Judgment : The subject matter of dispute relates to the possession of land comprised in T.S.No.4800/ 11, T.Nagar Village corresponding to Plot No.7, New Giri Road, T.Nagar, Madras-17. The Inspector of Police, Law and Order, Teynampet Police Station, the third respondent herein, appeared to have submitted a report in Crime No.E3/1674/91 under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. to the Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk, Madras, as to the existence of a situation affecting the peace and harmony of the locality, as a conse-quenceof a scramble for possession of the subject matter of dispute between the revision petitioners herein (A Party) and respondents 1 and 2 herein (B Party), and the same was taken on file as B7/ 24093/91. The Executive Magistrate, thereafter, sent subpoena to the respective parties, requiring them to appear before him on the date specified to give material evidence with regard to the proceedings initiated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. against them. In response to the same, the parties appeared to have entered appearance and submitted their written representations in projection of their claims. The Executive Magistrate, by order dated 3. 1992, passed the following Order: “It appears to me, on the grounds duly recorded, that a dispute, likely to induce a breach of the peace, existed between Thiru G.Sethuraman and others hereinafter called the ‘A’ Party and Miss. Meenakshi and T.S.Meenakshi Sundaram hereinafter called the ‘B’ Party residing at No.23, Chinna Reddy Street, Madras 8 and at No.47, Giri Road, T.Nagar, Madras-17 respectively concerning certain dispute over the possession of land comprised in T.S.No.4800/11 T.Nagar Village corresponding to Plot No.7, New Giri Road, T.Nagar Madras-17 situate within my local jurisdiction, all the said parties were called upon to give in a written statement of their respective claims as to the fact of actual possession of the said land morefully described in the Schedule hereto and being satisfied by due inquiry and thereupon, without reference to the merits of the claim of either of the said parties to the legal right of possession, that the claim of actual possession by the said Miss.Meenakshi Ammal and T.S.Meenakshi Sundaram is true; I do decide and declare that they are in possession of the said property as described in the schedule and entitled to retain such possession until ousted by due course of law, and do strictly forbid any disturbance of their possession in the meantime.” 2. The aggrieved ‘A’ Party came forward with the present action. When the matter was listed for hearing on 13. 1992, notice of motion returnable by one week was ordered. ‘B’ Party, respondents 1 and 2, entered appearance through a counsel of their choice and the third respondent was represented by the learned Government Advocate. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would assail the impugned order by placing the following points for consideration: (i) The Executive Magistrate inheres the jurisdiction to proceed under Sec. 145(1), Crl.P.C. only when he is satisfied, on a report of the -police officer or upon other information, that a dispute, likely to cause breach of peace, exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries there of within his local jurisdiction. In the instant case, no preliminary order as contemplated under Sec.l45(1), Crl.P.C. had been passed by the Magistrate before ever he sent subpoena to the parties concerned, requiring them to appear before him, and the non-passing of the preliminary order is bad in law vitiating the entirety of the proceedings. .(ii) Nothing emerges from the impugned order as to the Magistrate having applied his mind as to the projection of the respective claims of parties, reflected by the materials in the shape of affidavits, evidence - oral and documentary, in arriving at a decision as to the factual or actual possession of the subject matter of dispute by the ‘B’ Party, notwithstanding the fact that he erred in his opinion that the possession of the subject matter of dispute by the ‘B’ Party was true. This approach of the Executive Magistrate is violative of the mandatory provision adumbrated in Sub-sec. (4) of Sec.145 which by itself is sufficient to quash the proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would, however, repel such submissions, while learned Government Advocate appearing for third respondent left the matter to the discretion of the court. 5. Even at the outset I may point out that in the facts and circumstances of the case, 1 have no option except to affix my seal of approval on the points urged by learned counsel for the petitioners. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Executive Magistrate under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. is an exceptional one and the provisions of the section will have to be strictly followed, while taking action under it. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Executive Magistrate under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. is an exceptional one and the provisions of the section will have to be strictly followed, while taking action under it. The object of the section is not to permit parties to bring their civil disputes before a criminal court or to maneuver for possession for the sake of subsequent civil litigation, but to clothe the Magistrate concerned with the power to maintain peace within his local area. Therefore, a duty is cast on the Magistrate to guard against abuse of provisions by persons using it with the object of getting possession of the property, while attempting to drive the other party to a civil court. The very jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under this section arises out of his satisfaction of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace, either on a report of a police officer or upon other information, which satisfaction must be reflected in the order which he should make in writting, stating the grounds therefor. This order, which is the sine quanon of the proceeding initiated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. must require the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or through Pleader on a specified date and time and . put in written statement of their respective claims as respects the factual or actual possession of the property in dispute. After passing of a preliminary order, a copy of the order shall be served in the rnanner provided for service of summons by the Code of Criminal Procedure upon such person or persons as may be directed by the said Magistrate and at least one copy should be affixed at some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. This service of the copy of the order is provided under Sec. 145(1) and (3) together. It is apparent that a service of summons is not enough and the preliminary order itself shall have to be served in the same pattern as service of summons. 6. This service of the copy of the order is provided under Sec. 145(1) and (3) together. It is apparent that a service of summons is not enough and the preliminary order itself shall have to be served in the same pattern as service of summons. 6. This Court, on more, than one occasion, had held that under Sec. 145(1), Cr(.P.C, the Magistrate having jurisdiction shall make an order in writing that he was satisfied either from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace existed, and the grounds of his satisfaction should be clearly stated to indicate application of mind by the Magistrate in passing the preliminary order. This provision of making an order in writing, after initial satisfaction and stating the grounds of his satisfaction, has been held to be mandatory. 7. In the instant case, the sordid fact is that no preliminary order had been passed at all and what all had been done is the despatch of subpoena to the parties concerned immediately on receipt of the police report, requiring them to appear before the Magistrate and place material evidence in projection of their claims, which is indicative of the fact that the Executive Magistrate had not at all applied his mind in deriving the subjective satisfaction, which he was expected to have before he proceeds further in the matter. 8. Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.145, Crl.P.C. enables both parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence and the Magistrate is bound not only to receive all such evidence as may be produced but he is also empowered to take such further evidence, if any, as he may think necessary. After the production of the oral evidence the Magistrate will have to decide the actual or factual possession on the evidence placed before him, on the date when the preliminary order had been passed, which necessarily implied the discussion of the evidence placed before him. 9. A perusal of the impugned order does not at all indicate reference to any evidence, oral or documentary, in deciding the question of actual or factual or physical possession. What is worse is that, since the Magistrate had not passed any preliminary order, the so-called possession by the ‘B Parly as held by the Executive Magistrate cannot at all be stated to relate to the actual or factual possession on a particular date. What is worse is that, since the Magistrate had not passed any preliminary order, the so-called possession by the ‘B Parly as held by the Executive Magistrate cannot at all be stated to relate to the actual or factual possession on a particular date. Non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Sec.l45(4) also vitiates the impugned order.‘ 10. In the backdrop of the passing of the impugned order, it cannot be stated that it is sustainable in law and it deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, this revision is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the proceedings are remitted to the file of the Executive Magistrate for fresh disposal in accordance with law.