JUDGMENT M. K. Mukherjee, C.J. 1. By an order dated January 25, 1992, the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Lalganj, District Azamgarh (hereinafter referred to as the Magistrate') suspended the appellant herein from the office of the Pradhan of Chandewra Gaon Sabha on the allegation that he had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 36,119,75, which was entrusted to him for Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (Yojana, for short). Aggrieved thereby, he filed a writ petition, which was summarily dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court Hence this Special Appeal at his instance. 2. In assailing the order of suspension, Mr V. C. Misra, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, first contended that the U P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 ('Act, for short), by which the functioning of the appellant as the Pradhan was governed, did not cast any duty upon him to deal with the funds of the Yojana, and, therefore, the Magistrate had no power to suspend him for the alleged misappropriation of the funds thereof. He next contended that even if it was assumed that the allegation of misappropriation was true, the appellant could at best be; prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code, but no disciplinary action under the Act could be taken against him. The third submission of Mr Misra was that as the impugned order of suspension did not record any satisfaction of the Magistrate that the grounds, on which action was proposed under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act, existed, it was void ab initio in view of the second proviso to section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act. He next submitted that the contents of the impugned order clearly disclosed a dosed mind of the Magistrate and, therefore, any inquiry pursuant thereto would be an empty formality.. He lastly submitted that before passing the impugned order of suspension, the appellant should have been given a notice to show cause against the same. All the above contentions of Mr. Misra were seriously contested try the learned Standing Counsel. To appreciate the contentions [raised by Mr. Misra, it will be necessary at this stage to set out section 95 of the Act, so far as it is relevant for our purposes :- "95. Inspection-(1) The State Government may - (a)........ ........ (b) ................. (c) ........ ......... (d) ................. (e) ........ ........ (f) ........ ......... To appreciate the contentions [raised by Mr. Misra, it will be necessary at this stage to set out section 95 of the Act, so far as it is relevant for our purposes :- "95. Inspection-(1) The State Government may - (a)........ ........ (b) ................. (c) ........ ......... (d) ................. (e) ........ ........ (f) ........ ......... (g) remove a member of Nyaya Panchyat or a joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he - (i) .......... (ii) .......... (iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or (iv) .......... (v) .......... (gg) suspend a Pradhan or Up Pradhan or a member of Gaon Panchayat or Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or a panch, sarpanch or sahavak sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat against whom proceedings under clause (h) are contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending : Provided that :- (i) no action shall be taken under clause (f) clause (g) or clause (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed : (ii) no action shall be taken under clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under clause (h) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist." 3. To bring home his first contention, Mr. Misra argued, relying upon clause (g) (iii) above, that persistent failure on the part of the appellant to perform his duties imposed by the Act or the rules made thereunder might entitle a Magistrate to take steps for his removal and, for that matter, his suspension, but then, alleged dealing with the funds of the Yojana being no part of his duties under the Act, for breach thereof recourse to section 95 could not be had for removal or suspension of the appellant. 4. 4. A plain reading of clause (g) (iii) shows that in any of the fact situations envisaged therein, namely, (i) abusing the position as pradhan, (ii) presistent failure to perfrom the duties imposed by the Act or the rules made there under and (iii) his continuance as Pradhan being undsirable in public interest, proceeding for removal can be initiated. As the allegation shows, the appellant as the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha was entrusted with the money of the Yojana, and if the allegation is true he has, by misappropriating the money, abused his position qua pradhan. The case, therefore, squarely falls under the first part of sub clause (iii) of clause (g) of section 95 (1) of the Act. The first contention of Mr. Misra, therefore, fails. Coming to the second contention of Mr. Misra, we find from clause (gg) above that a Pradhan, against whom proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which, in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending, may be suspended. Therefore, even if no prosecution is launched against a pradhan, he can still be suspended, provided a proceeding under clause (g) is pending or contemplated against him. It cannot be said, therefore, that merely because no prosecution has been launched against the appellant under the Indian Penal Code, he cannot be proceeded against under section 95 of the Act. This contention of Mr. Misra, therefore, also fails. 5. To buttress his third contention, Mr. Misra relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Khazan Singh v. Sub Divisional Officer Aligarh, 1978 AWC 1 , and a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Girja Shankar Shukla v. Sub Divisional Magistrate Khaga, (1990) 2 UP LB EC 1225. In Khazan Singh (supra), a case under section 409 IPC was registered by Station Officer, PS Lodha against the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha and the station officer submitted a report to the Sub Divisional Officer requesting him that during the pendency of the investigation he (the Pradhan) should be placed under suspension. In Khazan Singh (supra), a case under section 409 IPC was registered by Station Officer, PS Lodha against the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha and the station officer submitted a report to the Sub Divisional Officer requesting him that during the pendency of the investigation he (the Pradhan) should be placed under suspension. Acting upon the aforesaid report, the sub divisional officer placed the Pradhan under suspension under section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act In setting aside the order of suspension, the Division Bench observed that there was nothing in the impugned order or in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents to indicate that the Sub Divisional officer before making the order of suspension, took care to prima facie satisfy himself that the grounds, on which he was proposing to hold inquiry under clause (g) against the Pradhan, existed, as was required. In making the above observation, the Division Bench pointed out that in the counter-affidavit, it was merely stated that a case under section 409 IPC was being investigated against the pradhan. 6. This case does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that prima facie satisfaction of the Sub Divisional Officer has to be recorded in the order itself, as contended by Mr.Misra. On the contrary, the observations made by the Division Bench indicate that the grounds be disclosed at a later stage in the counter-affidavit also. The case of Girja Shankar Shukla (supra) however, fully supports the contention of Mr. Misra inasmuch as it has been clearly held therein that the prima facie satisfaction required under section 95 (1) (gg) has to be recorded and mere mentioning of charges in the order of suspension would not be sufficient. The case of Girja Shankar Shukla (supra) however, fully supports the contention of Mr. Misra inasmuch as it has been clearly held therein that the prima facie satisfaction required under section 95 (1) (gg) has to be recorded and mere mentioning of charges in the order of suspension would not be sufficient. We regret our inability to accept the above proposition of law laid down by the learned Single Judge, firstly because even the Division Bench in the case of Khazan Singh (supra) has not gone to the extent of saying that the satisfaction could not be proved by evidence aliunde through a counter affidavit and secondly because we are in complete agreement with the contrary view taken by another learned Single Judge of this court in an earlier decision in the case of Ratan Singh v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, 1987 AWC 424 , wherein it was observed as under : "...It is not the requirement of the statute that in the order of suspension passed under clause (gg) there should be a recital that the officer passing an order of suspension is prima facie satisfied of the existence of the grounds for taking an action under clause (g) It follows that the validity of the order of suspension does not depend upon the recital of a prima facie satisfaction in it, what is necessary is that there should be actual prima facie satisfaction of the existence of the grounds under clause (g) for the passing of the order in consequence of such satisfaction. It further follows that the defect can be removed by showing other evidence, in proceedings, when a challenge is made to the validity of the order that in fact the officer concerned was prima facie satisfied of the existence of the grounds. It appears from the judgment delivered in the case of Girja Shankar Shukla (supra) that the learned Judges' attention was not drawn to the above two cases of Ratan Singh (supra) and Khazam Singh (supra). 7. While on this point, we may profitably refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial tribunal U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1381 . In that case, certain industrial disputes were referred to the Industrial tribunal under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by two general orders of the State Government. Ltd. v. State Industrial tribunal U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1381 . In that case, certain industrial disputes were referred to the Industrial tribunal under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by two general orders of the State Government. The orders did not contain the requisite satisfaction that was to be recorded by the State Government in accordance with section 3 of the said Act. In negating the contention of the employer that the Government did not record the necessary satisfaction in the orders themselves, the Supreme Court observed :- "The power to pass an order under section 3 arises as soon as the necessary opinion required thereunder is formed, this opinion is naturally formed before the order is made. If therefore such an opinion was formed and an order was passed thereafter, the subsequent order would be a valid exercise of the power conferred by the section. The fact that in the notification which is made thereafter to publish the order, the formation of the opinion is not recited will not take away the power to make the order which had already arisen and led to the making of the order. The validity of the order therefore does not depend upon the recital of the formation of the opinion in the order but upon the actual formation of the opinion and the making of the order in consequence. It would therefore follow that if by inadvertence or otherwise the recital of the formation of the opinion is not mentioned in the preamble to the order the defect can be remedied by showing by other evidence in proceedings where challenge is made to the validity of the order, that in fact the order was made after such opinion had been formed and was thus a valid exercise of the power conferred by the law. The only exception to this course would be where the statute requires that there should be a recital in the order itself before it can be validly made." "Our conclusion therefore is that where certain conditions precedent have to be satisfied before a subordinate authority can pass an order (be it executive or of the character of subordinate legislation), it is not necessary that the satisfaction of those conditions mast be recited in the order itself, unless the statute requires it. though, as we have already remarked, it is most desirable that it should be so, for in that case the presumption that the conditions were satisfied would immediately arise and burden would be thrown on the person challenging the fact of satisfaction to show that what is recited is not correct But even where the recital is not there on the face of the order, the order will not become illegal abinitio and only a further burden is thrown on the authority passing the order to satisfy the court by other means that the conditions precedent were complied with " 8. For the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that failure to record the grounds of satisfaction under the second proviso to section 95 (1) (gg) does not ipso facto make the order bad and it is open to the authority making the order to satisfy the court that the condition precedent for passing the order was complied with if any challenge is thrown In the instant case, since such a challenge has been thrown, we might have to entertain this appeal and give an opportunity to the respondent to produce materials before us to prove that the Magistrate had satisfied himself about the existence of the grounds for making the order, but for the fact that the grounds, required to be disclosed under the second proviso have, in our view, been detailed in the impugned order. It is, of course, true that in the order it has not been specifically stated that the Magistrate was 'prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which the action was proposed under clause (g) existed" but then those words are not to be treated as magic incantation. What is necessary is the substance and not the form of the order, as has been rightly pointed out in the case of Ratan Singh (supra). From a perusal of the impugned order, we find that it has been, specifically stated therein that an inquiry was held regarding the nature of works done under the Yojana for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 and the Junior Engineer, who was participating in the inquiry, submitted a note on 20-1-1992 with the details, according; to which the total expenditure incurred on the job was Rs. 56825/- but according to the completion certificate, which is available in the office of the Director of Planning, the total sum allotted was Rs. 56825/- but according to the completion certificate, which is available in the office of the Director of Planning, the total sum allotted was Rs. 92944.75P Thus, according to the Magistrate, an excess payment of Rs. 36.119.75P has been taken by the Pradhan, which indicated that he has embezzled that amount. The order further recites that on the charge of misappropriation of Government funds, the Gram Pradhan was being suspended with immediate effect and Additional Tahsildar, Lalganj, was being appointed as the Inquiry officer who was asked to take immediate action. 9. It would thus be seen that the grounds on which the Magistrate obtained satisfaction to suspend the appellant have been recorded in the order and that necessarily means that the requirement of clause (gg) has been fulfilled. 10. As regards the fourth contention of Mr. Misra, we find no material from which it can be concluded that the Magistrate has formed a conclusive opinion about the guilt of the appellant so as to make the inquiry on empty formality. On the contrary, the impugned order of suspension has been passed in contemplation of a proceeding and an officer has been appointed to inquire into the allegation against the appellant. The last contention raised by Mr. Misra need not be delved into and decided by us, in view of a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Salig Ram Misra v. Collector, Deoria, 1985 UP LB EC 513, which negatived an identical contention. 11. As all the points raised by Mr. Misra fail, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.