Judgment :- Petitioner is a tenant of a building owned by the 5th respondent who sought eviction on the ground of rent arrears, bona fide need for own occupation and sublease. The rent control court allowed the petition on all the grounds. On appeal the appellate authority modified the order and granted relief only on the ground of sublease. The revisional court refused to interfere. Hence this O.P. 2. The building is alleged to have been entrusted to the 6th respondent on the strength of a lease deed. Petitioner was stated to be the sub-lessee. Sixth respondent remained ex parte. Petitioner alone contested the rent control petition. He denied the sub-lease alleged in the petition and contended that he along with the 6th respondent had taken the shop room for conducting business jointly. The lease deed is alleged to have been executed for and on behalf of petitioner also. He further contended that rent was paid by him since the date of commencement of tenancy, and that he was in continuous occupation since then. 3. The rent control court on a proper consideration of the evidence adduced on both sides came to the conclusion that the case set up by petitioner was not true and that he is in occupation as a sub-lessee. The appellate authority concurred with this finding. The revisional court did not see any irregularity or impropriety in this finding and refused to interfere. The findings of the revisional court and the authorities below are challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the relief was granted on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The contention is that the landlord has failed to establish exclusive possession with petitioner and transferred for consideration. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision of this court in Leela v. AH & others (1982 KLT 685). On the other hand, it is the contention of 5th respondent landlord that exclusive possession and transfer for consideration had been proved and the ingredients of S.11(4)(i) of the Rent Control Act have been established. Before considering the facts of the case in order to ascertain whether the order of the rent control court and the appellate authority are perverse or unreasonable and whether there is any impropriety or irregularity or illegality in such order or proceeding, it is appropriate to refer to the judicial pronouncements on this aspect. 4. Before considering the facts of the case in order to ascertain whether the order of the rent control court and the appellate authority are perverse or unreasonable and whether there is any impropriety or irregularity or illegality in such order or proceeding, it is appropriate to refer to the judicial pronouncements on this aspect. 4. A sub-tenancy or a lease involves transfer of a right to enjoy the property in consideration for a price paid or promised as set out in S.105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The creation of sub-tenancy therefore involves creation of an interest in the property, which is so transferred to the sub-lessee. It is settled law that the mere fact that any person is allowed the use of the promises while the lessee retains legal possession is not sufficient to create a sub-lease. Right of exclusive possession and enjoyment should be conferred on the sub-lessee in order to create a sub-lease. 5. Section 11 of the Rent Control Act enables the landlord of a building to get an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession on one or other of the grounds mentioned in that section. One of such grounds is sub-lease or transfer of possession by the tenant. S.11(4)(i), which enables the landlord to claim eviction on this ground, reads thus: "If the tenant after the commencement of this Act, without the consent of the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sub-lets the entire building or any portion thereof if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so". A proviso was introduced to that sub-section in 1973 by which an opportunity was given to the tenant to terminate the transfer or the sub-lease, as the case may be, within 30 days of the receipt of the notice issued by the landlord intimating the contravention of the condition in the lease or the refusal of that notice. A proviso was introduced to that sub-section in 1973 by which an opportunity was given to the tenant to terminate the transfer or the sub-lease, as the case may be, within 30 days of the receipt of the notice issued by the landlord intimating the contravention of the condition in the lease or the refusal of that notice. The contentions contemplated in S.11(4)(i) are: (1) the tenant after the commencement of the Act transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire building or any portion thereof, (2) this was done without the consent of the landlord, (3) the lease does not confer on the tenant any right to do so, and (4) the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the contravention of the said condition of the lease and the tenant has failed to terminate the transfer or the sub-lease, as the case may be, within thirty days of the receipt of the notice or the refusal thereof. 6. Interpreting the provisions contained in S.11(4)(i) this Court in Ulliveetil Abu v. Beebi (ILR 1969 (2) Ker. 575) observed that while the initial onus of proving subletting or a transfer of the leasehold is on the landlord, once the Court is satisfied that there has been a transfer of possession the onus may shift and the tenant, within whose special knowledge the facts explaining the manner in which such possession has been transferred lie, may have to bear the burden thereafter. 7. This court has again considered the matter in Sreepathi Poti v. Venkitasubramonia Iyer (1976 KIT 256). It was found that there was a transfer of possession of a portion of the premises by the tenant. It is observed that the terms and conditions under which such a transfer was made will be known only to the transferor or the transferee and not to the landlord. It is for the tenant in such cases to establish the jural relationship as obtained between him and his transferee. 8. As observed earlier considerable stress was laid by learned counsel for petitioner on the decision in Lela v. AH and others (1982 KLT 685). This court had made a survey of the decision in Sreepathi Poll's case (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnavathi v. Hans Raj (AIR 1974 SC 280). 8. As observed earlier considerable stress was laid by learned counsel for petitioner on the decision in Lela v. AH and others (1982 KLT 685). This court had made a survey of the decision in Sreepathi Poll's case (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnavathi v. Hans Raj (AIR 1974 SC 280). It was held that if exclusive possession is not established and if the letting out is not established as one for valuable consideration, it cannot be said that there is an objectionable subletting as contemplated under the Act and as explained by the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnavati's case (supra). Agreeing with the views expressed in Leela's case (supra) this court in Kalyanasundaram Filial v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922) held that it is for the landlord to allege and satisfy the rent controller about the ingredients contemplated in S.11(4)(i) of the Act. 9. The position therefore is that the burden is on the landlord to establish transfer of exclusive possession by the tenant for valuable consideration. It has also to be shown that the lease does not confer on the tenant a right to sub-lease or transfer and an opportunity had been given to the tenant to terminate the transfer or the sub-lease by the notice contemplated in proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act. Is that burden of the landlord static? Does the onus shift to the tenant and, if so, when? These a re aspects to be considered in the light of the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Krishnavati's case (supra). 10. In interpreting the provisions of the statute and applying the judicial principles to the facts of a particular case, the court cannot ignore the realities of the situation and adopt a straightjacket formula. How can the landlord establish "exclusive possession of the sub-tenant" and "transfer for consideration"? Is it sufficient if the landlord enters the witness box and the tender's evidence about transfer of possession to the sub-tenant and about such transfer for consideration? Has he to produce documents to establish transfer of possession and payment of consideration to the tenant? The landlord may not be in a position to prove these facts by a concrete evidence in the form of documents. Has he to produce documents to establish transfer of possession and payment of consideration to the tenant? The landlord may not be in a position to prove these facts by a concrete evidence in the form of documents. Experience tells me that to insist the landlord to produce such evidence is asking for the impossible A is here that the observations of the Supreme Court in Krishnavati's case (supra) are to be correctly understood. The Supreme Court held: "Sub-letting was, therefore, the principal ground on which eviction was sought. When eviction is sought on that ground it is now settled law that the onus to prove sub-letting is on the landlord. If the landlord prima facie shows that the occupant who was in exclusive possession of the premises let out for valuable consideration, it would then be for the tenant to rebut the evidence". 11. This part of the observation, though quoted in Leela's case (supra), was omitted to be noticed by the court. On the other hand, considerable importance is seen given to the proof of exclusive possession of the premises and transfer for valuable consideration. The Supreme Court has laid down the law in clear terms. The onus of proving the sub-lease is on the landlord. But it was made clear that if the landlord prima facie shows that the occupant was in exclusive possession let out for valuable consideration, i the burden shifts and it is for the tenant to rebut that evidence. The burden is therefore not static. When once the initial burden cast on the landlord has been discharged, the tenant has to establish in what capacity the occupant is in possession and what are the terms of the transfer. 12. How can this initial burden be discharged? It can be in the form of oral evidence. The landlord can enter the witness box and speak about the exclusive possession by the sub-lessee. Such proof can also be by producing whatever documents the landlord is able to get. When once such evidence is adduced or produced, the burden shifts to the tenant who will be in a position to explain in what capacity the occupant is in possession. The observation of Namboodiripad, J. in Sreepathi Poti's case (supra) assumes considerable importance in this connection. When once such evidence is adduced or produced, the burden shifts to the tenant who will be in a position to explain in what capacity the occupant is in possession. The observation of Namboodiripad, J. in Sreepathi Poti's case (supra) assumes considerable importance in this connection. This court observed that the terms and conditions under which a transfer was made will be known only to the transferor and the transferee and not to the landlord. In such cases it is for the tenant to establish the jural relationship as between him and his transferee. The decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnavati's case (supra) was not specifically referred to in that decision, but the principle of the decision regarding the onus of proof is seen to have been applied. When once the burden cast on the landlord is only a prima facie proof of "exclusive possession of the premises let out for valuable consideration" and the burden thereafter is on the tenant to rebut that evidence, it cannot be said that these observations in Sreepathi Poti's case (supra) are "of a very wide character" as stated in Lela's case. Part of the observation of the Supreme Court was relied on in that case to hold that if exclusive occupation is not established and if the letting out is not established as one for valuable consideration, it cannot be said there is an objectionable sub-letting as contemplated under the Act. The other portion casting the burden on the tenant to rebut the evidence was omitted to be noticed. On the other hand, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court had been noticed in Sreepathi Poti's case and Ulliveettil Abu's case (supra), though no reference as such was made to that decision in Sreepathi Poti's case. To the extent to which the observations in Lela's case are against the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and in the two earlier rulings referred above, the decision in Leela's case has only to be treated as per incurium. 13. The position that emerges is that the burden to prove sub-lease or transfer of possession is on the landlord to enable him to get an order of eviction. Such burden is only a prima facie one. 13. The position that emerges is that the burden to prove sub-lease or transfer of possession is on the landlord to enable him to get an order of eviction. Such burden is only a prima facie one. If the landlord is able to show prima facie that the occupant is in exclusive possession of the premises let out for valuable consideration, the burden shifts to the tenant. It is for him to rebut the evidence and to explain how the occupant is in possession. As observed in Sreepathi Poti's case the terms of the transfer are known only to the tenant and the sub-lessee or transferee, as the case may be. Needless to say that those transactions are entered in to clandestinely in order to avoid the risk of eviction by the landlord. The prima facie proof of sub-lease or transfer can be in the form of oral evidence of the landlord himself and/or by persons who are aware of those facts. The court has to assess that evidence along with any document which the landlord is able to produce. When once both parties had adduced evidence, the burden of proof loses its importance. The court has only to assess the en tire evidence in order to find whether there had been a transfer of possession by the tenant for consideration. The duration of possession of the building, however long it may be, is no reason to deny the landlord his right to get eviction provided the ingredients of S.11(4)(i) are established. The Rent Control Act is intended to prevent unreasonable eviction and to permit the landlord to get possession of the building only on one or other of the grounds specified in S.11 of the Act. When that is established by the landlord and the claim has been found to be bona fide, the consequence is a direction to put the landlord in possession of the building. 14. Coming to the facts of the case, both the rent control court and the appellate authority found petitioner to be a sub-lessee. The revisional court did not find any impropriety or illegality in the orders of the authorities below. On a perusal of the impugned judgments and on hearing counsel on both sides I am not persuaded to hold that any error apparent on the face of the record has been committed by the authorities below requiring interference by this court. The revisional court did not find any impropriety or illegality in the orders of the authorities below. On a perusal of the impugned judgments and on hearing counsel on both sides I am not persuaded to hold that any error apparent on the face of the record has been committed by the authorities below requiring interference by this court. The sub-lease alleged by the landlord was denied by the petitioner and he set up an agreement by which the building was entrusted to petitioner and the 6th respondent. There is no written agreement; but reliance was placed on some documents to prove exclusive possession by petitioner. A notebook wherein payments of rent were entered was pressed into service by petitioner. This notebook along with the other documents were considered by the authorities below and the case set up by petitioner was found to be not true. Moreover, petitioner in his deposition has stated that he got possession from the 6th respondent. The matter has been considered by the rent control court and the appellate authority in a proper manner. The only conclusion possible is that petitioner has come into possession by virtue of a transfer of possession by the 6th respondent. The case set up by petitioner was found to be not true. The revisional authority has reappraised the evidence for ascertaining whether the order of the lower authorities were improper or illegal. On such reappraisal the court found the conclusions to be neither unreasonable nor perverse. On hearing counsel and on a perusal of the 'orders 1 am of the view that there is no error apparent on the face of the record requiring interference by this court. For the aforesaid reasons the O.P. is dismissed, but without costs.