JUDGMENT The plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge Class II Sanawad for eviction of the defendant-appellant on the ground of sub-letting contained in clause (b )of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961 alleging that while the house as per rent note Ex.P/1 dt. 28.5.70 was rented to defendant-respondent No.7 Babulal, Babulal had sub-let the same to the present appellant Kailashchandra. While Babulal admitted the allegations m:;\de by the plaintiff-defendant Kailashchandra the present appellant pleaded that though the rent note describes Babulal as the tenant, the house was in fact given on rent to the present appellant Kailashchandra. The trial Court dismissed the suit. In appeal by the plaintiff, the first appellate Court-Add1.Judge to the District Judge West Nimar Mandleshwar by Judgment and decree dated 1.8.90 reversed the judgmynt and decree of the trial Court and decreed the claim for eviction against the present appellant and respondent No.7 Babulal By order dated 20.3.91 the appeal was admitted for final hearing on following substantial question of law: Whether on facts and in the circumstances of the case, the lower appellate Court erred in law in holding sub-tenancy proved as ground for eviction under section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act? At the hearing today, Shri Dagaonkar urged that though the rent note describes defendant-appellant and respondent No.7 Babulal as tenant, the house was in fact taken for the present defendant-appellant Kailashchandra, who has been in its possession right from the very inception. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it ought to be held that Kailashchandra himself is tenant of the accommodation and not Babulal and description of Babulal in the rent note should be excluded from consideration. He also submitted that the defendant -- appellant has been in possession of the house with the knowledge of the plaintiff right from the very beginning and in such a case inference of subletting against-defendant- appellant should not be drawn. He further submitted that the finding against sub- letting recorded by the trial Court was proper. Therefore, appeal should be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court restored. He further submitted that if the judgment and decree passed by the first appellant Court were maintained, the appellant should be given atleast six months' time to vacate the accommodation. Therefore, appeal should be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court restored. He further submitted that if the judgment and decree passed by the first appellant Court were maintained, the appellant should be given atleast six months' time to vacate the accommodation. Repelling Shri Dagaonkar's contentions Shri Agarwal learned counsel representing respondents 1, 2 & 6 who are either co- landlords or L. Rs. of the deceased co-landlord Jadaon Chand Jain, submitted that the present matter was fully covered by the decision dated 24.6.92 of this Court in civil second Appeal No.32/89 (Leeladharv. Mangtulal) He submitted that having regard to sec. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and Sec.2(a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibitions) Act, 1988, the meaning of the property in sub-section (c) ibid and sub-section (2) of sec.3 the plea urged by the appellant that while the rent note describes Babulal respondent No.7 as the tenant, this appellant was in fact the tenant of the accommodation, was not open to him. Shri Dagaonkar after going through the Judgment agreed that the point arising for decision in the present second appeal is fully covered against the present appellant by the decision. Following the aforesaid decision it is held that the plea against the description in rent note that the defendant- appellant Kailashchandra is in fact the tenant as against Babulal who is described as tenant in the rent note Ex.P/1, is not open to the defendant-appellant. For the aforesaid reason, following the decision the appeal would have to be dismissed and the Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court upheld. As to grant of time, Shri Agarwal has no objection to six months time being granted to the appellant for vacating the accommodation in question. To that extent the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are modified. With the modification as to grant of time of six months to vacate the accommodation in question, the appeal otherwise fails and is hereby dismissed. Looking to the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs as incurred. Pronounced in open Court SA.32189 relied on.