JUDGMENT R.B. Mehrotra, J. - Thirty two petitioners, who were appointed as Routine Grade Assistants by the High Court, Allahabad on daily wage basis, challenged the order of termination passed against them by the Registrar of the High Court. Allahabad on 29th September, 1988. The order is a one line order saying "following daily wages employees are ceased to work with effect from October 1, 1988 forenoon". Thereafter the names of all the present 32 petitioners are mentioned and the order is signed by Sri P. C. Agarwal, Incharge Registrar of the High Court. 2. A background of the appointment and termination of the petitioners is set out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court, Allahabad. 3. The then Hon'ble the Chief Justice (Mr. K. J. Shetty) on 29th of April, 1987 issued a direction to the effect that some hands of the category of Routine Grade Assistant may be appointed on ad hoc basis and that the appointment will be purely contractual and will be terminable at any time without any notice. It was further directed that the candidates to be appointed as such shall be required to sign a contract to the said effect before their appointment. Subsequent thereto with the approval of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, some candidates were engaged on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 25/- per day. A total of 43 candidates were appointed on daily wage basis on their furnishing undertakings. Out of 43 candidates, 38 were appointed at Allahabad and 5 at Lucknow. The copy of the agreement has been filed with the counter-affidavit. The petitioners were appointed purely on contractual basis on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 25/- per day as per terms and conditions as laid down in the court's memorandum. The appointment letter issued to each of these petitioners has been filed as Annexure 1' to the writ petition and it is averred that similar appointment letters were issued to all the petitioners. In the appointment letter, it is stated "that (the Court has been pleased to engage him on daily wage @ Rs. 25/- per day. He will not be entitled to any wages for Sundays and other holidays unless called for work. He will also not be entitled to any kind of leave etc. In the appointment letter, it is stated "that (the Court has been pleased to engage him on daily wage @ Rs. 25/- per day. He will not be entitled to any wages for Sundays and other holidays unless called for work. He will also not be entitled to any kind of leave etc. His services can be dispensed with at any time without notice and he will have no claim for absorption/regular appointment on any post in the office of the court. 4. In case, he is willing to do work on daily wages, which may be assigned to him, he may report for duty to the undersigned w.e.f1-7-1987 positively." 5. This letter is signed by Sri B.P. Singh, the Registrar of the High Court, as he then was. 6. The counter-affidavit discloses the reason for the termination of the petitioners' services and it is stated therein that since the petitioners' appointment was ad hoc and as soon as the regular appointments to the post of routine grade assistants on the basis of the competitive examination for the recruitment was made, their services were dispensed with as no longer required. It is also submitted that since the petitioners' have accepted their appointment in agreement with the answering respondents that they will not be entitled to any regular appointment nor will they claim absorption or regular appointment on any post in the office of the court and as such they have no legal right to seek any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. The learned Senior Advocate Sri Sudhir Chandra, appearing for the petitioner, have challenged order directing the petitioners to cease to work on two grounds. 8. Firstly, that the petitioners were appointed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Court and the Registrar being subordinate to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the order of termination is violative of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India. 9. Secondly, that the order of termination passed against the petitioners is in violation of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 10. Refuting the aforesaid submissions, Sri M. C. Dwivedi, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioners were appointed only by the Registrar with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and their services have been rightly terminated by the Registrar again with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 10. Refuting the aforesaid submissions, Sri M. C. Dwivedi, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioners were appointed only by the Registrar with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and their services have been rightly terminated by the Registrar again with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Secondly, the High Court is not an industry but is a constitutional authority exercising sovereign functions of dispensing justice and as such the petitioners cannot claim benefit of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Thirdly, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that a Full Bench of this Court has taken a view that no writ petition can be directly entertained for violation of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as the petitioners have a remedy under the Act itself to raise the industrial dispute under Section 4-K of the Act and unless the said remedy is exhausted, it is not open to the petitioners to agitate the said question directly by means of a writ petition in the High Court. The said decision has been rendered in the case of Chanddama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Co-operative Union, Lucknow and others, reported in (1991) 2 UPLBEC 898. It is further contended that the petitioners' services have been validly terminated for cogent reasons as to accommodate the regularly selected routine grade clerks and petitioners, who were appointed on ad hoc basis as daily wages, have to make way for regularly selected candidates. 11. To ascertain as to whether the petitioners were actually appointed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Come or by the Registrar, the original record has been called for. The record reveals that a note was prepared by the Addl. Registrar on 24-4-1987 wherein it was mentioned "D. R. (E) has moved that there are a number of vacancies in the cadre of R. G. As. Applications were invited for the appointment on regular basis after holding test. There are 73 regular vacancies in this cadre. Holding of the test and preparation of regular list will take much time, i.e. at least four to five months. The process for conducting the examination is being expedited but even then it will not be possible to finalise the same within a short period. There are 73 regular vacancies in this cadre. Holding of the test and preparation of regular list will take much time, i.e. at least four to five months. The process for conducting the examination is being expedited but even then it will not be possible to finalise the same within a short period. The working in the High Court offices is completely shattered on account of the shortage of hands. The work is increasing every day and the office is unable to cope with the same. It is, therefore, necessary that some appointments be made on ad hoc basis for a specified period till regular appointments are made after holding a test. The appointment so made shall be purely on ad hoc basis for a specified period of three months. It will be contractual appointment terminable at any time without notice. A contract to that effect has to be signed by each candidate. Such appointment could be extended at the sweet-will of Hon'ble the Chief Justice till regular appointments are made. If you agree, sufficient number of hands in the cadre of R. G. As. be appointed on ad hoc basis for a specified period of three months. This period may be extended by Hon'ble C. J.. If necessary, till regular appointments ate made after holding the test. This appointments on ad hoc basis will be purely contractual terminable at any time without notice. Each candidate shall be required to sign the contract to that effect before the Registrar. Kindly obtain orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in this regard." 12. Thereafter after the aforesaid note, the Registrar has made a note "as proposed at ; 'A'. Thereafter Hon'ble the Chief Justice has noted 'Yes' and signed. In pursuance of the aforesaid note, the petitioners have been appointed in the proforma given out in Annexure 1' to the writ petition. An undertaking was also taken from each candidate that he has no objection and agree to work on daily wages on the terms and conditions laid down in the aforesaid memo, referred to above. 13. In pursuance of the aforesaid orders, the petitioners continued to work on daily wage basis right from the date that they joined their service i.e. 1-7-1987 to 20-2-1988. 13. In pursuance of the aforesaid orders, the petitioners continued to work on daily wage basis right from the date that they joined their service i.e. 1-7-1987 to 20-2-1988. Admittedly the petitioners did not work or as according to the petitioner, the petitioners were not permitted to work from 21-2-1988 but were again permitted to assume their duties on 29-2-1988. The Registrar of the High Court issued another appointment letter appointing the petitioners for a month and thereafter continued to extent the period of appointment till the petitioners services were terminated i. e.t on 30-9-1988. 14. The original record discloses that fresh appointment letters were issued by the Registrar of the High Court reappointing the petitioner on daily wage basis by an order, dated 2J-2-1988. The appointment was on the same terms in which the earlier appointment was made. This appointment was clearly made for a period of one month only. The appointment was thereafter extended from time to time with the approval of the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice. There is a note of the D. R. (E) addressed to tho Registrar recommending that the term of daily wage employees may be extended beyond 28th June, 1988. The Registrar has made a further note "if approved, the term of these daily wagers may be extended upto 30-9-1988". Then there is a note of Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice "Yes extend to 30-9-2988". Subsequently thereto, there is a note again of the D. R. (E) addressed to the Registrar that orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice may kindly be obtained regarding extension of the term of daily wage employees beyond 30-9-1988. There is an order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice that their term will expire on 30-9-1988. The Registrar has by the impugned order terminated the services of these petitioners, The record clearly reveals that the petitioners were only appointed by the Registrar of the High Court with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the petitioners services has also been terminated by the Registrar of the High Court with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The submission of Sri Sudhir Chandra that the petitioners were appointed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and their services have been terminated by the Registrar has no merit in the aforesaid background. 15. The submission of Sri Sudhir Chandra that the petitioners were appointed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and their services have been terminated by the Registrar has no merit in the aforesaid background. 15. Sri Sudhir Chandra has also submitted that under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, only Hon'ble the Chief Justice is the appointing Authority of all the employees of the High Court, as such since the petitioners were employees of the High Court, the services of the petitioners could have been terminated only by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and not by the Registrar. Under the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Condition of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976, Rule 3 (n) defines the 'Appointing Authority'- "2 (n) Appointing Authority' means the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer as he may direct." In pursuance of the aforesaid power, Hon'ble the Chief Justice has delegated his powers to the Registrar of the Court as 'Appointing Authority' in respect of matters of appointment, promotion etc. to Class III and Class IV posts referred to in Rules 5 to 15 of the aforesaid rules. The exact notification is given below : "HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD NOTIFICATION No. 2/Vo. 119 Dated : 23-8-1976 In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of Article 229 of the Constitution of India read with Rule 2 (n) of the High Court Officers and Staff (Condition of Service and Conduct Rules, 1976 and subject to Rule 6 of the said Rules the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to direct the Registrar of the Court to be the appointing authority in respect of all matters of appointment, promotion etc. to Class III and Class IV posts referred to in Rules 5 to 15 of the aforesaid Rules. By order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice Sd. M. P. Singh Joint Registrar." Rule 8 (a) provides for appointment of the routine grade assistants, as such the Hon'ble the Chief Justice delegated his powers in favour of the Registrar in exercise of powers under Clause (1) of Article 229 of the Constitution of India read with Rule 2 (n) of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976. Hence the Registrar became the appointing authority of the petitioners and was competent to appoint and terminate the services of the petitioners who were appointed on the post of routine grade assistants. The submission that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Court is the appointing authority of the petitioners is falsified by the aforesaid notification and the submission accordingly fails. 16. The vital question for consideration in the present case is whether the High Court can be treated to be an industry under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 17. The learned Senior Advocate Sri Sudhir Chandra has contended that the High Court is not exercising any sovereign functions i.e., it renders service to the citizens in discharge of its duties, as such comes within the definition of the 'industry' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the alternative he has submitted that assuming that the High Court is discharging sovereign functions by dispensing justice, there are several departments of the High Court which has got nothing to do with the discharge of the sovereign functions of dispensing justice. At best it can be said that Hon'ble Judges who are acting under the constitutional authorities are discharging sovereign functions of dispensing justice and the staff attached to the Hon'ble Judges can at best be said to be assisting the Hon'ble Judges. The rent of the lower staff of the High Court which is doing the routine work of typing, placing files copying etc. etc. and all the IV Class employees who are doing the work of the Mali, Jamadars, peons and domestic workers have got nothing to do with the dispensation of justice in exercise of sovereign powers and as such in view of the tests laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 , the units of the High Court and the employees employed therein, who are not connected with the discharge of the sovereign functions which are severable from the sovereign functions of the High Court, should come within the definition of 'industry' under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 18. 18. Section 2 (k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act defines 'Industry': " 2 (k) 'Industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." 19. The submission is that those units of the High Court which are not associated or which are severable from discharging of sovereign functions of the High Court come within the wider definition of the word 'Industry' defined under the Act as it includes all employment or avocation of workmen. 20. In the case of Des Raj etc. v. State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1182 , the Hon'bla Supreme Court reiterated the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra). Applying the dominant nature test, the Supreme Court held : "IV The dominant nature test: (a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking. some of whom are not workmen as in the University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, (1964) 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1963 SC 1873 or some departments or not productive of goods and services if isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments as explained in the Corporation of Nagpur, AIR 1960 SC 675 , will be the true test. The whole undertaking will be industry although those who are not workmen by definition may not benefit by the status. (b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies. (c) Even in Departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries away they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within Section 2 (j). (d) Constitutional and competently enacted Legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby." 21. In Des Raj's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the Irrigation Department of the State is discharging sovereign functions and as such is not an 'Industry'. In Des Raj's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the Irrigation Department of the State is discharging sovereign functions and as such is not an 'Industry'. The Court reiterated the dominant nature test evolved by Hon'ble Krishna Aiyer, J. in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra) and held that the main functions of the Irrigation Department when subjected to 'dominant nature test' clearly comes within the ambit of 'Industry'. It has also been noticed in this case that the definition of 'Industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act has been amended but the amended definition has not been enforced. 22. Apply the dominant nature test Constitution Bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra), held that even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within Section 2 (j), namely, within the definition of the word 'Industry'. Thereafter the Court held that the constitution and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby. Thus the Court permitted the Legislature to take away any of the departments or any of the categories of the departments from the definition of the word 'Industry' as defined in the Act. No such attempt has been made. The only question which remains to be examined in the facts of the case is that whether any unit of the High Court which has got nothing to do with the discharge of sovereign functions and which is severable from the units which are associated with such discharge of sovereign functions, can such units be called industry and the employees working therein as workmen. 23. Article 214 of the Constitution of India provides that there shall be a High Court for each State. Article 215 provides that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to puni3h for contempt of itself. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time, deem it necessary to appoint. Article 217 provides for appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time, deem it necessary to appoint. Article 217 provides for appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. Article 219 provides for oath or affirmation by Judges of High Courts. Articles 220, 221 and 222 provides for conditions of service of the High Court Judges. Article 225 provides the jurisdiction of the High Courts and Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers jurisdiction on the High Court to issue extra-ordinary writs. Article 227 provides powers of Superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises Jurisdiction. Articles 229 (2) of the Constitution of India says that subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court of by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose. 24. From the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution. It is clear that the Constitution provides for the establishment of the High Court and for the appointment of the Judges and their conditions of service as well as for the jurisdiction to which a High Court has to exercise. So the establishment of the High Court is directly under the Constitutional authority and the High Court exercised jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution or by any law enacted by the State Legislature. Discharging of constitutional functions is exercise of sovereign powers. The contention of Sri Sudhir Chandra that the High Court is dispensing justice, as such is rendering service is not tenable as the High Court is exercising its Constitutional functions which can be termed as sovereign functions. High Court as such has been established as a Constitutional authority and exercises Constitutional functions. In this view of the matter, the submission of the petitioners that the High Court as such is an industry is misconceived and is accordingly rejected. High Court as such has been established as a Constitutional authority and exercises Constitutional functions. In this view of the matter, the submission of the petitioners that the High Court as such is an industry is misconceived and is accordingly rejected. However, still the important aspect which "requires consideration in the matter is whether the entire High Court is one or (the High Court can be divided in two distinct wings, one on the judicial side and other on administrative side. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice takes many decisions on the administrative side which are amenable to High Court writ jurisdiction. The administrative functions of the High Court, therefore, cannot be termed as the sovereign functions and it cannot be said that all administrative powers exercised by the High Court are in exercise of its sovereign functions. Therefore, the administrative wing of the High Court cannot be treated to be a sovereign authority, particularly III Class employees who are discharging routine functions as typists, copyists, Record keepers and IV Class employees who are discharging functions of domestic servants, Jamadars, peons and Malis of the High Court are severable from the officers who are assisting the Judges in the discharge of their judicial functions. A clear line of distinction is drawn between the employees working in the High Court associated with the Hon'ble Judges and the employees working in the High Court for doing routine clerical works and the employees of the High Court doing routine manual work. The employees working on the clerical side and on manual side of the High Court are severable from those officers who are assisting the Hon'ble Judges in discharge of their sovereign functions. Administrative wing of the High Court come within the wider definition of the word 'Industry' as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board's case (supra) applying dominant nature test. Under Clause (c) of the aforesaid tests, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within the definition of the word 'Industry' as defined in Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid background. Under Clause (c) of the aforesaid tests, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within the definition of the word 'Industry' as defined in Industrial Disputes Act. In the aforesaid background. I am of the opinion that III and IV Class employees of the High Court working in the units of the High Court not directly connected with Judicial work can be categorised as an industry for the purposes of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Petitioners come in the aforesaid category. 25. Now only two question remain to be examined in the matter. Firstly whether the petitioner services have been terminated in violation of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly the petitioners have worked in the High Court from 1st July, 1987 to 21st February, 1988 and thereafter from 29-2-1988 to 30-9-1988. Section 2 (g) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, defines 'continuous service' as under : "2(g) 'Continuous service' means un-interrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, and a workman, who during a period of twelve calender months has actually worked in an industry for not less than two hundred and forty days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry. Explanation.In computing the number of days on which a workman has actually worked in an industry, the days on which (i) he has been laid off under the agreement or as permitted by Standing Order made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment, the larger number of days ; during which he has been so laid off being taken into account for the purposes of this clause. (ii) he has been on leave with full wages earned in the previous year, and (iii) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total period of such maternity leave shall not exceed twelve weeks, shall be included." 26. (ii) he has been on leave with full wages earned in the previous year, and (iii) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total period of such maternity leave shall not exceed twelve weeks, shall be included." 26. It is also settled that 240 days of the workman are to be counted back from the date of termination of his service. The petitioners' services were terminated on 30-9-1988. 240 days are to be counted back from 30th of September, 1988 and it is to be seen whether within one year, the petitioners have worked 240 days. From the admitted position, it is clear that the petitioners have worked for more than 240 days between 30-9-1987 and 30-9-1988 as there was a break of only 7 days in between. It is not disputed that petitioners services have been terminated without payment of one month's pay or any retrenchment compensation. The termination of petitioners' services is clearly in violation of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. For convenient reference, Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is also reproduced below : "6-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen day's average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government." 27. It has not been contended before me by the learned Standing Counsel that the termination of the services of the petitioners does not come within the meaning of the word 'retrenchment'. It has not been contended before me by the learned Standing Counsel that the termination of the services of the petitioners does not come within the meaning of the word 'retrenchment'. Section 2(s) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act defines the word 'retrenchment' as under : "(s) 'Retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman or any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (1) voluntary retirement of the workman ; or (ii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf." 28. It is clear from the aforesaid definition that the termination of the services of a workman for any reason whatsoever or otherwise than by way of punishment will come under the definition of 'retrenchment'. In the present case, the termination of the services of the petitioners do attract the definition of 'retrenchment'. So the petitioners' services stand retrenched and the provisions of Section 6-N are squarely attracted. 29. Now remains the question as to whether the petitioners should be relegated back to the alternative remedy of raising industrial dispute under Section 4-k of the U P. Industrial Disputes Act. In Chandrama Singh's case (supra), the Full Bench in Paragraph 14' held as under : "On the pleadings contained in the instant petition, the petitioner should not be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has complained violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for redressal of his grievance an adequate and efficacious remedy of reference under the provisions of Section 10 of the said Act itself exists. The Petitioner has neither pleaded nor proved the said remedy to be inadequate or inefficacious. He has also not demonstrated the existence of any exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances to permit him to by pass the alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner." 30. The Full Bench itself admitted the position that in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, the petitioners may be permitted to by pass the alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act. The petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner." 30. The Full Bench itself admitted the position that in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, the petitioners may be permitted to by pass the alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act. The extra-ordinary circumstance in the present case is that the fact that the petitioners have worked for more than 240 days within a year is not disputed. The petition was entertained at the initial stage as far back as in the year 1989. Counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. It is not appropriate at the stage of final hearing to relegate back the petitioners for agitating the matter again before the Industrial Tribunal or a labour court Another extraordinary circumstance in the case is that a vital Constitutional question has arisen in the case as to whether III and IV class employees employed in the High Court not directly connected with Judicial work can be brought under the Industrial Disputes Act. This is a matter of importance and it is appropriate that the High Court should itself adjudicate the question as to whether the employees employed as III and IV class employed of the High Court car be said to be employed in an industry. This question deserves a decision from the High Court itself instead of relegating the petitioners for invoking the remedy under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. For these extra-ordinary circumstances, 1 am of the opinion that the petitioners need not be relegated to the alternative remedy of approaching the State Government for making a reference under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 31. There is another aspect of the matter. The Full Bench in the case of Chandrama Singh's case (supra) itself was conscious of the fact that in extra-ordinary circumstances the petitioners can be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court. In series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also of this Court, it has been held that availability of alternative remedy is not a bar on the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court. It is the discretion of the High Court to decide as to whether it wishes to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction or relegate the petitioners back to the alternative remedy. It is the discretion of the High Court to decide as to whether it wishes to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction or relegate the petitioners back to the alternative remedy. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nooh, reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 , the Court held that the availability of the alternative remedy does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court for issue of appropriate writs and it is only a rule of discretion and convenience, where the High Court itself deem fit that it will be appropriate for the petitioners to pursue the alternative remedy, the High Court will relegate the petitioners to the alternative remedy. There are settled exceptions to the aforesaid rule also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in cases where the order is without jurisdiction or the principles of natural justice are violated or some Act is challenged on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of the Constitution, the bar of alternative remedy will not come in the way of the petitioner (See A.V. Vanketeshwaran v. R. A. Wadhwa, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 . The Full Bench of this Court did not rule that in every case the High Court is bound to relegate the petitioner to the alternative remedy of invoking jurisdiction available under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Full Bench itself carved out the exceptions in Paragraph 14' quoted above. I am clearly of the opinion that this is an exceptional case for the reasons set out earlier that the petitioners need not be relegated to the alternative remedy for raising industrial dispute under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 32. The Full Bench itself carved out the exceptions in Paragraph 14' quoted above. I am clearly of the opinion that this is an exceptional case for the reasons set out earlier that the petitioners need not be relegated to the alternative remedy for raising industrial dispute under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 32. In view of my finding that the units of the High Court, Allahabad employing III and IV Class employees on the administrative side are severable from the units associated discharge of sovereign and constitutional functions of the High Court, the petitioners employed as routine grade assistants are employed in an industry and are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and in view of my finding that the petitioners have worked for 240 days in a year and their services have been terminated without payment of one month's salary or retrenchment compensation, the termination of their services is illegal and the order of termination of the petitioners' services is liable to the quashed on the aforesaid ground. 33. I accordingly quash the order of Registrar of the High Court, Allahabad, dated 29th of September, 1988. The petitioners are entitled to be treated in service as if no orders were passed terminating their services. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs.