C. S. Sathya v. State of Karnataka and another — 1992 DIGILAW 375 (MAD)

Judgment : Criminal Revision Petition No.143 of 1989 is filed by the petitioner who is an accused in C.C.No.1597 of 1982 on the file of the Additional Munsif and J.M.F.C, Udupi, D.K., Criminal Revision Petition No.144 of 1989 is filed by the petitioner who is an accused in C.C.No.1442 of 1982, on the file of the same J.M.F.C. Both the cases are registered on the complaint of respondent No.2. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Respondent No.2 has filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that they have committed an offence punishable under Sec.500 of I.P.C. The petitioner filed application under Sec.177 read with Sec.201 of Crl.P.C. for their discharge. The learned Judge passed a common order in both the applications dismissing the said applications. As both these criminal revision petitions directed against the common order passed in both the criminal cases by the learned J.M.F.C, I have heard both these cases together and I am passing a common order in them. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and the learned counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the records of the case. 5. It is the case of respondent No.2, that accused No.2 in his weekly “Jwalamukhi” dated 12-2-1982 edited, printed and published an article defaming respondent No.2 and the complainant saw the weekly in question at Hubli and therefore, the petitioners have committed the offence punishable under Sec.500, I.P.C. and the J.M.F.C, court at Hubli has got jurisdiction to try the same. 6. The petitioners filed applications for their discharge on the ground that the J.M.F.C. Court at Hubli has no jurisdiction to try the case, as according to the averments in the complainants the acts of editing, printing and publishing the said weekly had been committed at Bangalore. 7. Sec.179 of Crl.P.C. lays down that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been one or such consequence has ensued. 8. 7. Sec.179 of Crl.P.C. lays down that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been one or such consequence has ensued. 8. In Kamal Singh Badalia v. State, 1980 Crl.L.J. (NOC) 59, the Calcutta High Court has held that Sec.179 can apply only to a case where a person is charged with an offence which constitutes not only the act committed by him but also the consequence which has ensued from the act. If the consequence is not part of the offence then Sec.179 has no application. In that case it was held where the defamatory letter was written by the accused at Patna to the Secretary of the Government at Bihar and the contents of the letter were made known to the officials of Government of Bihar before forwarding a copy thereof to another person in Calcutta. Therefore, it was held in that case that the ingredient of publication was completed at Patna when the contents of the letter were made known to the officials in the Secretariat. 9. In Banka Behari Singh v. O.M.Thomas, A.I.R. 1960 Ori. 126, Sec.179 came for interpretation in respect of books and His Lordship Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court held, “The consequence referred to in Sec.179, Crl.P.C. must be a part of the offence with which the accused person is charged. If as soon as an act is committed, offence is complete at the place where the act is committed and then merely because the same offence is repeated at another place, latter offence cannot be said to be a ‘consequence’ arising out of the very same act within the meaning of the aforesaid section. 10. In Ganga Prasad Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain, A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 128, again Sec.179 of Crl.P.C, came for interpretation and the court has held that the court within whose limits imputation was published, has jurisdiction to try the offence. 10. In Ganga Prasad Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain, A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 128, again Sec.179 of Crl.P.C, came for interpretation and the court has held that the court within whose limits imputation was published, has jurisdiction to try the offence. In the ruling also His Lordship has held as follows: “On a careful perusal of Sec.179, it is quite clear to me that the word ‘consequence’ occurring therein indicates only that consequence which is an integral part of the offence and not a consequence which is not material to the culpability of the accused in relation to that particular offence”. .11. In M.H Alexander v. Smt.Claira Alexander, A.I.R. 1959 All. 67, again Sec.179 came to be interpreted. In that ruling it has been held as follows: .“Sec.179, Crl.P.C. applies to those offences only where the act and its consequence taken together constitute the offence which is charged It may be that the act by itself amounts to an offence and when this act is taken together with the consequence it constitutes a different offence. If the accused is to be prosecuted for the act alone then the jurisdiction of the court where the consequence occurred will not arise, but if the accused is prosecuted for that offence which was completed by the act followed by its consequence then the courts where the act was committed and where the consequence ensued will both have jurisdiction to try the offence. The test to apply is whether the offender could have been prosecuted and punished for the offence charged even if the alleged consequence had not ensued. If the answer is in the affirmative then Sec.179, Crl.P.C. does not apply, but if the answer is in the negative Sec.179, Crl.P.C. does apply. It should also be remembered that the consequence should be closely related to the act and not merely a remote and contingent result. A proximity of time is essential between the act and the consequence. A consequence which is not so related to the act may at best provide evidence of the act. It does not become a part of the act." 12. A proximity of time is essential between the act and the consequence. A consequence which is not so related to the act may at best provide evidence of the act. It does not become a part of the act." 12. The test laid down by this ruling is, the test to find out as to whether Sec.179, Crl.P.C will come into play in a particular place or not is, whether the offender could have been prosecuted and punished for the offence charged even if the alleged consequence had not ensued. If the answer is in the affirmative then Sec.179, Crl.P.C. does not apply and if the answer is in the negative, Sec. 179, Crl.P.C. docs apply. .13. Sec.500 of I.P.C. describes punishment for defamation and Sec.499 defines defamation. The offence of defamation is committed by any person who by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases mentioned under the exceptions, to defame that person. Therefore, in order to constitute that offence not only the words should be written or spoken to, there must also be publication and they must be intended to harm the reputation of a person. The offence of defamation as defined in Sec.499 becomes complete when a publication is made and that publication should intend to harm the reputation of another person. Consequence of harming and intending harming reputation of another person by a publication is a part of the ingredient of the offence as defined in Sec.499 of I.P.C. Therefore, under Sec.179 of Crl.P.C, either the court where the words are spoken which are intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations makes or publishes or where the consequence of harming the reputation of another person ensue, have got the jurisdiction to try the case. The law that has been laid down by the various High Courts in the rulings referred to above is clear on this point that the consequence that ensue must form part of the ingredients of the offence and if it is not a part of the ingredients of the offence then the consequence even if it takes place in the jurisdiction of another court, it will not give jurisdiction to try the offence. In the instant case, from the complaint itself it can be seen that the alleged defamatory matter was published at Bangalore itself. When the matter is published in a paper or a weekly, it is intended to be read. So the consequence of harming the reputation of the complainant has ensued at Bangalore itself. The complainant reading or having come to know of this alleged defamatory matter at Udupi is not an ingredient of the offence, because the offence itself is completed at Bangalore. Therefore, in my opinion, the court at Bangalore alone has got jurisdiction to try the offence. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 relied on Slate of Punjab v. Nohar Chand, (1984)3 S.C.C. 512 :1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 432:1984 Crl.L.J. 1153.A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1492, wherein it has been held as follows: "The court where the sub-standard fertilizer is marketed will equally have jurisdiction to try the manufacturer of the sub-standard fertilizer whose manufacturing activity is at a different place." 14. This ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in fact supports the proposition that the court where consequence which form part of the ingredient of the offence ensued will have jurisdiction to try the offence. In that case the sub-standard fertilizers were marketed at one place and they were manufactured at another place. Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that either the place where the sub-standard fertilizer was manufactured or where it was marketed, the court has jurisdiction to try the manufacturer. It does not lay down any proposition contrary to what has been discussed by the various High Courts referred to in the rulings quoted above. The learned J.M.F.C, relied upon a ruling of our High Court reported in S.Bangarappa v. Ganesh Narayan Hegde, (1984)1 Kar.L.J.495: I.L.R. (1984)2 Karn. 278. It does not lay down any proposition contrary to what has been discussed by the various High Courts referred to in the rulings quoted above. The learned J.M.F.C, relied upon a ruling of our High Court reported in S.Bangarappa v. Ganesh Narayan Hegde, (1984)1 Kar.L.J.495: I.L.R. (1984)2 Karn. 278. In that case it has been held that on account of the publication in ‘Sanje Vani’ the court at Bangalore has got jurisdiction to try, but it does not mean that the court at Hubli has no jurisdiction for the “Samyukta Karnataka” daily was printed and published at Hubli. His Lordship in that ruling has held that the offences contemplated by Sec.179, Crl.P.C, are those which are not complete till a special consequence has ensued. His Lordship has also reiterated the well-known principle of law that the consequence must be the essential ingredient of the offence and it must arise within the jurisdiction of the court trying the offence. Therefore, the law laid down by this Court in this ruling is not contrary to what the other High Courts have held in the rulings cited above. The law is that the consequence that ensued must be an essential ingredient of the offence so as to give jurisdiction to that court where the consequence has ensued to try the offence under Sec.179, Crl.P.C. But on the facts of that case, His Lordship held that not only the court at Bangalore, but the court at Hubli had jurisdiction to try the offence. In that case, the allegations were that the petitioner had made a defamatory statement at Bangalore, which was published in ‘Sanje Vani’ at Bangalore on that day and it was also published in “Samyukta Karnataka” at Hubli. Therefore, there was publication at Hubli also. If there were not to be a publication in “Samyukta Karnataka” on 24. 1983, then Hubli Court could not have had jurisdiction in view of the law laid down by this Court in that case. It is on account of the fact that the ‘Sanje Vani’ has published defamatory statement in Bangalore and it was published at Hubli, in its edition at Hubli, Hubli has jurisdiction to try the offence. But in the case on hand, it is not the case of the complainant that there was any other publication at Udupi. The publication is only once and that is at Bangalore. But in the case on hand, it is not the case of the complainant that there was any other publication at Udupi. The publication is only once and that is at Bangalore. There was no fresh publication of the alleged defamatory matter at Udupi. Therefore, there was no consequence forming part of the offence of defamation that has ensued within the jurisdiction of Udupi Court. Another ruling relied upon by the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for respondent No.2 in this case is reported in Subramaniam Swamy v. P.S.Pai, (1984)2 Crl.L.J, 1329. There also the position of law laid down is that in order to give jurisdiction to a court either the offence or the consequence ensued from that offence forming part of the ingredients of the offence must take place within the jurisdiction of that court. There also the petitioner had made some defamatory statements in a Press Conference at Chandigarh and that was published in a newspaper at Bombay. The facts of those cases are different from the facts of this case. The alleged defamatory statement was made by the accused at Chandigarh. Therefore, the court at Chandigarh had also jurisdiction to try the offence, but it was published in newspaper circulated and read in Bombay, that is the consequence that has ensued within the jurisdiction of Bombay Court by virtue of publication of that statement in a newspaper published at Bombay. Therefore, on the facts of that case it has been held by the Bombay High Court that the court at Bombay had jurisdiction to try the offence. 15. Therefore, mere circulation of the paper at Udupi is not a consequence ensued from the act of the accused which forms part of the ingredients of the offence alleged in the case, as no part of the offence or its consequence has ensued within the jurisdiction of Udupi Court, and hence that court has no jurisdiction to try the offence alleged by the complainant in his complaint. 16. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that the plea taken by the petitioners is at a highly belated stage and it is taken only with a view to protract the matter. Under Sec.461, Crl.P.C, if any Magistrate, not being empowered by law tries any offender, the irregularity will vitiate the entire proceedings. Therefore, want of jurisdiction is a serious irregularity. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that the plea taken by the petitioners is at a highly belated stage and it is taken only with a view to protract the matter. Under Sec.461, Crl.P.C, if any Magistrate, not being empowered by law tries any offender, the irregularity will vitiate the entire proceedings. Therefore, want of jurisdiction is a serious irregularity. Therefore, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. The evidence has not begun in this case. Even if it were to begin and if it were to be proved that it had no jurisdiction, it could not have proceeded with the case after having come to know that it had no jurisdiction to try the case. 17. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340, the Supreme Court has held that a defect of jurisdiction, where it is pecuniary or territorial, or where it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. 18. Therefore, mere delay on the part of the petitioners to raise thisplea cannot make the court to overlook the fact that Udupi court has nojurisdiction to try the offence alleged by the complainant in his complaint andto permit the proceedings to go ahead inspite of the court coming to know thatthat court has no jurisdiction to try the offence. It will amount to abuse ofthe process of court and such proceedings will also be vitiated under Sec.461 ofCrl.P.C. 19. The learned counsel for respondent No.2, relied on, Munithayammav. Muddobalappa, A.I.R. 1955 Mys. 135, where it has been held that underSec.531,Crl.P.C. the proceedings in a wrong court are not to be treated asinvalid unless there is failure of justice. That ruling will not hold respondentNo.2 because there the point decided was that High Court under Sec.526, Crl.P.C.can transfer a case from a court having no jurisdiction to a court havingjurisdiction. The question of interpretation of Sec.179, Crl.P.C. vis-a-vis Sec.500,I.P.C. was not at all involved in that ruling. Learned counsel for respondentNo.2 further argued that by virtue of Sec.465, Crl.P.C, finding of sentence ofthe court will not be reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity,even if the court has no jurisdiction to try the offence. The question of interpretation of Sec.179, Crl.P.C. vis-a-vis Sec.500,I.P.C. was not at all involved in that ruling. Learned counsel for respondentNo.2 further argued that by virtue of Sec.465, Crl.P.C, finding of sentence ofthe court will not be reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity,even if the court has no jurisdiction to try the offence. But the point to benoted is the findings or sentence or order must be of a court of competentjurisdiction, so as to make its finding not liable for disturbance underSec.465, Crl.P.C. When the Udupi court is not having any jurisdiction at all,Sec.465, Crl.P.C. will not be attracted to any finding, order or sentence passedby them. Hence it will be sheer waste of time, energy to allow the proceedingsto go on in the court of Udupi, which is not having competent jurisdiction totry the offences alleged by the complainant in his complaint, in the fond hopethat the finding or sentence passed by that court will protected under Sec.465,Crl.P.C. 20. For the reasons discussed above, criminal revision petitions areallowed. Impugned order is set aside and the applications of the petitionersfiled under Sec.177 of Crl.P.C, arc allowed. 21. Learned Magistrate is directed to return the complaints of thecomplainant with an endorsement for presentation of the complaints to the propercourt. The bail bonds of the petitioners are cancelled in the said cases. Thecomplainant is at liberty to prosecute his complaint in the court of competentjurisdiction.