Order The short point involved in this case is, whether an amendment, prayed for by the petitioner in his application for pre-emption, filed under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 on the ground of co-shareship alone, for introduction of the ground of vicinage, made after the period of limitation, should be allowed. 2. Shorn of all details, the facts of this case inter alia, are that the petitioner filed an application for pre-emption under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) against the opposite parties in respect of .084 decimals of land in plot Nos. 609 and 610 in mouja Krishnapur under Police Station Arambagh, district Hooghly in 1974 alleging him to be a co-sharer of the said holding, and the said application gave rise to a miscellaneous case being Misc. Case No. 88 of 1974, subsequently, re-numbered as Misc. Case No. 4 of 1984. The sale deed, of the impugned transfer, was finally registered on 11th November, 1971 and the application for pre-emption was filed on 25th July, 1974. On or about 24th January, 1978 the petitioner filed an application for amendment of the original pre-emption application, seeking preemption on the additional ground of vicinage. The learned Munsif, 1st Court at Arambagh, Hooghly, however, by the impugned Order No. 13 dated 21st March, 1987 rejected the petitioner's said application for amendment inter alia, on the ground of limitation. 3. It was contended by the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that the Court below had acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting the application for amendment on the ground of limitation, and contended inter alia, that judging the facts and circumstances of the case, the court below should have allowed such prayer, even if the claim was barred by limitation on the relevant date. The learned Counsel in support of his contentions, referred to several decisions of this Hon'ble Court, viz., AIR 1968 Calcutta, 213; AIR 1978 Calcutta, 482; 1975(1) CLJ 494; 1981(2) CLJ, 310 and the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Charan Das's case, viz., 47 Indian Appeals, 255. 4. The learned Counsel in support of his contentions, referred to several decisions of this Hon'ble Court, viz., AIR 1968 Calcutta, 213; AIR 1978 Calcutta, 482; 1975(1) CLJ 494; 1981(2) CLJ, 310 and the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Charan Das's case, viz., 47 Indian Appeals, 255. 4. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties, however, contended that the Trial Court was right in rejecting the application for amendment as filed by the petitioner on the ground of limitation, and also contended that if at the time of filing of the original pre-emption application, the ground of vicinage was not open to the petitioner, because of the specific period of limitation as contained in Section 8(1) of the said Act. the court should not allow an amendment sought for by the petitioner long after, for adding the ground of vicinage, which had by that time become barred by limitation, and in support of his contentions, the learned Counsel referred to several decisions of this Hon'ble Court and also a decision of the Privy Council viz., AIR 1982 Calcutta, 407; AIR 1985 Calcutta 218 and 75 Indian Appeals, 147. 5. In the Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Bisweswar Bajpai and others vs. Jajneswar Bajpai and another, AIR 1968 Calcutta, 213, P.N. Mookerjee, Acting Chief justice and A.C. Gupta, J. referring to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Charan Das vs. Amir Khan, 47 Indian Appeals, 255 and also the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of J.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. vs. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 and Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda, AIR 1957 SC 363 held inter alia, that it was well known that, in the matter of allowing amendments, the Court's power was not circumscribed by the law of limitation, if, in its opinion, the amendment should otherwise be allowed. Ltd. vs. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 and Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda, AIR 1957 SC 363 held inter alia, that it was well known that, in the matter of allowing amendments, the Court's power was not circumscribed by the law of limitation, if, in its opinion, the amendment should otherwise be allowed. So far as the decision in the case of Smt. Ashalata Bairagya and another vs. Gopal Chandra Chakraborty and others, 1075(1) CLJ, 494 which is a Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court, is concerned, the said decision does not speak about the scope and effect of an amendment of a pre-emption application filed under Section 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1958, but discusses about the period of limitation for filing the application for pre-emption, on the ground of vicinage. In another Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Debabrata Bhowmick vs. Sm. Nani Bala Some, AIR 1978 Calcutta, 482, Murari Mohan Dutt and D.C. Chakravorti, JJ. held inter alia, referring to the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Bisweswar Bajpai case (supra), that where a party filed an application for pre-emption on the ground of being a co-sharer, but subsequently, sought to amend the application, claiming pre-emption on the ground of vicinage, the amendment could not be said to have changed the nature and character of the proceedings for pre-emption, nor did it introduce a new and inconsistent case and thus the amendment could not be refused on the ground of limitation. So far as the decision in Chandra Sekhar Sarkar vs. Bajdyanath Ghosh and others in 1981(2) CLJ, 310, which is a single bench decision, is concerned, Sudhindra Mohan Guha, J. discussed the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to an application for pre-emption filed under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 which was filed after coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963 and observed inter alia, that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were available to the applicant for condonation of delay in filing his application for pre-emption under the aforesaid Section 8. Lastly, the Privy Council, in its well-known decision in the case of Charan Das and others vs. Amir Khan and others in 47 Indian Appeals, 255 held inter alia, in clear terms, while discussing the principle of amendment, that although, the power of a Court, to amend the plaint in a suit, should not as a rule be exercised where the effect was to take away from the defendant a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time, yet, there were cases in which that consideration was outweighed by the special circumstances of the case. 6. Upon a discussion of all the above decision, it is thus quite clear, that it is the settled principle of law in the matter of allowing amendments that the Court's power is not circumscribed by the law of limitation, if in its opinion the amendment, should otherwise be allowed. When an application for amendment is made beyond the period of limitation the Court is to consider whether by refusing such amendment an injustice will be made to the party seeking the amendment. No doubt, in such a case, the Court is also to consider whether by granting such amendment an injury would be caused to the other side, but if the facts and circumstances of the case require an amendment to be allowed the Court will not be slow to allow such amendment no matter, whether the amendment was sought for after the period of limitation. 7. The Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Sm. Sudha Mukherjee vs. Sankar Chatterjee in AIR 1982 Calcutta 407, cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, however is clearly distinguishable on facts. That was a case in which Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as his Lordship then was) and S.N. Sanyal, J. rejected the amendment of plaint allowed by the learned Munsif, seeking to introduce the ground of reasonable requirement in a suit for eviction filed on the ground of sub-letting, in view of the specific bar of three years as imposed by Section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Their Lordships, while discussing the scope and ambit of Sections 13(1)(ff) and 13(3A) of the aforesaid Act in a suit for eviction originally filed by the plaintiff Sm. Their Lordships, while discussing the scope and ambit of Sections 13(1)(ff) and 13(3A) of the aforesaid Act in a suit for eviction originally filed by the plaintiff Sm. Sudha Mukherjee, on the ground of sub-letting, held inter alia, as follows:- "When she instituted the suit within 3 years from the date of her purchase she knew that under the law she could not institute the suit if it was based upon her own requirement. Having known as such she adopted the procedure of filing the suit on an irrelevant ground and completing the interlocutory steps to make the suit ready for hearing and at the same time taking advantage of resulting lapse of time, the filed the application for amendment to bring in the real ground in support of her claim for eviction. In substance, the amendment so sought for was solely for the purpose of circumventing the legal bar incorporated by sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which well barred the suit on the date it was instituted if the real ground in support of such a suit had been pleaded in the plaint. As such, the amendment sought for could not have been allowed. There is one more reason why the amendment should not have been allowed. The amendment if allowed would not alter the date of institution of the suit. This will be so for reasons given hereinafter. Hence the consequence of allowing the amendment would be introducing an infirmity which would render the suit not maintainable in law." 8. In the Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Inder Sengupta vs. Sm. Prabharani Chakraborty and another reported in AIR 1985 Calcutta, 218, Pradyut Kumar Banerjee, J. (as his Lordship then, was) and Ramkrishna Sharma, J. also followed the aforesaid Division Bench decision in Sm. Sudha Mukherjee's case (supra). 9. However, it will not be out of place to mention that, subsequently, the Supreme Court in a recent decision, in the case of Sm. Prabharani Chakraborty and another vs. Inder Sengupta (Civil Appeal No. 1521, judgment delivered on March 5, 1991), has taken a contrary view in the matter. The said decision of the Supreme Court has also been discussed by Bhagwati Prasad Banerjee and Amal Kanti Bhattacharji, JJ. Prabharani Chakraborty and another vs. Inder Sengupta (Civil Appeal No. 1521, judgment delivered on March 5, 1991), has taken a contrary view in the matter. The said decision of the Supreme Court has also been discussed by Bhagwati Prasad Banerjee and Amal Kanti Bhattacharji, JJ. in the case of Uma Mishra (Sanyal) vs. Monoranjan Sinha (F.A. No. 120 of 1987, heard analogously with F.A. Nos. 118 of 1987, 220 of 1986, 221 of 1986, 10 of 1988, 119 of 1987 and 117 of 1987, judgment delivered on 19th September, 1991) The above appeal before the Supreme Court was preferred against the aforesaid decision of the High Court in AIR 1985 Calcutta, 218 and the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the decision in Sudha Mukherjee's case (supra) also virtually stands overruled, and accordingly, none of the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions of this Hon'ble Court, as cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, helps the opposite parties in anyway. Lastly, so far as the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bhagwanji Morarji Gocludas vs. Alembic Chemical Works Company Ltd. and others in 75 Indian Appeals, 147 is concerned, no doubt it was held therein, considering the facts and circumstances of the case before the Privy Council, that the leave to amend was rightly refused by the lower appellate court, since at the time, when leave to amend was sought, any claim under the alleged implied agreement would have been barred by limitation. The said decision, however, is clearly distinguishable on facts and also did not discuss about anything regarding availability of the relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act so far as the barred claim under the alleged implied agreement was concerned. 10. The said decision, however, is clearly distinguishable on facts and also did not discuss about anything regarding availability of the relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act so far as the barred claim under the alleged implied agreement was concerned. 10. The Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Debabrata Bhowmick (supra), is a direct authority on the point at issue, so far as the present case is concerned, and relying on the said decision, and also following the earlier Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Bisweswar Bajpai (supra), as well as referring to the decision in the case of Chandra Sekhar (supra), and also considering the facts of this case, I have no hesitation to hold, that the amendment as sought for by the petitioner, should have been allowed by the learned Munsif in the present case, and the court below has acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting the application for amendment as prayed for by the petitioner for the reasons as aforesaid. 11. Accordingly, the order under challenge cannot be sustained in law and stands set aside. The application made by the petitioner before the learned Munsif, for amendment of his application for pre-emption under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 is thus allowed. The learned Munsif is now directed to hear out the application for pre-emption on merits and in accordance with law, positively within four months from the date of communication of this order to the trial court. The Civil Order is thus allowed, without, however, any order as to costs. The office is to communicate this order to the trial court without any delay. Let a xerox copy of this order be given to the applicant on giving usual undertaking by him. Application allowed.