S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application no. 785 of 1983. The petitioner in the Special Civil Application is the appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. The respondent in the Special civil Application is the first respondent in this Letters Patent Appeal. The second respondent in this Letters Patent Appeal has been subsequently impleaded at the appellate stage. It is better, that we refer to the parties as per their array in the Special Civil Application. The petitioner was hauled up in a disciplinary action for the misconduct of fraudulently altering the medical bill. There was an enquiry conducted and the enquiry officer submitted his report. There were numerically two charges practically sounding on the charge of fradulent alteration of the medical bill in different facets. The enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of charge No. 2. With regard to charge No. 1, the enquiry officer upheld it partially. Then the matter came to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority, giving reasons therefor, differed from the views of the enquiry officer on charges no. 1 and held that charge No. 1 was proved in toto and further disciplinary authority accepted the finding of the enquiry officer with regard to charge no. 2. By communication dated 29-1-1982, the disciplinary authority apart from forwarding to the petitioner copies of the finding of the enquiry officer disclosed to the petitioner, its tentative findings on the charges, in unambiguous terms, and also its tentative decision to impose the penalty of dismissal and the disciplinary seniority called upon the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal. The said communication stands annexed to this judgment of ours as Annexure a. The petitioner replied to the above show cause on 20-3-1982 and a copy of the reply of the petitioner stands annexed to this judgment of ours as Annexure b. The disciplinary authority on 13-10-1982 passed the final decision imposing on the petitioner the penalty of compulsory retirement. The said communication stands annexed to this judgment of ours as Annexure a. The petitioner replied to the above show cause on 20-3-1982 and a copy of the reply of the petitioner stands annexed to this judgment of ours as Annexure b. The disciplinary authority on 13-10-1982 passed the final decision imposing on the petitioner the penalty of compulsory retirement. The said order stands annexed to our judgment as Annexure c. The petitioner came to this Court impugning the imposition of the penalty by preferring Special Civil Application No. 4331 of 1982 and the said Special Civil Application was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 4-11-1982 in the following terms :"the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Board. He is directed to prefer appeal within 10 days. The appeal shall be decided by the board on merits at the earliest. Petitioners request for personal hearing may also be considered by the Board in accordance with rules and law The appeal should be disposed of by a speaking order which may be communicated to the petitioner within 10 days of its decision. In the meantime the impugned order of competent authority shall remain stayed till a further period of 10 days after the receipt of the decision in appeal at petitioners end. Petition is permitted to be withdrawn at this stage. Notice discharged. No costs. " ( 2 ) THUS directed to go by way of a departmental appeal, the petitioner prosecuted the same, that the departmental appeal did not prove fruitful to the petitioner. A copy of the order passed by the departmental appellate authority stands annexed to the present judgment as Annexure d. The petitioner thereafter preferred Special Civil Application No. 785 of 1983 (reported in 1983 (2) GLR 1145 .) questioning the disciplinary action and the imposition of the penalty as happened in the above manner. ( 3 ) THE learned single Judge, who dealt with Special Civil Application no. 785 of 1983, as we could see from his order, was asked to hear and deal with only one contention, namely, the propriety of the punishment or in other words the quantum of the punishment imposed on the petitioner. All the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner before the learned single Judge, as we could see from his order, centered around only this aspect. All the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner before the learned single Judge, as we could see from his order, centered around only this aspect. The learned single Judge examined this plea and held that the punishment awarded cannot be said to be excessive or unjust and ultimately dismissed the Special Civil Application. As already noted, this letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. ( 4 ) MR. Mohit S. Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner would advance five points before us covering interference at our hands. We will deal with them one by one. The first point is that when the disciplinary authority chose to differ from the findings of the enquiry officer on charge No. 1, the disciplinary authority ought to have put the petitioner on notice of this very move and afforded him an opportunity to make his say with reference to this move on the part of the disciplinary authority before it chose to render its tentative findings differing from those of the enquiry officer and the failure to do so has violated the principles of natural justice. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would in this regard place reliance on the pronouncement of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in M. J. Ninama v. Post Master general, Ahmedabad, 1984 0 GLH 800 . With regard to the right and power of the disciplinary authority to differ from the findings of the enquiry officer, no issue or dispute is being raised. What the learned Counsel for the petitioner pleads is that in case the disciplinary authority chooses to differ from the findings of the enquiry officer on any count, the delinquent servant must be informed to this attitude of the disciplinary authority and the delinquent servant must be afforded an opportunity to make his say on this move; and thereafter alone the disciplinary authority could arrive at its tentative findings differing from those of the enquiry officer and this alone will satisfy the principles of natural justice. The passage in the pronouncement of the learned single judge of this Court referred to above and which is being pressed forth into service by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is found in paragraph 13 of the report and it runs as follows :"what is emphasised is that the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority at the stage after considering the Enquiry Officers report would be tentative finding and before taking final decision, the Disciplinary Authority has to give an opportunity of being heard to the delinquent Government servant about such conclusion and inform the delinquent Government servant about such conclusion and give him an opportunity of being heard before arriving at the final conclusion. This right of representation at that stage cannot be effectively exercised unless the delinquent is furnished with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. In my opinion, in case the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer, it would also be necessary to furnish to the delinquent reasons for doing so so that the delinquent ran meet with them in the representation which he may make to the Disciplinary Authority. Unless the report of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons for disagreement with the Enquiry Officers findings are supplied, the delinquent will not be able to make a pointed and meaningful representation. It is no doubt true that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to hold an enquiry at which evidence of witnesses viva vocc is to be recorded if at an earlier stage there has been fair and full enquiry before the Enquiry Officer; but it is difficult to agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondents that after receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority, the delinquent has no right whatsoever to make representation against the charges levelled against him before fhe Disciplinary Authority. There is only one continuous enquiry till the Disciplinary Authority takes a final decision in regard to the charges levelled against the delinquent Government servant, though there are no doubt stages of enquiry such as framing of charges, reply to the charges, recording of the evidence, report of the Enquiry Officer, tentative conclusions by the Disciplinary Authority, final conclusion by the Disciplinary Authority, and imposition of punishment. It is only in the last stage of the enquiry, namely, imposition of the punishment that delinquent government servant is not required to be heard under the amended provisions of art 311 (2 ). However, till that last stage is reached, the delinquent must be afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard so far as the charges levelled against him are concerned. And as observed above, he could not be said to have been afforded such reasonable opportunity if he is not furnished with a copy of the Enquiry Officers report and is not given opportunity of making representation against the tentative findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority whether it agrees or disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. " ( 5 ) HOWEVER, much we may strain, we are not able to spell out any such proposition as the learned Counsel for the petitioner would advance as above from the passage occurring in the pronouncement of the learned single Judge of this Court. The learned single Judge in the context of the need to furnish a copy of the enquiry officers report to the delinquent servant, has, after referring to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, expressed his views that before taking final decision the disciplinary authority has to give an opportunity of being heard to the delinquent servant to have his say in regard to the tentative findings that the disciplinary authority has arrived at. We are prepared to agree with the above views of the learned single Judge, as they stand expressed in the above passage. But we are not prepared to read something more into the pronouncement of the learned single Judge, to spell out a proposition as advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The enquiry part being over, the disciplinary authority gets seized of the decision making process. The disciplinary authority may concur with the findings of the enquiry officer or differ from them and either way, it may come to its tentative conclusion or findings against the delinquent servant. While furnishing a copy of the report of the enquiry officer, the communication of the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority either affirming or differing from those of the enquiry officer will provide an effective opportunity to the delinquent servant to make his say to dislodge those tentative findings. While furnishing a copy of the report of the enquiry officer, the communication of the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority either affirming or differing from those of the enquiry officer will provide an effective opportunity to the delinquent servant to make his say to dislodge those tentative findings. While forwarding a copy of the report of the enquiry officer it will not be fair and it will not conform to the principles of natural justice, that the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority should be withheld from the delinquent servant and he be denied an opportunity to make his say over them. The tentative findings of the disciplinary authority could be at the level of accepting in toto the findings of the enquiry officer or disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer on any aspect and reacting a different finding from that of the enquiry officer. Either way the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority must be communicated to the delinquent servant so that he can make his say over the same. The enquiry officer renders his findings and it is for the disciplinary authority to accept or not to accept the same and the ultimate conclusion on the question of findings of guilt or otherwise and the consequent imposition of punishment all come within the sphere of the disciplinary authority. That is why there could be legitimate insistence that the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority be it so affirming the findings of the enquiry officer of differing from them, must be communicated to the delinquent servant to enable him to make his say on the tentative findings, and thereafter only the disciplinary authority could make its final decision. ( 6 ) COMING to the present case, as we could see from Annexure "a", the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority have in unambiguous terms been disclosed to the petitioner. Three reasons have been advanced by the disciplinary authority to take a view different from that of the enquiry officer with regard to charge No. 1 and the said reasons have been fully disclosed. With regard to charge No. 2, there is no difficult because it is a case of the disciplinary authority concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer and a copy of the report of the enquiry officer has been forwarded to the petitioner. With regard to charge No. 2, there is no difficult because it is a case of the disciplinary authority concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer and a copy of the report of the enquiry officer has been forwarded to the petitioner. Thus even the tentative findings of the disciplinary authority have been communicated to the petitioner, and so also the tentative decision to impose the punishment of dismissal. After the petitioner made his reply, the disciplinary authority arrived at the final decision and imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement. In the said circumstances there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner however would contend that as per the verbalism in the communication of the disciplinary authority Annexure "a" what the petitioner has been called upon to answer is only with reference to the punishment and he has not been specifically called upon to answer with reference to the tentative findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority. Such a hyper technical plea we are not able to appreciate and accept. The reason is simple. The communication is a composite one and has got to be read as whole. The tentative conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority and the proposed punishment have been disclosed in the communication, Annexure "a". Obviously the intention was to give the petitioner an opportunity to make his say. There is no embargo even indirectly indicated in the communication Annexure "a" that the petitioner should not traverse upon the findings of guilt tentatively arrived at by the disciplinary authority. If the petitioner chose to remain silent on this question, it was his option and it would not lie in his mouth to raise a voice of grievance at this juncture to say that he was prevented from making his say with regard to the tentative findings rendered by the disciplinary authority. It can never be said that the right of the petitioner to show cause against the tentative findings rendered by the disciplinary authority was shut out or curbed. Even without an invitation when all the materials were disclosed to him the petitioner ought to have protested against the tentative findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority. Nothing prevented him from doing so. The choice was that of the petitioner and the petitioner chose to remain silent on this question. Even without an invitation when all the materials were disclosed to him the petitioner ought to have protested against the tentative findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority. Nothing prevented him from doing so. The choice was that of the petitioner and the petitioner chose to remain silent on this question. ( 8 ) WE are bound to take note of the fact that this point is being urged for the first time before us only in the course of submissions by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the earlier Special Civil Application No. 4831 of 1982, this point was not expressed. In the appeal memorandum to the departmental appellate authority, this point does not appear to have been taken. Nor it is claimed it was so taken. In the present Special Civil Application no. 785 of 1983, this point has not been set forth and even in the memorandum of this Letters Patent Appeal, no such ground has been taken. We showed the indulgence of permitting the learned Counsel for the petitioner to raise this point in the course of this arguments and as per our above discussion, we do not find any substance in it and accordingly we eschew it. It must be remembered that the principles of natural justice are not an inflexible and rigid code to be applied blindly without reference to the facts of the case. The facts of this case bear out that no opportunity was denied or shut out to the petitioner to protest against the tentative findings rendered by the disciplinary authority. ( 9 ) THE second point put forth before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that very many servants of the respondent who were found guilty of more serious charges have been dealt with leniently and in contrast the petitioner has been dealt with very harshly and hence we must hold that the imposition of the penalty of compulsory retirement is disproportionate and unconscionable. The petitioner was holding a very responsible post as Officer grade I in the respondents services and as opined by the learned single Judge the misconduct alleged against the petitioner and found to have been proved could not be viewed lightly and there is no warrant for this Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment holding it to be unconscionable or disproportionate. Equally so, there is no scope for bringing in a theory of discrimination at all on this question. Thus we negative the second point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 10 ) THE third point put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent before passing the impugned order of punishment had consulted the Central Vigilance Commission and the petitioner was not furnished with the copies of the remarks of the Central Vigilance Commission on this question and this has violated the principles of natural justice and in this regard learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the pronouncements of a learned single Judge of this Court in A. K. Roy Choudhury v. Union of india and Ors. , 1982 GLH 300 : ( 1981 GLR 1153 ) and of the Bench of this Court in T. S. Rabari v. Government of Gujarat and Anr. , [1991 (2)] xxxii (2) GLR 1035. There need not be a quarrel over the proposition that if any material which had spoken and weighed in the subject of the disciplinary action and in particular with reference to the findings of guilt vis-a-vis the imposition of punishment has been withheld from the delinquent servant that must be held to have violated the norms of natural justice. But here the question which relevantly arises for our consideration is : is there any-thirg on record for us to hold that there was in fact a consultation and obtaining of comments or remarks from the Central Vigilance Commission before the impugned order came to be passed. From the papers disclosed before us nothing is evident towards this end. There is Civil Application no. 4743 of 1983 in this Letters Patent Appeal taken by the petitioner seeking to amend the very Special Civil Application at this appellate stage by introducing amendments to the effect that the respondent in fact consulted the Central vigilance Commission and obtained its comments or opinion. It is averred in the Civil Application that on the first hearing date of this Letters Patent appeal there was a statement made by the respondent, reacting to a suggestion by the Court to permit the petitioner to retire voluntarily, that the respondent had consulted the Central Vigilance Commission before passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement; and therefore the respondent cannot modify the order of compulsory retirement on its own1. The order made by the Court on 17-3-1983 is also being pressed into service to say that there ought to have had been a consultation with the" Central Vigilance Commission. The order made by this Court on 17-3-1983 runs as follows :leave to add Central Vigilance Commission as party respondent. Notice to the newly added respondent returnable on 4-4-1985. The notice will state that the Court proposes to recommend to the respondent-Bank to permit the appellant to retire voluntarily with effect from the date of his compulsory retirement or any other later date which the Court considers to be just and proper and that if the newly added respondent wants to show cause, it may cause an appearance to be made. If no appearance is made the Court will presume that the newly added respondent has no cause to show. "from the above extract, nothing is discernible with regard to any commitment or admission or concession made by the; respondent that there was in fact a consultation with the Central. Vigilance Commission before the impugned order of compulsory retirement came to be made. The above order of this Court only shows that with a view to implement the suggestion for permitting the petitioner to voluntarily retire the presence of the Central vigilance Commission was required. The averments in the Civil Application are ambiguous and bald. As to who made the statement before Court is not disclosed. The averments do nut bring conviction to the mind of the court about the veracity of this case sought to be put forth by way of amendment. Here again we must record that this plea comes belatedly at the appellate, stage. and we find that it is not based on sound and acceptable factual data. We cannot act upon such ambiguous and bald material and hold that there was in fact a consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission and the failure to, furnish to the petitioner the remarks or the opinion of the: Central Vigilance Commission vitiated the disciplinary action. It is true: that the respondent has not filed any reply to the Civil Application. We cannot act upon such ambiguous and bald material and hold that there was in fact a consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission and the failure to, furnish to the petitioner the remarks or the opinion of the: Central Vigilance Commission vitiated the disciplinary action. It is true: that the respondent has not filed any reply to the Civil Application. But that does not alter our consideration of this plea on its own merits and it is not possible for us to accept this theory implicitly on the simple round that there has been no reply to the Civil Application The burden on the petitioner to establish this aspect on acceptable and convincing to the satisfaction of the Court and this has not happened in the instant cese. Accordingly, we negative the third point. ( 11 ) THEN the fourth point taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that alleged blemishes in the service record of the petitioner have been taken note of while imposing the punishment on the petitioner. There is a fallacy in this line of thinking on the part of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The ultimate order imposing punishment by the disciplinary authority as per Annexure c, has not referred to any alleged blemishes on the part of the petitioner on the question of imposition of punishment. Our attention however has been drawn to the reference to the service record of the petitioner in the departmental appellate authoritys order. A close scrunity of the relevant passage in the said order only discloses that the departmental appellate authority was meeting and repelling the contention of the petitioner in his appeal memorandum that his service record is unblemished and hence he ought to have been dealt with leniently. Certainly the departmental appellate authority is bound to refer to the contention put forth in the appeal memorandum by the petitioner and we cannot tack it on to the original findings rendered by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of holding that behind the back of the petitioner his past service record has been taken note of and counted against him while imposing the punishment. Accordingly, we are not able to countenance the fourth point put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The fourth point is also one not expressed anywhere in the earlier proceedings and is being advanced before us for the first time. Accordingly, we are not able to countenance the fourth point put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The fourth point is also one not expressed anywhere in the earlier proceedings and is being advanced before us for the first time. ( 12 ) THE fifth point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that no personal hearing was afforded by the departmental appellate authority before it came to dispose of the appeal of the petitioner. It is not as if this point has been omitted to be dealt with by the departmental appellate authority. In fact it has been dealt with by pointing out that the rules which govern the proceedings do not provide, for granting a personal hearing at the appellate stage. That opinion has not been demonstrated to be untenable. None of the points survives and accordingly this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. We also dismiss the Civil Application No. 4743 of 1983, as lacking in merits and bona fides. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .