Judgment 1. THIS appeal has been preferred by the Registrar of the Appellate Side of this Court against an order dated 7th June, 1991 passed by a learned single Judge in an application for contempt taken out by the writ petitioners in connection with Matter No. 5300 of 1988 (Ram Chandra Bank and Ors. vs. The Registrar, Appellate Side, High Court, calcutta and Ors. ). The facts are indicated briefly here in below:-The petitioners are Group D (Class IV) employees of this Hon'ble court. The Government of West Bengal, Finance (Audit) Department, issued notification being No. 4025-F dated Calcutta the 22nd April, 1974 to the effect that recruitment to any lower division clerical post under the State Government, 10% of such posts in every office shall be kept reserved for recruitment by promotion from Class IV employees as also from eligible Class III employees having requisite qualifications, prescribed for the lower division clerical posts under the existing recruitment rules. The Rule was known as the West Bengal Services (Provisions for Promotion Prospects of Class IV Employees) Rules, 1974, which came into effect on 1st April 1974. 2. THE petitioner No. 1 has been serving from 1973, the petitioner No. 2 has been serving from 1974 and the petitioner No. 3 has been serving since April 1983 and all in the Appellate Side as Class IV employees. Having regard to the aforesaid rules, applicable to the State Government employees, at the material time the petitioners were also claiming, promotion as lower division clerks (Class III) of this Hon'ble Court. On 26th November, 1987 the Deputy Registrar, (Administration), Appellate Side, issued a notice purporting to hold a written test in respect of Class IV employees for promotion to the post of Class III and the same notice is annexure "b" to the writ application. The petitioners although appeared in the written test held by the High Court administration but challenged the legality of such interview notice on various points. The writ application was registered as Matter No. 5300 of 1988. The said writ application was adjudicated on merits by a learned single judge on 24th April, 1990. Upon affidavits filed by the respective parties, and upon a contested hearing the learned single judge disposed of the writ application by a detailed judgment and order dated 24th April, 1990. The writ application was registered as Matter No. 5300 of 1988. The said writ application was adjudicated on merits by a learned single judge on 24th April, 1990. Upon affidavits filed by the respective parties, and upon a contested hearing the learned single judge disposed of the writ application by a detailed judgment and order dated 24th April, 1990. The operative part of the judgment and order dated 24th April, 1990 is quoted here in below:- "in my view, therefore, the respondents shall consider the case of eligible candidates from amongst the Group D employees for promotion in the available vacancies (being 10% of the posts) in the cadre of Lower division Assistant on the basis of Seniority-cum-Suitability. The list of eligible Group - D employees shall be prepared only after scrutiny of the original certificates to be produced in support of the educational qualification. But the petitioners herein stand on a different footing. They have appeared at the written test but failed and they secured fairly good marks. They should be considered for promotion in the existing vacancies on the basis of the seniority-cum-suitability after holding an interview to determine their suitability. Let this order be implemented as expeditiously as possible. Let xerox copy of this judgment and order be made over to the learned advocates for the parties on usual terms and upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of the judgment and order. Let all parties act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment and order. " 3. IT appears that the appellant did not prefer any appeal against the said final order dated 24th April, 1990, passed in Matter No. 5300 of 1988 and therefore, the said judgment and order dated 24th April, 1990, stands in the field. 4. IT was alleged by the petitioners that inspite of the said judgment and order the administration of this Court was not doing anything and ultimately the petitioners took out an application for contempt before the learned single judge upon notice to the appellant. 4. IT was alleged by the petitioners that inspite of the said judgment and order the administration of this Court was not doing anything and ultimately the petitioners took out an application for contempt before the learned single judge upon notice to the appellant. When the application came up for hearing on 7th June, 1991, the learned counsel appearing for the administration submitted that the order dated 24th April, 1990, passed in Matter No. 5300 of 1988 is not clear as to how the cases of the petitioners should be considered and invited the court to clarify the order dated 24th April, 1990. On such submission, the learned single judge clarified the order dated 24th April, 1990, by an order dated 7th June, 1991. The order dated 7th June, 1991 passed in the application for contempt against which the appeal has been preferred is reproduced here in below:- The Court:- Mr. Sarkar has submitted that the order dated 24th April, 1990 passed by me is not clear as to how the case of the petitioners should be considered. The order dated 24th April, 1990 has made it amply clear that the petitioners stand on a different footing and accordingly their cases should be considered separately on the basis of their seniority-cum-suitability. The question of taking their interview would not arise as they have appeared at the test. In that view of the matter it is directed that the petitioners shall be considered for promotion on the basis of their seniority, in the available reserved vacancies for promotion from Group 'd' to Group 'c' within two weeks from date having regard to the fact that they have already appeared at the tests and obtained fairly good marks. While considering the cases of the petitioners for promotion, the case of Rajeswar Rai, who was already selected on the basis of the written test, shall also be taken into account. I am told that a Committee has been formed by the Hon'ble Chief justice for framing rules and regulations for future appointment by promotion from Group 'd' to Group 'c' posts, but such rules and regulations will in any case not apply to the petitioners and the said rajeswar Rai, the order dated 17th April, 1989 shall be taken into account. All parties to act on a signed copy or this dictated order upon the usual undertaking. All parties to act on a signed copy or this dictated order upon the usual undertaking. " It was against this order dated June 7, 1991, this appeal has been preferred by the Registrar, Original Side of this Court, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, senior Advocate for the appellant has submitted that as a matter of fact the learned judge passed altogether, "a different order", on the application for contempt. In other words, the direction as contained in the order dated 24th April, 1990 was substantially altered and/or modified by passing a different order on 7th June, 1991. The Specific direction for consideration of the case of the writ petitioners for promotion in the existing vacancies on seniority-cum-suitability basis, after holding interview to determine the suitability, cannot be changed and/or altered by passing a different order on the application for contempt. 5. IN any event the order dated 24th April, 1990 which reached its finality upon disposal of the writ petition cannot the modified, altered or reviewed in the application for contempt. The order dated 7th June, 1991 passed in the contempt application is contrary to and tin conflict with the final order dated 24th April, 1990. 6. IN support of such contention, Mr. Mukherjee relied upon a decision of this court reported in 92 CWN 550, Md. Nurul Afsar vs. Collector of Malda. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that it is now well settled that when a writ petition is finally disposed of, it is not open to the court to reopen the proceedings by means or a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. Mr. Mukherjee in this connection cited state of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahma Dutta Sarma reported in AIR 1987 S. C. 943. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the writ petition was finally disposed of on 24th April, 1990 and there was a specific order that the writ petitioners should be considered for promotion in the existing vacancies on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability, after holding an interview to determine their suitability. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the writ petition was finally disposed of on 24th April, 1990 and there was a specific order that the writ petitioners should be considered for promotion in the existing vacancies on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability, after holding an interview to determine their suitability. The writ petitioners by way of contempt application claimed benefits of promotion to the posts of lower division Assistant in terms of the judgment dated 24th April, 1990 and his Lordship was pleased to pass the impugned order altering or changing the final order and directing that the writ petitioners shall be considered for promotion on the basis of the seniority giving a complete go bye to the earlier direction to determine their suitability by holding their interview. Mr. Mukherjee then drew the attention of this Court with regard to a decision reported in 1991 (2) CHN 174 (Ranju Gopal Mukherjee v. Ramspada mahaldar ). 7. MR. Mukherjee next placed a Division Bench judgment reported in 1992 (1) CHN 160 (Ashis Chakraborty vs. Hindusthan Lever Shramik Karmachari congress.). Mr. Mukherjee contended that it was not open for the learned single judge to materially add to or alter the order which was alleged to have been violated and the court exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order under appeal. 8. ON the question of maintainability of the appeal, Mr. Mukherjee cited a supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1978 S. C. 1014 (Purshottamdas Goel vs. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon ). Mr. Mukherjee contended that in this case the appeal has been taken out from an order or decision made by the learned single Judge in the contempt application and although the learned single Judge has not finally disposed of the contempt application, passed an interlocutory order affecting the rights of the parties inasmuch as by the impugned order a right is sought to be conferred upon the petitioners to be considered for promotion on the basis of seniority without holding interview for determination of suitability. Mr. Mukherjee contends that in view of the decision reported in Ranjit Chatterjee and Anr. v. Ramawatar Chowbey reported in 1981 (2) CHN 97 it has been held that there is no prohibition in Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act from preferring an appeal against "an interlocutory order. " On the submissions made above Mr. Mr. Mukherjee contends that in view of the decision reported in Ranjit Chatterjee and Anr. v. Ramawatar Chowbey reported in 1981 (2) CHN 97 it has been held that there is no prohibition in Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act from preferring an appeal against "an interlocutory order. " On the submissions made above Mr. Mukherjee contends that the order dated 7th June, 1991 should be set aside. Mr. Asoke De, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent/writ petitioners submits that Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) deals with the provisions for appeal. The order dated 7th June, 1991 was passed by the learned single Judge in the application for contempt. Under Section 19 of the said Act an appeal shall lie, as of right from "any order" or "decision" of the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In the instant case in passing the order dated 7th june, 1991 the learned single Judge has not exercised "the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. " The order dated 7th June, 1991 is neither an "order or decision" of the High Court within the meaning of Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. As the appellants (High Court administration) were never punished in any manner whatsoever no appeal lies under Section 19 of the said Act. 9. MR. De contends that the debate as to whether "an interlocutory order", passed in an application for contempt is appealable or not has been resolved by the judgment reported in AIR 1978 S. C. 1014 Purushottamdas Goel v. The hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon and Ors, where Supreme Court held that where there is "some order" or "decision" of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised by it by the parties "affecting their rights" and in that situation, an appeal is maintainable, Mr. De also contended that in the case of Ranjit chatterjee and Anr. v. Ramawatar Chowbey (supra) this Court also held that there is no prohibition in Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act from preferring an appeal against an interlocutory order if that order affects the rights of the parties. De also contended that in the case of Ranjit chatterjee and Anr. v. Ramawatar Chowbey (supra) this Court also held that there is no prohibition in Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act from preferring an appeal against an interlocutory order if that order affects the rights of the parties. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of that case and the legal position, the Division Bench name to the conclusion that the appeal is maintainable. 10. MR. De took us to the question that the subject matter of investigation of the court will be whether the order appeared against has adversely affected the right of the appellant by deletion of the interview part. Mr. De further submits that the present appeal is neither an appeal under Section 19 of the contempt of Court Act in or an appeal under clause 15 of the letters patent. Mr. De further contends that to bring an appeal, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, it is well settled by various judgments that the appellant must establish that the order appealed against has adversely affected his right. Mr. De continues that since the question of infringement of any constitutional or statutory rights of the appellant could not be established, it is not an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. De submits that since" no decision" or "order" of the High Court has been given in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the present appeal is also not an appeal under section 19 of the said Act. Accordingly, Mr. De submits that the present appeal is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of this particular case and is liable to be dismissed. 11. MR. De submits that the principles laid down in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Brahma Dutta Sarma reported in AIR 1987 S. C. 943 do not apply on the ground that there the writ petitioner tried to reopen the proceedings by filing a miscellaneous application. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment the court held that when proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition, it is not open to the court to re-open the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment the court held that when proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition, it is not open to the court to re-open the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. The Supreme Court observed that if this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning. Mr. De submits that the principles laid down in the said case will not apply in this proceedings, under appeal, because the petitioners first of all did not take out a "miscellaneous application", with an intention to reopen the writ petition which has been decided finally. The petitioners took out an application for contempt alleging inaction of the appellant over the judgment and order dated 24th April, 1991. The learned single Judge passed the impugned order in an application for contempt and not upon a miscellaneous application. 12. WITH regard to the exercising of the power of contempt under the said Act, mr. Mukherjee contended that it is not open to the court to pass an order which will automatically add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience for which its contempt jurisdiction was invoked. In support of that contention Mr. Mukherjee relied upon the principles laid down in the case of Ranju Gopal mukherjee v. Ramapada Mahaldar reported in 1991 Vol. 2 (II) CHN 174 and the case of Ashis Chakraborty vs. Hindusthan Lever Shramik Karmachari Congress reported in 1992 (1) CHN 160 . In the facts and circumstances of the said two cases the court held that it was not open to the court to pass an order which will materially add to or alter the order for the alleged disobedience of which its contempts jurisdiction was invoked when judged in the context of this principle, there is no escape from the conclusion that the learned Judge went beyond his jurisdiction in passing the order under appeal. In reply to the aforesaid contention Mr. De relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 S. C. 1826, Mohammad Idris and another vs. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and others. In reply to the aforesaid contention Mr. De relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 S. C. 1826, Mohammad Idris and another vs. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and others. There the Supreme Court held that a learned single Judge of the High Court was justified in giving appropriate directions to close the breach in addition to punishing the party for contempt of court. 13. IN order to appreciate the decisions of Ranju Gopal Mukherjee (supra)and Ashis Chakraborty (supra), Mr. De reminded this Court that it is unnecessary for us to appreciate the principles laid down in the said two cases, inasmuch as, there no preliminary question was raised by the party as to the maintainability of the said appeals. 14. MR. De contends that the order dated 7th June, 1991 having been passed on the invitation of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and when the court deleted the interview part, in our view, it is difficult to hold that the order appealed against has materially altered and/or changed the original order. Because from the facts and circumstances, it is clear that the administration has not framed any statutory rule till date with regard to holding of interview of the Group "d" employees of this court and thus went unnoticed to the learned single Judge while deciding the writ application. Mr. De contends that when the clarification was sought for by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant on 7th June, 1991, the court noticed that no rule has been framed under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution providing a rule for holding interview with regard to the class IV (Group D) employees for promoting to the posts of lower division clerk (Group D ). The court noticed that since the petitioners have fairly done well in the written test and when no rule is in the field for holding interview, the petitioners should not go through the corridors of interview and as such the court clarified the order dated 24th April, 1990 exempting the petitioners from appearing in the interview. In the final order dated 24th April, 1991 the court observed "it will be too much to expect from a class IV employee in the test which will virtually seal his avenue of promotion". 15. WITH regard to the decision cited by Mr. Mukherjee reported in 92 CHN 550 (Md. In the final order dated 24th April, 1991 the court observed "it will be too much to expect from a class IV employee in the test which will virtually seal his avenue of promotion". 15. WITH regard to the decision cited by Mr. Mukherjee reported in 92 CHN 550 (Md. Nurul Afsar v. Collector of Malda) Mr. De contends that in the said case the violation of an undertaking was questioned. From a reference to the order appealed against it appears that in the instant case nobody gave an undertaking. The order dated 7th June, 1991 or 24th April, 1991 were not passed on consent. Mr. De submits, therefore, the principles laid down in the said case are not applicable in the present circumstances. 16. HAVING heard the rival submissions of the parties, it strikes to us that no rule for holding interview has been framed by this court for the purpose of holding interview with regard to the class IV employees (Group D) for promoting them to the posts of lower division clerks (Group D ). The right to hold interview of the petitioners must spring out from the statutory rules of any, framed. There is no debate that under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution, the High court has been given power to frame rules relating to the services in respect of its employees. From a reference to the final judgment and order dated 24th April, 1990 it would be found that the learned trial court has already observed that regarding the promotion of Group D employees to Group C no such rule has been framed as yet with regard to holding of interview and no such rule has been gazetted also till date. Therefore, in absence of such rules framed under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution, the administration and/or appellants have no right to contend that the petitioners must appear in the interview board and alternatively by deletion of the interview part pursuant to the order dated 7th June, 1991, the appellants cannot contend that their valuable right of holding an interview has been taken away. The question of taking away any right will arise only when such right to hold interview is conferred upon the high Court under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, the question of taking away of such right cannot and does not arise. The question of taking away any right will arise only when such right to hold interview is conferred upon the high Court under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, the question of taking away of such right cannot and does not arise. Therefore, the principle that if an order passed in a contempt proceeding, if adversely affects some one's right, would not arise in the instant case because no constitutional right under article 229 (2) of the Constitution is subsisting in the field in favour of the High court administration. Therefore, the principles laid down in the case of purushottamdas Goel v. Ramawatar Chowbey reported in 1981 (II) CHN 97 will not be applicable in the instant case. 17. IN our considered opinion, if no rule has yet been framed by the administration with regard to the question of holding interview under Article 229 (2) of the constitution, the question goes really to the root of the order i. e. where from the administration is getting the power of holding interview with regard to the class IV employees for promoting them to the posts of lower division clerks (Group III ). 18. THAT being the position, since no right has been created in favour of the appellant, under Article 229 (2) of the constitution the question of taking away such right by the order appealed against cannot and do not arise. The principle that whether an appeal is maintainable from an interlocutory order passed in an application for contempt, the well settled legal position is that such interlocutory order, if adversely affects some-ones right, the appeal would be competent. The right of the aggrieved person must be a subsisting right and such right must not be illusory. Accordingly, we are of the clear opinion that since no right of holding the interview has been conferred upon the appellant, the administration of this court, so far as the class IV employees are concerned for promoting them to class III, it would be improper for us to interfere in the order appealed against. Since the appeal is not competent it is unnecessary for us to consider the question as to whether the order appealed against materially changed the original order. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs and ad interim stay granted in this appeal stand vacated. Since the appeal is not competent it is unnecessary for us to consider the question as to whether the order appealed against materially changed the original order. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs and ad interim stay granted in this appeal stand vacated. All parties and the department concerned are to act on a signed copy of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Appeal is dismissed.