JAIN, J.— This is defendants first appeal arising out of the judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Merta dated 17.8.87 whereby he has decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. (2) The brief facts of the case are that the respondent Amra filed a suit for cancellation of sale-deed dated 27.6.73 and for declaration and possession of the suit land. According to the plaintiff-respondent, originally the property stood in the name of one Kana father of Bheru and after the death of Kana in Samvat Year 2002, the property came in the hands of Bheru as ancestral property. It was alleged that the plaintiff was adopted by Bhura by a registered adoption-deed dated 31.7.58. It was alleged that sale-deed executed by his adoptive father Bheru @ Bhura with regard to Khasra no. 655 and 655/1 situated at Mithri village, Tehsil Nawa was ineffective and not binding on plaintiff as he gets right in the ancestral property. It was alleged that the sale was not for legal necessity of the family and he prayed for cancellation of sale-deed and possession of the disputed land from the appellants. During the pendency of appeal Bheru died on 11.9.77 and his L. Rs. were brought on record. (3) The appellants-defendants Narainsingh, Laxman Singh and Bhanwarlal denied the allegations that the property is ancestral one. However, they have admitted the fact of adoption as well as sale-deed executed in their favour. They have pleaded that property in the hands of Bhura as a sole surviving coparcener. It was his separate property and had full right over the land in dispute. They further pleaded that they are bonafide purchasers without notice and with consideration. So, the sale-deed cannot be cancelled after such a long time when they have spent huge amount in the improvement of the property. It was also alleged by the defendants that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as the matter relates to agricultural land and only khatedari rights have been transferred by the sale-deed and not the ownership right. Thus, suit is triable by Revenue Court. (4) On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed as many as four issues, there English translation is as under: — 1. Whether the defendant no.l is the sole Khatedar tenant of the land in dispute has right to sale? (D) 2. Thus, suit is triable by Revenue Court. (4) On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed as many as four issues, there English translation is as under: — 1. Whether the defendant no.l is the sole Khatedar tenant of the land in dispute has right to sale? (D) 2. Whether defendants nos.l to 4 are bonafide purchasers for value without any notice cannot be dispossessed from the land in dispute? (D) 3. Whether after the death of defendant no.ls father in Samvat Year 2002, Defendant no.l became sole surviving coparcener and all properties vests in him cannot be divested by the adoption of plaintiff on 31.7.58? (D) 4. Relief. (5) The appellants-plaintiff in support of their case have examined five witnesses and the respondents have examined three witnesses. The plaintiff filed adoption-deed and a copy of sale-deed. The defendants in support of their case filed copy of Jamabandy. (6) The learned trial court after considering the material on record decreed the suit on 17.8.76. Hence, the defendant has filed this first appeal. Before I proceed it is to be noted that a preliminary issue was framed by the learned court below on 11.4.75, which reads as under: — "Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit or not"? (7) The learned court below after hearing counsel for both the parties and discussing the various provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and the authorities held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit vide its order dt. 18.4.75. (8) Therefore, it is not open to the appellant to agitate this point of jurisdiction of the court. As it has become final between the parties by the order dt. 18.4.75 which was not challenged in any higher court. (9) Now, I take up the case issue-wise, finding recorded by the lower court. The burden of all the issues have been put on the appellant-defendant. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. M.D. Purohit is that Section 41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 recognises the right of sale and gift by a Khatedar. (9) Now, I take up the case issue-wise, finding recorded by the lower court. The burden of all the issues have been put on the appellant-defendant. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. M.D. Purohit is that Section 41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 recognises the right of sale and gift by a Khatedar. Section 41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads as under : — "The interest of a Khatedar tenant shall be transferable, otherwise than by way of sub-lease, subject to conditions specified in S. 42 and 43." (10) Originally, it was admitted case of the parties that land in dispute was in the name of Kana who was father of Bheru, defendant no.l Kana died in Samvat Year 2002 and after his death the property in dispute came in the hands of Bheru, the only son of Kana. On the basis of inheritance, the land in dispute entered in the name of Bheru after death of Kana. (11) Section 40 of the Act, 1955 relates to succession to tenants and runs as under : — "When a tenant dies intested his interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance with the personal law to which he was subject at the time of his death." (12) This goes to show that Bheru got interest in the land under the personal law to which he was governed. There is no dispute that parties are Hindus and governed according to Hindu Mitakshra Law as existed at the time of death of Kana. Thus, after death of Kana, Bheru, defendants name was entered in the revenue record as sole Khatedar. The position of Hindu Law is very clear on this point. A sole Khatedar could have sold the khatedari rights to anybody without any reservation. But as soon as he took a son in adoption prior to sale of khatedari rights, then the adopted son becomes equal owner in the khatedari land which was in his (adopted sons), grand fathers land. Originally, in a co-parcenery property a son, grand son and great grand son takes an equal share with his father by birth. This is the essence of Hindu Coparcenary property. Originally, in a co-parcenery property a son, grand son and great grand son takes an equal share with his father by birth. This is the essence of Hindu Coparcenary property. In the present case, the admitted case of the parties is that originally land stood in the name of Kana who died in Samvat Year 2002 intestated, leaving behind his only son defendant Bheru. Bheru being a sole surviving coparcener could have sold the land in dispute to any body prior to a natural born son or a son is adopted by him. As soon as he adopts a son he becomes equal share-holders in the lands in dispute and after adoption, Bheru had no right to sale lands in dispute. So, the issue no.l has rightly been decided by the learned trial court in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant-appellant. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the contention of the appellant that he being the sole surviving owner Bheru has right to sale has no substance and is rejected. (13) The next contention of Mr. M.D. Purohit, the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned trial court has wrongly decided issue no.2 in plaintiffs favour. His further submission is that he is the bonafide purchaser without notice and for valuable consideration, so his rights in the land in dispute cannot be defeated by plaintiff. (14) It is no doubt true that a person cannot sell better title than what he himself possess. In other words, a person can sell his own rights in the property and not of others. The appellant has not come with a case that defendant Bheru sold his property for legal necessity of his family or for their benefit. In the absence of pleading, the sale of land by Bheru cannot bind the rights of the plaintiff in the suit land. Under Hindu Law a Karta of coparcenary property can make out a sale of his coparcenary property for legal necessity or for the benefit of family in order to binds the other coparceners. But in the present case, there is nothing on record which will go to show that the sale was for the legal necessity or for the benefit of family in order that the sale will be binding on the plaintiff also. Otherwise one coparcener cannot binds other coparceners for his individual acts. But in the present case, there is nothing on record which will go to show that the sale was for the legal necessity or for the benefit of family in order that the sale will be binding on the plaintiff also. Otherwise one coparcener cannot binds other coparceners for his individual acts. When the plaintiff has an equal share in the land in dispute with Bheru, then Bheru alone has no right to execute a sale without consent of his adopted son,who has an equal share in the disputed property. The counsel has not been able to show from record anything, otherwise. Thus, as stated above, the appellant Bheru gets no right to execute the sale and such a sale is void. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force and is rejected. The finding of the learned trial court on issue no .2 is correct. (15) The next submission of Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the appellant is that the defendant no.l Bheru became sole surviving coparcener after death of his father Kana in Samvat Year 2002 and once a property vests in Bheru cannot be divested by taking plaintiff in adoption in the year 1958. He has submitted that the learned trial court has wrongly decided issue no.3 and also not considered the effect of Sec. 12 (C) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 which being a special law overrides the general law. (16) Under the principles of Hindu Law by Mulla, Chapter XII deals with the coparcener and coparcenary property under the Hindu Mitakshra Law. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has brought about some radical changes in the law of succession without abolishing joint family and joint family property. Speaking generally it does not interfere with the special rights of those who are members of Mitakshra coparcenary but it is important to note that Sec. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 recognises the rights upon the death of a coparcener of certain preferential heirs to claim an interest in the property that would have been all attached to him if there had been a fact of partition immediately before his death and the principle of devolution by survivorship is affected to that extent. The cardinal principle of Mitakshra Law is that a coparcener in a joint family, cannot make a valid gift or sale or bequest of his interest in the coparcenary property so as to defeat the rights of other members to take by survivorship is partly abolished to the extent that now it is competent to such a coparcener to dispose of his own share by will (S. 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956) his undivided interest in the coparcenary property. A Hindu coparcener is much narrower body than the joint family. The later consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor, and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. Where as coparcenary consists of only those persons who acquire by birth an interest-in the joint or coparcenary property. These are sons, grand sons and great grand sons of the holder of the joint property. No coparcener can commence without a male ancestor. A coparcenary is purely a creature of law and it cannot be created by acts of parties. The only exception to this general principle is that by adoption a stranger may be introduced as a member of coparcenary. (17) In the case where a male Hindu inherits no property from his father, grant father or great grant father, but acquires property from his own exertions, then it is his personal self acquired property and his sons, have no right on it by birth. He can dispose of it in any manner as he likes as it is his self acquired property. But if he dies intestated, then his son, grand son and great grand son acquires in it a right by birth. Such a property in the hands of son becomes ancestral property for grand son and great grand son and even to a adopted son, who also becomes a coparcener along with others. (18) The essence of coparcenary under the Mitakshra Law is unity of ownership. The ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of a coparceners. No individual member of that family while it remains united or undivided, can predict his definite share in the undivided property, because it is fluctuating with the deaths and births. The rights of each coparcener unlike a partition takes place, consists in a common possession and common enjoyment of coparcenary property. No individual member of that family while it remains united or undivided, can predict his definite share in the undivided property, because it is fluctuating with the deaths and births. The rights of each coparcener unlike a partition takes place, consists in a common possession and common enjoyment of coparcenary property. (19) No female can be coparcener under the Mitakshara Law, even a wife is entitled to her maintenance out of her husbands property. The incidents of a joint family or a coparcenary property is that every coparcener has a joint interest and joint possession. It devolves by survivorship. But this right of survivorship is now subject to section 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. (20) The male issue of a coparcener acquires an interest by birth in the coparcenary property. So, also an adopted son acquires an interest in the coparcenary property from the date of his adoption by a coparcener. All the property inherited by a male Hindu from fathers father or fathers fathers father is called ancestral property. And the son, grand son and great-grand son of the person inherits property, that becomes ancestral property for his son, grand son and great -grand sons. Where A inherits the properties from his father, his son, sons son or sons sons son not in the existence at the time A holds the property as absolute owner and can deal with it as he likes. If A as absolute owner, transfer such property or part thereof, then his after born son, grand son or great-grand son cannot challenge such transfer, so also an adopted son who comes in the family after transfer made by A as absolute owner, has no right to challenge the transfer made before his adoption. But if any transfer is made in the existence of his son, grand son, great-grand son or in the existence of any adopted son, then he has a right to challenge such transfer. (21) Under the Hindu Mitakshra Law the property held by a sole surviving coparcener is the separate property and as stated above, he can deal with it as he likes. The separate property in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener who inherits from his father, becomes coparcenary property for his natural born son or adopted son subsequently. (21) Under the Hindu Mitakshra Law the property held by a sole surviving coparcener is the separate property and as stated above, he can deal with it as he likes. The separate property in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener who inherits from his father, becomes coparcenary property for his natural born son or adopted son subsequently. (22) A father under Hindu Law has special power to alienate coparcenary property including the interest of son, sons son and sons sons son for legal necessity or for payment of antecedents of debts of the family provided that, the debt was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. On the other hand a sole surviving coparcener has a right to sale mortgage, gift or alienate coparcenary property as his separate or self acquired property even for immoral or illegal purposes. Nobody is going to check him from doing so. After such alienation by sole surviving coparcener, a natural son is born or taken in adoption, the born son or adopted son has no right to challenge such alienation which was made by sole surviving coparcener prior to his birth or adoption. (23) On the other hand where the sole surviving coparcener inherits property from his father and a son is born or taken in adoption then such sons become equally coparcener with his father in the property and sole surviving coparcener has no right to alienate afterwards as he likes. (24) Now, looking to the facts of the present case in the light of Law of Hindu Mitakshra coparcenary, as discussed above, the admitted position of the parties is that (i) Originally property belong to Kana, father of defendant no.l Bhura (ii) at the time of death of Kana in Samvat Year 2002, Bhura was the sole surviving coparcener (iii) Bhura took plaintiff in adoption, by a registered deed on 31.7.58 and lastly the sale deed was executed by Bhura on 27.6.73 at least 15 years after the plaintiff was taken by adoption. Therefore, the position becomes clear that the defendant no.l had no right to execute the sale-deed. (25) Now, I take up the second limb of the argument of Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the appellant regarding effect of section 12(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Therefore, the position becomes clear that the defendant no.l had no right to execute the sale-deed. (25) Now, I take up the second limb of the argument of Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the appellant regarding effect of section 12(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. He has submitted that vesting of estate in the hands of sole surviving coparcener (Bheru) cannot be divested by taking plaintiff in adoption, in the light of Sec. 12 (c). (26) Section 12(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 runs as under : — "12 Effect of Adoption :— An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be served and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family; provided that (a). . . . (b). . . . (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption." (27) Provision (c) of this Section departs from the Hindu General Law and makes it clear that adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which has vested in him or her before adoption. If provision (c) of Sec. 12 is read in the light of provision of Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which provides that where a property is vested in the widow governed by joint family of Mitakshra Law cannot be divested by subsequent adoption, or where the sole surviving coparcener alienate coparcenary property and rights are vested in the purchaser cannot be challenged by adopted son who was adopted subsequent to alienation. In order to protect such persons right, specific provision has been made in S. 12(c) of the Act of 1956, and this provision does not, however, abrogate the incidents of the joint family property. (28) A reference may be made in this regard to Vasant & Anr. vs. Dattu & Ors. (1) D. Shamrao Agalawe vs. Panduray Mirju & Ors. (2) and Dinji vs. Daddi (3). (29) In Vasant & Anr. vs. Dattu & Ors. (28) A reference may be made in this regard to Vasant & Anr. vs. Dattu & Ors. (1) D. Shamrao Agalawe vs. Panduray Mirju & Ors. (2) and Dinji vs. Daddi (3). (29) In Vasant & Anr. vs. Dattu & Ors. (supra) it has been held that the introduction of a member into a joint Hindu family by birth, or adoption have the effect of decreasing the share of the rest of the members of the Joint Hindu Family, but it does not certainly invoke any question of divesting any person of any estate vested in him. (30) The joint family continues to hold the estate but with more members then before. There is no fresh vesting and divesting of the estate in any one. It cannot be said that on the death of a member of joint family the property member be considered to have vested in the remaining member by survivorship. The property no doubt, passes by the survivorship, but there is no question of any vesting or divesting in the sense contemplated by Sec. 12 of the Act. To interpret Sec. 12 to include cases of devolution by survivorship on the death of a member of joint family would be deny any practical effect to the adoption made by the widow of such a member of the joint family. Such a result was not in contemplation of Parliament at all. Thus, where a widow of a deceased coparcener adopts a child, S. 12 (c) does not preclude the adopted child from claiming his share in the joint family property, for it a share is given to the adopted child, there is no question of "divesting any person of any estate which vested in him before adoption." (31) Same is the view expressed in D.S. Agalawe vs. P.Mirju & Ors. (supra), which has placed reliance on Sita Bai vs. Ramchandra (4) and Vasant & Anr. vs. Dattu (supra). (32) A person adopted by the Hindu widow after coming into force of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 can claim a share in the property which had devolved on a sole surviving coparcener on the death of the husband of widow, who took him to adoption. Consequently, the adopted son and adopting widow can file a suit for partition against the person who was a sole surviving coparcener. Consequently, the adopted son and adopting widow can file a suit for partition against the person who was a sole surviving coparcener. Before adoption proviso (c) to Sec. 12 is not a bar to such suit. Since, no question of divesting the sole coparcenary of his estate is involved. The joint family does not cease to be joint family when it passes to the hands of sole surviving coparcener, the said properties become the joint family property in his hands of his son. The only difference between the right of the manager of a joint Hindu family over joint family property is that while the former can alienate the joint Hindu family property only for legal necessity or for family benefit, the later is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property as long as he remains sole surviving coparcener and he may sell or mortgage the coparcenary property and he may sale or mortgage the coparcenary property even though there is no legal necessity or family benefit or even make a gift of the coparcenary property. If a son is born or adopted subsequently by a sole surviving coparcener or a new coparcenary is inducted in the family on adoption made by a widow of the deceased coparcener, an alienation made by the sole surviving coparcener before the birth or birth of a new coparcener or the induction into family by adoption, whether by way of sale or mortgage or gift, would however stand for the coparcener who is born or adopted after alienations, cannot object to the alienation made before he was born or adopted. (33) In AIR 1990 SC 1153 (supra), this position has been put beyond all doubt. That was a case where the death of the adoptive father must have taken place prior to commencement of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and it has been pointed out that adoptive mother got a limited estate in the property which originally belonged to her husband and by virtue of the said Act, she acquires right of absolute ownership and subsequent adoption made by her could not divest her of the right of her husband vested in her in view of proviso (c) to S.12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. (34) Reference can be made to AIR 1982 Karnataka, 334 (5), wherein it has been held that out of two brothers one died leaving behind his widow and sole surviving coparcener, the other brothers widow adopted a son, the adopted son became joint coparcener with the sole surviving coparcener having equal rights in the coparcenary property. Yet there is another case H.P. Veeresh V. Smt. Channobasamma (6). In that case the undisputed facts were that the suit property belonged to husband of defendant who died on 14.5.1970 i.e. after coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. After death of her husband, she became sole owner and properties in her possession. Widow took a son in adoption on 10.12.1972, by a registered deed. Adopted son filed a suit for partition of the property on the claim of joint ownership with his adoptive mother. It was held that the properties were with the widow at the time of death of her husband in 1970 and, thus, she became absolute owner in view of Sec. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, therefore, the adopted son has no right in the properties. Once the property is vested in the adoptive mother prior to adoption cannot be divested u/s. 12(c) of the Act, 1956. Thus, in view of the authoritative pronouncement made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the appellant cannot challenge the finding of the learned trial court on issue no. 3 under the shelter of S. 12(c) of the Act of 1956 which has no application to the facts of present case as defendant No. 1 being father sold the property. (35) Mr. Purohit has lastly contended that a decree to the extent of half share can be granted. The appellant has no right to claim half share because he cannot have joint possession with the plaintiff unless partition takes place, it cannot be said which half portion he has purchased. But the suit is for cancellation of sale-deed and possession filed by the plaintiff-respondent. Admittedly no partition had taken place, and not decree to the extent of half share could not be granted particularly when half share was no claimed in the trial court and the argument is rejected. Mr. But the suit is for cancellation of sale-deed and possession filed by the plaintiff-respondent. Admittedly no partition had taken place, and not decree to the extent of half share could not be granted particularly when half share was no claimed in the trial court and the argument is rejected. Mr. Purohit has drawn my attention that it has come on record that after filing of this appeal, the appellants have filed an application praying that they have settled their dispute in execution case no . 7/88 and they may be allowed to withdraw the appeal and a decree may be modified to the extent of half share in favour of Bhanwarlal. On the other hand Mr. Shishodia has opposed it stating that no compromise has been filed and that apart 0.23 Rule 4 CPC bars the execution court from disposing of the case in terms of the compromise. Thus, I find no force in the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant. (36) No other point has been pressed before me. (37) In view of my findings given with regard to issues no. 1, 2 and 3 the consequence is that issue no. 4 should have been decided in plaintiffs favour. The disputed land is joint family property and as discussed above, the defendant no.l Bheru @ Bhura had no right to sale it without consent of the plaintiff, therefore, the sale-deed executed by defendant no.l in favour of defendants no. 2 to 4 is unauthorised, illegal and void. The plaintiff is also entitled to get possession from defendants no. 2 to 4. The judgment and decree passed by learned Distt. Judge dt. 27.8.76 is maintained. (38) The appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs.