Judgment : The petitioner is a State Transport Undertaking operating number of stage carriage services in the entire Madurai District and also on the adjoining inter-district and inter-State routes. The first respondent is a stage carriage operator, operating on the Srivilliputhur Town Service route between Srivilliputhur and Puthur (via.) Rajapa-layam, Seithur, Muhavoor and Dhalavoipuram. It made an application for variation of permit conditions involving 1) conversion of the route from town service into mofussil service; 2) extension of route from Srivilliputhur to Sivakasi by means of 12 singles; and 3) reduction of: (a) 10 singles from Rajapalayam to Dhalavoipuram; and (b) 6 singles from Dhalavoipuram to Puthur. The Regional Transport Authority second respondent rejected the application holding that the advantage of the proposal is outweighed by greater disadvantages and that the application is not in public interest. An appeal was preferred by the first respondent to the tribunal/third respondent. 2.. When the appeal was taken up for consideration, counsel for the first respondent made the following endorsement: “This appellant is not pressing for conversion of town service into mofussil service and prays that the new sector sought for, i.e., Srivilliputhur to Sivakasi may be granted as a town service and by way of an independent route in the existing permit instead of by way of extension as this course will obviate the objection of the Corporation that if converted into a mofussil route, the approved scheme Madurai to Shencottah published on 25. 1975 will be a bar.” Obviously, the endorsement was made in order to avert the objection raised by the petitioner herein to the grant of conversion, as the route, if converted, would fall within an approved scheme. Even after the aforesaid endorsement was made modifying the prayer, the petitioner put forward several objections to the grant of the application of the petitioner. An objection was raised by the first respondent that the petitioner had no locus standi to raise-any objection to the application of the first respondent and the only purpose for which notice was issued to the petitioner was to get the details of approved schemes. The tribunal overruled the said contention of the first respondent and considered the objections raised by the petitioner herein. The tribunal overruled the said contention of the first respondent and considered the objections raised by the petitioner herein. However, the tribunal rejected the objections of the petitioner on merits and allowed the appeal filed by the first respondent, on the following terms: “The appellant is permitted to ply nine singles between Puthur and Srivilliputhur instead of eight singles, and eight independent singles is granted between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi. The permit holder is allowed to do one additional singles from Puthur to Rajapalayam in order to maintain the present night halt. Curtailment of two singles between Puthur and Rajapalayam, curtailment of three singles from Dhalavoipuram to Srivilliputhur and curtailment of one single from Dhalavoipuram to Rajapalayam are allowed. The lower authority is directed to issue another permit to the bus of the appellant to do eight independent singles between Srivilliputhur to Sivakasi as a multi-pronged route, and the some shall be issued within a month from the date of the receipt of the records without fail. After the issuance of the abovesaid permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Kamarajar District at Virudhunagar, the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority, shall fix suitable timings within two months. The conversion of the route from town service to mofussil, prayed for in the application is rejected. The pattern of trips shall be as follows: The bus of the appellant shall depart from Rajapalayam in the morning as at present and do its first single between Rajapalayam and Srivilliputhur singles 2 to 5 shall be done between Srivilliputhur and Puthur. Thereafter, the appellant shall do eight continuous independent singles, i.e., singles 6 to 13 between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi. Thereafter singles 14 to 18 shall be done between Srivilliputhur and Puthur continuously and the 19th single shall be done from Puthur to Rajapalayam and the bus shall halt for the night at Rajapalayam.” 3. Aggrieved by the said order of the tribunal, the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the same. A preliminary objection is raised by learned counsel for the first respondent that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person and he is not entitled to maintain the writ petition. It is. also argued by learned counsel that the petitioner had no right to raise objections even before the Regional Transport Authority or before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. A preliminary objection is raised by learned counsel for the first respondent that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person and he is not entitled to maintain the writ petition. It is. also argued by learned counsel that the petitioner had no right to raise objections even before the Regional Transport Authority or before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. According to him, the policy under the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has changed from that which prevailed under the old Act. It is pointed out by him the grant of permits has been considerably liberalised and there is no scope for objections by other parties. It is also submitted that the only particulars which should be furnished by the petitioner Corporation when applications for grant of permits or variation of conditions of permit are considered,, are the details of the approved schemes. Beyond that, the petitioner Corporation has no right, according to him, to raise any objections on the merits of the application. Reliance is placed on the following passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, etc., A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 443: "5. Acomparative reading of the provisions of the Act and the old Act makes it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for asking irrespective of the number of operators already in the field. Under Sec.57 read with Sec.47(l) of the old Act an application for a stage carriage permit was to be published and kept for inspection in the office of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations/ objections against the said application. The application, along with objections, was required to be decided in a quasi-judicial manner. Sec.47 (3) of the old Act further permitted the imposition of limit on the grant of permits in any regional, area or on a particular route. It is thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV "control of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under: 1. The applications for grant of permits were published and were made available in the. office of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations; 2. It is thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV "control of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under: 1. The applications for grant of permits were published and were made available in the. office of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations; 2. The applications for grant of permits along with the representations were to be decided in quasi-judicial manner; and 3. The Regional Transport Authority was to decide the applications for grant of permits’ keeping in view the criteria laid down in Sec.47(1) and also keeping in view the limit fixed under Sec.47(3) of the Act. An application for grant of permit beyond the limited number fixed under Sec.47(3) was to be rejected summarily. 6. The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Secs.47 and 57 of the old Act. The right of existing -operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Sec.47 and Sec.57 under the Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permits. Sec,71(l) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Sec.80(2), which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant on application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that of Sec.47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Sec.71(3)(a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more than five lakhs. ... ... ...More operators mean healthy-competition and efficient transport system. Overcrowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, clinging to the bus-doors and even sitting on the roof-tops are some of the common sights in this country. Moreover one finds a bus which has noisy-engine, old upholstry, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. ... ... ...More operators mean healthy-competition and efficient transport system. Overcrowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, clinging to the bus-doors and even sitting on the roof-tops are some of the common sights in this country. Moreover one finds a bus which has noisy-engine, old upholstry, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter-public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronise the operator who is providing the best service. Even otherwise, the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. The apprehension of the petitioners that too many operators on a routes are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed-out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport system in a state is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal. ... ... ... It is thus a guaranteed right of every citizen whether rich or poor to take up and carry on, if he so wishes,.the motor transport business. It is only the State which can impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Secs.47(3) and 57 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the right under Art. 19(1) (g) so far as the motor transport business was concerned. The said restrictions have been taken, away and the provisions of Secs.47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the Statute Book. The said restrictions have been taken, away and the provisions of Secs.47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the Statute Book. The Act provides liberal policy for the gram of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business. The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Art.l9(l)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the Parliament has undone. When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Art. 19(1)(g) there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners." 4. According to learned counsel for the first respondent, notice was issued to the petitioner by the Regional Transport Authority and the objections raised by the petitioner were considered. According to him, Rules 136 and 141 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules prescribe public hearing and hearing of representative or accredited agent. It is submitted by him that Rule 157(2)(a) of the said Rules provides for filing an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant an extension on variation or curtailment of an existing route or area covered by a permit. It is contended that the petitioner had, therefore, a right to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal. I am of the view that it is wholly unnecessary for me to decide the question whether the State Transport Undertaking had a right to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority or the tribunal. In the present case, the petitioner has been heard by both the Authorities. The objections raised by the petitioner have been overruled by the tribunal. Hence, the first respondent is not affected in any way by the tribunal allowing the petitioner to prefer its objections to the application made by the first respondent. It would be necessary to consider such a question in cases where the tribunal refuses to hear the State Transport Undertaking or other objectors and in cases where objections preferred by the objectors including the State Transport Undertaking are upheld. Hence, I do not propose to consider the said question here. 5. However, it is necessary to decide whether the petilioner is entitled to maintain the writ petition. Hence, I do not propose to consider the said question here. 5. However, it is necessary to decide whether the petilioner is entitled to maintain the writ petition. The contention of the first respondent that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved and he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is well-founded. The order made by the tribunal does not in any manner affect any right of the petitioner herein. The route does not fall within the approved scheme. The petitioner has no grievance as such against the order. But, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the tribunal has acted in contravention of the provisions of the Statute and the rules made thereunder. According to firm, even a member of the public can-bring to the notice of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution a violation of statutory provision and get a direction that the statutory authority should comply with the statute and the rules made thereunder. It is rightly submitted by learned counsel for the first respondent that if the petitioner has filed the writ petition as a member of the public and if this matter is to be treated as a public interest litigation, then the test of public injury should be satisfied. It is submitted that in the present case, there is no such public injury and the petitioner cannot sustain the writ petition on the only ground that some provisions of the statute and the rules are violated. 6. In The Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. Teekappa Gowda & Bros, and others, A.I.R 1971 S.C. 246: (1970)2 S.C.J. 473, it was held that a rice mill owner had no locus standi to challenge under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the setting up of a new rice mil! by another, even if it was in contravention of Sec.8(3)(e) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, because no right vested in such a person was infringed. The position was reiterated in Nasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578. It was held that a rival in trade, in that case a cinema theatre owner, had no locus standi to invoke the special jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 7. The position was reiterated in Nasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578. It was held that a rival in trade, in that case a cinema theatre owner, had no locus standi to invoke the special jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Following the said rulings, a Full Bench of this Court held in M.L.Krishnamurthi v. The District Revenue Officer, Vellore, (1989)2 L.W. 442 , that an existing rice mill owner was not a person aggrieved, when permit or licence under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act was granted to another person, for entitling him to file a writ petition challenging the grant. In Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, etc.,A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 443, already referred to in this judgment, the Apex Court has quoted in extenso the observations made by Sarkaria, J. in Nasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, and reiterated the proposition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the decisions in Surendra Rao v. Regional Transport Authority, Gorakpur, A.I.R. 1992 AII. 211 and Quilon District Private Bus Operators ‘Association v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, A.I.R. 1992 Ker. 267. In the former case it is held that an existing operator has an alternative remedy of revision before the tribunal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority grant-ingstage carriage permit to an applicant. That has no relevance in this case. In the latter case, it is held that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or violation of some provisions of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. The sine qua non is public injury. Mere violation of a provision of law is not sufficient to enable the third party who is not aggrieved, to challenge the order in question. Hence, that judgment also does not help the petitioner. .9. If the petition is to be treated as a public interest litigation, it is necessary for the petitioner to establish that the impugned order causes injury to public interest. Hence, that judgment also does not help the petitioner. .9. If the petition is to be treated as a public interest litigation, it is necessary for the petitioner to establish that the impugned order causes injury to public interest. The following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.P.Gupta and others v. President of India and others, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, is relevant: " 18......But there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest or what may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury." (Italics mine). .10. Again in Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1109, it is ruled thus: ."60. It is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigants." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following passage in the judgment in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1902: "36. Locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, may be with same result. One relates to maintainability of the petition and other to exercise of discretion. Law on the former has marched much ahead. Many milestones have been covered. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administration action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administration action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenging with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy bodies or interlopers. S.P.Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298 and Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344. Even otherwise physical or economic injury may give rise to. civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern out weight such considerations.“ That was a case in which conversion of a public park into a private nursing home was held to be illegal. It was a clear case of public injury. Hence, the observations of the Supreme Court made in the context of the facts of that case cannot help the petitioner herein. 12. In this case, the tribunal has found that the grant of the application made by the first respondent will be most beneficial to the travelling public and no inconvenience will be caused to them in any manner. The following passages in the order of the tribunal are relevant: ”17. At present, the appellant is plying eight singles between Puthur and Srivilliputhur, one single between Srivilliputhur and Rajapalayam, and single between Rajapalayam and Dhala-voipuram and three singles between Srivilliputhur and Dhalavoipuram. Out of the above, the appellant has prayed for reduction of 10 singles from Rajapalayam to Dhalavoipuram, and six singles from Dhalavoipuram to Puthur. In the sector between Seithur and Rajapalayam, six town buses are plying doing 98 singles and the occupancy ratio is 54%. In the sector between Dhalavoipuram and Seithur. 4 town buses are plying doing 70 singles and the occupancy ratio is 42%. In the sector between Dhalavoipuram and Puthur, 4 towns buses are plying doing 62 singles and them occupancy ratio is 51% only. On an appreciation of the pros and cons and in order to rationalise and make it more viable and also to provide maximum benefit to the travelling public, in my view, it would be expedient to make the sector Puthur to Srivilliputhur a straight route instead of small, independent sectors. Hence I am persuaded to hold that the existing two singles between Puthur and Rajapalayam and three singles between Dhalavoipuram and Rajapalayam and one single between Rajapalayam and Dhalavoipuram can be curtailed considering the poor occupancy ratio in those sectors. I am clearly of the opinion that no inconvenience will be caused to the travelling public and the other bus operators by doing so and the curtailment can be effectively compensated by straightening the sector between Puthur and Srivilliputhur by granting nine single between the sector, viz., Puthur to Rajapalayam may be granted in order to maintain the existing night halt. 18. 18. In the sector between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi only 11 buses are plying doing 134 singles and considering the occupancy ratio, viz., 94% which is extremely high, I am clearly of the opinion that there is sufficient justification to run more buses in that sector as that alone will help the travelling public to reach Sivakasi without any loss of time. Admittedly, Sivakasi is a big industrial town and there are number of match factories, and other factories and therefore running more buses will help the travelling public to reach Sivakasi conveniently and the workers to reach their factories punctually. On a careful analysis of the entire matter and on making a calculation of the timing that will be consumed and the maximum distance that can be covered in a day, viz., 500 km., I am persuaded to hold that the permit holder can be allowed to run eight independent singles between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi and the same will be most beneficial to the travelling public. “ Hence, I hold that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved and it is not entitled to maintain a writ against the order of the tribunal. 13. Even otherwise, the contentions urged by the petitioner are without any merit. It is argued that the application filed by the first respondent before the Regional Transport Authority is only for conversion of a route from town service into mofussil service and there is no application for grant of a new permit. It is contended that the modification in the prayer consequent on the endorsement made before the appellate tribunal does not fall within the scope of the petition filed before the Regional Transport Authority. It is submitted that the averments found in the application before the first authority do not support the prayer in the modified form. There is no substance in this contention. It is seen that in paragraph 2 of the application and column 13 of Form PVA attached to the application, it is stated that the vehicle is at present plying on the route Srivilliputhur to Puthur as town service and it is sought to be extended from Srivilliputhur to Sivakasi a distance of 20 Kms., by reducing l0 singles from Rajapalayam to Dhalavoipuram and 6 singles from Dhalavoipu-ram to Puthur to serve the public. The tribunal has rightly found that the averments in the application are sufficient to support the modified prayer. 14. The next contention is that under Sec.80(3) of the Act, there cannot be an application for inclu-. sion of a new route or alteration of a route in the case of a stage carriage permit. According to learned counsel, with reference to a stage carriage permit, there can be only an application to vary the conditions by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the areas specified in the permit. It is necessary to extract the section in order to appreciate the contention. Sec.80 in so far as it is relevant, is as follows: ”80.(1) An application for a permit of any kind may be made at any time, .(a) A Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act: .Provided that the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under Clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec.74; Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the some and an opportunity of being heard in the matter. (3) of Sec.74; Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the some and an opportunity of being heard in the matter. (3) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by altering the route or routes or area covered by it, or in the case of a stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit: Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route to increase the frequency of the service so provided without any increase in the number of vehicles: ... ... ...‘‘ 15. It is argued that the first part of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.80 of the Act which applies to any permit, other than a temporary permit is a general provision and the second part of the Sub-section, which applies to stage carriage permit, is a special provision and the rule that ‘special will prevail over general’will apply. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1170. The following passage is cited: “(9) There will be complete harmony however if we hold instead that Clause 5(a) will apply in all other cases of proposed dismissal or discharge except where an inquiry is pending within the meaning of Clause 23. We reach the same result by applying another well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the some person gives two directions one covering a large, number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect. In Pretty v. Solly, (1859)53 E.R. 1032, quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p.206, 6th Edition) Romilly, M.R., mentioned the rule thus:” The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. The rule has been applied as between different provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, (l858)28 L.J.Ch. 598, Churchill v Crease, (1889)135 U.S. 255 and Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Company, (1905)199 U.S. 401.“ 16. It is, therefore, contended that the first part of the section under which variation of conditions of any permit be inclusion of new route or routes etc., will not apply in the case of a stage carriage permit with reference to which a special provision is made under the second part of the section, I do not agree with this contention. The language of the subsection is very significant. It can be analysed as follows: An application to vary the conditions can be made, .(1) by inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area; or .(2) by altering the route or routes or areas covered by it; or .(3) by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum: or (4) by variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified. As regards the four alternatives set out above, all of them will apply to a stage carriage permit. Alternatives 1 and 2 will have application to permits other than stage carriage permit. As regards the four alternatives set out above, all of them will apply to a stage carriage permit. Alternatives 1 and 2 will have application to permits other than stage carriage permit. No doubt, the fourth alternative may apply to some extent to contract carriage permit; but generally such permits are issued for a Stage or throughout the country. The Parliament has deliberately used the expression ‘or’ or a conjunctive and not as a disjunctive. Hence, there is no scope for contending that the sub-section contains a special rule for stage carriage permits and a general rule for all the permits, with the result the special will prevail over the general. Even assuming that the provision for a stage carriage permit is a special rule, unless there is a repugnancy between the general rule and the special rule, there is no question of the special overruling the general. If both can stand together, then the rule that special rule excludes general’ cannot be invoked. 17. However, the matter is not res Integra. The question has been considered by this Court and another High Courts earlier with reference to corresponding provisions under the old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. Sec.57(8) of the old Act was on similar terms. Under the Central Act, sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57 read as follows: ”(8). An application to vary the conditions of any permit other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier’s permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit; Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles." 18. By the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act (HI of 1964), sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57 of the old Act was amended by the words "or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit", after the words "by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area". It is worth nothing that the provision for application for variation, extension or curtailment was with reference to any permit other than a temporary permit under the old Act as amended by the Madras Act. In the letter part of the section in which reference was made to stage carriage permit, the provision was for an application for variation by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it. It is to be noted that by the same Amendment Act III of 1964, Sec.48 of the Central Act of 1939 was also amended. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.48 was omitted and in sub-sec.(3), Clause (i) was renumbered an clause (i-a) and the following clause was inserted as clause (i): "that the stage carriage or stage carriages shall be used only on a specified route or routes or in a specified area," Sub-clause (a) of clause (xxi) of Sec.48 was substituted with the following clause: "(a) vary, extend or curtail the route or routes or the area specified in the permit;" (The remaining part of Sub-clause (a) of Clause (xxi) is not extracted as it is unnecessary for this case.) Thus, when the legislature amended Sec.48, Sec.57 was also amended consequently. The expression used in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (xxi) is ‘vary, extend or curtail’, while the expression used in sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57 is ‘variation, extension or curtailment’ Thus, it is seen that the legislature thought fit to incorporate the provisions of Subclause (a) of Clause (xxi) of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.48 in Sec.57 as it had made the route as a condition of the permit under sub-sec. (3) of Sec.48. The reason for such amendment was obviously the opinion expressed by the majority of a Full Bench of this Court in Natesa Mudaliar v. Thanapal Bus Service, A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 136. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., and Jagadisan, J. who formed the majority, took the view that the route was not a condition of a permit, as it did not fall under Sec.48(3) of the Act as it stood. 19. 136. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., and Jagadisan, J. who formed the majority, took the view that the route was not a condition of a permit, as it did not fall under Sec.48(3) of the Act as it stood. 19. After referring to Sec.57(8) of the old Act, it was observed as follows: "This is only a procedural provision and is practically a substitute of the old Rule 208(a). which we have already extracted above. This sub-section consists of three parts and provides what application should be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. The first category comprises applications to vary the conditions of any permit other than a temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes in a new area. The second group comprises applications in regard to stage carriage permit for increasing the number of services above the specified maximum. The third class comprises application in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carriage permit for increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit. The first category uses the expression ‘any permit’. Necessarily even a stage carriage permit would fall within its ambit. But if the route is not a condition of the permit relating to a stage carriage then obviously that group should have regard only to permits in regard to other kinds of transport vehicles like contract carnage or public carrier. It would not be proper to assume that because a provision is made for treating an application to vary the condition of any permit by including a new route what is not prescribed as a condition of permit should be attributed to have that character. As we have said, this is not a substantive provision enacting the conditions of a stage carriage permit, but is only a rule of procedure which obliges the transport authority to treat certain applications as if they are applications for a grant of a new permit. We are therefore unable to agree with any of the contentions urged on behalf of the first respondent." (Italics mine). It was to overrule the view taken by the majority, the amendment was brought in by the State legislature, Later, Sec.48 of the Central Act was similarly amended by Central Act 56 of 1969 with effect from 3. We are therefore unable to agree with any of the contentions urged on behalf of the first respondent." (Italics mine). It was to overrule the view taken by the majority, the amendment was brought in by the State legislature, Later, Sec.48 of the Central Act was similarly amended by Central Act 56 of 1969 with effect from 3. 1970 by omitting sub-sec.(2) and introducing clause (i) in sub-sec.(3) and renumbering the old clause (i) as clause (i-a) as was done by the State legislature. 20. It is worth referring to the view expressed by Ramamurti, J. in his dissenting judgment in that case, on the interpretation of Sec.57(8) of the Act, which is as follows: "(43) If I may say so, this clause is unambiguous, explicit, and very clear and does not admit scope for any argument or difficulty in the rules of interpretation. The word "any" is of general import and excludes limitation or qualification and is "all inclusive", "the words used negative qualification and affirm generality." Vide Per Fry, L.J. Duck v. Bates, (1884)13 Q.B.D. 843 at p. 851. In construing statutes the word "any" is equivalent to and has force of "every" and "all". I see absolutely nothing in the context of the sub-section to control or restrict the generality that is connoted by the deliberate use of the expression "any". On the other hand, such context as is manifested in Sec.57(8) leads to the same inference. The controlling context "excepting a temporary permit" shows that the legislature is full aware of the implications of the import of the word "any" and exempts only a temporary permit and no other. It is impossible to brush aside or slur over the three component parts of Sec.57(8): the first part dealts with all the vehicles, the second part deals with a stage carriage permit with regard to the increase of the number or vehicles and the third part deals with the increase in the number of vehicles of a contract carriage or a public carrier. The proviso to the section further emphasises the same view and its importance should not be overlooked. (44) I am wholly unable to countenance any argument involving an assumption that there is any looseness or inaccuracy in the language employed in Sec.57(8). The proviso to the section further emphasises the same view and its importance should not be overlooked. (44) I am wholly unable to countenance any argument involving an assumption that there is any looseness or inaccuracy in the language employed in Sec.57(8). I have no doubt in my mind that the legislature has used the words "any permit" in the opening words of sub-sec.(8) deliberately, with a view to take in all vehicles without any distinction and that whenever the legislature wants to make a distinction and restrict the scope, it has taken particular care, to do so by employing necessary, precise, apt, language. If I may say so, I cannot even visualise what clearer language the legislature could have employed to manifest its legislative intent. There is no justification whatsoever for reading the words "any permit" as "any permit other than a stage carriage permit", as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, especially when the legislature disignedly excepts a temporary permit only." 21.. With respect, I agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge and apply it here in interpreting Sec.80 sub-sec.(V) of the Act. 22.. Though there is no discussion on the question. the same view is expressed by Veeraswami. J. in Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. v. Raman and Raman (P) Ltd.. (1965)1 M.L.J. 504, in the following words: "Sec.57(8) enjoins that an application to vary a condition of a stage carriage permit by inclusion of a new route should be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. The effect of this is that an application should be disposed of by complying with the procedure for the grant of such carriage permits." 23.. The question was raised specifically before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayana Reddy v. Secretary Regional Transport Authority. Cuddappah and another. (1960)2 An.W.R. 91, and it was held that the first part of Scc.57(8) of the Act would apply to stage carriage permits also. The relevant passage reads thus: "Sri Babul Reddy invites us to hold that the first part of Sec.57(8) applies only to contract carriage permits or public carriers’ permits and is inapplicable to stage carriage permits and that it is only the clause which deals with "increasing the number of services above the specified maximum" that governs the stage carriage permits. We think this argument is unsubstantial. We think this argument is unsubstantial. The first part of Sec.57(8) is general in its terms and governs not only contract carriages or public carriers but stage carriages also. It should be remembered that Chapter IV is headed. "Control, of Transport Vehicles" which includes stage carriages. If really the intendment of the section was that the first part of it should be confined only to contract carriages and public carriers, it would have been made specific by restricting its scope only to the two types of carriages. In our opinion, this sub-section enables as to solve the problem before us without much difficulty.“ 24. It is, therefore, clear that the first part of the section will also apply to all permits including stage carriage permit and the only exclusion is a temporary permit. There is no warrant for applying the maxim generalis specialibus non derogant 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that under Sec.80(3) of the Act an application to vary the conditions of any permit shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit and if the first respondent’s application is treated as one for grant of a new permit, it will not be entitled to the permit, as the first respondent is not an individual. Reliance is placed on the proviso to Sec.71(l) of the Act. the said sub-section reads thus: ”A Regional Transport Authority shall, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of this Act: Provided that such permit for a route of fifty kilometers or less shall be granted only to an individual or a State Transport undertaking.“ According to learned counsel the first respondent being a private limited company, is neither an individual nor a State transport undertaking and is, therefore, not entitled to grant of a new permit. Learned counsel for the first respondent submits that the contention was not raised before the tribunal and the petitioner should not be permitted to raise it here. It is further argued that even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention. It is pointed out that the fiction introduced in the last part of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.80 of the Act is for a limited purpose and the effect thereof is to make the procedure prescribed in Secs.80(1) and (2) to be applicable to the application. It is further argued that even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention. It is pointed out that the fiction introduced in the last part of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.80 of the Act is for a limited purpose and the effect thereof is to make the procedure prescribed in Secs.80(1) and (2) to be applicable to the application. In other words it is contended that by treating the application as one for grant of a new permit, the provisions of sub-secs.(1) and (2) of Sec.80 of the Act are alone applicable to the same and orders should be passed on the basis of the said provisions. 26. My attention is drawn to the judgments of the Supreme Court in M/s.Shiv Chand Amolak Chand v. The Regional Transport Authority and another, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 9: (1983)4 S.C.C. 433 : 1984 Lab.LJ. 1: (1984)1 Comp.L.J. 214, and M.Duraiswami v. Sri Murugan Bus Service, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1980; (1986)2 S.C.J. 50. In both the cases, the provisions of Sec.57(8) of the old Act were considered. Referring to the fiction introduced by sub-scc.(3), the Court observed in the former case as follows: ” There can, therefore, be no doubt that if an application for varying the condition of a permit by extension of the route specified in the permit were equated wholly with an application for grant of a new permit and the permit for the extended route were to be regarded as a new permit, the procedure prescribed in Sec.47 sub-sec.(3) would have to be followed and the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted on the extended route would have to be determined before the application could be entertained by the Regional Transport Authority. But we do not think that the prescription in sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57 that an application for varying the condition of a permit by extension of the route shall be treated as an application for grant of a new permit has effect of equaling such an application with an application for grant of a new permit for all purposes so as to attract the applicability of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.47. Sec.57 deals with the procedure in applying for and granting permits; and sub-secs.(3) to (7) lay down the procedure which must be followed in considering and deciding, inter alia, an application for grant of a stage carriage permit. Sec.57 deals with the procedure in applying for and granting permits; and sub-secs.(3) to (7) lay down the procedure which must be followed in considering and deciding, inter alia, an application for grant of a stage carriage permit. Sub-sec.(8) follows upon sub-secs.(3) to (7) and is part of the same section which has a definite object and scheme of providing the procedure for considering and granting an application and, therefore, when it provides that an application to van, ‘the conditions of a permit by the inclusion of new route or routes or new area or by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it shall be treated as an application for grant of a new stage carriage permit it is obviously intended to incorporate and make applicable the proce-dureset out in the preceding sub-secs.(3) to (7) to such an application. The context in which sub-sec.(8) occurs and its juxtaposition with sub-sees. (3) to (7) in Sec.57 clearly indicate that what is sought to be made applicable to an application referred to in sub-sec.(8) by treating it as an application for grant of a new permit, is the procedure set out in sub-secs.(3) to (7) of Sec.57 and nothing more. The requirement spelt out in sub-sec.(3) of Sec.47 that the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted on any particular route must be first determined before an application for grant of a stage carriage permit can be entertained by the Regional Transport Authority under Sec.48, is obviously not a part of the procedure for considering an application for grant of a permit; it is a condition precedent before an application for grant of a permit can be considered and granted. This condition precedent cannot be said to have been incorporated by reference under sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57. An application to vary the conditions of a permit as set out in sub-sec.(8) of Sec.57 is undoubtedly to be treated as an application for grant of a new permit, but that is only for the purpose of applying the procedure set out in sub-secs.(3) to (7) of that section. It is not an application for a new permit and if it is granted, the permit for the extended route does not become a new permit in the hands of the applicant." 27. It is not an application for a new permit and if it is granted, the permit for the extended route does not become a new permit in the hands of the applicant." 27. In the latter case, the above passage was quoted and the position in law was reiterated. Hence, the contention that the provisions of Sec.71(l) of the Act are attracted to the application of the first respondent is untenable. 28. The next contention is that the provisions of Rule 3(e) of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules are violated by the grant of permit to the first respondent. The said rule defines "City and Town Service" as "a service plying in a city or a Municipal Town or any built up place notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette as "City" or "Town" for this purpose by the Transport Authority concerned with the prior concurrence of the State Transport Authority. No route shall lie entirely outside, but at least one terminus of it shall be within the limits of municipal town or a city or any built up place notified for the purpose. The aggregate distance of a "town" or "city service" route lying partly within and partly outside the limits of a municipal town or city or any built up place, notified for the purpose shall not exceed 30 kilometres." 29. The contention is that the distance between Srivilliputhur and Puthur is 28.6 Kms. and the distance between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi is 20 Kms. and the aggregate being 48.6 Kms. exceeds the limit of 30 Kms. fixed in Rule 3(e). Hence, permission to operate between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi offends the rule. There is no merit in this contention too. The rule refers only to the aggregate distance of ‘a’ town service or city service route. If a permit covers two routes, each of them shall not exceed 30 Kms. There can be no dispute that a permit can cover more than one route. Sec.70(l)(a) and Sec.72(2)(i) of the Act use the expression "route or routes". Hence, aggregate distance referred to the Rule 3(e) must be computed with reference to each route. Moreover, in this case another permit has been issued to the first respondent to run a town service between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi. Sec.70(l)(a) and Sec.72(2)(i) of the Act use the expression "route or routes". Hence, aggregate distance referred to the Rule 3(e) must be computed with reference to each route. Moreover, in this case another permit has been issued to the first respondent to run a town service between Srivilliputhur and Sivakasi. Rule 3(e) does not refer to the aggregate of the distance covered by two permits and hence there is no violation of the rule in this case. 30. The facts referred to by the tribunal show that the order has been made in the best interests of the travelling public. Hence, there is no justification for interfering with the same. The writ petition fails and suffers a dismissal with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs.1,000.