Judgment :- Revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 109 of 1988 on the file of the Principal Munsiffs Court, Neyyatlinkara. The challenge in this revision is against an order whereby the court below has set aside the decree passed in the suit conditionally on payment of an amount of Rs. 100/- as costs. In the revision, the petitioner has contended that I.A. No. 186 of 1991 in which the court below has passed the impugned order was not maintainable and as such the impugned order is bad in law. 2. The suit in question after a protracted interlocutory proceedings was posted for appearance of parties to 6-12-1990. On that day the plaintiff alone appeared and on behalf of the defendant there was no representation and the suit was posted to 12-12-1990 for filing written statement. There was also a direction to the effect that no further time will be given for filing the written statement. On 12-12-1990 the counsel for the defendant reported no instructions. Defendant's name was called. He was absent and declared ex parte. After noting that written statement was not filed the court below heard the plaintiff and the suit was decreed as prayed for.. It was the decree so passed by the court below which was sought to be set aside as per LA No. 186 of 1991. 3. As the only question raised in the revision relates to the maintainability of IA No. 186 of 1991, it is not necessary to refer to the reasons stated in the affidavit for the failure of the defendant to appear on the relevant date and file the written statement as ordered. The only question to be considered is whether the application, LA. No. 186 of 1991 filed under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. is maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case? 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the decree passed in the suit is one under Order VIII Rule 10, C.P.C. and as such no application under Order IX Rule 1 S, C.P.C. will lie for setting aside such a decree. Only an appeal will lie in such cases. It was submitted that this Court has held so in the decision reported in Krishnadas v. Chathu (1989 (1) KLT605). 5. Only an appeal will lie in such cases. It was submitted that this Court has held so in the decision reported in Krishnadas v. Chathu (1989 (1) KLT605). 5. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on 12-12-1990 the defendant was absent and the court has specifically declared the defendant ex parte and has thereafter passed the decree in question. As such it cannot be considered as a decree passed under Order VIII Rule 10, C.P.C. It has to be treated just like any other decree passed ex parte liable to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. Learned counsel has submitted that in such circumstances an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. is perfectly maintainable. In support of the above submission the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Manick Peter v. Surendranathan (1987 (2) KLT 328) and two other decisions referred to in the said decision. 6. The facts of the case decided by the Division Bench were more or less similar to that of the present case. That was also a case where the defendants failed to file writ ten statement on the day to which the suit was posted for filing the written statement. Defendants failed to file the written statement and the court declared the defendants ex parte and passed the decree and judgment noting the fact of non-filing of the written statement also. Afier referring to the relevant provisions and the decisions of the Madras and Karnataka High Courts, this Court has observed thus: "On the failure of the defendants and their counsel to appear in court on the adjourned date of hearing of the suit, Us disposal under Order VIII Rule 10 C.P.C. is therefore to be treated as a disposal in accordance with Order XVII Rule 2. An ex parte decree passed under Order VIII Rule 10 is not to be treated differently from any other decree exparte liable to be set aside under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C." 7. In the case on hand also, the defendant failed to appear and file his written statement on the date fixed for filing the same. Accordingly the defendant was declared exparte and it is thereafter the decree was passed. In the case on hand also, the defendant failed to appear and file his written statement on the date fixed for filing the same. Accordingly the defendant was declared exparte and it is thereafter the decree was passed. In view of the fact that the counsel has reported no instructions, his physical presence in court on that day cannot be treated as effective appearance of a counsel on behalf of the defendant in the suit. As such it is a case where both the counsel and party were absent on the day when the decree was passed as in Manick Peter's case (1987 (2) KLT 328). In this view, I find that the principle laid down by the Division Bench in Manick Peter's case (1987 (2) KLT 328) is squarely applicable to the case on hand. Accordingly the disposal of the suit in this case is liable to be treated as a disposal in accordance with Order XVII Rule 2 and as such liable to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. just like any other ex parte decree. 8. As I have already held that the present case is fully covered by the Division Bench decision (Manick Peter's case, 1987 (2) KLT 328), it is not necessary for me to consider the correctness or otherwise of the decision reported in Krishnadas v. Chathu (1989(1) KLT 605) which was challenged by the learned counsel for the respondent on various grounds relying specifically upon the decisions reported in N, Jayaraman v. Glaxo Laboratories India Ltd. (AIR 1981 Mad. 258) and Mls. Kuvaro Industries, Bangalore v. State Bank of Mysore (AIR 1985 Karnataka 77) wherein a contrary view was taken. However, it is necessary to note that Manick Peter's case (1987 (2) KLT 328), a Division Bench decision, which has elaborately dealt with the same question, was not brought to the notice of the court. I may also point out that from the statement of facts contained in Krishnadas's case (1989(1) KLT 605) it is not possible to say whether the defendant was declared ex parte or not in that case. I may also point out that from the statement of facts contained in Krishnadas's case (1989(1) KLT 605) it is not possible to say whether the defendant was declared ex parte or not in that case. The learned judge apparently proceeded on the basis that the defendant in that case was not declared ex parte under Order IX Rule 6,C.P.C. In my view it is clear from the observations of the learned judge contained in paragraph 7 of the judgment in Krishnadas's case (1989 (1) KLT 605) that the principle laid down therein may not be applicable to a decree passed after declaring the defendant ex parte under Rule 6 of Order IX, C.P.C. After referring to the judicial pronouncements which had taken the view that a decree passed under Order VIII Rule 10 without any written judgment on merits could be treated as an ex parte decree coming within the meaning of Order IX Rule 13 and as such an application to set aside such a decree under Order IX Rule 13, is maintainable, the learned judge has posed the problem for consideration in the following words: "In other words, it is not a condition precedent that a decree shall be one passed after declaring the defendant ex parte under Rule 6 of Order 9" The above observations would in my view indicate that in cases where the court has specifically declared the defendant ex parte and pronounced the judgment thereafter, the condition precedent for applying the provisions of Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. would be satisfied and such a decree cannot be considered as one passed exclusively under Order VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C. I would therefore distinguish the above decision as far as the present case is concerned and would leave the matter there. 9. In the circumstances, I find that LA No. 186 of 1991 filed under Order IX, Rule 13,C.P.C. in this case was perfectly maintainable and the order passed by the court below (2) setting aside the decree docs not call for any interference in exercise of the jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. C.R.P. is accordingly dismissed. No costs.