NAND KESHWAR PRASAD v. LABOUR COURT — 1992 DIGILAW 372 (ALL)

S. C. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who was an employee of the Indian Farmers Fertilizer Co-operative Limited, allahabad, hereinafter referred to as iffco has challenged by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the award of the Labour Court dated June 16, 1985 in Adjudication Case No. 543 of 1984. ( 2 ) THE controversy in this case relates to the resignation submitted by the petitioner to the employers dated September 28, 1983 to be ef-fective from January 22, 1984 and the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the resignation could be withdrawn in the facts and circumstances of the case and on that basis the acceptance of the employers to treat the petitioners services being terminated with effect from January 22, 1984 would be valid or not. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was employed with respondent No. 2 as Printing Machine Operator. There were serious charges of misconduct of theft, against the petitioner and a disciplinary action was in contemplation. The petitioner apprehending the aforesaid action submitted a letter of resignation on September 28, 1983 purporting to be effective from January 22, 1984. The respondent No. 2 decided to accept the resignation instead of proceeding with the departmental enquiry and it was informed by letter dated September 30, 1983 that the resignation is accepted with effect from january 22, 1984. However, the petitioner was informed that his wages for the period up to january 22, 1984 are being deposited in his account and he need not attend his duties from october 1, 1983 onwards. The petitioner by letter dated October 1, 1983 informed that the resignation letter had not been voluntarily written and he was forced to tender the resignation and was also forced to receive the acceptance letter and was not allowed to resume his duties. According to the petitioner this action was taken on account of his active participation in the union activities. ( 4 ) THE Labour Court, on a consideration of the evidence on record, recorded a finding the the petitioner did not submit the letter of resignation under any threat or coercion. On the other hand it was a voluntary act. According to the petitioner this action was taken on account of his active participation in the union activities. ( 4 ) THE Labour Court, on a consideration of the evidence on record, recorded a finding the the petitioner did not submit the letter of resignation under any threat or coercion. On the other hand it was a voluntary act. This is established from the fact that it is written in the own handwriting of the petitioner and after he submitted the resignation, on necessary enquiry, the petitioner informed that he had submitted the resignation for some personal reasons. It is further established that the resignation was voluntarily made as the petitioner was involved in a case of theft of some articles of the employers and he apprehended disciplinary action and dismissal from service. In order to save himself of the embarrassment, the petitioner submitted the resignation voluntarily. The Presiding Officer was further of the view that the employers also accepted the resignation by the petitioner and they paid the wages up to January 22, 1984 to get rid of the employee with immediate affect. Both the letter of resignation and the acceptance by the employers under the aforesaid circumstances, cannot be treated to be under threat, coercion or under influence. The action of the respondent No. 2 in not allowing the petitioner to resume his duties with effect from January 22, 1984 is in accordance with law. ( 5 ) THE impugned award has been assailed on the ground that the Labour Court committed manifest error of law in holding that the resignation of the petitioner was validly accepted by respondent No. 2. It was further submitted that as the resignation was to become operative with effect from January 22, 1984, the petitioner was at liberty to withdraw and the acceptance of resignation prior to the proposed prospective date cannot be treated to be a valid acceptance to make the prospective resignation irrevocable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel cited the case Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, 1978-I-LLJ-492. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand contended that before the labour Court, the only ground raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the letter of resignation was not voluntary but it was submitted under threat and coercion. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand contended that before the labour Court, the only ground raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the letter of resignation was not voluntary but it was submitted under threat and coercion. The argument which is now sought to be built up was not raised before the Labour Court and, as such, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this ground in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution for the first time. It was further contended that after the resignation was accepted by the respondent No. 2 with effect from January 22, 1984 on September 30, 1983, the petitioner was paid his wages also up to January 22, 1984 which he ccepted. Thus the resignation became irrevocable and the same could not have been revoked. ( 7 ) THE finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court that the letter of resignation was submitted voluntarily has neither been assailed seriously by the learned counsel for the petitioner nor in my opinion, the petitioner would succeed in dislodging this finding of fact in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. As regards the revocation of the resignation which was to become effective prospectively, in the present case, the resignation was accepted and the petitioner was treated to be out of employment with effect from January 22, 1984. The petitioner who was treated to be in employment up to January 22, 1984 was paid his full wages for the intervening period and was directed not to attend the duties. There is no dispute that the acceptance in these terms of the resignation of the petitioner was communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner at no stage refused to accept the wages for the intervening period or revoked the resignation on the ground that it would become operative with effect from January 22, 1984. The petitioner only raised the plea that the letter of resignation was submitted under threat and coercion and he may be allowed to resume his duties. It is further admitted that there are no rules or procedure prescribed for tendering the resignation. In the present case, the petitioner has indicated his intention to resign from a future specified date. The petitioner only raised the plea that the letter of resignation was submitted under threat and coercion and he may be allowed to resume his duties. It is further admitted that there are no rules or procedure prescribed for tendering the resignation. In the present case, the petitioner has indicated his intention to resign from a future specified date. His services normally would stand terminated from the specified date and it would be open to withdraw the resignation at any time before it becomes effective but the revocation of the resignation would not be available to the petitioner as the same was immediately accepted by the employer from the date it was intended to be given effect to. It is only till the resignation is not accepted by the appropriate authority, it would be open to withdraw the same. Merely because the resignation was to operate prospectively and it had not operated, it would be open for withdrawal, would not be applicable as it had not remained an unilateral act of the resignee but it has been accepted as such by the appropriate authority to be operative from the date it has been desired in the letter of resignation. In view of this acceptance, the withdrawal would not be possible on the ground that the resignation had not become effective. The rule enunciated in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, 1970-I-LLJ-13 at page 15 is quoted below): "where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his service normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. " ( 8 ) EVEN in the case of Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra (supra) the Honble Supreme court laid down as under at pages 502-503: "it will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a Government servant or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service or office tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a Constitutional functionary and under proviso (a) to Article 217 (1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he resigns in presenti the resignation terminates his office tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning office is not complete because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal. " ( 9 ) IN my opinion, the acceptance of resignation by the competent authority even though from a future date and the acceptance of wages for the intervening period by the employee establishes that the change of mind of the petitioner to revoke the resignation tendered by the petitioner would not be available and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner cannot revoke the resignation tendered by him. In my opinion, the withdrawal of resignation by the petitioner at any time before it became effective would have been available provided the resignation of the petitioner had not been accepted by the competent authority as also the acceptance of wages by the petitioner for the intervening period. The petitioner, in these circumstances, cannot be allowed to resile from the stand taken by him earlier to save his dismissal from service. ( 10 ) THE petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. .