JUDGMENT - Dr. SARAF B.P., J.:—Both these writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner M/s. Bhor Industries Limited raising a common question of law and, as such, they were taken together for hearing and arguments and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The petitioner No. 1 (petitioner hereinafter) is a Limited Company carrying on the business, inter alia, of manufacture of PVC sheets, tapes, coated and laminated fabrics. For the purpose of use in manufacture of these products, it imported regularly PVC Resin. PVC Resin was classified by the respondents, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, for the purpose of levy of Octroi under section 192(1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 as an item falling under Item No. 32(c) of Schedule H (the Octroi Schedule). Item No. 32 which forms part of Class Y, reads as below: “Class V - Perfumes, Toilet requisites, colours and household goods. 32(a) Hair oil, perfumed oils, perfumery of all kinds, scents, attars, scented material, incense sticks, aromatic chemicals, toilet requisites of all kinds, shaving cream, shaving sticks, tooth powder, tooth paste, Pomade, combs, brushes, looking glasses, hairpins, breeches, garters and suspenders. 4 per cent ad valorem. (b) Scissors, razors, safety razors, blades, knives, penknives, spoons, forks, cutlery and all kinds of needles of all sorts, locks and keys, stoves and petromax and their parts and accessories and hardware articles. 4 per cent ad valorem. (c) Laces, tapes, rings of wood and metal embroidery articles, celluloid and celluloid articles, beads of all sorts, imitation pearls, articles of imi- tation, jewellery, plastic and plastic goods, plastic powder, bakelite and bakelite goods. The petitioners paid the Octroi in respect of PVC Resin imported and brought by them into the Municipal limits of the respondent Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay right from September 1984 onwards. In August 1987, the petitioners noticed two judgments of this Court wherein interpreting Item 15-A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 it had been held, inter alia, that PVC Synthetic Resin is not plastic. The petitioners thereupon made claims for refund of the octroi paid by them on PVC Resin between September 1984 to September, 1987. The first such claim was made on 2nd September 1987. The petitioners thereupon made claims for refund of the octroi paid by them on PVC Resin between September 1984 to September, 1987. The first such claim was made on 2nd September 1987. By another letter dated 17th December, 1987, the petitioner requested the third respondent, Deputy Assessor and Collector (Octroi) to consider the practice of charging octroi on PVC Resin and issue necessary directives exempting PVC Resin from octroi. The petitioners in the said letter which is Exh. 'K' to the petition specifically referred to the two decisions of this Court and gave reasons in support of their contentions. 2. The respondent No. 3 by letters dated 8th January, 1988 and 9th March, 1988 rejected the claim of the petitioners for refund of the octroi already collected from them on the ground that the goods in question had been correctly charged under Item No. 32 of Schedule 'H'. By another letter dated 18th February, 1988, the petitioners were informed that “PVC Resin is correctly classified under No. 32(c) @ 4 per cent ad valorem of Octroi Schedule H, appended to Bombay Municipal Corporation Act”. This letter is annexure 'H' to the writ petition. None of these letters, however, contains any reason as to why the decisions of this Court, though delivered while interpreting the provisions of Central Excise Act, according to the respondents, were not applicable despite the fact that the very same controversy raised in this case had been decided by this Court in those cases. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the first writ petition viz. Writ Petition No. 1146 of 1988. While admitting the said writ petition, this Court passed an interim order giving liberty to the respondent to assess the petitioners in accordance with law with the direction not to collect the same from the petitioners on their furnishing a bank guarantee of nationalised bank to the extent of 50% of the assessed duty and giving a bond for the balance of the 50% of the assessed duty. 3. The petitioners in this writ petition have claimed two reliefs. Firstly, a declaration that PVC Resin does not fall under Item 32(c) of Schedule H and, as such, no octroi is leviable on import thereof. 3. The petitioners in this writ petition have claimed two reliefs. Firstly, a declaration that PVC Resin does not fall under Item 32(c) of Schedule H and, as such, no octroi is leviable on import thereof. The second relief sought for is the refund of the octroi paid by them in respect of PYC Resin for the period from September 1984 to September 1987. This petition was filed on 15th April, 1988. 4. The second Writ Petition No. 1333 of 1989 was filed by the petitioners on 20th April, 1989. In this petition the item in question was Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin which also was sought to be assessed under the same Item 32(c). In this case also the petitioners seek a declaration that Hydrocarbon Resin does not fall under Item 32(c) and also refund of a sum of Rs. 75,450/- which had been paid by them in respect of this product by way of Octroi from 13-8-1988 to 21-2-1989. 5. There is no controversy at the bar in regard to the fact that PVC Resin and Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin both stand on the same footing so far as the levy of octroi under Item 32(c) is concerned. If PVC Resin does not fall under this item, the other Item Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin will also not fall under it. The question for determination, therefore, is whether the PVC Synthetic Resin which is imported and brought into the local limits of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by the first petitioner is plastic or plastic powder or not. If it is not, the respondents will not be entitled to levy any octroi on its import under Item 32(c). 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Dharmadhikari submits that this controversy has by now been resolved by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in (Asmaco Plastic Industries v. Municipal Corporation for City of Thane)1, 1992(3) Bom.C.R. 188 (Writ Petition No. 940 of 1984). It is a decision rendered on 25th/26th March, 1992. The taxing entry for interpretation before the Court was Item No. 53 under Class V of Schedule I, to the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. This entry is exactly in similar terms as Item 32(c). It is reproduced below: Class V - Perfumes, toilet requisites, Colours and Household goods. It is a decision rendered on 25th/26th March, 1992. The taxing entry for interpretation before the Court was Item No. 53 under Class V of Schedule I, to the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. This entry is exactly in similar terms as Item 32(c). It is reproduced below: Class V - Perfumes, toilet requisites, Colours and Household goods. 53 (a) Hair oil, perfumed oils, perfumary of all kinds, scents, attars, scented material, incense sticks, aromatic chemicals, toilet requisites of all kinds, shaving cream, shaving sticks, tooth powder, tooth paste, pomade, combs, brushes, looking glasses, hairpins braces, garters and suspenders. (b) Scissors, razors, safety razors, blades, knives, pen knives, spoons, forks, cutlery of all kinds, needles of all sorts, locks and keys, stoves and petromax and their parts and accessories and hardware articles. (c) Laces, tapes, rings of wood and metal, embroidery articles, celluloid and celluloid articles, beads of all sorts, imitation pearls plastic and plastic goods, plastic powder, bakelite and bakelite goods, articles made of ivory and bones and all sorts of buttons and haberdashery. (d) All kinds of furniture such as wooden, iron, steel, cane etc. (e) Umbrellas, rain coats, rain hats and caps. The octroi is levied at a rate of 2% on the value of the goods which fall under Item No. 53(c). 7. The Division Bench of this Court (Pendse and Choudhary, JJ.) after elaborate discussion of the various authorities on the subject held that PVC Resin was neither plastic nor plastic powder, and as such, could not be subjected to octroi under Item 53(c) of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. 8. The learned Counsel submits that this decision interpreting the very identical item of the Schedule to the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules and holding that PYC Resin is not plastic or plastic powder is binding on this Court even while interpreting Item 32(c) of Schedule H to the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Counsel, further submits that even before this decision the point at issue was concluded by earlier decisions of this Court. However in view of the recent Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 940 of 1984, the issue is no more res integra. 9. On going through the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court, I find that the controversy in these two Writ Petitions stands fully concluded in favour of the petitioners. However in view of the recent Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 940 of 1984, the issue is no more res integra. 9. On going through the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court, I find that the controversy in these two Writ Petitions stands fully concluded in favour of the petitioners. Following the same, I hold that PVC Resin and the Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin imported by the petitioners within the octroi limits of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay are neither plastic nor plastic powder and, as such, not liable to octroi under Item 32(c) of Schedule H to the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. 10. In view of this decision, assessments if any made by the Corporation after the two writ petitions were filed on the strength of the liberty given by this Court shall stand automatically cancelled. 11. The next question that falls for determination is claim of refund of the octroi paid in respect of these items on various dates prior to the filing of the two writ petitions. The claims made in Writ Petition No. 1146 of 1988 on different dates in all amounting to a sum of Rs. 96.26,706.85 Ps. (for the period from August 1984 to September, 1987) were rejected by the respondents by their orders dated 8th January, 1988 and 9th March, 1988 (Annexures F and G to the petition) on the ground that the duty had been correctly charged under Item 32. The claim of refund in Writ Petition No. 1333 of 1989 pertains to octroi collected by respondents during the period 13-8-1988 to 21-2-1989. This claim was rejected by the respondents by letter dated 7th December, 1988 on the ground that the claim was time-barred. Counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of the decision of this Court holding that no octroi was leviable on PVC Resin and Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin under Item 32(c), the levy and recovery thereof by the Corporation was without any authority of law and, as such, they are bound to refund the same. The petitioners pray for appropriate directions to the respondents to refund all such amounts collected by them from the petitioners. This prayer is opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The learned Counsel submits that before the filing of the writ petition, the petitioners paid octroi on PVC Resin and Hydrocarbon Resin without any protest. The petitioners pray for appropriate directions to the respondents to refund all such amounts collected by them from the petitioners. This prayer is opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The learned Counsel submits that before the filing of the writ petition, the petitioners paid octroi on PVC Resin and Hydrocarbon Resin without any protest. At no point of time the levy had been challenged by them. For the first time, a challenge was made when the application was filed in September 1987 claiming refund and later again in December 1987. He also disputes the facts that the petitioners came to know of the earlier decisions of this Court in Central Excise matters holding that PVC Resin is not plastic or plastic powder only in August, 1987. He attributes the knowledge of these decisions to the petitioners from the date of judgments which were delivered as back as in 1981-82. His submission is that petitioners should not be granted any refund. This submission is based on three grounds, namely unjust enrichment, public policy and delay in making the claim for refund. The public policy plea is based on the ground that the Corporation having collected the octroi has already utilised the same for the various development and welfare activities of general public nature and hence any direction to grant the refund will cause hardship to the Corporation and will be against public policy. Limitation plea is based on Rule 26 of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Octroi Rules, 1965, which prescribe a period of limitation of three months for making claim for refund. 12. Reliance is placed in support of these submissions on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (D. Cawasji and Co. v. State of Mysore)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 813, (Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 971, (Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa)4, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1676 and (Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Thane Municipal Corporation)5, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 53. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in (Industrial Cables (India) Ltd. v. Union of India)6, reported in 1985(19) E.L.T. 351. Ltd. v. Thane Municipal Corporation)5, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 53. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in (Industrial Cables (India) Ltd. v. Union of India)6, reported in 1985(19) E.L.T. 351. The learned Counsel also submits that to avoid refund of the amount collected by the respondents for the period prior to the filing of the writ petitions, this Court should declare the aforesaid interpretation of Item 32(c) of the Schedule applicable prospectively from the date of filing of the writ petition. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, submits that none of the above objections raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents is applicable to refund of octroi in the present case. The objections, according to him, are misconceived. So far as unjust enrichment is concerned, Counsel submits that the principle of unjust enrichment has no application to a case of refund of octroi. Regarding public policy, the submission is that public policy demands that the Corporation should refund the octroi collected by it without any authority of law to the person from whom it was so collected rather with interest. The bar of limitation under the Rules, according to the petitioner, is not applicable to such refund. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (H.M.M. Ltd. v. Administrator Bangalore City Corporation)7, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 47, (Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong)8, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 772, Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (supra) A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1676 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in (Solar Pesticides Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)9, 1992 Mh.L.J. 871. 14. I have perused the decisions relied upon by the Counsel for the parties in support of their rival contentions. 15. So far as the right of the party to get repayment or refund of amount paid by it under a mistake of law is concerned, the law appears to have been well settled long back by a Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in (Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiyalal Mukundlal)10, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 135 wherein it was held: “ ........ if it is once established that the payment, even though it be of tax, has been made by the party labouring under a mistake of law the party is entitled to recover the same and the party receiving the same is bound to repay or return it. No distinction can, therefore, be made in respect of a tax liability and any other liability on a plain reading of the terms of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act ….. To hold that tax paid by mistake of law cannot be recovered under section 72 will be not to interpret the law but to make a law by adding such words as 'otherwise than by way of taxes' after the word 'paid'.” 16. Reference may also be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 772 wherein dealing with the question whether in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Courts should have directed refund, it was observed: “.... Normally speaking in a society governed by rule of law taxes should be paid by citizens as soon as they are due in accordance with law. Equally, as a corollary of the said statement of law it follows that taxes collected without the authority of law as in this case from a citizen should be refunded because no State has the right to receive or to retain taxes or monies realised from citizens without the authority of law.” It was further observed: “We agree that normally in a case where tax or money has been realised without the authority of law, the same should be refunded and in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court has power to direct the refund unless there has been avoidable laches on the part of the petitioner which indicate either the abandonment of his claims or which is of such nature for which there is no probable explanation or which will cause any injury either to respondent or any third party. It is true that in some cases the period of three years is normally taken as a period beyond which the Court should not grant relief but that is not an inflexible rule. It is true that in some cases the period of three years is normally taken as a period beyond which the Court should not grant relief but that is not an inflexible rule. It depends upon the facts of each case.” Applying these principles to the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court observed: “There was no unexplained delay. There was no fact indicated to the High Court from which it could be inferred that the appellant had either abandoned his claims or the respondent had changed his position in such a way that granting relief or refund would cause either injury to the respondent or anybody else. On the other hand refunding the amount as a consequence of declaring the assessment to be bad and recovery to be illegal will be in consonance with justice equity and good conscience. We are, therefore, of the view that the view of the High Court in this matter cannot be sustained.” (emphasis supplied) 17. These principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. (supra) still hold the field. The Supreme Court in none of its subsequent decisions has held that no refund should be directed by the High Court even if the levy has been found by it to be invalid or without any authority of law. Even in Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1676, a decision which has been heavily relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents, the Supreme Court has not said so. What has been observed by the Supreme Court is: “A finding regarding the invalidity of a levy need not automatically result in a direction for a refund of all collections thereof made earlier. The declaration regarding the invalidity of a provision and the determination of the relief that should be granted in consequence thereof are two different things and, in the latter sphere, the Court has, and must be held to have, a certain amount of discretion. It is a well settled proposition that it is open to the Court to grant, mould or restrict the relief in a manner most appropriate to the situation before it in such a way as to advance the interests of justice.” 18. It is in the light of these observations that the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Co. It is a well settled proposition that it is open to the Court to grant, mould or restrict the relief in a manner most appropriate to the situation before it in such a way as to advance the interests of justice.” 18. It is in the light of these observations that the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Thane Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 53 refused to allow the claim of the petitioner Company to concession in the form of lower rate of octroi. It was observed: “In any event the petitioner-Company cannot claim concession at this distance as a matter of right.” “In the instant case, the octroi duty paid by the petitioner-Company would naturally have been passed on to the consumers. Therefore, there is no justification to claim the same at this distance of time and the Court in its discretion can reject the same.” 19. Reference may be made in this context to another decision of the Supreme Court in (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Thane)11, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 645. In this case also there was a question of refund of octroi duty under the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. In this case also the claim for refund was opposed by the Corporation on the ground that the appellants therein had recovered the amounts by way of octroi from the dealers or the customers to whom they had sold the goods. The argument was that if refund is ordered, it would amount to allowing the appellants to unjustly enrich themselves at the cost of the public to whom the burden has already been passed. Rejecting the contentions of the Corporation, it was observed: “This argument is based on the ground that in the selling price the Company had merged the octroi duty originally paid as deposit and if a refund is made the company would be getting an additional amount over and above normal price which they would have charged but for the fact that they were initially asked to deposit octroi. There is no evidence that any of the articles sold by the Company is subject to any price control by the Government or that the Company had charged any octroi separately in the bills. There is no evidence that any of the articles sold by the Company is subject to any price control by the Government or that the Company had charged any octroi separately in the bills. Invoices and the other documents of sale to the outside purchasers produced before us do not also show that any octroi was separately charged and collected by the Company. It may be mentioned that in the rejoinder filed by the appellants in the writ petition, they have specifically denied that they 'have recovered the amount paid by them by way of octroi duty from the dealers to whom they had sold the goods or that the dealers in turn have recovered the octroi duty from the customers. In view of this the question of unjust enrichment does not arise.” 20. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that this observation of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case of the petitioners. The petitioners too have not sold the goods imported by them to anybody. No octroi has been collected by them. These goods have been used by them for the manufacture of the certain goods by themselves. As such, the above observation of the Supreme Court will fully apply to the present case. He also submits that if the Corporation come across any transaction where the petitioners have realised or collected any octroi in addition to the price of the goods from any customers or any of the goods imported by them are found to have been sold by them, no refund may be granted to them in respect of import of such goods. This concession, the learned Counsel submits, has been made by the petitioners, just to put an end to the argument of the Corporation based on the ground of unjust enrichment even though that principle, on the face of it, has no application to octroi. 21. Reliance is also placed on a decision of this Court in Solar Pesticides Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1992 Mh.L.J. 871, wherein a Division Bench of this Court (Sujata Manohar and Kapadia, JJ.) referring to the doctrine of unjust enrichment observed that this doctrine has no application in the case where the imported goods are either consumed by the importer or are used by him in the manufacture of other products. In the case of the imported products Customs duty paid on it becomes a part of the cost of manufacture of the new item or items in which the imported component is an ingredient. In such cases, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not invoked. On the basis of the aforesaid observation, the Court came to a conclusion that additional duty of customs levied on raw material which was imported was not an additional duty on any finished product which was going to be sold to the consumer and to whom the incidence of the additional duty of customs can be passed on directly. Since the additional duty of customs was found not to have been passed on by the petitioner to any third party by selling the imported goods, they were held entitled to claim refund of the amount recovered from them without any authority of law. 22. Reliance in this connection is also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in H.M.M. Ltd. v. Administrator Bangalore City Corporation, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 47. This was also a case of claim of refund of octroi collected by the Bangalore City Corporation under the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act. 1949. Allowing the claim of refund the Supreme Court observed: “Octroi in this case is a duty on entry of the raw materials for coming in. It is the duty on the coming in of the raw materials which is payable by the Producer or the manufacturer. It is not the duty on going out of the finished products in respect of which the duty might have been charged or added to the costs passed on to the customers. In such a situation, no question of 'undue enrichment' can possibly arise in this case.” It was further observed : “We see no ground as to why amount should not be refunded. Realisation of tax or money without the authority of law is bad under Article 265 of the Constitution. The respondent is a statutory authority in the present case. It has no right to retain the amount, so far as so much.” In the light of these observations, the Corporation was directed to refund the amount of octroi collected by it to the petitioners. 23. The respondent is a statutory authority in the present case. It has no right to retain the amount, so far as so much.” In the light of these observations, the Corporation was directed to refund the amount of octroi collected by it to the petitioners. 23. On a careful consideration of the various decisions referred to above, I am of the clear opinion that in the instant case, there is no case of unjust enrichment of the petitioners nor the refund goes against any public policy. The objections to the refund on the ground of unjust enrichment and being against the public policy, therefore, do not stand to reason and the same are accordingly rejected. 24. The only ground of objection to refund that survives for consideration is the ground of limitation. Mr. R. L. Dalal, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that under Rule 26 of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Octroi Rules, 1965, three months is the period of limitation within which the claim for refund should be made. The claim in this case, therefore, is barred by limitation. In the alternative, the learned Counsel submits that even if it is held that the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 26 does not apply to claim of refund of octroi collected without any authority of law, such claim will be governed by the period of limitation prescribed under Article I 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which applies to suits for recovery of payments made under a mistake of law which is three years from the date when the mistake is known. The Counsel also submits that as observed by the Supreme Court, the power to grant consequential relief by way of refund being discretionary, in the present case this Court should not exercise its discretion to grant refund for a period of more than three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. I have considered the aforesaid submission of Mr. Dalal, the learned Counsel for the respondents. So far as Rule 26 is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the period prescribed under Rule 26 is not inflexible one. The Commissioner has the power, under this Rule itself, to allow the application for refund to be filed within such longer period as he might in any special case or class of cases allow. So far as Rule 26 is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the period prescribed under Rule 26 is not inflexible one. The Commissioner has the power, under this Rule itself, to allow the application for refund to be filed within such longer period as he might in any special case or class of cases allow. That, however, is not very material in this case in view of the fact that the said rule applies only to refund of octroi paid under the Act. This has no application to refund of octroi collected without any authority of law as in the present case. So far as the period of limitation of three years is concerned, in view of the observations in Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong (supra), I am of the opinion that though the period of three years is normally taken as the ordinary period beyond which the Courts may not grant relief, that is not an inflexible rule. It depends on the facts of each case. 25. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am, however, inclined to accept the alternative arguments of the learned Counsel of the respondents that the claim of refund should be confined to amounts recovered by the respondents within a period of three years prior to the filing of the writ petitions. Writ Petition No. 1146 of 1988 was filed on 15th April, 1988. Accordingly, the refunds in respect of claims covered by Writ Petition No. 1146 of 1988 may be restricted to recoveries made on or after 16th of April, 1985. In Writ Petition No. 1333 of 1989 which was filed on 21-2-1989, the claim for refund pertains to the collections made from 13-8-1988 to 21-2-1989. These are well within the period of 3 years. The same are, therefore, to be allowed. 26. In the light of the foregoing discussions, the respondents are directed not to levy any octroi under Item 32(c) on the PVC Resin and Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin. They are further directed to refund to the petitioners the octroi collected from them on PVC Resin during the period from 16th April, 1985 to 15th April, 1988 and on Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin from 30th September, 1988 to 21st February, 1989. They are further directed to refund to the petitioners the octroi collected from them on PVC Resin during the period from 16th April, 1985 to 15th April, 1988 and on Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin from 30th September, 1988 to 21st February, 1989. In view of the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the respondents had no occasion to verify the genuineness of the claim of the respondents, liberty is given to the respondents to verify the claim before making the refund in terms of the aforesaid directions. The petitioners shall produce all requisite documents in support of their claim. The respondents shall not be required to refund octroi collected by them from the petitioners in respect of any consignment or any part thereof if it is found that the same has not been consumed by the petitioners in their own factory but sold to others. All these verifications shall be completed and refund due to the petitioners granted to them within a period of three months from today. Any assessment made by the Corporation levying octroi on the petitioners in respect of import of PVC Resin and Synthetic Hydrocarbon Resin during the pendency of these writ petitions by virtue of the liberty granted by this Court shall stand cancelled. The Bank guarantee furnished and the bonds executed by the petitioners shall be kept alive for a period of three months from today. 27. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed. -----