JUDGMENT P.K. Shamsuddin, J. 1. Petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the Indian partnership Act. A building with assessment No. VI/5 (Old No. XI/14) of Cochin Corporation belonging to the petitioner was leased out to the 4th respondent as per a rent deed dated 16th June 1963 and supplementary deed dated 31st December 1964. The petitioner filed an application for eviction of the 4th respondent before the Rent Controller Cochin, under S.11(2), 11(2)(a), 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(4)(III) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Ext. P-3 is the said petition. The allegation was that there was arrears of rent and that the petitioner bona fide required the building for his own additional accommodation. -It was also alleged that the tenant had a building reasonably sufficient for his requirement to carry on business in his possession. The Rent Controller dismissed the application holding that none of the grounds stated for eviction was made out. Ext. P-5 is the order of the Rent Controller. On appeal, the appellate authority found that the tenant has a building in his possession which is reasonably sufficient for the requirement of the tenant. In that view of the matter the appellate authority ordered eviction under S.11(4)(III) of the Act. Ext. P-6 is the order of the appellate authority. The matter was taken in revision before the District Court. The learned District. Judge reversed the finding of the appellate authority on the question of applicability of S.11(4)(III) restored the order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the petition for eviction. Ext, P-7 is the said order. 2. Aggrieved by the said order, the landlord filed C.R.P. No. 2939/78 before this Court. This Court by Ext. P-8 order held that the revisional authority had exceeded his jurisdiction, that the order of the appellate authority is supported by legal evidence and that the revisional authority acted illegally in interfering with the order of the appellate authority. In that view this court restored the order of the appellate authority. The matter was further taken to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal 626/81. The Supreme Court did not go into the merits but allowed the appeal following its decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai 1987 (1) SCC 183 . In that view this court restored the order of the appellate authority. The matter was further taken to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal 626/81. The Supreme Court did not go into the merits but allowed the appeal following its decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai 1987 (1) SCC 183 . where the Supreme Court held that no further revision under S.115 C.P.C. would lie against the order passed by the District Judge in revision under S.20 of the Act. It is in those circumstances the petitioner filed this Original Petition challenging Ext. P-7 order passed by the District Judge. 3. Learned counsel for the landlord submitted that the revisional authority has far exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority. Learned counsel invited my attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in K. A. Anthapai v. C. Ahammed 1992 (3) SCC 277 = 1992 (2) KLT 284 . Dealing with the question of revisional powers under S.20 the Supreme Court observed as follows: "..................it may also be mentioned that in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act, the High Court can "call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. It is no doubt true that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under S.20 is wider than that conferred under S.115 C.P.C. But at the same time, a revision under S.20 cannot be equated with an appeal. Moreover, the revisional power conferred under S.20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. While considering the provisions conferring revisional power couched in a language similar to that contained in section20 of the Act, this Court has laid down that the power conferred on the High Court is essentially a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact of the subordinate authority merely . because it does not agree with the said findings. (See Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithabrao Maruthirao Janagaval, Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. - Rangaswamy Chettiar). because it does not agree with the said findings. (See Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithabrao Maruthirao Janagaval, Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. - Rangaswamy Chettiar). The revisional court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the court below. (See, Rajbir Kaur v. Chokesiri and Co.)." 4. Supreme Court has clearly laid down that though revisional power under S.20 is wider than that conferred under S.115 C.P.C. it cannot be equated with an appellate power. It is merely a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the appellate authority merely because it does not agree with the said findings. In other words, there is not much scope for reappraisal of the evidence in revision under S.20 of the Act. 5. The appellate authority in passing Ext. P-6 order has considered the evidence at length on the question whether the landlord is in possession of alternative building reasonably sufficient to carry on his business. It is not disputed that the 4th respondent is admittedly in possession of another building very close 'to the petition schedule building. The evidence shows that the building is situated just on the other side of the road. The business carried on by the 4th respondent in this petition building is that of a commission agent. It is also admitted that in the alternative building the same kind of business was carried on in a very flourishing manner by the tenant who was occupying the said building. The 4th respondent's only contention is that a drying yard is an essential requirement for carrying on his business and that is not available in the alternative building. In Para.8 of the judgment of the appellate authority there is an elaborate discussion on the question. It was adverted to by the appellate authority that notice for vacating the premises was, issued prior to the filing of the petition for eviction as required by law in which possession of an alternative building reasonably sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the tenant was specifically pointed out Ext. A-9 is the reply notice. No mention has been made therein about non availability of the drying yard. A-9 is the reply notice. No mention has been made therein about non availability of the drying yard. It has been pointed out by the appellate authority that what is stated in reply was insufficiency of accommodation. The appellate authority also pointed that this statement cannot be correct in view of the admission made by the 4th respondent as R.W. 1 to the effect that, there is more place in the alternative building in the possession of the tenant. The appellate authority also found that the nature of the business of the 4th respondent was that of a commission agent and that normally no commission agent is expected to carry on any , processing activity before sale is effected. A reading of the order passed by the revisional authority would show that what the learned Judge has done is to re-appreciate the entire evidence. By this proceeds, the revisional authority came to the conclusion, that a dry yard is an essential requirement and that being not available in the alternative premises the tenant has made out a case for interference under S.20 of the Act. On going through the discussion made by revisional authority I am persuaded to hold that what has been done by the revisional authority is beyond the powers conferred by S.20 of the Act, Now the principle has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Anthapai's case 1992 (3) SCC 277 = 1992 (2) KLT 284 (supra) and in the light of the principle enunciated in that decision. I .have no doubt in my mind that the revisional authority has exceeded its powers. 6. The foregoing discussion would show that Ext. P-7 is unsustainable. I therefore quash Ext. P-6 and restore the order passed by the appellate authority. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their costs. Original Petition is disposed of as above.