JUDGMENT M.Katju 1. This writ petition and the connected writ petition Nos. 748 of 1992, 749 of 1992, 750 of 1992 and 751 of 1992 are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioner has filed these writ petitions against an order of respondent No. 2 dated 3-12-1991 rejecting the petitioner's application for deciding the reference in terms of the settlement dated 19-10-1989. The facts of the case are that the State Government made a reference under section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court. The terms of the reference have been quoted in para 4 of the writ petition, and the dispute referred is; regarding validity/justification of the termination of service of respondent No. 3 from 24-9-1985. While this reference was pending adjudication, it is alleged that the petitioner's factory closed down irrevocably on 4-1-1989. Thereafter certain negotiations were held and it is alleged that ultimately and agreement dated 19-10-89 was reached, true copy of which is annexure-1 to the writ petition. This agreement was registered under section 6-B (2) of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, vide annexure-3 to the writ petition. The petitioner contends that all outstanding disputes between the petitioner and the workmen were settled by the aforesaid settlement dated 19-10-1989. Hence, the petitioner moved an application before the Labour Court for deciding the adjudication case No. 294 of 1988 in terms of the settlement dated 19-10-1989. A true copy of the said application is annexure-4 to the writ petition. However, by the order dated 3-12-91 (annexure-6 to the writ petition) the Labour Court has rejected the said application. Aggrieved, the; petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 3-12-1991, and praying for a mandamus directing the Labour Court to decide the adjudication case as per settlement dated 19-10-1989. 3. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged in this case, and I have heard Shri S. S. Bhatnagar, and Shri M. B. Saxena for petitioner, and Shri K.P. Agarwal for respondent No. 3, I am, therefore, disposing of this case finally in accordance with the Rules of the Court. 4. I have perused the settlement dated 19-10-1989. This settlement has been signed by the employees, and representatives of various Unions. 4. I have perused the settlement dated 19-10-1989. This settlement has been signed by the employees, and representatives of various Unions. It also bears the signature of the Additional Labour Commissioner, U. P. The settlement states that the employers has closed down the unit for being unprofitable, and this gave rise to disputes which could not be settled by the parties themselves. Thereafter, talks took place in the presence of two Honourable Ministers, and the Labour Commissioner, U. P. which led to the settlement whose terms were set out below. 5. The paragraphs in the settlement dated 19-10-89 which are relevant to this writ petition are paragraphs 10 and 14, paragraph 10 states "All disputes/cases pending before the High Court, Industrial Tribunal, or Labour Court, whether individual or collective shall stand disposed off by this settlement, and all such matters shall be withdrawn from the courts where they are pending." Paragraph 14 states "On the basis of this settlement all disputes arising out of the closure of the factory shall stand disposed off." 6. I have also perused the impugned order dated 3-12-1991. The said order states (in para 10) that the matter regarding termination of service of the workmen does not come within the scope of the settlement. Shri Bhatnagar has invited my attention to clause 10 of the settlement dated 19 -10-89, and he has contended that in view of this clause all the disputes including the dispute regarding validity of termination of service of respondent No. 3 will stand disposed off in terms of the settlement dated 19-10-89. Shri Bhatnagar contended that clause 10 of the said settlement has been wholly ignored by the Labour Court in its order dated 3-12-1991. Shri Bhatnagar also contended that the respondent No. 3 was a member of the Chemical Factory Mazdoor Union as is evident from the certificate dated 25-1-1992, which is annexure 'RA-1' to the rejoinder affidavit. Since the Chemical Factory Mazdoor Union was represented by its Vice President under the settlement dated 19-10-89, Shri Bhatnagar has contended that the said settlement was binding on the respondent No. 3. 7. On the other hand. Shri K. P. Agarwal appearing for respondent No. 3 has argued that the settlement dated 19-10-1989 was not binding on respondent No 3. Since the Chemical Factory Mazdoor Union was represented by its Vice President under the settlement dated 19-10-89, Shri Bhatnagar has contended that the said settlement was binding on the respondent No. 3. 7. On the other hand. Shri K. P. Agarwal appearing for respondent No. 3 has argued that the settlement dated 19-10-1989 was not binding on respondent No 3. In para 4 of the counter affidavit it has been alleged that the respondent No. 3 had not authorised any of the trade Unions to settle the dispute arising out of his termination of service. Shri K. P. Agarwal has also invited my attention to annexure 'CA-1' to the counter affidavit on the basis of which he contends that it was not the Union but the respondent No. 3 himself who raised the dispute regarding his termination of service. 8. In my opinion, the dispute regarding termination of service of the respondent No. 3 cannot be said to have been settled by the settlement dated 19-10-1989 IN this connection it is important to keep certain fundamental concepts clear. The policy behind the Industrial Disputes Act (as well as U. P. Industrial Disputes Act) is to protect the workmen as a class vide Indian Cable Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen, 1962 I LLJ 409. An individual dispute does not by itself become an industrial dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by the Union or a substantial number of workmen of the same establishment vide Western India Match Company v Ist Union, 1970 II LIJ 256 SC. A dispute raised by a single workman cannot become an industrial dispute unless it is supported either by his Union or in the absence of a Union by a substantial number of workmen of the establishment, vide Workmen of Indian Express Newspapers Private Limited v. The Management of the INdian Express, 1970, II LLJ 132 SC. From the aforesaid decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court it becomes clear that ordinarily if a Union settles the dispute with the management, such settlement will be binding on the workmen who are its members. This is so because in view of the principle of collective bargaining an individual workman is not a party to an industrial dispute, and he has to ordinarily accept the decision taken by his Union. This is so because in view of the principle of collective bargaining an individual workman is not a party to an industrial dispute, and he has to ordinarily accept the decision taken by his Union. Hence, if section 2A had not been inserted into the statute Shri Bhatnagar's argument would have been perfectly correct. 9. However, an exception was made to the principle of collective bargaining by section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (which was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act in 1965, and in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act in 1978). Section 2-A marks a significant departure from the principle of collective bargaining. Under section 2-A it is not necessary in matters relating to termination off service etc that there must be an espousal by the Union of the workman's cause. Hence, in matters relating to termination, discharge, dismissal or retrenchment, the Union cannot enter into a settlement with the management which will be binding on the worker whose service is terminated without such workman's consent. In the present case the service of the petitioner was terminated in 1985, and hence, unless his consent is taken, the Union has no right to settle the dispute relating to his termination of service. The absence of any mention of paragraph 10 of the settlement in the order dated 3-12-91 is, therefore, of no consequence. 10. There are no doubt certain decisions of the Supreme Court where it has been held that if the vast majority of the workers reach to a settlement with the employer such a settlement is binding even on the workers who are not a party to it or who refuse to accept it vide M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1981 SC 2163 , Balmer Lawrie Workers Union v. Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 311 . Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad .v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., AIR 1990 SC 180H, etc. The principle underlying these decisions is contained in section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which makes settlements in the course of conciliation binding even on non-parties vide General Manager, Security Paper Mill v. R. S. Sharma, AIR 1986 SC 955. However, settlement not in the course of settlement are only binding on the parties, vide section 18 (1). The principle underlying these decisions is contained in section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which makes settlements in the course of conciliation binding even on non-parties vide General Manager, Security Paper Mill v. R. S. Sharma, AIR 1986 SC 955. However, settlement not in the course of settlement are only binding on the parties, vide section 18 (1). In the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act section 68 corresponds to section 18 (1) of the Central Act, but there is no provision in the U. P. Act corresponding to section 18 (3) of the Central Act. Hence section 18 (3) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act applies in U. P. also as there is no repugnant provision in the U. P. Act, vide Article 254 of the Constitution. It follows that by virtue off section 18 (3) Settlements in the course of conciliation reached with a Union (or Unions) representing a vast majority of the workman of the establishment would ordinarily be binding on the minority union or minority of workers even if they object to it. 11. However, the above principle has some exceptions, and one main exception is relating to disputes covered by section 2-A. Such disputes covered by section 2-A are in fact individual disputes which are treated by legal fiction to be industrial disputes. Hence in such cases an individual workman (whose service is terminated etc) cannot be bound by any settlement between the employer and the Union or Unions, unless he consents to such settlement The above mentioned decisions will, therefore, not apply to disputes covered by section 2-A. 12. It may be noticed that in the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co Ltd. case (supra) the dispute was; relating to the demand of the workers for higher additional daily wage. In the Balmer Lawrie case (supra) the dispute was regarding deduction of 13% of the arrears. In the Baraumi Refinery case (supra) the dispute was regarding the age of superannuation. Thus, in none of these cases the dispute was regarding a matter covered by section 2-A. Hence,. all these rulings are distinguishable, and their principle will not apply to the facts of the present case. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the order of the labour court dated 3-12-1991 is correct, and calls for no interference. all these rulings are distinguishable, and their principle will not apply to the facts of the present case. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the order of the labour court dated 3-12-1991 is correct, and calls for no interference. However, I make it clear that in case the termination of service of respondent No 3 is set aside by the Labour Court, the Labour Court will not have jurisdiction to grant salary for the period after the date of closure. 13. In the writ petition No. 751 of 1992, M/s. Hari Fertilizers v. State of U P. and others, the reference in respect of workman's termination was made at the instance of the Union. However, since I am of the opinion hat the Union has no right to settle the dispute regarding the termination service of a workman without his consent. this distinction is not material. of whether the dispute regarding termination of service of the workman was made at the instance of the Union or of the workman, in either case before such a dispute is settled, the consent of the workman must be taken. 14. In view of the above, I uphold the order dated 3-12-1991, though for reasons other than those mentioned in the order. The writ petitions are consequently dismissed There is no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.