Judgment :- MISHRA, J. 1. A suit by the plaintiffs-appellants for a specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property to the extent indicated in the plaint in favour of the plaintiffs has failed in the trial court. The agreement dated 10.8.1980, contemplated inter alia that the defendant had agreed to sell to the first-plaintiff about 38 grounds of land mentioned in ‘A’ schedule to the plaint to develop the area into a housing colony to enable persons with fixed incomes to construct houses thereon consistent with the policy of the Government to encourage construction of small and medium sized houses. The purchaser-first plaintiff had agreed to purchase the property from the defendant at a consolidated price to be calculated at the rate of Rs. 8,500/- per ground in so far as the bare land was concerned and also additional price for the superstructure thereon. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant made certain applications to the authorities for exemption from the operation of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (Act 24 of 1978) and that the first plaintiff was informed by the defendant on or about 20.3.1981 that defendants application for exemption from the operation of the abovesaid Act was rejected. The first plaintiff then took such actions to see that suitable orders under the Act were passed by the competent authority in accordance with the terms of the agreement dated 10.8.1980. The defendant, in the meanwhile took a further advance of Rs. 5,000/-on 2.3.1982 and thereafter informed the first plaintiff that sometime earlier in. April, 1982, she had received a copy of the notice under S. (4) of the Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1978, dated 31.3.1982 permitting the defendant to retain the properties comprised in schedule B to the plaint. The first plaintiff then requested the defendant to appoint a competent engineer or architect to value the superstructure. The defendant at that stage replied that the same may wait till she filed an appeal against the order of the competent authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. In the meanwhile, however, the first plaintiff nominated the second and the third-plaintiffs to purchase portions of the property that could be sold by the defendant in pursuance of the agreement dated 10.8.1980. In the meanwhile, however, the first plaintiff nominated the second and the third-plaintiffs to purchase portions of the property that could be sold by the defendant in pursuance of the agreement dated 10.8.1980. The plaintiffs stated in the plaint that the first plaintiff had all along been ready and willing to perform her obligation under the agreement and, in fact, had discharged her part in relation to the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, and that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to discharge all obligations under the terms of the agreement, that they had paid almost the entire value of 3894 sq. m. of land, which the defendant had been permitted to retain by the competent authority at Rs. 1,48,427/- on the basis of Rs. 8,500/- per ground, the price agreed upon under the agreement. The plaintiffs also estimated the value of the superstructure at Rs. 50,000/- and stated that they were prepared to pay these amounts unconditionally, less a sum of Rs. 10,000/- received by the defendant or such other sum as the Court fixed. 2. The defendant resisted the suit saying that she was the sole owner of the property mentioned in Schedules A to D to the plaint, measuring about 40 grounds, that she knew that since the passing of Act 24 of 1978 the property was subject to a ceiling and satisfactory solution was necessary. She entrusted the matter to one Rangaswamy, an advocate, who introduced another person A.K. Shanmugha Sundaram, the husband of the first plaintiff. Shanmugha Sundaram represented to the defendant that he, being a politician, was having considerable influence in the corridors of power and stated that he intended to buy the entire property of the defendant to develop the area into a housing colony to enable persons with fixed incomes to construct houses thereon consistent with the policy of the Government to encourage constructions of small and medium sized houses. Both Mr. Rangaswamy and Mr. Shanmugha Sundaram convinced the defendant about the political power and influence of the latter and that he would be able to get exemption for the defendants 40 grounds under S. 21 of the Act and told her that without such an exemption she had to part with a major portion for a nominal sum and that she, therefore, accepted their advice and entered into the agreement, referred to in the plaint. She stated, however, that she wanted to retain for herself her existing residence and 2 1/2 grounds around it, but they persuaded her to accept a plot of 2 grounds in the proposed lay-out and 1200 sq. ft. plinth. Her case in the Trial Court was that the document was taken in the name of the wife of the advocate Shanmugha Sundaram, but she was only a name-lender and was totally ignorant of the ramifications of the suit transaction. As regards the additional payment of money, the defendants case was that she was sent for in March, 1982, by her advocate Mr. Rangaswamy, who asked her to come alone, she was told by him that although exemption was refused, Mr. Shanmugha Sundaram, the advocate husband of the first-plaintiff, was still at it. They asked her to receive a sum of Rs. 5,000/- again and stated that Mr. Shanmugha Sundaram would procure exemption. Under these circumstances, she received the said sum of Rs. 5,000/-. 3. The agreement between the first plaintiff and the defendant is thus admitted. Ex. P1 is the agreement. The defendant agreed to sell to the first-plaintiff the property, as described in ‘A’ schedule of the plaint, roughly measuring about 38 grounds and sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to her as advance. Under the agreement, however, the value of the superstructure was to be determined by a competent engineer or an architect to be nominated by the defendant and the purchaser. The object of the sale, as seen from the terms of the agreement, was to develop the area into a housing colony to enable persons with fixed income to construct houses, consistent with the policy of the Government, encouraging construction of small and medium sized house. 4. While according to the first-plaintiff, she was always willing and ready to perform her part of the contract, according to the defendant, the contract itself had become void as the terms of the agreement under clause 14 had not been complied with. 5. The learned single Judge, however, has found that the first-plaintiff made averment that she was ever ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, but, in view of clause (c) of S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act, found that the condition precedent that there should not only be an averment in the pleading, there should be proof thereof, has not been satisfied. After referring to some of the clauses of the agreement; learned Judge has also found as follows: “In the instant case, the transaction of the sale agreed to be effected between the parties under the agreement was subject to necessary approval and sanction of the appropriate authority acting under Act 24 of 1978. Clause 10 of the agreement has been already extracted and the relevant portion of that clause reads that the transaction of sale hereby/agreed to be effected under this agreement shall be subject to the necessary approval and sanction of the appropriate authority under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, and it shall be the sole responsibility of the purchaser to obtain the same.”. Clause 13 specifically says that ‘notwithstanding anything that is contained in this agreement if the transaction is not approved by the authority acting under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, within sue months from the date of this agreement’ the agreement shall be treated as cancelled. A reading of this agreement shows that the parties entered into a contingent contract depending for its performance on a future event, the future event being the sanction by the appropriate authority acting under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, to exempt plaint A schedule property from the operation of the Act. Now that future event not having taken place within the time prescribed in clause 13, the contract, must be deemed to have been cancelled. It is pointed out that the suit for specific performance is laid not for the entire extent mentioned in plaint a Schedule, but only for B schedule property which has been allowed by be retained by the defendant by the Government under the orders passed under S. (4) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act by which an extent of 21 and old grounds of the land was acquired by the Government, leading the rest to be retained by the defendant. Now in this case, both the parties were aware of the fact that the provisions of Act 24 of 1978 will be attracted to the sale of the land under the agreement as is clear from the terms of clauses 10 and 13 would indicate. Clause 10 imposes sole responsibility on the purchaser to obtain necessary approval and sanction of the appropriate authority. Clause 10 imposes sole responsibility on the purchaser to obtain necessary approval and sanction of the appropriate authority. Provision was made in clause 13 in the event of the sanction being refused, and that is to treat the agreement as cancelled. The time-limit provided for under clause 13 for obtaining such sanction is six months from the date of agreement. In case such sanction was refused earlier also, the agreement would be at an end. Where both the first plaintiff and the defendant have entered into a contract which depends for its performance on the approval and sanction by the authorities concerned under Act 24 of 1978 excepting the entire area of the land specified in a schedule, and when clause 13 specifically says that if such approval is not obtained within six months from the date of agreement, or it is refused earlier on any ground, the parties have to treat the agreement as cancelled, specific performance of the contract will not be decreed even for partial performance of so much of the contract as is possible. The parties to the agreement know full well the obstacles to the full performance of the contract and they have made a special provision under clause 13 for treating the contract as cancelled in case sanction is not obtained within six months from the date of agreement. There is no alternative contract to meet the event of sanction being refused. The relief now asked for therefore cannot be granted.” We have not entered into other details for we shall presently see that the learned Judge has rightly non-suited the plaintiffs on the ground of the failure of the plaintiffs to establish that they were ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It is pertinent also to notice that the agreement was between the first-plaintiff and the defendant. There was no agreement between the other plaintiffs and the defendant. The agreement was with respect to the area of about 38 grounds subject to the exemption from the acquisition under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. The exemption order, which was received sometimes in April, 1982, limited the extent of the land in the hands of the defendants to a much smaller area. The agreement was with respect to the area of about 38 grounds subject to the exemption from the acquisition under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. The exemption order, which was received sometimes in April, 1982, limited the extent of the land in the hands of the defendants to a much smaller area. In any case, it is conceded before us that apart from the averment in the plaint that the first plaintiff or the plaintiffs were ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract there has been no evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs to show their readiness. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, submitted that unless the averment was traversed, in the sense that it was challenged by the defendant, the pleading was enough then there was no onus upon the plaintiffs to prove the averment. He has drawn some inspiration for this argument from a judgment of this Court by a learned single Judge in P. Lakshmi Ammal v. S. Lakshmi Ammall AIR 1991 Madras 137, in which the learned Judge has observed as follows, on the facts of the said case: “On the first of these submissions, I find that as against the definite plea in paragraph 7 of the plaint that plaintiff has been and is still ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement of her part of which the first-defendant has had notice.” The only plea in the written statement of the first-respondent is the allegations in paragraph 7 of the plaint that this defendant is aware of the contract is denied as false.” Thus, it is found that there is no denial at all to the plea that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Likewise, the second-respondent also has not denied the said plea, in his written statement. Further, to the specific averment in paragraph 5 of the plaint ‘by the letter part of July, 1974, the plaintiff informed the defendants of her readiness to complete the sale”, there is no specific denial at all. There is only a vague and evasive denial by the first-respondent as follows: The allegation contained in paragraph 5 of the plaint are fri volous and denied. Likewise, the second-respondent also has not specifically denied the abovesaid averment in the plaint. There is only a vague and evasive denial by the first-respondent as follows: The allegation contained in paragraph 5 of the plaint are fri volous and denied. Likewise, the second-respondent also has not specifically denied the abovesaid averment in the plaint. Further, the first-respondent as D.W. 1 and the second respondent as D.W. 2 did not depose at all that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform the contract. In the circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for respondents and 1 and 2 that the abovesaid readiness and willingness has not been proved, cannot be accepted. Therefore, I held that the appellant was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. The learned single Judge has made the above observations in a case in which facts revealed that under the agreement of sale, pursuant to the agreement, all steps were taken so much so that the sale deed was made ready for registration, but the respondent evaded signing the deed, so much so that when asked to appear before the Registrar to receive the balance sum of consideration money, he did not turn up at Sub-Registrars Office. Learned counsel in this behalf, has also cited a Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Kirpal Singh v. Kartaro AIR 1980 Rajasthan 212. In that case, however, the law is stated in these words: “9. It is well established that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, it is the duty of the plaintiff to aver and prove that he was and is ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. In this connection reference may be made to S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (which will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the Act), which provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he was or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. An explanation has further been appended to sub-S. (2) which reads as under: Explanation . An explanation has further been appended to sub-S. (2) which reads as under: Explanation . For the purposes of clause (c): (i) Where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court; (ii) The plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 10. Clause (c) is a new one. It lays down a condition precedent to the enforcement of specific performance of a contract. It is based on the maxim that he who seeks equity, must do enquiry’ and more so in the cases of specific performance. We have therefore, to see whether the plaintiff has complied with this essential requirement of law for seeking specific performance. In para No. 3 of the plaint, it has been alleged that the plaintiff paid to the defendant Rupees 2000/- as earnest money or a part of the purchase price on 2.9.1967 and demanded the possession of a part of the land as stipulated on 13.1.1963, but the defendant did not hand over the possession of the same. It is also alleged that in accordance with the terms of the agreement the plaintiff was always ready and willing to get the sale deed registered on payment of Rs. 10,960/-. balance of the sale price and called upon the defendant several times to accept the money and execute the sale deed and get it registered but the defendant went on evading. It is further stated, that on 13.1.1968 he asked the defendant to execute the sale deed, but the defendant did not comply, nor got the sale deed registered on 15.1.1968 as agreed between the parties, and that on 15.1.1968 he went to the office of the Registrar or Sub-Registrar, Ganganagar, by whatever designation he may be called, with the sale money, but the defendant did not turn up, and thus the defendant neither executed the sale deed nor got it registered. He has also alleged that he has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and is even now ready and willing to do so, but the defendant has committed breach of agreement. In the written statement the defendant, in the first instance, took the plea that he had not received Rs. He has also alleged that he has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and is even now ready and willing to do so, but the defendant has committed breach of agreement. In the written statement the defendant, in the first instance, took the plea that he had not received Rs. 2000/- at the time of execution of the document, a plea which was negatived by the trial court and not argued either before the learned single Judge or before us and then while replying to paragraph No. 3, it was pleaded as below: Para No. 3 of the plaint is denied. The plaintiffs did not pay any amount and hence no question arises of delivering possession of the land to him. The defendant is in possession of his land in dispute as usual. All the allegations contained in para No. 3 of the plaint are denied.” 11. It may be noticed that the defendant has not specifically denied the various allegations made by the plaintiff in para No. 3 of the plaint. On the other hand, a general denial has been made. Order 8, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure lays down, that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth except damages. Rule 5 further provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. Now, in the present case, no doubt, there is a general denial of the allegations contained in para 3 of the plaint. But there is a specific denial only with respect to receiving Rs. 2,000/- at the time of execution of the document. A number of other material allegations contained in that para have not been specifically denied. It is also significant that no issue has been struck on the question whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 2,000/- at the time of execution of the document. A number of other material allegations contained in that para have not been specifically denied. It is also significant that no issue has been struck on the question whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, since in the eye of law the plaintiff is bound to aver and prove the same, we must look into the evidence to find out whether the allegation made by the plaintiff as to his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract has been proved. But, while doing so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the defendants denial in this respect is evasive. P.W. 2 plaintiff Kirpal Singh has stated that he was ready and willing to get the sale deed registered in accordance with the terms of the agreement but the defendant did not comply. He further states that he went to the Registrars office on the appointed date for getting the sale deed registered, but the defendant did not turn up. He also states he took the money with him, but the defendant was trying to back out of the agreement as the prices of the land had gone up. However, he wants the land. In the course of cross-examination, he has stated that he had not given any written notice to the defendant for getting the sale deed registered but he did not go to the defendants house many a times. On the other hand, L.W. 1 Gujar Singh defendant has not said a word in this respect.” After stating as above, the Bench has said: “14. Coming to the essential terms of the contract, Mr. Hestimal placed great reliance on two decisions of this Court: Mst. Suraj Bai v. Nawab Mohammed Mukaram Ali Khan (ILR 1969) 19 Raj. 508) and Dhanbai v. Pherozshah (1970 Raj. L.W. 594) in support of his contention that the defendant should have purchased the stamps for execution of the sale deed and should have also got prepared a draft of sale deed. It is important to note that in the agreement Ex. 1 it is nowhere provided that the plaintiff would purchase the stamps and would also get prepared a draft of the sale deed. Thus these are not the essential terms of the contract. It is important to note that in the agreement Ex. 1 it is nowhere provided that the plaintiff would purchase the stamps and would also get prepared a draft of the sale deed. Thus these are not the essential terms of the contract. It is true that under the T.P. Act unless there is a contract to the contrary it is the duty of the buyer to pay for the stamps as well as to get a draft of the sale deed prepared. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that this was not the essential term of the contract. But, apart from that the stage for purchasing the stamps and getting a draft prepared was not at all arrived at in this case, in as much as it is not the arrived at in this case, in as much as it is not the defendants case that he wanted to execute the sale deed but was prevented from doing so on account of the omission on the part of the plaintiff to provide money for purchasing stamps and getting a draft of the sale deed prepared. In this view of the matter, the rationale of the decision in Mst. Suraj Bai v. Nawab Mohammed Mukarram Ali Khan has no application to the facts of this case. So also in Dhanbai v. Pherozshah there was no allegation contained in the plaint that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Learned counsel also relied upon Ardeshir v. Flora Sassoon AIR 1928 PC 208: Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar ( AIR 1967 S.C. 868 ), as also a few cases of other High Courts; Bishwanath v. Janki Devi (AIR 1978 Patna 190); G. Shivayya v. Shivappa Bassappa (AIR 1978 Kant. 98), Mahmood Khan v. Ayub Khan ( AIR 1978 All. 463 ) and Andhra Paper Mills v. State of Andhra (AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 57). But we do not consider it necessary to discuss these cases, as, in our opinion, the law is well settled that the plaintiff must aver and prove that he was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which he was required to perform. However, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the plaintiff has averred and proved this essential requirement of law. However, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the plaintiff has averred and proved this essential requirement of law. In this connection, we may refer to Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal ( AIR 1971 S.C. 1238 ), wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows: Our attention has been invited to a statement in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 34, Third Edition, at page 338 that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, it is the purchaser who has to prepare the draft conveyance and submit it to the vendor for approval. No such point was raised at any prior stage and in any case we do not consider that after the cancellation of the agreement by the respondents it was necessary or incumbent on the appellants to send any draft conveyance. The very fact that the y promptly filed the suit shows their keeness and readiness in the matter of acquiring the plot by purchaseRediness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. In our judgment, there was nothing to indicate that the appellants at any stage were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract.” “15. As discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that the plaintiff had averred and proved that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential term of the contract which he was required to perform. We may here add that the learned single Judge after discussion of the relevant evidence has come to a firm finding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. This finding is essentially a finding of fact. No doubt, it is open to us in a special appeal to exam ine even findings of fact but unless there are glaring circumstances to warrant an interference with a finding of fact arrived at by the learned single Judge, we would ordinarily be not justified sitting as a court of special appeal under S. 18 of the High Court ordinance to re-appreciate the evidence. But that question, however, does not arise in this case, as, we have ourselves discussed threadbare the evidence produced by the parties and concur in the finding arrived at by the learned single Judge in this respect.” 6. Clause (c) of S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, reads as follows:— “Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.” This is a special rule of pleading and the proof, for the reason that the relief in a suit for specific performance of contract is a relief in equity. S. 16, which speaks of personal bar to relief, has this special provision, which deals with objections, not derived from the nature of the contract, but solely from the acts or conduct of the claimant. Ordinarily rules of pleading require that the plaint should contain only, a statement in a concised form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not be evidence by which they have to be proved. Order 6 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure says. “Where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the Opposite Party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract alleged or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract.” Provisions in Chapter VI of the Indian Evidence Act say in no uncertain terms that the terms of a document cannot be proved otherwise than by the production of the document itself. But, Courts in India have taken the view that apart from the exceptions that are enumerated in the said Chapter, the fact of proof of the transaction is permissible. Rules as to burden of proof in Chapter VII of the Indian Evidence Act say, in Ss. But, Courts in India have taken the view that apart from the exceptions that are enumerated in the said Chapter, the fact of proof of the transaction is permissible. Rules as to burden of proof in Chapter VII of the Indian Evidence Act say, in Ss. 101 to 106, that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal rig ht or liability dependent on the existence of facts, which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist; the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side; the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The words in S. 103, “the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person” clearly show that a fact required to be proved by a law, has to be proved by the person upon whom the burden is created. Such exception is indisputable in the language of clause (c) of S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, afore quoted. This provision says, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove” The word ‘prove’ in this (section) must be understood in the sense that the plaintiff is required to bring in support of the fact in issue such facts, which would prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the Court can either disbelieve it or believe it. In the light of the above, when we see the aforecited two judgments, that is to say, the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of P. Lakshmi Ammal v. S. Lakshmi Ammal AIR 1991 Madras 137 supra and the Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kirpal Singh v. Kartaro AIR 1980 Rajasthan 212, we fail to find any departure. It is not possible to read in those judgments a rule that will require a pleading of denial of the contract or a specific denial about the ever readiness and willingness. Such readiness and willingness will always be a fact of special knowledge and conduct of the plaintiff and not that of the defendant. The specific acts of representations to the defendant, if pleaded, may require a denial. Absence of denial in such a case, and in some other cases, may be a circumstance, as has been said in the judgment of Rajasthan High Court, and not that in the absence of denial, the requirement of proof, created by the statute, will be waived. 7. A learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Suraj Singh v. Sohan Lal AIR 1981 Allahabad 330, has stated the law on the subject in these words: “The requirement as to averment and proof of the plaintiffs readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is clearly a mandatory one. The language in which S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is counched makes it abundantly clear that unless the plaintiff establishes to the satisfaction of the Court that he has fulfilled the requirements of Clause (c) of S. 16, the court will not be able to grant a decree for specific performance of the contract in his favour. The absence of any ple a on the part of the party resisting the plaintiffs claim to decree for specific performance of the contract will not matter at all and the plaintiff is bound in law to establish compliance with the requirement of clause (c) aforesaid. ( See Mohammed Khan v. Ayub Klian ( AIR 1978 All 463 ), As to the first part of the submission suffice it to say that the statutory requirement as contained in S. 16(c) of the Act in obliging the plaintiff to aver and prove that he was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by him before a decree for specific performance can be granted in his favour necessitates the examination by the Court of the case from this viewpoint and to record a finding about it. The fact that the plaintiff had complied with the mandatory requirement of S. 16(c) of the Act can only appear from a clear finding in that regard by the court in its judgment.” There are a number of judgments of the Courts, but it is indisputably well established, as laid down in the case of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Session (AIR 1928 P.C. 208), a judgment before the amendment in the Specific Relief Act and introduction of clause (c) afore quoted, that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff has to allege, and if traversed, he has to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit. But the application of this principle obviously demands a finding of a fact as to whether there was or was not on behalf of the plaintiff a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to perform his part of the obligation thereunder. The word ‘if the fact has been traversed in the judgment of the Privy Council should not, however, he mistaken-to be as the fact ‘having been denied”. A learned single Judge of the Patna High Court in the case of Chandrabali v. Pritem Singh AIR 1965 Patna 211, has stated the law in these words: “I think the averment made by the plaintiff in paragraph 16 of the plaint cannot be held to amount to any failure on the part of the plaintiff in affirming on in expressing his willingness to perform his part of the contract as agreed upon between the parties. Thus, in the present case, it cannot be held that there was no willingness expressed by the plaintiff in the plaint for the payment of the balance of the consideration money which was left therein for the court to assess and find.” Almost in the some lines is the judgment of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of P. Lakshmi Ammal v. S. Lakshmi Animal AIR 1991 Madras 137. These cases have proceeded on the facts and not on the principles that are relevant for these purposes. These cases have proceeded on the facts and not on the principles that are relevant for these purposes. The Privy Council judgment has been read, as we have read it, by a learned Judge of the High Court of Orissa, in the case of Mali Bewa v. Dhunds Somal AIR 1970 Orissa 161, who pointed out that in view of what has been indicated by the Judicial Committee, it becomes mandatory that not only it should be averred in the plaint but also it should be stated in Court during trial. In that case, the learned Judge found, as a fact, that there was absence of such an averment in the plaint. We have thus no manner of doubt that in the instant case, the learned single Judge has taken a correct view of law in this behalf and has rightly held. “.In this case, though there is an averment in the plaint in regard to the readiness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract, there is absolutely no proof of the same. The first-plaintiff has not gone into the box, nor her husband who is alleged to be the person responsible for this agreement has also been examined. There is no reason why the first plaintiff has not been examined.” 8. The words of the statute that are used in the plaint do not really mean the averment of the fact as to the readiness and willingness. No one can say that he has averred a fact by quoting the words of a statute. Fact has a definite meaning in the legal world and the Evidence Act defines it to mean and include: “(1) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses and (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.” If there is a statement about anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses or any mental condition of which any person is conscious, that will be an averment of a fact. It is permissible for a Court, for the said reason to hold in spite of the words of the statute stated in the plaint, that there is no averment as to the willingness and readiness. Denial of such words of the statute, as we have noticed earlier, is not necessary at all. It is permissible for a Court, for the said reason to hold in spite of the words of the statute stated in the plaint, that there is no averment as to the willingness and readiness. Denial of such words of the statute, as we have noticed earlier, is not necessary at all. Denial of the facts in this behalf, however, may be relevant. It is not possible to say, on the facts of the instant case, that the defendant has not denied the averment of facts with respect to the readiness and willingness of the first-plaintiff, who alone had entered into the agreement for sale. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were not parties to the agreement. If they had any agreement, that was with the first-plaintiff only. How could they then proceed against the defendant and how could they maintain a suit for enforcement of a contract for sale of an immovable property. We have no hesitation, for the reasons afore-mentioned, in affirming the finding of the learned single Judge in this behalf, and holding that the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in as much as they have not proved the factum of their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. 9. We would have concluded our judgment at what we have already found, but, when we noticed in the judgment of the learned single Judge a statement about the refund of Rs. 10,000/- that the husband of the first-plaintiff paid to the defendant, we thought we should see how substantial justice is done and the plaintiffs, who parted with some money which they did not get back yet, they are not unreasonably punished. The learned single Judge has said: “The first plaintiff is only entitled to refund of Rs. 10,000/- and nothing more. In fact, the defendant, is her written statement, has stated that she sent a cheque for Rs. 10,000/- on receipt of summons but it was returned by the first-plaintiff. Further, there is also no prayer in the plaint for refund of the advance amount. Under those circumstances, the first-plaintiff can take appropriate steps for recovery of the amount of advance. In fact, the defendant, is her written statement, has stated that she sent a cheque for Rs. 10,000/- on receipt of summons but it was returned by the first-plaintiff. Further, there is also no prayer in the plaint for refund of the advance amount. Under those circumstances, the first-plaintiff can take appropriate steps for recovery of the amount of advance. This suit for specific performance is dismissed with costs.” Proviso to sub-S. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, says that, where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or made by him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. We accordingly, permitted amendment of the plaint at this stage of appeal and a petition to that effect has been filed. The amendment sought for reads as follows: “In the event of this Honourable Court coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance, the first-plaintiff may be granted the return of the amounts advanced with interest thereon at 24 per cent per annum and also at least a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs as damages. In this connection, it may not be out of place to point out that the defendants would have the advantage of release of at least additional 7 1/2 grounds from the urban ceiling authorities and hence in equity the defendant should be directed to disgorge the benefit that had been obtained by the defendant by reason of the efforts of the first plaintiff. Further, even with reference to the value of the money of Rs. 10,000/- advanced, the same would have fetched about 1.17 grounds at the relevant point of time when, as on date, the value of one ground, even according to the guideline, value is Rs. 6 lakhs.” 10. The idea behind the prescription of the law to permit amendment of the plaint for the relief not asked for in the suit is not to allow introduction of any dispute of fact. 6 lakhs.” 10. The idea behind the prescription of the law to permit amendment of the plaint for the relief not asked for in the suit is not to allow introduction of any dispute of fact. The words in the amendment, “In this connection, it may not be out of place to point out that the defendants would have the advantage of release of at least additional 7 1/2 grounds from the urban ceiling authorities and hence in equity the defendant should be directed to disgorge the benefit that had been obtained by the defendant by reason of the efforts of the first-plaintiff. Further, even with reference to the value of the money of Rs. 10,000/- advanced, the same would have fetched about 1.17 grounds at the relevant point of time, when, as on date, the value of one ground even according to the guideline value is Rs. 6 lakhs.” are thus beyond the scope of the proviso. There may not be any amendment to introduce a new issue either of fact or law. Undoubtedly, any amendment with the facts to be ascertained in the words that we have quoted will introduce new elements of dispute and require further evidence. We thus find it not possible to allow the aforequoted amendment. We, however, find it permissible to allow the amendment, (sought) for, in the words; “In the event of this Honourable court coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance, the first-plaintiff may be granted the return of the amounts advanced with interest thereon at 24 per cent per annum and also at least a sum of Rs. 20,000,00/- as damages.” The damages claimed have got the same infirmity, as the other which we have declined. But, we have not rejected this part at the threshold and examined ourselves whether any damages, on the facts of this case, can be allowed. It is not a case of any breach of the contract by the defendant. The suit has to fail not for the reason of just a technicality, but for the reason of a substantial error caused on account of the absence of proof of the plaintiffs being ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It is not a case of any breach of the contract by the defendant. The suit has to fail not for the reason of just a technicality, but for the reason of a substantial error caused on account of the absence of proof of the plaintiffs being ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. We have also noticed that except the first-plaintiff, the other two plaintiffs had no contract of any kind with the defendant and the contract, which the first-plaintiff had entered into got substantially altered on account of the competent authority refusing to grant permission to sell the entire land about 38 grounds of land. The learned trial Judge has said, at no point of time, in the instant case the purchaser intimated to the vendor her willingness to perform her part of the contract and to complete the transaction in terms of the contract. No notice on behalf of the first-plaintiff has been filed and no evidence on behalf of the first-plaintiff has been adduced. Learned trial judge has also said: “A reading of clause 10 shows that it is sole responsibility of the first plaintiff to obtain the approval and sanction of the appropriate authority under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and that the agreement is only subject to that approval and sanction. In this regard the averment in paragraph 5 of the plaint pertaining to exemption from the operation of Act 24 of 1978 appears to be rather dubious. The first-plaintiff states in paragraph 5 of the plaint as follows: “It appears that the defendant had made some applications to the authorities for exemption from the operation of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, Act 24 of 1978. The defendant informed the first-plaintiff that the obtaining of final orders of Government and the other concerned authorities under the ceiling law was far more important than having the value, of superstructure ascertained and that the same may be taken up after orders were made under the ceiling legislation. The defendant informed the first-plaintiff that the obtaining of final orders of Government and the other concerned authorities under the ceiling law was far more important than having the value, of superstructure ascertained and that the same may be taken up after orders were made under the ceiling legislation. The first-plaintiff was later informed by the defendant that on or about 20.3.1981 the State Government had rejected the request of the defendant for exemption.” A reading of the averments extracted about would leave an impression on the reader that the first plaintiff is not concerned in any way with the obtaining of the exemption from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, but later, in paragraph 6, the first plaintiff says that she took steps to see that suitable orders under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act were passed by the competent authority and that they took such action as was open and possible for her in accordance with the agreement dated 10.8.1980. The defendant has pointed out in paragraph 9 of her written-statement that it was the responsibility of the first-plaintiff to obtain exemption and but for that promise the agreement would not have been signed by the defendant at all.” We can have no other view of the case of the parties that there was a representation by the plaintiffs and accordingly a clause was incorporated in the agreement that the plaintiffs would ensure the exemption from the ceiling law and that exemption was not ordered. The plaintiffs cannot find fault with the defendant, if the agreement could not be performed. 11. The above, in our opinion, is sufficient for denying to the plaintiffs any damages. The only reason why we allow the refund of Rs. 10,000/- by permitting the amendment of the plaint at this second appellate stage is that the defendant, in her written-statement has stated that she sent a cheque for Rs. 10,000/- on receipt of summons, thus acknowledged receipt of the said amount, which cheque, however, has not been encashed by the first-plaintiff. The amount of Rs. 10,000/-, it appears has been paid to the first plaintiff in two instalments Rs. 5,000/- on the date of the agreement and Rs. 5,000/- subsequently. We, however, think that on a decree of Rs. 10,000/- on receipt of summons, thus acknowledged receipt of the said amount, which cheque, however, has not been encashed by the first-plaintiff. The amount of Rs. 10,000/-, it appears has been paid to the first plaintiff in two instalments Rs. 5,000/- on the date of the agreement and Rs. 5,000/- subsequently. We, however, think that on a decree of Rs. 10,000/-, (Rupees ten thousand only), as above, interest should be allowed only from the date of the tender of the said amount of Rs. 10,000/- by the defendant to the plaintiffs, namely, 31.5.1982 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum with six monthly rests, until payment. 12. In the result, the Appeal is dismissed with the modification in the decree, as above, that there shall be a decree for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum with six monthly rests, with effect from 31.5.1992, until payment. On the facts of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. The decree, however, shall be subject to realisation of court-fees.