JUDGMENT - D.R. DHANUKA, J.:---M/s. Elbros Textiles Limited has filed this petition for adjudication of Surendrakumar Harkishor Jain as an insolvent on the ground that the said debtor has, failed to comply with the Insolvency Notice No. N/122/88 dated 6th July, 1988. 2. This petition raises two questions of law. The said questions of law are formulated as under : (1) Whether one of the joint decree holder is entitled to file an Insolvency petition for adjudication of the debtor as an Insolvent or whether all the decree holders must necessarily join in the petition as petitioners? (2) Whether the Insolvency petition based on non-compliance of Insolvency notice calling upon the debtor to pay the decretal debt in pursuance of a decree passed by the foreign Court or furnish security in respect thereof is not maintainable in case of non-resident creditor in absence of prior permission of Reserve Bank of India? In my opinion, the insolvency petition can be filed by one of the joint creditors on principles anologous to Order XXI, Rule 15(1) of Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, Insolvency petition is maintainable even in absence of permission of Reserve Bank of India if the, debtors fails to furnish security for payment of decretal debt. Actual payment can be made on receipt of permission from Reserve Bank of India or Central Government. 3. The material facts required to be stated for disposal of this petition are as under : (a) On 19th April, 1985, a decree was passed by the Court of Queen's Bench Division of the Supreme Court of England and Wales against Stretch Fibres (India) Ltd., and Surendra Jain. Elbros Textiles Ltd., and Adolph Likeman were the co-plaintiffs in the proceeding before the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division. By the said judgment and decree dated 19th April, 1985, the defendants were directed to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Sterling £1,83,115.65 and sum of £ 98,000 together with interest thereon from 1st day of September, 1978 to the date of the decree with cost of the action to be taxed. (b) The Court is informed by the learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor that the said Adolph Likeman was a director of Elbros Textiles Ltd., at the material time and in fact the amounts in question were recoverable by Elbros Textile Ltd., alone. (b) The Court is informed by the learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor that the said Adolph Likeman was a director of Elbros Textiles Ltd., at the material time and in fact the amounts in question were recoverable by Elbros Textile Ltd., alone. The Court is informed by the learned Counsel for petitioning creditors that Shri Adolph Linkerman was joined in the proceeding merely as a proforma plaintiff. The Court is further informed that Mr. Linkerman is not alive. These facts are not on affidavit. I shall therefore, assume for the purpose of this petition that both the decree holders are the joint creditors of the two debtors i.e. Stretch Fibres (India) Ltd., and Surendrakumar Harkishor Jain. 4. The said decree was filed in this Court for execution as contemplated under section 44-A and Order XXI, Rule 22(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. By an order made in Execution Application No. 148 of 1987 on 27th April, 1987. This Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant leave to the decree holders to execute the said decree against the debtor Shri Surendrakumar Harkishor Jain. 5. This Court issued Notice No. 867 of 1987 in view of the leave granted to the petitioning creditors to execute the decree. The debtor raised several contentions in reply to the said notice. The debtor contended before this Court that the said decree passed by the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division was not executable as the said decree was without jurisdiction and as the said decree was not passed on merits. By an order dated 1st March, 1988, Pendse, J., dealt with each of the contentions raised by the debtor. The learned Judge rejected each of the contention raised on behalf of the debtor. The Notice was made absolute against the defendant No. 2 i.e. the debtor Surendrakumar Harkishor Jain. I am bound by the said judgment. I am in respectful agreement with the same. No appeal was filed against the said judgment. 6. On 6th July, 1988, the petitioning-creditors took out Insolvency Notice No. N/122/88 as permissible under the provision of The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The said notice was duly served upon the debtor by substituted service. The said notice was served on 23rd September, 1988. No appeal was filed against the said judgment. 6. On 6th July, 1988, the petitioning-creditors took out Insolvency Notice No. N/122/88 as permissible under the provision of The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The said notice was duly served upon the debtor by substituted service. The said notice was served on 23rd September, 1988. By the said notice and debtor was called upon to pay or furnish security for the decretal amount to the satisfaction of the petitioning creditor within 35 days from service of the said notice. The debtor failed to comply with the said notice. The debtors did not furnish any security. The debtor was bound to furnish security for payment of decretal debt. 7. On 20th July, 1988, the debtor took out notice of motion in this Court for setting aside the said Insolvency notice. By an order dated 17th January, the said notice of motion was allowed to be withdrawn on application made by and on behalf of the debtor. The period of 35 days from service of the said Insolvency notice expired on 17th January, 1989 i.e. on the day on which the above referred Notice of Motion No. 118 of 1988 was withdrawn by the debtor. 8. The petitioning creditors contend that the debtor committed an act of Insolvency on 17th January, 1989, being the day on which 35 days expired from service of the said Insolvency Notice. By this date the debtor had neither paid the said amount nor furnished any security as required by the said notice. 9. Shri Makhija, learned Counsel for the debtor has raised two questions of law having bearing on the maintainability of this petition. Apart from these technical contentions, the learned Counsel for the debtor had no more submissions to make in view of the order passed by Pendse, J., on 1st March, 1988 and in view of the said notice of motion for setting aside the Insolvency notice having been withdrawn. 10. The learned Counsel for the debtor has submitted that the Insolvency notice was taken out by both the decree holders and the present petition for adjudication has been filed only by one of the creditors/decree holders. The learned Counsel submits that the petition is therefore, not maintainable. 10. The learned Counsel for the debtor has submitted that the Insolvency notice was taken out by both the decree holders and the present petition for adjudication has been filed only by one of the creditors/decree holders. The learned Counsel submits that the petition is therefore, not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the debtor has relied upon the judgment of High Court of Calcutta, in the case of (Ananta Kumar Saha v. Sadhu Charan Saha Poddar)1, A.I.R. 1926 Calcutta 234. The learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor has relied upon Order 21, Rule 15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and has sought to derive support from the said provisions for maintainability of this petition by analogy. Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that : "Where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, anyone or more of such person may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or, where any of them has died for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased". It is obvious from the decree that the decree does not imposes any condition to the contrary as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words either of the joint decree holders is entitled to execute the decree and it is not a mandate of the Civil Procedure Code that all the decree holders must join in an application for execution. In the abovereferred Calcutta case it was undoubtedly held that one of the joint creditors could not maintain the Insolvency petition. There is no discussion of relevant principles in the abovecited case. With respect, I disagree with the view taken by Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta. In the Calcutta case no reference was made to Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is true that Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the Insolvency proceedings and is applicable to only to application for execution of decree. Nevertheless the principle of the said Rule can be taken into consideration, for purpose of deciding the first preliminary question raised by Mr. Makhija, and for purpose of harmonious construction of relevant provision of Presidency Town Insolvency Act. Nevertheless the principle of the said Rule can be taken into consideration, for purpose of deciding the first preliminary question raised by Mr. Makhija, and for purpose of harmonious construction of relevant provision of Presidency Town Insolvency Act. As far as possible, the Court must avoid construction which will create anamoly. If one of the joint decree holders can apply for execution of the decree there is no logical reason as to why one of the joint creditors cannot maintain an Insolvency petition. I am not applying the provision contained in Order 21, Rule 15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure to this petition for purpose of deciding first preliminary point. I am persuaded to take the principles of the said rule into consideration for purpose of interpretation of section 12 of the presidency Towns Insolvency Act. I therefore, hold that the petition is maintainable. 11. Shri Makhija has then contended that the petition is not maintainable as admittedly the Procedure has not yet obtained permission of the Reserve Bank of India or of the Central Government as contemplated under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. On this aspect Shri Makhija has relied upon the judgment of Kailasam, J., as his Lordship then was in the case of (A.B. Lobo v. Fateh Khan by Power of Attorney Agent)2, A.I.R. 1972 Madras 323. This judgment is undoubtedly helpful to Mr. Makhija upto a point. By the Insolvency notice the debtor was called upon not merely to make the payment of the decretal amount/debt but also to furnish security to the satisfaction of the creditor. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 does not prevent the debtor from furnishing suitable security for decretal debt if he is inclined to do so. The debtor could offer to make conditional deposit of amount in Indian rupees in this Court. 12. On 4th, 1992, the hearing of arguments in respect of this petition was concluded at that time also I had requested Mr. makhija to enquire from his client as to whether the debtor was willing to deposit the decretal amount in Court as a security or furnish any other security securing payment of decretal debt. No answer was forthcoming for want of instructions. makhija to enquire from his client as to whether the debtor was willing to deposit the decretal amount in Court as a security or furnish any other security securing payment of decretal debt. No answer was forthcoming for want of instructions. Accordingly one more opportunity is given to the debtor by this judgment to deposit the decretal amount as and by way of security or furnish security as aforesaid before I pass final orders in the matter. 13. Before I finalise this judgment I direct the debtor to deposit the entire decretal amount in this Court as and by way of security or furnish bank guarantee of a nationalised bank in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master on or before 9th September, 1992. It is hereby expressly clarified that the amount if deposited in cash will not be released to the decree holder unless the petitioner/decree holder first obtains permission of the Reserve Bank of India or Central Government or obtains no objection from the Reserve Bank of Central Government. In case the debtor fails to deposit the decretal amount in this Court as and by was of security or furnish bank guarantee as directed as and by way of security for decretal debt, the debtor shall have to be adjudicated as an Insolvent. Final order on this aspect are reserved. 14. In light of the view which I have taken, I adjourn this matter for further orders on 15th September, 1992. Order accordingly. -----