JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—These seventeen Regular Second Appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment as these arise out of common decree and judgment and common questions of law and facts are involved in all of them. 2. The common decree and judgment dated 24-7-1991, impugned, is passed by the District Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan, whereby he has affirmed the decree and judgment dated 18-8-1990 of Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, dismissing seventeen suits of the appellants/plaintiffs against different set of" defendants. . 3. The decree and judgment dated 18-8-1990 of Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, is in the following terms :— "No witness present even today, though this was the last opportunity granted. This is one of the oldest case pending in this Court and, therefore, this date was given as the last opportunity. Several opportunities ha\e been granted to the plaintiff to adduce evidence, but no avail. Hence, I have no option but to close the evidence of the plaintiffs by the order of the Court. Accordingly, I dismiss this suit under Order 17, Rule C. P.C. Copy of this order be placed in all the connected cases. File after completion be consigned to the record room". 4. The background of passing such a decree and judgment by the trial Court was as follows : On 19-2-1986, the appellants-plaintiffs No. 1 to 3 filed a Civil Suit which was registered as Civil Suit No. 8/1 of 1986 against the respondent-defendant Pyare Lal and Smt. Prem Lata Devi widow of Maharaja Natwar Singh, who had died during the pendency of the trial, and her name was deleted from the array of defendants. Appellant-plaintiff No. 4, Rani Padmini Devi was originally impleaded as proforma defendant but lateron transposed as plaintiff with the leave of the Court. The decree prayed for in the suit was for declaration that sale of the suit property by late Smt Prem Lata Devi was not binding on the appellants-plaintiffs. The consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from changing the nature of the suit land by raising any construction thereon or in any manner changing its nature, till the partition of the suit land, was also sought for The other sixteen suits out of which the present appeals have arisen, were also riled against different defendants for similar cause of action 5. After exchange of written statement and replication, issues were framed on 24-9-1986. After exchange of written statement and replication, issues were framed on 24-9-1986. On the same day, six other suits number 9 of 1986 to 15 of 1986 were consolidated with suit No. 8/1 of 1986 as the Court found that common questions of fact and law were involved in them As a result of consolidation, evidence was ordered to be recorded in Civil Suit No. 8/1 of 1986 and the appellants-plaintiffs were directed to deposit process-fee and diet money within seven days for summoning the witnesses. 6. Thereafter on two consecutive dates, that is, 7-11-1986 and 20-12-1986, it was noticed that neither the plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were present nor list of witnesses, process-fee and diet money were submitted to summon the witnesses. However, on 20-12-1986, the Counsel for Smt. Prem Lata Devi informed the Court of her death, therefore, the Counsel for the appellants plaintiffs sought an adjournment to take necessary steps in the matter From 20-12-1986 to 20-4-1988, no date was fixed for recording the plaintiffs evidence as miscellaneous applications remained under consideration. On 20-4-1988, the appellants-plaintiffs were asked to produce their witnesses on 5-5-1988 but no proceedings were held on that day as the Presiding Officer was not available. Again on 10-5-1988, the case was fixed for plaintiffs evidence on 1-6-1988, on which date instead of producing their witnesses, the appellants-plaintiffs moved an application for consolidation of ether cases with Suit No. 8/1 of 1986. On the next date of hearing, that is, 13-6-1988, nine more suits No. 11 of 1987 to 17 of 1987, 101 of 1987 and 102 of 1987 were consolidated with Suit No. 8/1 of 1986. The case was adjourned to 2-7-1988 for recording the plaintiffs evidence. They were directed to file process-fee and diet money and list of witnesses within a period of four days 7. On 2-7-1988, instead of producing their witnesses, the appellants-plaintiffs moved an application under Order 16, Rule 19, C. P. C. for appointment of a Local Commissioner for recording the statement of appellant plaintiff No. I, Smt. Durga Kumari and other witnesses of the adoption deed dated 23-2-1965. This application was allowed on 8-7-1988 and Sh R P Saini, Advocate, Nahan, was appointed Local Commissioner, The appellants-plaintiffs were directed to submit list of witnesses of the adoption deed and to deposit Rs, 3,000 as the Local Commissioners fee within a period of three days. This application was allowed on 8-7-1988 and Sh R P Saini, Advocate, Nahan, was appointed Local Commissioner, The appellants-plaintiffs were directed to submit list of witnesses of the adoption deed and to deposit Rs, 3,000 as the Local Commissioners fee within a period of three days. The case was adjourned to 2-81988 fat the report of the Local Commissioner. On 2-8-1988, it was noticed that the Local Commissioners report was not received and also that proceedings m the suit had been stayed by the District Judge, Nahan. The stay continued till the case, alongwith other consolidated sixteen suits, was transferred from the Court of Sub-Judge, Nahan, to the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, who took them on his file on 28-3-1989 and after awaiting for the Local Commissioners report for a couple of hearings noticed on 2-6-1989 that the order appointing the Local Commissioner for recording the statements of appellant-plaintiff No. I and other witnesses could not be given effect to as the appellants-plaintiffs had failed to deposit Rs. 3,000 as the fee of the Local Commissioner In the circumstances, the case was again listed for. Plaintiffs evidence on 20 74989 on which date again the old story was repeated and neither the appellant plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were present nor they were summoned. Again adjournment was granted on the ground that the Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs intended to file an application for consolidation of some more suits with suit No. 8/1 of 1986. Further, a number of adjournments were sought for and granted on the ground that application for consolidation of all the suits with the matter which was/is pending in the High Court was under consideration. In the meantime, an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. for transposing Smt. Padmini Devi as plaintiff was filed which was allowed on 5-5-1990 and pleadings were allowed to be amended accordingly. The application for consolidating four other suits with Suit No. 8/1 of 1986 was also considered and rejected on 22-6-1990 Ultimately, the case was listed for plaintiffs evidence on 21-7-1990 when the following order was passed :— "No P. W. present even today. These are the oldest case with me and adjournment prayed on the ground that the plaintiff is sick. Adjournment granted in the interest of justice. To come up on 18-8-1990 for PWs. These are the oldest case with me and adjournment prayed on the ground that the plaintiff is sick. Adjournment granted in the interest of justice. To come up on 18-8-1990 for PWs. but this is the last opportunity granted.” On 18-8-1990 the impugned order was passed. Feeling aggrieved the appellants-plaintiffs challenged the decree and judgment of the trial Court before the District Judge, Nahan, but failed. Hence the present Regular Second Appeal. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Sh Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, has urged that the substantial question of law arising in these , appeals is, whether on the facts and circumstances on record, the trial Court was justified in closing the evidence and dismissing the suits of the plaintiffs under Order 17, Rule 3, C. P. C. According to him, the order was required to be passed under Order 17, Rule 2, C. P. C. and Order 17, Rule 3, C, P. C. was not attracted because the appellants-plaintiffs were not present and presence of their Counsel was of no avail as the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the plaintiffs. As witnesses were to be produced by the plaintiffs, their Counsel could not act in the hearing of the suit. Another aspect pointed out by Sh. Kuldip Singh is that for granting adjournment, the grounds put forward for seeking adjournment on a particular date of hearing were required to be considered and adjournments sought for and granted on earlier occasions could not be the sole ground for refusing adjournment. He further submits that the trial Court has failed to consider whether the respondent-defendant could be compensated in terms of money had one more opportunity been granted to the appellants-plaintiffs to produce their evidence. 9. In order to test the first argument of Sh. Kuldip Singh, the scope of Order 17, Rules 2 and 3 C. P. C , as amended by the amendment of 1986, is to be examined. These are :— "2. 9. In order to test the first argument of Sh. Kuldip Singh, the scope of Order 17, Rules 2 and 3 C. P. C , as amended by the amendment of 1986, is to be examined. These are :— "2. Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed.—Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the patties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit Explanation.—Where the evidence or a substantial portion of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the Court may, in its discretion proceed with the case as if such party were present. 3. Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence etc.—Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default— (a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forth with ; or (b) if the parties are, or any of them is, absent, proceed under Rule 2." 10. These provisions came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Prakash Chander Manchanda v. Janki Manchanda, (1986) 4 SCC 669. The facts of that case were that on the date when the case was fixed for defendants evidence, neither the defendant nor his Counsel nor his witnesses were present. The trial Court closed the defendants evidence and adjourned the case for arguments. On the subsequent dates when arguments were heard and judgment was announced, the defendant remained absent Thereafter, the defendant filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the ex-parte decree and the question arose whether the order closing the evidence of the defendant was passed under Order 17, Rule 2 or Rule 3, C. P C. and whether the application .under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C was maintainable or not ? In the context of these facts, Oza, J. speaking for the Bench held :— "It is clear that in cases where a party is absent the only course as mentioned in Order 17, Rule 3 (b) is to proceed under Rule 2. It is therefore clear that in absence of the defendant, the court had no option but to proceed under Rule 2. Similarly, the language of Rule 2 as it now stands also clearly lays down that if any one of the parties fails to appear, the Court has to proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed under Order 9. The explanation to Rule 2 gives a discretion to the Court to proceed under Rule 3 even if a party is absent but that discretion is limited only in cases where a party which is absent has It d some evidence or has examined substantial part of their evidence. It is therefore clear that if on a date fixed, one of the parties remain absent and for that party no evidence has been examined up to that date the Court has no option but to proceed to dispose of the matter in accordance with Order 17 Rule 2 in any one of the modes prescribed under Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure It is therefore clear that after this amendment in Order 17, Rules 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure there remains no doubt and therefore there is no possibility of any controversy. In this view of the matter it is clear that when in the present case on October 30, 1985 the case was called nobody was present for the defendant. It is also clear that till that date the plaintiffs evidence has been recorded but no evidence for defendant was recorded. The defendant was only to begin on this date or an earlier date when the case was adjourned. It is also clear that till that date the plaintiffs evidence has been recorded but no evidence for defendant was recorded. The defendant was only to begin on this date or an earlier date when the case was adjourned. It is therefore clear that up to the date i.e. October 30, 1985 when the trial Court closed the case of defendant there was no evidence on record on behalf of the defendant In this view of the matter therefore the explanation to Order 17, Rule 2 was not applicable at all Apparently when the defendant was absent Order 17, Rule 2 only permitted the Court to proceed to dispose of the matter in any one of the modes provided under Order 9. 7. It is also clear that Order 17, Rule 3 as it stands was not applicable to the facts of this case as admittedly on the date when the evidence of defendant was closed nobody appeared for the defendant. In this view of the matter it could not be disputed that the Court when proceeded to dispose of the suit on merits had committed an error. Unfortunately, even on the review application, the learned trial Court went on in the controversy about Order 17 Rules 2 and 3 which existed before the amendment and rejected the review application and on appeal, the High Court also unfortunately dismissed the appeal in limine by one word." 11. In the light of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court, it is clear that Order 17, Rule 2, C. P. C. is a general provision which applies to all those hearings in the suit where the parties or any one of them fail to appear. In such a situation, the Court has been given an option to adopt any one of the modes provided under Order 9. C. P. C. to dispose of the suit or make such other order as it thinks fit. In such a situation, the Court has been given an option to adopt any one of the modes provided under Order 9. C. P. C. to dispose of the suit or make such other order as it thinks fit. Order 17, Rule 3 (b) further provides that in the absence of parties of any one of them, the suit will be disposed of in accordance with one of the modes directed in Order 9, C P. C. or by making such other order as the Court thinks fit even if any party to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence or to cause the attendance of his witnesses or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit for which time has been allowed. The only exception to this provision is as provided by the explanation to Rule 2 of Order 17 according to which the suit need not be disposed of by one of the modes provided under Order 9, C. P. C. and the Court may proceed with the case in the absence of parties or any one of " the parties as if such party was present, if evidence or substantial portion of the evidence of that party has already been recorded. Order 17, Rule 3 (a), C. P. C. provides for a special category of cases in which parties are present but one of them has committed a default of not producing his evidence or to cause attendance of his witnesses or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit for which time has been allowed to him. In such category of cases, the Court has been given discretion to proceed to decide the suit forthwith. In other words, where the parties are present or deemed to be present as provided in Explanation to Rule 2 of Order 17, C. P. C. the Court may proceed with the case and decide it. How the Court will proceed and what decision it will take depends upon the stage and facts and circumstances of the suit but the decision will be on merit and under Rule 3 (a) of Order 17, C. P. C. 12. How the Court will proceed and what decision it will take depends upon the stage and facts and circumstances of the suit but the decision will be on merit and under Rule 3 (a) of Order 17, C. P. C. 12. Applying this interpretation to the facts of the present case, it becomes clear that the order dated 18-8-1990 was rightly passed by the trial Court under Order 17, Rule 3 (a), C. P. C. because on that day, the appellants-plaintiffs were present through their counsel and they had failed to produce their evidence and cause the attendance of their witnesses for which time was granted to them by the earlier order dated 21-7-1990 The argument of the learned Counsel, Mr, Kuldip Singh, that the appellants-plaintiffs are not deemed to be present despite the presence of their counsel as he could not proceed with the case in the absence of the appellants-plaintiffs and/or their witnesses, is fallacious on the face of it. It is well settled that when a party does not appear in person but by a pleader, the appearance of the pleader is deemed to be the appearance of the party. If the argument of the learned Counsel is accepted, in all earlier similar occasions, the Court would have dismissed the suit for the absence of the appellants-plaintiffs instead of granting adjournment on the request of the counsel. If every case in which a party fails to be present and/or produce his evidence is disposed of by adopting one of the modes as provided under Order 9, C. P. C. despite the presence of his counsel, not only the progress of the case will be hampered but the provisions of Order 3, C, P C. will also be negated. In the present case, the appellants-plaintiffs were represented by the same learned Counsel throughout and on the fateful day also he appeared for them Neither he pleaded no instructions nor sought permission to withdraw from the proceedings. Therefore, this Court need not refer to the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs in which the facts were different that ; the counsel appearing in the case was engaged only for moving the application ; the counsel withdrew from the proceedings after making application or request for adjournment etc etc. Therefore, this Court need not refer to the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs in which the facts were different that ; the counsel appearing in the case was engaged only for moving the application ; the counsel withdrew from the proceedings after making application or request for adjournment etc etc. In Kuri Lal Rungta v. Smt Banarsi Devi and others, AIR 1986 All 94, the contention that defendant was deemed to be present when the learned Counsel representing him had left the Court as he had no instructions in the case and he was instructed to move an application for adjournment, was repelled by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court and it was held :— "The alleged leaving of court by the defendants counsel on the rejection of the application for adjournment of the case without further taking any steps by moving an application for withdrawing his power from the case could not amount to his effective withdrawal from the case, and so the defendant could not be taken to be absent at the hearing It appears to be fairly well settled that leave of discharge from the case to a counsel shall be granted only when the counsel asks for it with notice to his client, and, as such, the discharge of the counsel from the case cannot be taken to occur merely from the fact that the counsel of his awn volition had left the Court room when an adverse order was passed on his application for adjournment. The counsel who had without effectively withdrawing from the case, walked out of the Court room on his own accord, could at any time walk in and take part in the proceedings and there could be no impediment in his way in doing so. He could also cross examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff whose evidence was recorded by the Court while proceeding to decide the case on merits under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code. Thus, in our opinion, the defendant cannot be taken to be absent at the hearing on the said date on the ground that his counsel had left the Court room after rejection of the adjournment application. The Court below, thus, rightly proceeded to decide the case under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code." 13. The learned Counsel Mr. Thus, in our opinion, the defendant cannot be taken to be absent at the hearing on the said date on the ground that his counsel had left the Court room after rejection of the adjournment application. The Court below, thus, rightly proceeded to decide the case under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code." 13. The learned Counsel Mr. Kuldip Singh is right in urging that past conduct of a party cannot be the sole criterion for refusing adjournment and grounds put forth for seeking adjournment on a particular date of hearing are the main consideration but while considering adjournment, the Court cannot shut its eyes if repeated adjournments were sought on almost similar grounds and no steps were taken in the progress of the case despite repeated orders by the Court and a party takes the Court for granted that the case will be adjourned at his wish In the present case, during the period when the case was listed for evidence for the first time on 7-11-1986 to the last date when it was dismissed on 18-8-1990, the Court had fixed the case for recording the appellants-plaintiffs evidence on seven occasions and directed them to submit the list of witnesses, file process-fee and deposit diet money within the specified period. This direction was not complied with even once The appellants-plaintiffs could bring their witnesses at their own responsibility but they were required to give their list within fifteen days from the date when issues were framed as provided under Order 16, Rule 1,C. P C. and also as directed by the Court when the case used to be listed for evidence Not only this, the appellants-plaintiffs had obtained the order dated 8-7-1988 to examine appellant-plaintiff No. 1 and witnesses of the adoption deed dated 23-2-1965 on commission but failed to deposit Commissioners fee of Rs. 3,000 as well as the list of witnesses and about one year was wasted in this. After the appellant-plaintiff Smt. Padmini Devi was transposed as plaintiff No. 4, the case was listed for appellants-plaintiffs evidence on 21-7-1990. On that day when the Court found that the appellants-plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were not present, it though granted adjournment as prayed for on the ground that appellant-plaintiff No 1 was ill, but it was made clear by the Court that last opportunity was being granted for producing their evidence. On that day when the Court found that the appellants-plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were not present, it though granted adjournment as prayed for on the ground that appellant-plaintiff No 1 was ill, but it was made clear by the Court that last opportunity was being granted for producing their evidence. Despite this, neither the appellants-plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were present on the next date of hearing nor their Counsel put forward any reason for their absence. It was, for the first time, stated in appeal before the District Judge that appellant-plaintiff Smt Durga Devi, who was about 78 years of age and was living at Lucknow, was critically ill and appellant-plaintiff No. 3, Sh. Kumar Uday Parkash, who is also general attorney of appellant-plaintiff No. I, had gone to attend on her at Lucknow. For this reason, appellants-plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 could not attend the Court on 18-8-1990 to appear as their own witnesses. Even in appeal, the appellants-plaintiffs have not disclosed the names of their witnesses whom they intended to produce except that one of them Sh. Madan Mohan Mishra, who is witness of the adoption deed, could not come from Faizabad due to anti-reservation rallies and disruption of traffic. However, in the facts and circumstances on record before the trial Court, it had rightly dismissed the suit(s) under Order 17, Rule 3, C. P. C. on 18-8-1990. On that day, when the Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs had not stated any ground why the appellants-plaintiffs and/or their witnesses were absent and had not asked for adjournment, there was no occasion for the trial Court to consider the grant of one more adjournment for which the defendant could be compensated by payment of costs. 14. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in these Regular Second Appeals and these are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case there is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.