Judgment :- The first plaintiff in the suit O.S.135 of 1977 on the file of the Munsiff-Magistrate's Court, Ponnani is the appellant in this Second Appeal. The appellant and respondents 2 to 7 herein constituted a Marumakathayam Thavazhi. The said Thavazhi was entitled to perform kazhakam services in Sree Dakshinamoorthy temple in Sivapuram. The first respondent who was a defendant in the suit is the trustee of the temple. 2. The appellant claimed that the thavazhi consisting of him self and respondents 2 to 7 was entitled to perform the kazhakam services in the temple for six months in a year and the wages due to the thavazhi was at the rate of ninety paras of paddy per year. The appellant had also taken assignment of the right of another thavazhy to perform the kazhakam services for a period of three months and thus the appellant claimed remuneration for the kazhakam services for a period of nine months in a year for the three years in question. The total amount claimed in the suit was Rs.1350/-. The suit was filed on 14-9-1977 by the appellant alone. The appellant claimed that in respect of the claim for six months he was entitled to claim on behalf of his thavazhy. In the suit an objection was taken by the defendant that after the coming into force of The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 with effect from 1-12-1976 the appellant could not sue in his capacity as the karanavan and the other members of the thavazhy not having joined the plaint, the suit was not maintainable. It must be noticed that this objection was raised by the defendant in the written statement filed on 23-5-1978. The appellant took no steps to implead the other members of the thavazhy but respondents 2 to 7 herein made an application, I.A.1103/1980 on 2-12-1980 praying that they may be impleaded as additional plaintiffs in the suit. It was submitted on their behalf that as per the arrangement between theme the appellant alone was entitled to recover the money and they are willing to have a decree passed in favour of the appellant alone. They also submitted that the appellant had transferred his rights for the subsequent years in their favour and that they have no objection to a decree being granted to the appellant in respect of the years in question. 3. They also submitted that the appellant had transferred his rights for the subsequent years in their favour and that they have no objection to a decree being granted to the appellant in respect of the years in question. 3. The trial court found the other pleas set up by the defendant not sustainable and found that the appellant was entitled to a decree for the kazhakam wages claimed. The argument raised on behalf of the defendant was that the claim of additional plaintiffs 2 to 7 (respondents 2 to 7 herein) having become barred on the date of their application for impleading filed in the suit, there cannot be a decree in favour of the appellant for the suit claim. Reliance was placed on S.21(1) of the Limitation Act. The trial court stated simply that in its opinion the amendment of the plaint related back to the date of the original institution of the suit for the purpose of limitation. It also stated that since no relief is sought by the additional plaintiffs in their favour S.21(1) of the Limitation Act had no application. The trial court therefore decreed the suit in its entirety. 4. The defendant filed an appeal before the Lower appellate Court. The only point canvassed before that court on behalf of the defendant was that the suit as against plaintiffs 2 to 7 having been barred on the day they sought to get themselves impleaded in the suit, the trial court was in error in decreeing the suit in its entirety. The Lower appellate Court found that by virtue of the provisions of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act the appellant could not maintain the suit for and on behalf of his thavazhy by indicating his status as the karanavan. It held that the members of the thavazhy had become co-owners and the other co-owners not having come forward with the suit in the time the claim for the share of the other co-owners has become barred. It therefore modified the decree of the trial court and confined it to the three months' wages taken assignment of by the appellant and 1/7th share in the wages for six months claimed by the appellant on behalf of his thavazhy. It is this decree that is challenged by the appellant in this Second Appeal. 5. It therefore modified the decree of the trial court and confined it to the three months' wages taken assignment of by the appellant and 1/7th share in the wages for six months claimed by the appellant on behalf of his thavazhy. It is this decree that is challenged by the appellant in this Second Appeal. 5. Considering the fact that the claim is for wages and is only for a sum of Rs.1350/ -it does not appear that the Second Appeal is maintainable in view of S.102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But realising that this court can in appropriate cases exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent Sri. P.N.K. Achan did not pursue that objection very seriously. 6. Sri.T.R. Govinda Warriar, Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that in paragraph 6 of the plaint the right of the thavazhy was being put forward and the question under S.21(1) of the Limitation Act is really one of bonafides and that it cannot be said that there was no bonafides on the part of the appellant in suing by himself and in respondents 2 to 7 coming forward to get themselves impleaded on objection being raised by the contesting respondent. He submitted that under the proviso to S.21(1) of the Limitation Act it can easily be seen in this case that the omission to include plaintiffs 2 to 7 was due to a mistake made in good faith and that the court can direct that the suit by them shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the appellant originally instituted the suit. He also submits that there is nothing in the Limitation Act, which compels that an order in terms of the proviso should have been passed even at the time of allowing the impleading application. He relied upon the decision reported in Gopalakrishnan Chettiar v. Annamma Devassya (AIR 1991 Ker. 72) to submit that the applicability of the proviso to S.21(1) of the Act can be considered by the court even at the time of the final disposal of the suit and if so considered on the facts and in the circumstances of the case this is a case to which the proviso to S.21(1) of the Act applies. 72) to submit that the applicability of the proviso to S.21(1) of the Act can be considered by the court even at the time of the final disposal of the suit and if so considered on the facts and in the circumstances of the case this is a case to which the proviso to S.21(1) of the Act applies. He emphasised that the question is one of bonafides and it cannot be postulated that there was any lack of bonafides in this case for, after all, the suit is only one for wages for the kazhakam services rendered by the appellant and his erstwhile thavazhy. In answer it is submitted by Sri. Achan that the objection as to non-impleadment was taken with reference to the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act as early as on 23-5-1978 and the appellant did nothing to get the other members of the erstwhile thavazhy impleaded in the suit. He also submits that the application for impleading was filed by the other members of the thavazhy and not by the appellant and that therefore the theory of bonafides propounded by Sri. Warriar has no application to the case on hand. He therefore submits strongly that the suit by additional plaintiffs 2 to 7 must be deemed to have been filed only on 2-12-1980 and in that case the suit is clearly barred in so far as plaintiffs 2 to 7 arc concerned. He also refers to the allegations in the affidavit in support of the application for impleading made by plaintiffs 2 to 7 and points out that there is no plea of the suit having been instituted on their behalf or of any bonafide omission on the part of the appellant. With reference to decided cases he also points out that the effect of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act is to bring about a statutory death of the thavazhy and on the coming in to force of the Act on 1-12-1976 the members have become co-owners with independent claims in respect of the suit amount. He submits that the proviso to S.21(1) of the Limitation Act has no application to the case on hand. 7. As noticed the suit was laid on 19-9-1977. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act came into force on 1-12-1976. He submits that the proviso to S.21(1) of the Limitation Act has no application to the case on hand. 7. As noticed the suit was laid on 19-9-1977. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act came into force on 1-12-1976. The right to claim the remuneration for kazhakam services in respect of a period of six months in an year vested with the thavazhi of the appellant and the appellant was the kaianavan of that thavazhi. With effect from 1-12-1976 the capacity to represent the thavazhi in his status as karanavan was lost by the appellant. By virtue of the provisions of the Abolition Act the members of the erstwhile thavazhy had been constituted co-owners of the right. It cannot therefore be said that the appellant had the right to institute the suit in his capacity as karanavan and seeking to represent his thavazhy in that suit. The objection of the defendant therefore that the appellant could not maintain the suit in his capacity as karanavan is correct and calls for no interference. 8. Order 1 Rule 10(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates cases where a person is added as a defendant in a suit which is already pending. It provides that subject to the provisions ofS.21of Limitation Act the proceedings as against any person added as a defendant shall be deemed to have been begun only on the service of the summons. Order 1 Rule 10(5) on its terms do not apply to the addition of a plaintiff. But Order 1 Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where the suit is instituted in the name of a plaintiff and it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the" right plaintiff, the co-art may at any stage of the suit if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bonafide mistake and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just. It is interesting to note that Order 1 Rule 10(5) does not deal with the effect of the subsequent impleading of a plaintiff in the suit. It is interesting to note that Order 1 Rule 10(5) does not deal with the effect of the subsequent impleading of a plaintiff in the suit. But coming to S.21 of the Limitation Act it comprehends within its scope the addition of a new plaintiff or a new defendant and S.21(1) of the Limitation Act provides that the suit as regards the newly added plain tiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. The normal effect of reading Order I, R.10(1) CPC and S.21 of the Limitation Act it is to be postulated is that in the case of addition of a new plaintiff the suit must be deemed to commence only when he was so impleaded. This position emerges notwithstanding the fact that 0.1 R.10(5) speaks only to the addition of a defendant when it refers to S.21 of the Limitation Act. It appears to me that the power conferred on the court under O.I Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading an additional plaintiff has no thing to do with the effect of that impleading in so far as it relates to question of limitation to be determined under the Indian Limitation Act. So considered S.21(1) of the Limitation Act specifically provides that in so far as a newly added plaintiff is concerned the suit will be deemed to have been filed only when he was made a party to the suit. But this provision in S.21 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act is circumscribed by a power vested in the court to regard the suit as having been filed even in favour of a newly added plaintiff from the day of its original institution in the name of the wrong plaintiff. This power is conferred by the proviso to S.21(1) of the Limitation Act and it calls for the satisfaction of the court that the omission to implead a new plaintiff was bonafide or due to a mistake made in good faith. This entails an enquiry as to whether the omission to implead originally was due to a bonafide mistake or omission. 9. There is another aspect arising in this case. The appellant is admittedly a co-owner entitled a1ongwith the others to recover the kazhakan wages on the day when he instituted the suit. This entails an enquiry as to whether the omission to implead originally was due to a bonafide mistake or omission. 9. There is another aspect arising in this case. The appellant is admittedly a co-owner entitled a1ongwith the others to recover the kazhakan wages on the day when he instituted the suit. Is it possible in law to postulate that the suit was filed by him not only for himself but as an agent of the others. No doubt the appellant has claimed in this case to represent the thavazhy as its karanavan. But what he in fact did was file the suit in respect of an amount due to the thavazhy of which he was a representative. His capacity to represent the thavazhy by himself had been lost by virtue of the Abolition Act. But could it be said that his capacity as a co-owner to represent the others also does not exist? It is therefore necessary to consider what is the status of a co-owner vis-a-vis the others and whether he is entitled to represent the other co-owners or could be deemed to represent the other co-owners when he is putting in suit a right which he holds in common with the other owners. If the answer to this question be in the affirmative, then it may be a case where S.21(1) of the Limitation Act may not be attracted at all and the suit could be maintained and the formal impleading of plain tiffs 2 to 7 who had prayed that the decree may be granted in favour of the appellant would remove all possible impediments in the way of granting a decree in favour of the appellant. 10. This is a case where the amount that is claimed in the suit belongs to a set of co-owners. The amounts are due from a stranger who according to the plaint has withheld what is really due to the co-owners for services rendered. It has been laid down that a co-owner by himself is entitled to recover possession of co-ownership property from k trespasser. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Rampraischa (AIR 1976 SC 2335) and other cases that a co-owner landlord could claim eviction from a tenant by himself because a co-owner is jurisprudentially as much an owner as a sole owner. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Rampraischa (AIR 1976 SC 2335) and other cases that a co-owner landlord could claim eviction from a tenant by himself because a co-owner is jurisprudentially as much an owner as a sole owner. If this be the status of a co-owner vis-a-vis a stranger, could it not be postulated that a co-owner also has the right to recover amounts due to the other co-owners by himself. No doubt the co-owner who so recovers may be bound to account to the other co-owners for what he has received. He may also be liable to indemnify the debtor against any future claims by the other co-owners. In fact as observed by the Supreme Court in Karbalal Begum v. Muhammed Salt (AIR 1981 SC 77) he may even be constituted a trustee for the other co-owners in respect of the amounts, which he receives. The fact that he may be liable to account to the others would not make his claim untenable or unsustainable as against a stranger from whom the amounts are claimed. If this position is applied to a case like the present it could be seen that the suit laid by the appellant who was a co-owner was not defective or could not be held to be not maintainable for the mere reason that the other co-owners were not impleaded. If it is a case where the suit could be proceeded with then the mere fact that plaintiffs 2 to 7 were impleaded later would not make any difference in so far as it relates to the question of limitation. If it is a case where the suit could be proceeded with then the mere fact that plaintiffs 2 to 7 were impleaded later would not make any difference in so far as it relates to the question of limitation. I am therefore of the view that even at its inception the suit filed by the appellant which could be treated as one in his capacity as a co-owner only could have been proceeded with in so far as it related only to a claim for recovery of wages for the kazhakam services rendered and which was due to a number of co-owners were subsequently impleaded and they had filed a statement before the court that the decree could be granted in favour of the appellant sufficiently protects the defendant from any future claims arising in respect of the amounts in question and that therefore it could be seen that there will be no defect in the frame of the suit or in the sustainability of the claim made by the appellant. The question of limitation in that case would not arise at all and the Lower appellate Court was clearly in error in finding that the claim relating to the other co-owners who were impleaded only subsequently would be barred. Sri. Warriar, the learned counsel for appellant brings to my notice the decision reported in Surayya Begum v.Mohd. Usman 1991 (3) SCC 114. The said decision, it appears to me, proceeds on the theory of substantial representation rather than dealing directly with the question of the capacity of a co-owner to represent the others in an action. In that case their Lordships also held that if the omission to implead one of the heir of a deceased tenant is bonafide then it cannot be said that the order for eviction could not be validly obtained or enforced. The said decision may not directly apply to enable me to decide that a co-owner can maintain an action on behalf of others, which is the point tin t, arises for decision in this case. 12. On the question of applicability of S.21(1) of the Limitation Act, Sri. Warriar brings to my notice the decision reported in Indad Ahmad v. Patteshri Prasad 37 Indian Appeals 60. In that case the plaintiff and his brother were entitled to certain property and the plaintiff alone brought the suit in time. 12. On the question of applicability of S.21(1) of the Limitation Act, Sri. Warriar brings to my notice the decision reported in Indad Ahmad v. Patteshri Prasad 37 Indian Appeals 60. In that case the plaintiff and his brother were entitled to certain property and the plaintiff alone brought the suit in time. The joining of his brother as a co-plaintiff after the period of limitation, it was held, would not by itself attract the provisions of S.21(1) of the Limitation Act. U.N. Mithra in his Commentaries on the Limitation Act, 10th edition page 510 notices that this view has now been adopted by all the High Courts. The learned author further observes: "Where in a suit for rent originally instituted by a co-sharer landlord, the remaining co-sharer landlord was added as a proforma defendant but subsequently more than three years after the rents sued accrued due the proforma defendant obtained an order making him a co-plaintiff, it was held adopting the above said principle that the latter was not a new plaintiff within the meaning of this section and the suit was not barred". The foot note shows that this proposition is supported by a number of authorities of the various High Courts. If this proposition that the rent due to a co-owner could be recovered by one of the co-sharer or co-owners and S.21(1) has no application in the case of the joinder of the other co-owner or co-sharer on objection being taken, then, according to me, in the present case also the amount due to the co-owners could be recovered by way of instituting the suit in time by one co-owner and the fact that the others were joined later, after the period of limitation, would make no difference and would not attract S.21(1) of the Limitation Act. 13. The alternate contention of Sri. Warriar is that in any event there is no lack of bonafides in this case in not impleading plaintiffs 2 to 7 originally and that therefore this is a case to which the proviso to S.21 (1) ought to be applied to enable the plaintiffs to recover what is justly u< 14. 13. The alternate contention of Sri. Warriar is that in any event there is no lack of bonafides in this case in not impleading plaintiffs 2 to 7 originally and that therefore this is a case to which the proviso to S.21 (1) ought to be applied to enable the plaintiffs to recover what is justly u< 14. If it is held that the co-owner had the capacity to sue a stranger for recovery of amounts due to the co-owners or that this is a case to which the power under the proviso to S.21(1) of the Limitation Act is to be exercised to deem the suit as having been filed by all the plaintiffs even at its inception, there is no dispute that the appellant is entitled to recover the entire amounts decreed by the trial court. The Lower appellate Court was therefore in error in granting the appellant a decree only as regards his share. I therefore modify the decree of the Lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the trial court. The appeal and the Second Appeal are the result of the omission on the part of the appellant in not impleading all the co-owners to the action. Though I have found legally that the action could not be defeated on that score, I consider that this is a case where the appellant is not entitled to his costs of the litigation and therefore I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs throughout.