JUDGMENT : R.B. Mehrotra, J. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order, dated 23-7-1935 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi declaring premises No. S-18/2-a, situate at Raja Bazar, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the premises) in releasing the premises in dispute in favour of the respondents-landlord and the order, dated 6-4-1986 issuing a direction to the petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute in the prescribed Form 'C' under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). 2. The facts necessary for decision of the writ petition, in brief, are, that the premises in dispute was earlier in occupation of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway and was being used as an office of the aforesaid authority. The premises was vacated by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway. Thereafter an application was moved on behalf of Maharaja Kashi Naresh Sri Vibhuti Narayan Singh on behalf of his son Maharaja Kumar Anant Nirayan Singh, minor at the relevant time. By order, dated 6-6-1977, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi released the premises in dispute in favour of the landlord for the purposes of using it for doing Hotel business. Thereafter on 17th of August, 1979, an agreement was entered into between Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh, owner of the premises I party, Maharaj Kumari Vishnu Priya and others as lessor II party and M/s. Cottage Industries Exposition Private Ltd., as III party. The agreement provided that the II party has taken the property on lease for the purpose of setting up a Handicraft Museum and the III party is desirous of setting up of a Handicraft Business in the premises in dispute on terms and conditions agreed upon and the II party is desirous of getting a lease. The I party has no objection if the II party leases the property in favour of III party. On the basis of the aforesaid agreement, the present petitioner was inducted in the premises in dispute as a lessee thereof. The terms of the agreement are not relevant for the controversy in the present writ petition as such are not being detailed. On the basis of the aforesaid agreement, the present petitioner was inducted in the premises in dispute as a lessee thereof. The terms of the agreement are not relevant for the controversy in the present writ petition as such are not being detailed. The agreement contemplated that the I party is the owner of the property and in case for any reason the tenancy of the II party terminates in law, the tenancy created in favour of III party shall be allowed to continue and deemed with the I party on the terms and conditions of the deed. 4. The agreement contemplated that the lease will be for the entire Hall and for the adjoining room of the house known as 'Mint House Hall' in the first floor. The rent will be charged according to the rent settled between II and III parties amounting to Rs. 15,000 per month for the building and Rs. 2,500 for the publicity and for advertisement for user and service charges. The rent shall start from 1st of December, 1979. The rent was contemplated to be paid in advance and it is alleged that first month's rent was realised by the lessor's on 1st of December, 1979. 5. It is stated in the writ petition that subsequent thereto on 20-1-1980, one Farooq Ahmed moved an application for allotment of the premises in dispute in his favour. Subsequent thereto another application was filed by one Syed Hussain for the allotment of the premises in dispute in his favour. 6. On 10-4-1981, an application was moved to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi which was signed by Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh as partner of the Mint House. In this application, it was alleged that the first floor of the premises which was got vacated from the Northern Railway is being used by applicant No. 1 as partner of the Hotel and applicant No. 2, namely, M/s. Cottage Industries Exposition Private Ltd. for exhibition and business of Handicrafts. It was stated therein that the premises had been let oat at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month as rent and Rs. 2,700/- per month for advertisement etc. It was prayed that the tenancy may be regularised at the rate of rent settled between the parties. This application was clearly for the regularisation of the agreement entered into between the respondent-landlord and the petitioner. 15,000/- per month as rent and Rs. 2,700/- per month for advertisement etc. It was prayed that the tenancy may be regularised at the rate of rent settled between the parties. This application was clearly for the regularisation of the agreement entered into between the respondent-landlord and the petitioner. The said application was registered as Case No. 45 of 1981 whereas the application for allotment made on behalf of Farooq Ahmed was registered as Case No. 8 of 1981. The counter-affidavit discloses that on behalf of the Cottage Industries Expositions, appearance has been put in by Sri A.K. Chaterjee Advocate and Sri Ram Naresh Tripathi, Advocate in Case No. 8 of 1931, Farooq Ahmad v. Maharaja Anant Narayan Singh. In this case several applications were made on behalf of the petitioner seeking adjournment in the case on one ground or the other. On 23-7-1985, in case No. 45 of 1981, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the premises in dispute to be vacant. The order states: "the present proceedings under Rent Control Act have been initiated in respect of House No. S-18/2-A, Raja Bazar, Varanasi on the basis of the application of the partner of Mint. House Hotel, dated 10-4-1981, Besides that some applications have been received for allotment on behalf of Syed Hussain and others. In this connection, the report was also called from the Rent Control Inspector. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the file. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Counsel of the applicant Syed Hussain and Maharaja Anant Narayan Singh have agreed that the house in dispute may be declared vacant. Accordingly, the vacancy may be notified of the house in dispute." 7. The said order is in Hindi and has been signed by the Additional Collector, Supplies, Varanasi. After that, an endorsement in English is also made which is as under :- "Applicant Syed Hussain and Counsel for Maharaja Anant Narayan Singh both agree on publication of vacancy, other parties are absent. Accordingly vacancy be notified. Detail order attached. 12-8-1985 Ko Pesh Ho." Sd. Illegible. 23-7-1985. A.D.M. (C.S.)." 8. Subsequent thereto an application was moved on behalf of Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh that the premises in dispute is bonafide required by him and may be released in bis favour. This application was moved on 23-9-1985. 9. The aforesaid application was contested by the present petitioner. Detail order attached. 12-8-1985 Ko Pesh Ho." Sd. Illegible. 23-7-1985. A.D.M. (C.S.)." 8. Subsequent thereto an application was moved on behalf of Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh that the premises in dispute is bonafide required by him and may be released in bis favour. This application was moved on 23-9-1985. 9. The aforesaid application was contested by the present petitioner. Inter alia it was contended in the objection that the vacancy of the premises has been wrongly notified and the premises in dispute is not bona fide required by the landlord. The landlord has himself prayed for the regularisation of the tenancy of the petitioner, as such there is no question of releasing the premises in dispute in favour of the landlord. It was also contended that, the landlord has violated the provisions of Section 11 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By an order dated 7-4-1986, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer released the premises in dispute in favour of the respondent landlord. 10. Aggrieved by the order, dated 23-7-1985 declaring the premises in dispute to be vacant and the order, dated 7-4-1986 releasing the premises in dispute in favour of the respondent landlord, the petitioner filed a writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 in this Court. This writ petition was filed on 31-7-1986. An interim order, dated 13-10-1986 was passed slaying the operation of the orders dated 23-7-1985 and 7-4-1986 and staying all further proceedings pending before the authorities under the Act subject to the condition that the petitioner pays to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 the agreed rent of the premises in dispute at the rate of Rs. 17,500/- per month. During the pendency of this writ petition, the present writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1144 of 1987 was filed by the petitioner on 16-1-1987. In this petition it was specifically stated that since the entire facts and actual position was not fully within the knowledge of Shafiq Reshi and Wali Mohammad, the entire facts could not be brought to the notice of the Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 and the respondents are trying to take advantage of the said mistake. Therefore, the petitioner has been advised to withdraw the said writ petition and file a fresh writ petition. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 and the respondents are trying to take advantage of the said mistake. Therefore, the petitioner has been advised to withdraw the said writ petition and file a fresh writ petition. A copy of the application for withdrawing the earlier writ petition was annexed in this writ petition. In this writ petition an additional relief was also sought for quashing of the order, dated 4th June, 1986, issuing the eviction order of the petitioner in Form 'C' of the rules prescribed under the Act. 11. The first writ petition i.e., Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 was withdrawn by the petitioner on 14-7-1988. This Court permitted withdrawal of the writ petition in the following terms :- "Since the petition is sought to be withdrawn, it is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The interim order, dated 8-8-1986 is vacated." 12. A preliminary objection has been raised by Sri K.M. Dayal, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-landlord that in view of the fact that the first writ petition was get dismissed as withdrawn, the second writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the principles of Order XXIII, Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure and also on the principles of constructive res-judicata. Sri Dayal has mainly relied upon the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwarlior and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC page 88, for the proposition if the first writ petition has been dismissed as withdrawn, the second writ petition will be barred on the principles contained in Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a decision of this Court given in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1588 of 1991, Sunil Kumar and others v. The State of U.P. and others, decided on 17th of January, 1992, taking a view that if a later writ petition is dismissed as not pressed then the earlier writ petition filed on the basis of the same cause of action will be barred by the principles of constructive res-judicata. 13. Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant for the purposes of the present case, runs as under : "Order XXIII. - Withdrawal and adjustment of suit. 1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim. 13. Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant for the purposes of the present case, runs as under : "Order XXIII. - Withdrawal and adjustment of suit. 1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim. - (1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim : Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in Rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII, extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. (2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) where the Court is satisfied,- (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) where the plaintiff - (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. (5) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14. In the case of Sarguja Transport Service (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held : "The principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit. Invito beneficial non-datur. The law confers upon a man no right or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abondons or disclaims a right will lose it. Invito beneficial non-datur. The law confers upon a man no right or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abondons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason, the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principles under lying the above rule is founded on public policy but it is not the same as the rule of res-judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code which provides that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The rule of res-judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court." 15. In the present case, the situation is slightly different. The present writ petition was filed when the first writ petition was pending and both the writ petition remained pending for some time before this Court. The record reveals that the application for withdrawal of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 was opposed by the Counsel for the respondents and despite it, the Court passed an order permitting withdrawal of the writ petition as not pressed. The record reveals that the application for withdrawal of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11088 of 1986 was opposed by the Counsel for the respondents and despite it, the Court passed an order permitting withdrawal of the writ petition as not pressed. After getting the aforesaid writ petition dismissed, the petitioner has not filed any fresh writ petition but the present writ petition was already pending at the time when the first writ petition was got dismissed as withdrawn. In this view of the matter, the provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted. In Girdhari Lal Bansal v. Chairman, Bhakra Beas Management Board, Chandigarh and others, reported in AIR 1985 P&H page 219, the Punjab and Haryana High Court took the view as under : "If second suit is filed before the first suit is withdrawn, then Order XXIII Code of Civil Procedure is not attracted and second suit cannot be dismissed under Order XXIII. Rule 1 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 16. The view which I have taken is supported by the aforesaid decision that in the present matter the withdrawal of earlier writ petition will not bar the hearing of the second writ petition which has been filed during the pendency of the first writ petition and which remained pending for considerable time along with earlier writ petition simultaneously. 17. The second objection, for the maintainability of the present writ petition, that the present writ petition is barred by the principles of constructive res-judicata on the ground that the earlier writ petition was got dismissed as withdrawn has also no substance. In the case of Sarguja Transport Service (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has itself held that dismissal of earlier suit as withdrawn will not operate as a bar of the trial of the second suit on the principles of constructive res-juaicata. Sarguja, Transport Service’s case is a direct authority for the proposition that the order dismissing the earlier writ petition as withdrawn will not bar hearing of second writ petition on the principles of constructive res-juidicata. 18. In the case of Sunil Kumar and others (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has taken a view that if a later writ petition was dismissed as not pressed, then the trial of the earlier writ petition will be banned by the principles of res-judicata. 18. In the case of Sunil Kumar and others (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has taken a view that if a later writ petition was dismissed as not pressed, then the trial of the earlier writ petition will be banned by the principles of res-judicata. This case is clearly distinguishable as there for the same cause of action a third writ petition was filed which was get dismissed as not pressed. This Court took a view that since the third writ petition was got dismissed, the principles of constructive res-judicata will be attracted for the trial and hearing of the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner substantially for the same cause of action. In this very decision, the learned single Judge has earlier taken a view that if two writ petitions are simultaneously filed and one of them is withdrawn, then the trial of the other writ petition will not be barred on the principles of Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. or on the principles of constructive res-judicata. In Sunil Kumar's case (supra), this Court has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, reported in AIR 1978 SC page 1283. In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held : "But the technical rule of res-judicata although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. If is not safe to extend to principle of res-judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guesswork." 19. Later on the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same decision held : "Similarly even if one writ petition is dismissed iu limine by a non-speaking one word Order 'dismissed', another writ petition would not be maintainable because even the one word order, as we have indicated above, must necessarily be taken to have decided impliedly that, the case is not a fit one for exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Another writ petition from the same order or decision will not lie." 20. In the present case, the situation is quite different. Another writ petition from the same order or decision will not lie." 20. In the present case, the situation is quite different. The earlier writ petition has not been dismissed either in limine or after hearing the parties. On the other hand the petitioner has been permitted to withdraw the aforesaid writ petition and the said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. It is thus dear that the Court did not decide anything. Neither the Court was invited to decide anything. Both the parties were present. The Counsel for the respondents opposed the withdrawal of the application, even then the Court granted the permission to withdraw the writ petition. This will not amount to dismissal of the writ petition on merits, as such it cannot be said that since the first writ petition was not dismissed as withdrawn, the hearing of second writ petition will be barred by the principles of constructive res-judicata. The second objection raised on behalf of the respondents also deserves to be rejected. 21. The learned Counsel Sri K.M. Dayal has also raised the objection that since the petitioner has not come with clean hands and has changed the stand which it had taken in the first writ petition, the second writ petition should hi dismissed on this ground. Sri Dayal has also submitted that the petitioner filed the second writ petition to avoid to interim order pissed in the first writ petition and manipulated to obtain a second interim order which was a blanket one and which did not impose any condition regarding payment of rent on the petitioner. The petitioner in its second writ petition has clearly stated that the first writ petition filed by it was on wrong instructions, therefore, the petitioner is filing the second writ petition and has been advised to withdraw the first writ petition. On several dates, both the writ petitions were listed together. The respondents opposed the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition but despite it, the Court permitted the withdrawal. Both the writ petitions were before the Court and the time of the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition it was open to the Court to pass a conditional stay order in the present writ petition but the Court did not chose to do so. Both the writ petitions were before the Court and the time of the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition it was open to the Court to pass a conditional stay order in the present writ petition but the Court did not chose to do so. The petitioner had cleanly disclosed in the second writ petition that the first writ petition was pending and as such it cannot be said that the petitioner has approached the Court with unclean hands. I am, however, not expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner's submission that the agreement to execute the lease deed was got executed under inducement. I am not concerned in the present writ petition to examine as to whether the agreement entered into between the parties was executed between the parties on their own free will or under any inducement. The only relevancy of the aforesaid agreement for the purposes of the present writ petition is that the petitioner was inducted in the premises in dispute by the respondent-landlord as lessee without any permission of the Rent Control authorities. The respondents also tried to get the induction of the petitioner in the premises in dispute regularised. 22. The petitioner has challenged the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 23-7-1985 declaring the premises in dispute to be vacant and the order or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 7-4-1986 releasing the premises in dispute in favour of the respondent-landlord. 23. The order, dated 23-7-1985 pissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the premises in dispute to be vacant has been challenged mainly on the ground that the vacancy has been declared without following the mandatory procedure contemplated by Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules framed under the Act. It has also been contended that in view of the law laid down in Ganpat Roy and Others v. Addl. It has also been contended that in view of the law laid down in Ganpat Roy and Others v. Addl. District Magistrate and others, reported in AIR 1985 SC page 1635 : 1985 (2) ARC 73 (SC), the pasting of the report of the Rent Control Inspector directing the vacancy to be notified on the notice board and hearing the objections of the landlord, tenant or occupant before declaring the vacancy is sine quo non for declaring the vacancy and the said procedure was given a go bye in the present matter and as such the order declaring the premises to be vacant was ab initio void and all follow up procedure taken for the release of the premises in dispute in favour of the respondent-landlord should fall on this ground alone. 24. Rule 8 of the Rule framed under the Act provides the mandatory procedure for ascertaining the vacancy. Rule 8 is reproduced below :- "8. Ascertainment of vacancy.- (1) The District Magistrates, shall, before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under Section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, get the same inspected. (2) The inspection of the building, so far possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. The facts mentioned in the report should where ever practicable, be elicited from at least two respectable persons in the locality and the conclusion of the inspection report shall be pasted in the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such pasting, and if in the mean time any objection is received, not before the disposal of such objection. (3) Any objection under sub-rule (2) shall be decided after consideration of any evidence that the objector or any other person concerned may adduce." 25. Section 15 of the Act casts an obligation on the landlord to intimate the vacancy to the District Magistrate on a building falling vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it and also casts an obligation on the tenant to intimate such vacancy on his vacating the building. Section 15 of the Act casts an obligation on the landlord to intimate the vacancy to the District Magistrate on a building falling vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it and also casts an obligation on the tenant to intimate such vacancy on his vacating the building. Section 15 of the Act is reproduced below :- "15. Obligation to intimate vacancy to District Magistrate. - (1) Every landlord, shall on a building falling vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it or by release from requisition or in any other manner whatsoever gives notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate not later than seven days after the occurrence of such vacancy, and such notice may at the option of the landlord be given before the occurrence of the vacancy. (2) Every tenant so vacating a building shall give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate and also to the landlord not less than fifteen days before the vacancy. (3) The notice under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. (4) The District Magistrate, on being satisfied on an application made to him in that behalf that there was sufficient cause for the landlord or the tenant not to give notice under sub-section (1) on sub-section (2) within time, may condone such delay." 26. In the present matter neither the vacancy was ascertained under Rule 8 nor the report of the Rent Control Inspector shows that the building was inspected in accordance with Rule 8 (2) nor any vacancy was notified in accordance with the aforesaid rule. The landlord also did not intimate any such vacancy as required under Section 15 of the Act. On the other hand the report of the Rent Control Inspector was called for on the application moved on behalf of the respondent-landlord for regularising the agreement executed between the petitioner and the respondent-landlord and for regularizing the rent agreed upon between the two. On the other hand the report of the Rent Control Inspector was called for on the application moved on behalf of the respondent-landlord for regularising the agreement executed between the petitioner and the respondent-landlord and for regularizing the rent agreed upon between the two. The Rent Control Inspector in his report dated 28-7-1981 clearly stated that the portion of the premises in dispute which was released in favour of Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh has been let out by Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan Singh in favour of M/s. Cottage Industries Expositions on rent and since the aforesaid letting out is advancing the cause of release made in favour of Maharaja Kumar Anant Narayan favour of M/s. Cottage Industries Expositions (P) Ltd. This report clearly shows that the Rent Control Inspector did not report that the premises in dispute is vacant and is open for allotment. On the other hand, the said report said that the premises in dispute is in possession of the M/s. Cottage Industries Expositions (P) Ltd. and should be allotted in its favour. 27. The above facts clearly reveal that the mandatory provisions of Rule 8 were not followed. On the other hand the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the premises to be vacant on the basis of the concession having been made by one of the applicants for allotment and the landlord. It is clear from Rule 8 and Section 15 that the building can be declared to be vacant only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the aforesaid two provisions. The vacancy cannot be declared by consent of the applicant for allotment and the landlord. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was clearly in error in declaring the premises in dispute to be vacant on the basis of an agreement having reached between one of the applicants for allotment and the landlord. 28. A bare reading of Rule 8 demonstrates that before declaring the premises in dispute to have fallen vacant, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is under an obligation to call for and decide the objections after consideration of evidence produced by the objector or any other person concerned. In the present case, no occasion arose for filing any such objection as the vacancy was never notified on the notice board nor there was any Rent Control Inspector's report notifying that the premises has fallen vacant. In the present case, no occasion arose for filing any such objection as the vacancy was never notified on the notice board nor there was any Rent Control Inspector's report notifying that the premises has fallen vacant. The mandatory requirement of Rule 8 was clearly given a go bye. The landlord also at no point of time intimated any such vacancy nor any such vacancy was notified under Rule 9 of the Rules framed under the Act. 29. Sri K.M. Dayal, learned Counsel for the respondents has mainly contended that the petitioner had full knowledge of the aforesaid proceedings for declaration of vacancy. The petitioner filed his vakalatnama in the application for allotment moved for the premises in dispute and several adjournments were taken on behalf of the petitioner before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The petitioner thereafter absented him from the proceedings, as such the Rent Control and Eviction Officer committed no error in declaring the premises to be vacant on the basis of the consent arrived at between the respondent-landlord and one of the applicants seeking allotment. Sri Dayal relied upon a case, Arun Kumar Solanki v. VIIth Addl. District Judge, Agra and others, reported in 1989 (1) ARC page 523, wherein this Court has held as under:- "It is, therefore, necessary that the District Magistrate ought to apply his mind to the report and come to the conclusion as to whether a particular building is vacant or not, This conclusion must be placed on a notice board for being brought to the notice of the general public to enable them to apply for allotment thereof. It is, therefore, necessary that such a procedure must be followed. In the instant case, admittedly this was not done. The question is whether this lapse will render the entire proceedings illegal? In my view, it will be taking too drastic a view of the matter particularly when the parties were not at all at issue on the question of vacancy. It may be an irregularity or even a serious lapse but despite that it was not likely to cause any prejudice to the parties since it was admitted on all hands that the building was vacant. I hold accordingly." 30. The case is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the parties were not on issue on the question of declaration of vacancy. I hold accordingly." 30. The case is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the parties were not on issue on the question of declaration of vacancy. In the present case, the vacancy was very much in issue. In fact the Rent Control Inspector's report in substance says that the premises is not vacant and is in occupation of the petitioner. The said occupation should be regularised by allotting the premises in favour of the petitioner. The landlord was also seeking regularisation of the agreement executed between the respondent-landlord and the petitioner. In fact there was no issue of the vacancy at all. The issue was for the regularisation of the agreement executed between the respondent-landlord and the petitioner. In the aforesaid proceedings all of a sudden on one day the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the vacancy on the basis that the landlord-respondent and one of the applicants of the allotment are agreeable for declaring such vacancy. The order is clearly in violation of the mandatory requirements of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules framed under the Act and as such is bad in law. The order, dated 23-7-1985 declaring the premises to be vacant is accordingly liable to be quashed. 31. Several other points have been urged on behalf of the petitioner as well as on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner has claimed that the landlord is estopped from getting the premises in dispute to be declared vacant as the petitioner has become a tenant of the premises in dispute and since no application under Section 19 of the Act had been given for evicting the petitioner within three months from the date of unauthorised letting, the said tenancy stands regularised in favour of the petitioner. Since I am taking a view that the premises in dispute has been wrongly declared to be vacant, it is not necessary to examine further contentions raised by the petitioner as well as by the respondents. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer while deciding the question of declaring the vacancy will consider the submission of the parties on its merits. I need not express any opinion on the other submissions made on behalf of the parties. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer while deciding the question of declaring the vacancy will consider the submission of the parties on its merits. I need not express any opinion on the other submissions made on behalf of the parties. In view of the fact that the order declaring the premises in dispute to be vacant is being quashed, the follow up order of releasing the premises in dispute in favour of the respondent-landlord, dated 7-4-1986 is also to fall through, unless the premises is declared to be vacant, the premises cannot be released in favour of the respondent-landlord. The other follow up order, dated 4th June, 1986 directing the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute has also to fall through. 32. The writ petition accordingly succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 23rd July, 1985, 7th April, 1985 and 4th. June, 1935 are quashed. The matter is remanded back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to take appropriate steps in accordance with law on the applications of the allotment moved by Sri Syed Hussain and Sri Farooq Ahmad and others. Parties will bear their own costs.