Judgment 1. BY an order dated February 22. 1989, this matter was referred to the Special Bench by the Hon'ble the Chief justice for finally settling the controversy as to whether an appeal made to the district Judge under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure might be transferred by him to an Assistant District Judge for disposal and whether the assistant District Judge is competent to hear such an appeal. 2. BEFORE we consider the question straight away, it would be relevant for us to consider the background of the case. Alleging inter alia that the opposite party had made a deliberate false statement in her verified petition for amendment of the plaint, the petitioners who are the defendants in the suit to eviction moved an application before the learned Munsif who was in seisin of the case for lodging a complaint against the opposite party for having committed an offence under Section 193 Indian Penal Code and for that purpose, to make an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The Id. Munsif rejected the application. The petitioners thereafter took an appeal to the learned District Judge under Section 341 of Criminal procedure Code. The Ld. District Judge, instead of hearing the appeal himself, transferred it to the learned Asstt. Distinct Judge, Arambagh, who dismissed the same on contest. Thereafter, the petitioners moved this revisional application invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well as the Ld. Assistant District Judge Both the parties agreed that an appeal under Section 341 Criminal Procedure Code lies before the learned district Judge. However, the controversy centres round the question as to whether the District Judge is duty bound to hear such an appeal himself or he has power under Section 22 (1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court act 1887, (hereinafter referred to for the purpose of brevity as the 'act') and under Section 24 (l) (a) of the Civil Procedure Code to transfer the appeal to an Assistant District Judge for disposal. The other ancillary question that obviously arises in this context is whether an Asstt. District Judge is also competent to hear an appeal under Section 341 of Criminal Procedure Code. The other ancillary question that obviously arises in this context is whether an Asstt. District Judge is also competent to hear an appeal under Section 341 of Criminal Procedure Code. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that an appeal under Section 341 criminal Procedure Code must have to the heard by the learned District Judge himself to whom such an appeal lies and he could not effect any transfer of such an appeal to an Assistant District Judge or to an Additional District judge for disposal by taking recourse to either Section 22 (1) of the Act or section 24 (l) (a) of Criminal Procedure Code. Apart from making a detailed analysis of Section 341 and sub-section (4) of Section 195 Criminal Procedure code, Mr. Balai Ch. Roy the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners placed two Divisional Bench Judgments of this court in Ramcharan Chandra vs. Taripullahsk. (16 CWN 645 = ILR. 39 Cal 774) and Hari'mondal vs. Keshab ch. Manna (16 CWN 903 = ILR 40 Cal 87. In Ramcharan's case, a Munsif dismissed a suit on bond and the decision was upheld by the appellate court and application for sanction to prosecute against the plaintiff for offence under sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code was refused by the Munsif to the former. However, under Section 195 (6) of the Code of Criminal procedure, power of revoking or granting any sanction given or refused, was given to the authority to which the authority giving or refusing it was subordinate and sub-section (7) provided that for the purpose of this section every court should be deemed to be subordinate only to the court to which the appeals from the former court ordinarily did lie. There was no doubt that the district Judge was the only court to which appeals from an order of a transfer ordinarily did lie. For the purpose of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, a Munsif was not subordinate to a Subordinate Judge. A Subordinate Judge could dispose of any appeal transferred by him by the district Judge under Section 21 (1) of the Civil Courts Act, but the power of revoking or granting sanction was given (only to the Court to which an appeal lies. A Subordinate Judge could dispose of any appeal transferred by him by the district Judge under Section 21 (1) of the Civil Courts Act, but the power of revoking or granting sanction was given (only to the Court to which an appeal lies. Thus the said power could not be exercised by a Subordinate Judge to whom an appeal did not lie from the order of the Munsif; but who can only dispose of an appeal transferred to him by the District Judge. In Hari Mondal's case, an application for compromise was filed on behalf of the decree-holder in execution of a decree obtained by him against the Judgment-Debtor in a mortgage suit and the execution case was ordered by the Munsif to be compromised on full satisfaction. Subsequently, the decree-holder filed a petition under Sections 224 and 623 Criminal Procedure Code 1882 to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that the application for compromise for filed by him or on his behalf and he alleged that the said application was forged. On the case having been heard by the learned Munsif, it was found hall the application for compromise was really a forgery and accordingly, an order was passed by the learned Munsif setting aside the order of dismissal of the execution case Thereafter the decree-holder applied for and obtained a sanction from the learned Munsif to prosecute, Hari Mondal, one of the judgment Debtor and Sections 192, 196, 463 and 471 Indian Penal Code. Against the order of the Munsif, two appeals were filed by Hari Mondal and some other judgment - debtors to the Ld. District Judge who transferred the said appeal to the file of the Subordinate Judge for dispesal. The appeals were dismissed and thereafter Hari Mandal and others obtained a rule against the order granting section to prosecute them and a Division Bench of this Court herd that, the district judge could not transfer those appeals to the subordinate Judge for disposal. The Division Bench. The appeals were dismissed and thereafter Hari Mandal and others obtained a rule against the order granting section to prosecute them and a Division Bench of this Court herd that, the district judge could not transfer those appeals to the subordinate Judge for disposal. The Division Bench. presided over by Sir asutosh Mookenee, held that sub-section (6) provided that any sanction given or relused in the section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate Sub-section (7) provided that for the purpose of this section every court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the court to which appeals from the former court ordinarily lie. Under section 21 sub-section (2) of the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887 an appeal from the order of the Munsif lies to the District Judge. Consequently, the District judge is the authority competent to sub-section (6) of Section 195 Criminal procedure Code to revoke or grant a sanction which has been given or refused by the Munsif. According to the opinion of Their Lordships of the Division bench, the District Judge was not competent under Section 22 (1) of the Bengal civil Courts Act, 1887 to transfer the appeal presented before him for disposal by a Subordinate Judge. That section provided that a District Judge may transfer to any subordinate judge under his administrative control any appeal pending before him from the decree or order of a Munsif. An application under sub-section (6) of Section Criminal Procedure Code was not an appeal within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887. It was however, suggested to Their Lordships that any order has been made by the High court sub-section (4) of Section 21 of Bengal Civil Courts act so as constitute the Subordinate Court as the appellate authority over the Munsif, the order as made by the subordinate Judge as passed in this case was found to be without jurisdiction. 3. MR. Sett the learned Advocate for the opposite party, has however, cited two later Division Bench Division Judgments before us which seemed to have taken a contrary view on the identical point. In Lal Md. and Ors. 3. MR. Sett the learned Advocate for the opposite party, has however, cited two later Division Bench Division Judgments before us which seemed to have taken a contrary view on the identical point. In Lal Md. and Ors. vs. D. I. G., C. I. D. Bengal reported in 34 CWN page 80 the learned Munsif rejected the petition of opposite party for sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Sections 476 criminal Procedure Code (Old) on changes under Sections 120b, 109,209 and 471 Indian Penal Code. Against the order of the Ld. Munsif, an appeal was preferred by the opposite party to the learned District Judge and the Ld. District Judge ultimately transferred it to the Additional District Judge to deal with it. The Ld. Additional District Judge allowed the appeal by his judgment dated 17. 1. 29 and this order was challenged by the petitioner before the High court in revision on the ground that the Additional District Judge had no authority to make the com plaint under Section 476b of the Code. The Division bench over-ruled the contention holding that though the appeal lay to the Ld. District Judge under Section 8 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887, an Additional district Judge was empowered to discharge all the functions of the District judge which may be assigned to him. It was further held that Section 24 l) (a)of the Code of Civil Procedure gave unfettered jurisdiction to the Ld, District judge to transfer an appeal or any proceeding pending before him to any competent court subordinate to it. In that view of the matter, Rule was discharged by the Division Bench. In Chandra Kumar vs. Gopi Nath Kar, reported in AIR 1938 Cal 463, the Munsiif refused sanction to launch prosecution. Thereupon an appeal was preferred to the learned District Judge against the order of the Munsif and the District Judge transferred the appeal to the Subordinate Judge for disposal. The Ld. Subordinate Judge reversed the order of the Munsif and made a complaint to the learned Sub-Divisional magistrate against the petitioner under Section 192 Indian Penal Code. The petitioner then moved this Court in revision and obtained a Rule. The Ld. Subordinate Judge reversed the order of the Munsif and made a complaint to the learned Sub-Divisional magistrate against the petitioner under Section 192 Indian Penal Code. The petitioner then moved this Court in revision and obtained a Rule. It was contended or behalf of the petitioner that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal inasmuch as under the provisions of Section 476 Criminal Procedure Code (Old) an appeal was to be made to the Court to which the Court which refused to make the complaint is subordinate, within the meaning of Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. The Division Bench, however, overruled the point by holding that under Section 22 of the Act, the district Judge may transfer to any subordinate judge under his administrative control, any appeal from the decrees or orders of Munsif pending before him and the Subordinate Judge was competent to hear such appeals. The Division bench also overruled the contention that the order refusing sanction for prosecution is not a final order as contemplated under Section 32 of the Act. A Full Bench of Patna High Court in Rampaiti Quer vs. Jadxmadan thakur, reported in AIR 1968 Patna 100 had also to deal with the question of an appeal filed before the District Judge which stood validly transferred to the learned stood Additional District Judge: It held that it was by virtue of Section 8 (2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act that the District Judge could transfer suits and appeals to the Additional District Judge; but Section 476b of Criminal Procedure Code expressly provided that the appeal against the order of the original civil court under Section 476 Criminal Procedure Code shall lie to the court to which that court is subordinate as described in Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. The Court of the District Judge alone is superior court over the Munsif and subordinate judges within his jurisdiction, but there was no provision contended section 476b Criminal Procedure. Code for transfer by that court to another court, since it expressly said that the right of appeal is conferred only oh that superior court to which the original Civil court is subordinate. Therefore, it could be said with same justification that the superior court has no jurisdiction to transfer an appeal under Section 476b to a Additional District Judge. Code for transfer by that court to another court, since it expressly said that the right of appeal is conferred only oh that superior court to which the original Civil court is subordinate. Therefore, it could be said with same justification that the superior court has no jurisdiction to transfer an appeal under Section 476b to a Additional District Judge. However, under Section 21 (3) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the Additional District Judge can be assigned function of receiving appeals and on such assignment, appeals may be preferred directly to the Additional District Judge. But so long as the function of receiving appeals has not been assigned to a Additional District judge, he could not be said to be a "superior court" to which appeal ordinarily lies from the decrees and orders of the lower civil courts. Hence, unless the function of receiving the appeals are assigned to the Additional District Judge under Section 21 (3) of the Bengali Agra and Assam Civil Courts, appeals will not directly lie to him and he will not be the appellate court for the purpose of section 476b Criminal Procedure Code and the District Judge cannot transfer appeals to him for disposal. Patna High Court in this context approved of an earlier decision of its own in Inder deo Ojha vs. Emperor, reported in AIR 1945 patna 322 =ilr 24 Patna 1. The Supreme Court had also to deal with almost an identical question in Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1956 sc 391 . The Supreme Court in this case analyzed the provisions of Section 476a and Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code though in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case there a senior subordinate judge apparently exercised certain powers over another subordinate judge in making a complaint while exercising either powers as an original court or as an appellate authority under Section 476b Criminal Procedure Code. The supreme Court had to deal elaborately with the question as to what was meant as a court subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3) Criminal procedure Code which was competent to take action under Section 476 criminal Procedure Code. The offences were originally committed in the court of a subordinate judge of First Class jurisdiction. The supreme Court had to deal elaborately with the question as to what was meant as a court subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3) Criminal procedure Code which was competent to take action under Section 476 criminal Procedure Code. The offences were originally committed in the court of a subordinate judge of First Class jurisdiction. An application was filed in the court of its successor, but before he could deal with the same he was transferred and thereafter no subordinate judge of first class jurisdiction was appointed in the place. Ultimately, a Subordinate Judge of 4th Class power was sent in that area. He ultimately declined and made a report to the Ld. District Judge that he had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The District judge thereupon transferred the matter to a senior subordinate judge and that officer made the complaint. The aggrieved party filed an appeal against the said order to the Additional District Judge who held that the senior subordinate judge had no jurisdiction to make the complaint because he was not the successor of the subordinate Judge of First Class Jurisdiction before whom the offence was committed. The matter went to the High Court in revision and the High Court held that senior subordinate judge had jurisdiction and that the materials disclosed a prima facie case and accordingly, he set aside the Ld. Additional District Judge's order and restored the order of the senior subordinate judge making the complaint. The matter having come to, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court found that the Senior Subordinate Judge did not appear to be vested either with administrative or judicial control over any other subordinate court except in so far as it was a court of appeal in respect of certain specific classes of cases. Punjab High Court notification had a peculiarity of its own and it could not be relevant in the context to have a thorough discuss on the respective jurisdiction of the different subordinate judges vested with different degrees of powers. Section 476 Criminal procedure Code authorized appropriate court, after recording a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice, to make a complaint in writing and forward it to the Magistrate of First Class having jurisdiction. That was so done in the case of Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra. Section 476 Criminal procedure Code authorized appropriate court, after recording a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice, to make a complaint in writing and forward it to the Magistrate of First Class having jurisdiction. That was so done in the case of Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra. The other question that the Supreme Court had to decide as to whether the court of senior subordinate judge was the court to which original court of the subordinate judge was subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held in this context that "subordination" has been given a special meaning in this section. It is not any superior court that has jurisdiction nor yet the court to which the former is subordinate, for what might be termed, most general purposes, but only the court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of section 195 (3. The Supreme Court was arrived to the conflicting decisions amongst different High Court the proviso mostly centering round the word, "ordinarily" One view was that ordinarily means, "in the majority of cases". The Supreme Court rightly rejected that interpretation since that would be rendering otiose the provision of Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. If appeals lie to a particular court e. g. the district Court, in the majority of cases and to another court, say the High court, only in a few cases, then the inferior tribunal is a fixed quantity and so the need to chose between inferior and superior court cannot arise. That would make sub-clause (a) to the Proviso otiose. Also it does not necessarily follow that the appeal in the majority of cases will always lie to the inferior court. Such cases may arise in which the majority of appeals should go to the higher of the two given tribunals and in any case the interpretation has the disadvantage that the court may be compelled to call for and go into a mass statistic to ascertain which of the two courts is to entertain majority of appeals over a given period of time as well as to determine what is the appropriate period of time. The Supreme Court also considered the other view in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment. The Supreme Court also considered the other view in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment. The word could mean and imply that the higher court is the one to which there is an unrestricted right of appeal and so cannot apply when any restriction intervenes. As such, when the right of appeal is limited to a particular clause of cases or is hedged in confusion as to which was the view taken in M. S. Sherif vs. State of Madras, reported in 52 cr. L. J. 67 = AIR 1954 SC 347. The Supreme Court poses the question in this manner that the first thing they are to look for is that whether any decrees, orders or sentence of the original court are appealable at all. If they are not and the court is a civil court, then under Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure code, the appeal against an order making or refusing to make a complaint will be to the principal court of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. If however, appeals from decrees or orders lie to different court, then we have to find out as to which of them they ordinarily lie to and select the one of the lowest court among them. In determining the court or courts to which appeal will ordinarily lie, we have to see which court or courts entertain appeals from that clause of cases or which tribunal in the ordinary way, apart from specific notification or laws that leave the matter out of the general clause. Applying the rule in this context, the Supreme Court held that the appeal to the senior subordinate judge cannot be termed ordinary because the special appellate jurisdiction conferred by a Punjab High Court Notification is not ordinary jurisdiction of the senior subordinate judge, but an additional power which can only be exercised in certain clause of cases. It was not a power common to all subordinate judges or even to all senior subordinate judges. Consequently, that court is not one of the appellate tribunals contemplated by section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure Code and its proviso, but the appeals do ordinarily lie either to the District Court or the High Court and as the District Court was the lower of these two tribunals, that must be regarded as appellate authority for the purpose of Section 476b Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that when the original court did not make a complaint under Section 476 Criminal Procedure Code or reject the application, then the only other court competent to exercise this powers is the court to which appeals from the original court "ordinarily lie". That court in the said section was found to be the court of the ld. District Judge and not the court of the additional District Judge. Therefore, the order of ld. Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction of the additional District Judge attracted interference by the High Court. As regards the other question that was argued in that case as to whether the High Court itself had the power, while setting aside the order of the Additional Sessions judge, to make a complaint, the Supreme Court found that the High Court was not superior court within the meaning of Section 195 (3) Criminal Procedure code and not even an original court and it had no jurisdiction also to make a complaint of its own in the facts and Circumstances of the said case. Therefore, all that the High Court could and should have done was to send the case to the district Judge's court for disposal according to Haw and accordingly, the matter was committed back to the court of the District Judge which was given liberty to exercise its own discretion in the matter so as to deal with the complaint. 4. WE are conscious about the contention raised by Mr. Sett that Section 195 (6) Criminal Procedure Code (Old) as it existed prior to 1923 was obliterated from the Statute by way of Amendment in 1923. Section 195 (7) of the Old Code was also incorporated with certains light variation in section 341 of the present code. Section 195 (6) of the Old Code as it existed prior to 1933 was brought in as Section 476b by virtue of 1923 Amendment Act with certain modification and even 195 (7) came in as 476b with certain variation. Mr. Sett argued that power to grant sanction was altogether different from the power to transfer an appeal. At the time when the two decisions of the Calcutta High court in 16 CWN 645 = ILR 39 Cal. Mr. Sett argued that power to grant sanction was altogether different from the power to transfer an appeal. At the time when the two decisions of the Calcutta High court in 16 CWN 645 = ILR 39 Cal. 774 and 16 CWN 903 = ILR 40 Calcutta 37 were delivered, there was no provision for appeal in the Statute at the relevant time Section 195 (6) provides that any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate Sub-section (7) reiterates that every court shall be deemed subordinate only to the court to which appeals from the former court ordinarily lie. In 1973 Criminal Procedure Code, sub-section (5) was also deleted Section 341 of the Present Code does not lay down any procedure for hearing an appeal, but only confers a right of appeal. Section 476b also similarly confers a right of appeal. The venue of preferring an appeal was prescribed, by making a distinction that in respect of civil matters, an appeal will lie to the District Court and in respect of criminal matters to the Sessions judge and the intention of the Legislature is not that either the Civil Procedure code or the Criminal Procedure Code will apply as the case may be. As regards procedure of hearing appeals, according to Mr. Sett, ratio of the two pre-1923 amendment decisions is that no power of transfer was ever held by the District judge; but then, power to grant or refuse sanction was only on the District judge by virtue of Section 195 (7), where the emphasis was on the word, "only", which is absent now in the present Section 195 (4) Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the present Section 341 Criminal Procedure Code does not create any special jurisdiction as regards procedure of hearing appeals, but only creates a forum of appeal. If legislature in its wisdom ought to have thought of curtailment of such special powers as contemplated in Bengal, Agra and assam Civil Courts Act, there should have been a subsequent legislative enactment,but since that was not so done, it would prove that the Legislature had intention otherwise. Mr. If legislature in its wisdom ought to have thought of curtailment of such special powers as contemplated in Bengal, Agra and assam Civil Courts Act, there should have been a subsequent legislative enactment,but since that was not so done, it would prove that the Legislature had intention otherwise. Mr. Ajit Kumar Roy, appearing as amicus curiae submitted that the nature of the 'lis' is to be determined first and in this connection he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1956 SC 391 , Kuidip Singh vs. State of Punjab, in para 21 of the said judgment. Mr. Roy further submitted that to that extent the decision of the Patna Full Bench reported in air 1968 Patna 100 Must Rurnpati Kuer vs. Jadunandan where their Lordships relied on Ms. Sheriff' vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 was rendered per incuriam in as much as in Kuldip Singh's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were clearly of the view that in the said decision of Ms sheriff vs. State of Madras (ibdi) the point was neither considered not decided. Once the nature of the lis stands determined, it would transpire that the district Judge is to entertain the appeal and the appeal also ordinarily lies to the District Judge. The expression "district Judge' has been dealt with in the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and provisions thereof make it amply clear that if and when the District Judge hears the appeal as an appellate authority, he has all the powers conferred on him by the said Act. He placed Section 22 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 to emphasize the said point. His further submission was that an appeal is a creature of statute and the provisions for hearing the appeal must also be governed by the statute itself conferring the said power. 5. MR. Roy further submitted that where two decisions of equal strength are before a Court, the court can legitimately follow the decision which is more logical and in that context he referred to Bholanath Karmakar and Ors. vs. Madan mohari and Ors., reported in 1988 (1) Calcutta Law Times HC page 1 which is a special Bench decision of this Court. 6. MR. vs. Madan mohari and Ors., reported in 1988 (1) Calcutta Law Times HC page 1 which is a special Bench decision of this Court. 6. MR. Priyanath Ghosh, learned Advocate for the State, submitted before us that regard being had to the expedience and workability, we have to make such an interpretation which must conform to a reasonable interpretation. The power of the Ld. District Judge to transfer the case to the Assistant District judge or to the Additional District Judge is to be taken as an implied one. There not having been any fetter imposed by the statute prohibiting such a transfer, we should make an interpretation accordingly Mr. Ghosh also relied upon the decision reported in Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 391 with particular reference to paragraphs 36 and 37, 38 and 39 of the judgment and submitted before us the distinguishing feature of the Punjab Court's Act, in comparison with the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court's Act, 1887. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that there was no controversy at all raised by any of the parties that the forum of preferring an appeal should be any Court otherwise than the District Judge's Court, but then the District Judge is always free to make an administrative distribution of work under Section 24 (a)of Criminal Procedure Code so that an appeal from an order of the Court of a munsif could be sent to the Assistant District Judge for disposal in accordance with law, as was done in the facts and circumstances of the present case and ever, the District Judge was free to transfer the case to an Additional District judge, since both the Additional District Judge and the Assistant District judge were deemed to be subordinate to the District Judge. Mr. Balai Ch. Ray, ld. Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, however, submitted that the "superior Court" and the subordinate Court are expressions used in juxta position to each other. Mr. Ray submitted that under section 195 (4) Criminal Procedure Code power was conferred on such an appellate Court as an authority to which the original court was subordinate. section 195 (4) (a) of the present Code almost equates the provisions of Section 195 (b), of the Old Code. Mr. Ray submitted that under section 195 (4) Criminal Procedure Code power was conferred on such an appellate Court as an authority to which the original court was subordinate. section 195 (4) (a) of the present Code almost equates the provisions of Section 195 (b), of the Old Code. Section 341 read with Section 195 (4) of the present code provides for the same forum so far as was provided by Sections 197 (6)and 197 (7) of the Old Code prior to 1923. Mr. Ray contended further that words, "the court to which such court shall be deemed to be subordinate" is also written in the present Code in Section 195 (4) (a. Mr. Ray took us through section 195 of the post 1923 Code and also placed before us Old Sections 195 (6) and 195 (7. We may quote here the provisions of Old Sections 195 (6)and (7) for our ready reference : 195 (6) Any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate; and no sanction shall remain in force for mors than six months from the date on which it was given, provided that the High Court may, for good cause shown, extended the time. (7) For the purposes of this Section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie, that is to say.- (a) where such appeals lie to more than one Court the appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where such appeals lie to a Civil and also to Revenue court, such Court shall be deemed be subordinate to the civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed; (c) where no appeal lies, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the principle court of criminal jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such first mentioned court is situate." 7. IT must, however, be remembered that under the old Code prior to 1923 there was no provision for appeal and that is the precise reason why Section 195 (7) (c) applied. IT must, however, be remembered that under the old Code prior to 1923 there was no provision for appeal and that is the precise reason why Section 195 (7) (c) applied. However, under Section 476a and 476b of the Code of 1898 as it stood after 1923 amendment, the provisions of Old Sections 195 (6) and (7)were retained in their essence though such sub-sections were in fact deleted. Mr. Ray contended that the entire idea behind the legislative amendment was to give a substantive right of appeal as was provided in post 1923 Code in distinction to the power of "superior Court" to grant or revoke sanction. Under the Old Section 476 of pre-1923 Code there was a procedure delineated about holding of a preliminary enquiry and to confer on the Magistrate such powers to proceed in accordance with law, even to transfer the case if so authorized under Section 192, to some other competent Magistrate. The present section 340 somewhat represents Section 476 (2) of the Old Code and Section 476 of pre-1923 Code. According to Mr. Ray there was indeed difference of language used in the different Codes, but the "superior Court" remained all the same. Mr. Roy citing the decision reported in Surendra Nath Maity vs. Susil Kumar chakraborty, reported in 35 CWN 775, contended further that Section 476 of post-1923 Code of Criminal Procedure Code did not seem to be exhaustive and are supplementary to Chapter XXXI of 1898 Code. Mr. Ray further drew our attention to Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code about licensing civil court with reference to the decision reported in = 34 CWN 80 Lal Mohd. and Ors. vs. D. I. G., C. I. D. Bengal, before us, Mr. Ray contended that the said reported decision suffers from two errors. It could not have differed from another division Bench reported, in 16 CWN 645 to hold that an appeal did lie from such an order and at any rate it could not delineate that it thought that it was expedient in the interests of justice that a large number of courts should not be deprived from hearing such appeals. Mr. It could not have differed from another division Bench reported, in 16 CWN 645 to hold that an appeal did lie from such an order and at any rate it could not delineate that it thought that it was expedient in the interests of justice that a large number of courts should not be deprived from hearing such appeals. Mr. Ray then directed our attention to the fact that if the appeal has to be disposed of by a "superior Court" the subordinate Judge or an Assistant District Judge is not Superior Court over the Munsif and for subordination the real test is to be applied in conformity with the provision of Section 341. In ILR 40 Cal. 239 Pochi Metch vs. Emperor, district Judge was found not competent to transfer such a case to a subordinate Judge because Section 185 did not confer a right of appeal to him under pre-1923 Code. Mr. Ray further contended that Section476a and 476b of post-1923 Code have not specifically deleted the spirit behind the provisions of pre-1923 Code especially section 195 (6) and (7) and the Superior court was only the District Judge's Court and not the Subordinate Judge's court. Mr. Ray, however ultimately gave up his initial argument that the ld. District Judge was a persons designata. Mr. Ray further contended that in view of the pronouncement in Mr. Rampart Kuer vs. Jadunandan, AIR 1968 Patna 100, there was scope of further agitation of the question as to whether the district Judge is to transfer an appeal to the Subordinate Judge or to the additional District Judge. Further we find that in the decision in Kuldip singh's case reported in AIR 1956 SC391 (paragraphs 10 and 11), the question is no more resintegra. The word "subordination" was given a special meaning. Only the "courts" mentioned in Section 195 l) (b) and (c) could remove the bar and make the complaint. Mr. Ray laying stress of paragraphs 7 and 12 of the reported judgment in AIR 1968 Patna 100, contended that the District Judge is alone the Superior Court. 8. WE find that the language used in Section 476b of 1898 Code as it stood after 1923 amendment and in Section 341 of the present Code remain more or less the same. The subordination of Courts is to be adjudged by the yardstick, given by sub-section (4) to Section 195. 8. WE find that the language used in Section 476b of 1898 Code as it stood after 1923 amendment and in Section 341 of the present Code remain more or less the same. The subordination of Courts is to be adjudged by the yardstick, given by sub-section (4) to Section 195. To hear appeal is the determinant of superiority of a Court. In detraining the Court to which an appeal will lie, one has to see which court entertain appeals from that of the tribunal in the ordinary way apart from special notifications or laws that left the matter out of the general class. Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 sc 391 at 395. The words of the statute both in 1898 Case and 1973 Code remain more or less identical. As was pointed out in M. S. Shariff vs. State of, madras, AIR 1954 SC397. The word "subordinate'' does not bear its ordinary meaning. It is used as a term of art and lias been given a special meaning by reason of the definition given in the statute, a fiction that has been imposed by the issue of expression "deemed". There is no controversy at all an the question that an appeal lies to the district Judge's Court on the learned Munsif refusing to make a complaint under sub-section. (l) or sub-section (2) of Section 340 because the Munsif court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195 to the Section 341, it is the "superior court" only which may thereupon, after notice to the parties concerned, direct the making of a complaint which the munsif Court might have made under Section 340 and if it makes such a complaint, the provision of that section shall apply accordingly. The same is the case where the learned Munsif made a complaint and the aggrieved party is to prefer an appeal against the said order and it is again the superior court i.e. the District Judge's Court which could direct, the withdrawal of the complaint. The same is the case where the learned Munsif made a complaint and the aggrieved party is to prefer an appeal against the said order and it is again the superior court i.e. the District Judge's Court which could direct, the withdrawal of the complaint. We have taken into consideration the decision of the Patna High court in Indradeo Ojha vs. Emperor, reported in AIR 1945 Patna 322 and also the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court Ram Chandra vs. Taripulla reported in 39 Calcutta Weekly Notes 744 for the proposition that the Munsif is not subordinate to a subordinate Judge and that the Court of the District judge was the only court to which an appeal could properly lie from an order of the Munsif refusing to grant sanction to prosecute a party to a litigation in that Court. This decision was followed by a single Judge of the Patna High court reported in AIR 1933 Patna 179 Dularikoeri vs. Faukadar Khan in which case it was held that the Court of the District Judge is the only court to which the Court of Munsif is subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3) of 1898 Case so that the appeal under Section 476b could be heard only by the district Judge himself and that consequently the District Judge has no power to transfer an appeal of that nature to the subordinate Judge for hearing. What was held in Indradeo Ojha vs. Emperor (supra) that the words of Section 195 criminal Procedure Code have got to be strictly construed which was reiterated by another Patna decision reported in AIR 1936 Patna 122 Thakur Prasad vs. Emperor. In Indradeo Ojha vs. Emperor (supra) it was further held that the additional District Judge was not competent to hear the appeal from the orders of the subordinate judge refusing to file a complaint Giving a considered appreciation of the two Supreme Court decisions in M. S. Shariff vs. State of madras, reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 and Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab. reported in AIR 1956 SC 391 which have both been considered in the Patna full Bench decision in ML Rampatikuer and Ors. reported in AIR 1956 SC 391 which have both been considered in the Patna full Bench decision in ML Rampatikuer and Ors. vs. Jadunandan Thakur and ors., we are of the considered view that the appeal filed before the District judge could not be transferred to the Subordinate Judge or the Assistant district Judge since the superior court had no jurisdiction to transfer an appeal under Section 476b of 1898 Code and for the matter of that under section 341 of the present Code, to a Subordinate Judge or ah Assistant district Judge. We are conscious of the position that under Section 21 (3} of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the Additional District Judge could be assigned the functions of receiving appeals and on such assignment the appeals may be preferred directly to him but so long as the function of receiving appeals has not been assigned to the Additional District Judge as per the Patna Full Bench views, he could not be said to be superior Court to which appeal, ordinarily lie from the decrees and the orders of the lower Civil courts. However, we need not dilate on the provisions of Section 8 of the Civil courts Act for a final pronouncement as to the powers of the District Judge to transfer such appeal to the Additional District Judge but then we are unanimous on the point that in so far as the Munsif is concerned, the subordinate Judge or the Assistant District Judge is not the "superior court" within the meaning of Section 341 of the present Code and an appeal under section341 could not be transferee for the purpose of hearing and for making of a complaint or for granting of the sanction or even for withdrawal of the complaint, as the case may be to subordinate Judge or the Assistant District judge. We are further of the opinion that the dissection amongst the different judgment, of our own court can thus be reconciled to this effect by disapproving the view taken by out two Division Bench judgments in Chandra kumar vs. Goplnathar, reported in AIR 1938 Calcutta 463 and Lal Mohd. and ors. v. DIG, GID reported in 34 CWN 80, by observing inter alia that in the present context of the language in the 1973 Code, they are no more good law. 9. and ors. v. DIG, GID reported in 34 CWN 80, by observing inter alia that in the present context of the language in the 1973 Code, they are no more good law. 9. ACCORDING, we set aside the judgment as passed by the learned subordinate Judge or the Assistant District Judge and we direct the District judge to hear out the appeal on merits, as expeditiously, as possible.