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1992 DIGILAW 372 (GUJ)

PAREKH HASMUKHRAY NAGARDAS v. ABEDABEN NOORKHAN

1992-11-26

N.J.PANDYA

body1992
N. J. PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE application (sic) is the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 90 of 1976 of the Court of Civil Judge (JD) Junagadh. The said suit was filed for arrears of rent and vacant possession of the rented premises. The rent note is at Exh. 43. Looking to it it is quite clear that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellate-original plaintiff and the respondents who are three in number before the Trial court. Here also there are three respondents because in the cause title the name of respondent No. 2 has been deleted. Respondents No. 1 and 3 are served but they have chosen not to put in any appearance of an Advocate. In other words they are not present. ( 2 ) THE defence taken amongst other contentions before the Trial Court was that the sale deed Exh. 42 dated 1-8-1967 was in the nature of money-lending transaction and as such the property never vested in the appellant-landlord and correspondingly therefore the defendants were never the tenants. In a face of a written documents and particularly Exh. 42 which is a registered document if any oral evidence is to be had Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act will have to be borne in mind alongwith which of course we have to consider Sections 93 and 94 of the said Act also. Apparently the respondents are relying on documents which are produced before the Trial Court at mark 60/17 and 60/18. I fail to understand how the documents which are not proved and exhibited could be referred to in the judgment to decide a controversy between the parties. ( 3 ) INCIDENTLY it may be mentioned that this document relates to the so-called agreement between the landlord and the tenants giving a right to the tenants to repurchase the property conveyed to him as per document Exh. 42. The moment there is a plea of money-lending transaction in the face of document Exh. 42 which is totally silent about the so-called right to purchase and for that of course when reliance is placed on documents which are not proved and exhibited one has to look to the provision of the Transfer of Property Act particularly with reference to mortgage by conditional sale. The relevant of provision in Section 58 cl. 42 which is totally silent about the so-called right to purchase and for that of course when reliance is placed on documents which are not proved and exhibited one has to look to the provision of the Transfer of Property Act particularly with reference to mortgage by conditional sale. The relevant of provision in Section 58 cl. (c) of the Transfer of Property Act and this proviso clearly states that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. Obviously. when Exh. 42 is silent about any such condition of resale there is no question of document Exh. 42 being in nature of a mortgage by conditional sale. ( 4 ) STRANGELY enough in paragraph 24 of the judgment the learned Appellant Judge has recorded a finding that document Exh. 42 which is dated 1 was presented for registration on 2 On the date on which rent note Exh. 43 was executed which is 1-8-1967 the property had not vested in the landlord and therefore there could not have been relationship of landlord and tenant on 1-8-1967. Therefore the finding recorded is that Rent Note Exh. 43 was executed as a part and parcel of the money-lending transaction to recover interest on the amount of loan by way of rent. ( 5 ) I have gone through Exh. 42 and as noticed above it does not provide for a right of repurchase as contemplated by proviso to cl. (c) of Section 58 of Transfer of Property Act 1882 In view of Sections 91 to 94 of the Indian Evidence Act no oral evidence could be even admitted to explain away the transaction as disclosed by Exh. 42 the sale deed. So far as the reasoning of the learned Appellate Judge is concerned about the property not having vested till the document was presented on 2-8-1967 for registration provision of Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 is a clear answer. The document which has been ultimately registered shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and it will not be from the time of its registration. The document Exh. 42 presented for registration on 2-8-1967 has in fact been registered in the books of the Registrar on 20-8-1967. The document Exh. 42 presented for registration on 2-8-1967 has in fact been registered in the books of the Registrar on 20-8-1967. According to the reasoning of the learned appellate Judge no valid title would pass in favour of the plaintiff till the registration in fact was taken place. According to him the date of presentation also will have no meaning. Section 47 clarifies the whole situation. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY Exh. 42 will operate from the date of its execution namely 1 Once this aspect is appreciated the whole reasoning based on the fact that the document was presented for registration on 2-8-1967 will go away as the title will be vested in the appellant-landlord on and from 1-8-1967 the date on which Exh. 42 was executed. ( 7 ) IN this view of the matter the conclusion arrived at by the Court of first instance i. e. the Trial Court will have accepted. There is a relationship of landlord and tenant. The learned appellant Judge has also recorded the fact that there is an amount outstanding which in face of the relationship of landlord and tenant will certainly be in the nature of rent and when rent is outstanding the tenant would be in arrears thereof and if it is for a period of more than six months he shall face eviction. That is precisely the finding of the Trial Court. ( 8 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons I set aside the judgment and order of the learned Assistant Judge of Junagadh and restore the judgment and order passed by the Court of Civil Judge (JD) at Junagadh. The decree passed by the Court of first instance will have to be confirmed. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid discussion clearly indicates that the judgment and order of the first Appellate Court at Junagadh is wholly based on misreading of law and therefore the present application is allowed. As aforesaid the judgment and order of the first appellate Court at Junagadh is set aside. The decree passed by the Trial court is confirmed and is restored. Parties to bear their own costs. (GDB) Rule made absolute. .