when the notification was issued, the circumstances were prevailing, could it be said that this situation continue to date i. e. for 8 years. The reply from the other side is that the affidavit of the Deputy Secretary precisely meets with this requirement and more than adequately by the details given therein make out a case that in fact the situation continues to prevail. In the beckground narrated above, in our opinion, there is a great force in the submission made on behalf of the State through the learned, addl. Solicitor Shri Altaf Ahmad as well as learned APP Shri Maulin Raval. In this light, we may quote a passage from "principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice J. P. Singh-4th Edition 1988 page 544" which was shown to us by the learned Addl. Solicitor general Shri Altaf Ahmad. It read as under : when the subordinate legislation has reasonable nexus with the object and purpose of the enabling statute, the Court is not to concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of the subordinate legislation or of the policy formulated therein. The supreme Court applied the above principle in upholding the validity of a regulation made under Seg. 36 of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards Act. 1965 which provided that no candidate shall claim or be entitled to revaluation or inspection of the answer books or other documents as they are treated by the divisional Board as confidential. It was also held in this, case that the regulations had to be judge on a three-fold test namely : (1) whether the provisions of the regulations fall within the scope and ambit of the power conferred on the delegate (2) whether the regulations made are to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of the enabling act; and (3) whether they infringe any of the fundamental rights or other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution" according to the aofresaid text, the Notification is required to be upheld. The first stroke (/) in our opinion, is required to be read as "and" and obviusly, therefore, the second stroke will lose any meaning and can be taken to be redundant. ( 51 ) OTHERWISE also, when an act is under challenge, till the challenge is made out it has been taken as a valid enactment and after analysis when challenge to Section 3 (2) of pasa is not accepted, the Notification having been issued thereunder, in our opinion, it is required to be upheld. All told, therefore, we are of the opinion that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 is valid and the Notification Annexure A Page 30 is also a valid one. ( 52 ) SHRI Raval had submitted that this being a pre-execution matter, the petition at that stage should not be admitted by the Court, because the action taken under the Act is valid till the provision of the Act which is sought to be challegned is struck down. In our opinion, this submission of L. A. P. P. Shri Raval cannot be accepted because, if the challenge is accepted and the provision is struck down, it will be struck down from the act and will be taken to be non-existent right from the beginning. That is why at the time of admission, with reference to the aforesaid 5 categories, particularly with reference to categories 1, 4 and 5, the petition was admitted though not spelt out in admission order, but in A and L of the main petition at page 25, it was stated. ( 53 ) LAPP Shri Raval had cited certain decisions in connection with pre-detention matters, when are they to be admitted, grant of bail, grant of bail, grant of interim relief etc. but as the matter is being taken up for final hearing not only after admission, but grant of interim relief, we feel that except for referring to these authorities, they need not be discussed. These authorities are : (1) AIR 1986 SC 1441 (2) 27 (2) GLR 1431 (3) 28 (2) GLR 1345 (4) A Full Bench Decision, which has been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. ( 54 ) SHRI Raval had cited judgments to the effect that user of word "or" is not impermissible in detention law. These authorities are : (1) AIR 1986 SC 1441 (2) 27 (2) GLR 1431 (3) 28 (2) GLR 1345 (4) A Full Bench Decision, which has been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. ( 54 ) SHRI Raval had cited judgments to the effect that user of word "or" is not impermissible in detention law. However, the said word was found to be used in all these judgments in connection with detention order where the activity of the detenu was found prejudicial to the security or public order and in that light, the user was found to be permissible. The controversy before us is altogether of a different nature. These decisions are: (1) AIR 1992 SC 1256 (2) AIR 1992 SC 2141 (3) AIR 1972 SC 923 (4) 1983 Cr. LJ 440 - Where COFEPOSA order was under scrutiny. He had also cited an unreported decision of the Division Bench (G. N. Nanavati and n. B. Patel, JJ.) in Special Criminal Application No. 997 of 1988, which in our opinion, has no bearing on the case before us as the submission before the learned Judges was to be effect that in Bharuch District the circumstances referred to in the Notification are not prevailing. No doubt, this submission was made on the basis of the fact that Notification is of the year 1985. However, in absence of an averment in this regard in the petition, the learned Judges held that it was for the petitioner to make out a case on this line. To that extent the burden was on the petitioner. As discussed above, the case putforth by the peitioners in the matter before us relates to the validity of the statutory provision and the notification is sought to be assailed on the ground of non application of mind because circumstaces prevailing or likely to prevail, the words occuring in the statutory provision have been used without indicating as to which of the two situations is to govern the case. ( 55 ) WHEN the Court is required to consider the validity of an order of delegation, it is to be remembered that the order of delegation is in the nature of a subordinate legislation. ( 55 ) WHEN the Court is required to consider the validity of an order of delegation, it is to be remembered that the order of delegation is in the nature of a subordinate legislation. For considering its validity, what is to be borne in mind therefore, is if, in absence and in tenor it is in accordance with the statutory provision, it should not be lightly interfered with. For this Shri Altaf Ahmad, has relied on "the Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by Justice G. P. Singh, the relevant portion has been quoted here in above. We agree with him. ( 56 ) THE case of the petitioners is based on Categories 1, 2 and 5 of Alka Gadias case. However, one more category relied on by the petitioners is that of vagueness, reliefs on extraneous materials etc. For this purpose, the petitioners arc relying on a notice that was served on him as per Annexure C by the Resident Deputy Collector, Rajkot calling upon him to clarify the status of a particular plot of land. Apparently, this notice has not been replied to, but instead, a telegram is being sent as per Annexure B by the petitioners. However, in absence of the order which, in fact, has been passed, it will not be possible for us to accept the submission based on the Notice Annexure C that the order is based only on the facts mentioned in the notice and no other material is relied on. In our opinion, therefore, to discuss category no. 4 on the basis of notice Annexure C will be futile. ( 57 ) ANOTHER limb of arguments based on Annexure C Notice was, it relates to transactions that were entered into between a span of about 6 to 8 months and in relation to one plot of land only. It cannot be said that the petitioners fall within the definition of property grabber as per Sec. 2 (h) of PASA. Thereafter, Shri Kotwal had proceeded to disect this Section and indicate from it that there are different possible activities in relation to a land not belonging to the proposed detenu and one of them namely unauthorised structure is further defined by sec. 2 cl. Thereafter, Shri Kotwal had proceeded to disect this Section and indicate from it that there are different possible activities in relation to a land not belonging to the proposed detenu and one of them namely unauthorised structure is further defined by sec. 2 cl. (i) and therefore, according to Shri kotwal, any order of detention passed would be suffering from the vice of vagueness, taking into consideration the extraneous material stale grounds to snaffling live link etc. The answer would be the same as given earlier with regard to category no. 4 of Alka gadias case. ( 58 ) IN sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 there is a reference to situation prevailing in an area within the local limits of jurisdiction of a District Magistrate. If the provision is read in this light, as submitted by the learned Addl. Solicitor General, Shri Altaf Ahmad, obviously, the submission of Shri Kotwal that the provision of sub-sec. (2) visualises delegation of power only with regard to a particular area within the local limits of jurisdiction of a given Officer will lose all its significance. We agree with Shri Altaf ahmad. ( 59 ) THE Notification Annexure A page 30 being under the Ordinance and that ordinance having been repealed, a submission was made on behalf of the petitioners that it has lost its statutory base. The answer is clearly to be obtained from Sec. 19 (1) providing for repeal and saving. Otherwise also, General Act 54 would take care of the situation. ( 60 ) A faint attempt was made by Shri Kotwal to attack the exercise of power by the district Magistrate, Rajkot within the city limits of Rajkot because, for that area, the power is also conferred on the Police Commissioner of the City of Rajkot. However, when power can be conferred on two Officers and if either of them, happened to be having concurrent power in respect of a particular portion of that area, obviously the conferment or the exercise thereunder, cannot be questioned on any court. The concept of more than one authority exercising concurrent jurisdiction is by now, too well known to be discussed any further. . ( 61 ) BEFORE parting with the matter, we may record the fact that the learned Addl. Solicitor General Shri Altaf Ahmad had conceded that if the Court so felt, it may read down provision of Sub-sec. The concept of more than one authority exercising concurrent jurisdiction is by now, too well known to be discussed any further. . ( 61 ) BEFORE parting with the matter, we may record the fact that the learned Addl. Solicitor General Shri Altaf Ahmad had conceded that if the Court so felt, it may read down provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 to include a reasonable period in it and thereafter, he had said that the review that has been carried out in connection with each of the cases reported by the authorised Officer after the order is passed may itself be held to be a reasonable exercise of the power. While avoiding this submission that the Court should read into sub-sec. (2) some reasonable period, because according to the petitioners, the provision is required to be struck down, Shri Kotwal, developed his argument on the basis of the words used namely "circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail" that of necessity this situation can be for a period only and cannot be for all time to come. However, having come to the conclusion that there is no vice of excessive delegation, we are not entering into this aspect any further. ( 62 ) IN the result, the petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief in each matter granted earlier is vacated. The petitioner in each of the petitions is given 3 weeks time to surrender on executing an undertaking in that regard. .