HASAN, J.—This is an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, (in short, the Act) against an order of the District Judge, Jaipur City passed on 1.11.1980, rejecting the appellants application moved under Section 20 of the Act. (2) Admitted facts are that, the respondent-Railway invited tenders for construction works at Dabla; for the appellant- Company tendered its offer which was accepted by the respondent-Railway and consequently, an agreement bearing No. C & S/EXEN/C/JP/DS/3/ dated the 7.03.1973, was entered into between the appellant and the respondent for the construction of following structures : (i) 8 Units type II Quarters; (ii) 12 Units type I Quarters (since increased to 16); (iii) Approach Road for staff quarters; (iv) External sanitary and drainage arrangements; (v) Three signalling cabins including cabin near K. 220 (long afterwards abandoned on railway account); (iv) ELFs Duty room (long afterwards abandoned on railway account). As admitted by the respondent in reply, the required work was completed by the appellant. (3) It had been averred in the application moved under Section 20 of the Act that the appellant Company sent its draft bill alongwith letter dated the 19.01.1974 to the respondent-Railway, for a sum of Rs. 30827.80 p., only for the scheduled items carried out by the appellant reserving its right of claim for expenses-that were incurred on railway account incidental to the portion of main work abandoned on railway account after efflux of time, besides Rs. 26,000/- odd of the Companys security deposit having been blocked with the Railway. The appellant Company asserted that no correct measurements and assessment of the work duly done by the appellant-Company, which were required for the purpose of making full payments, so also to prepare final bill, have been made by the respondent-Railway despite persistent requests, nor any record thereof had properly been maintained by the respondent Railway, nor any heed was paid to the Companys demand to do so. The appellant-Company, further asserted that on account of lack of proper measurements and assessment of the works duly done by it, it resulted in making payment of an amount far less then what was actually due to the appellant Company, and that being so, it submitted itemwise joint measurements to the Railway authority alongwith bills for payment under its letter dated the 19.01.1974. The appellant-Company then asserted that the Railway authority did not prepare correct final bill based on actual measurements at site and they prepared final bill worth Rs. 11,885.60 p. only, as against draft bill of Rs. 30,827. 40p. for the items worked, without recording complete measurements of the works done. No doubt, the said amount of final bill was accepted by the appellant-Company but, under protest reserving all its rights for further claims and disputes. Thereafter, the appellant Company presented its list of under payments to the railway authority under its letter dated the 11.01.1975, and that apart, followed by its reminders. But , ultimately, the appellant-Company presented its claim to the Chief Engineer (S&C), Western Railway, Bombay through his advocates letter dated the 31.01.1976 but it too was rejected under railway authoritys letter N. WC/401/3/40/1/12 dated the 10.02.1976. Then, the appellant-Company through its Advocate sent a registered notice dated the 23.03.1976, under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, demanding a reference of all the questions in dispute and differences, to the arbitration in accordance with condition of the contract. Such a demand was turned down by the respondent authority for referring the disputes to the arbitration, vide letter dt. the 14.04.1976. Again, the appellant Company persuaded the matter with the respondent for reference of the disputes & differences to the arbitration under clause 63 of the General Conditions of Contract, vide letters dated 5.3.77, 30.8.77, 16.03.1978 and 27.10.1978. Here again, the appellant Company failed in its efforts while the Railway authority communicated the appellant Company under its letter dated the 31.03.1978, that there was no case for reference to arbitration. The last effort was resorted to persuade again the matter of reference to the arbitration, by the appellant-Company but it also resulted in vain under communication dated the 8.01.1979 of the Railway authority. Therefore, finally, the appellant-Company presented its application under Section 20 of the Act before the District Judge, Jaipur City Jaipur. (4) In reply to the application of the appellant-Company, the respondent Railway reiterating its averments made by it in its communication sent to the appellant-Company, contended that the payment of final bill has been made in full and final; that no amount stood due against the Railway nor any dispute remained to be decided nor was any controversy so as to refer the matter to the arbitration. It had also been pleaded in the reply that the application under Section 20 of the Act was time barred. (5). Two issues were framed — (1) Whether the appellant-Company has issued no dues certificate under protest, and if so, what is its effect? (2) Whether the application is within time? (3) What relief? (6) After hearing both the parties, the subordinate court vide its order dated the 1.11.1980 rejected the appellant-Companys application under Section 20 of the Act holding it to be barred by limitation as contained in Art. 137 of the Indian Limitation Act and further holding that the cause of action for filing such an application had arisen on 28.9.1974 when the payment of the said final bill was received by it. Issue No. 1 was decided against the appellant-Company. Hence this appeal. (7) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. (8) First question raised and arose out of the contentions of the parties, is as to the application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to the application or petition filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. At the very outset, I may say that this question now stands concluded vide decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity, Trivandrum vs. T.P. K.K. Amsom & Besom (1) which has been followed in Union of India vs. M/s. .L.K. Ahuja & Co (2). In Union of India vs. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra), their Lordships of the Apex Court placed reliance upon the decision in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. T.P. K.K. Amson (supra), and reiterated that Article 137 would apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court; and that the words any other application under Article 137, cannot be read on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in part I of the third division. Thus, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity, Trivandrum vs. T.P. K.K. Amson (supra) & Union of India Vs. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra), Article 137 would be applicable to an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity, Trivandrum vs. T.P. K.K. Amson (supra) & Union of India Vs. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra), Article 137 would be applicable to an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. (9) In fact, during the course of arguments, on the question of application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, "the Limitation Act) both the parties have tried to intermingle the matter. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the final bill was prepared on 28.9.1974 and the limitation period should be computed from 28.9.1974 and according to him, the claim is entirely time-barred, as it having been applied for arbitration after three years from 28.9.1974. Here, taking the benefit of the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra) and in Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority (3). I adopt that whether the claim to be made in the reference to arbitration is barred or not is a question to be decided by the Arbitrators and not by the Court in are application under S. 20 of the Act, because, in my view, there is a distinction between the claim being barred under the Limitation Act and right to apply under S. 20, as Sec. 20 is only a machinery one for referring the disputes to arbitration by an order of Court. (10). Next question which emerges for consideration is, whether the petition application under Section 20 of Act was filed within limitation under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Period of limitation under the Article is three years from the time right to apply accrues. And, it is settled law that right to apply would accrue when there existed a dispute which can be the subject-matter of a reference. Therefore, cause of action would arise when the claim of one party when it arises, is denied or there is a threat to deny, and only in that event, it becomes a dispute and cause of action arise from that date. In other words, the cause of action to apply under Sec. 20 will arise only when a dispute or difference regarding payment of the claim arises. So, when one party denies the claim of the other then the right to apply under Sec. 20 accrues. In other words, the cause of action to apply under Sec. 20 will arise only when a dispute or difference regarding payment of the claim arises. So, when one party denies the claim of the other then the right to apply under Sec. 20 accrues. (11) In order to sbstantiate his contention as to the commencement of the limitation and as to when right to apply does accrue, Shri U.N. Bhandari vociforcely cited a decision delivered by Calcutta High Court in V.G. Ghawa Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (4), wherein the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity, Trivandrum vs. T.P.K.K. Amsom & Besom (supra) which was followed in Union of India vs. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra), was followed. I have carefully perused the decision cited by Shri Bhandari. Lending support from the said decision cited (supra), and adopting, therefrom also, I am of the considered opinion that a right to apply under Sec. 20 of the Act can be said to accrue only after a demand is made to refer the disputes to arbitration under the arbitration. (12) It is also trite law that in order to be entitled to order of reference under S. 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which the agreement of arbitration applied. In the case at hand, admittedly there was no denial that there was no agreement of arbitration. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and refusal in respect of the same by respondent vide its letter dated the 10.02.1976 in response to the appellants claim cum letter dated the 31.01.1976. Significantly to note here that for the purpose of getting an arbitrator appointed, letter dated 23.03.1976, demanding a reference of all the questions in dispute and differences, to the arbitration in accordance with condition of the contract, was sent through appellants counsel and its reply was sent by the respondent vide letter dated the 14.04.1976 stating therein that the appellant had no case to resort to arbitration for the alleged disputes or differences. And the application under Section 20 of the Act has been filed on February 19, 1979. And the application under Section 20 of the Act has been filed on February 19, 1979. (13) In similar circumstances as are in the case at hand, the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. M/s L.K. Ahuja & Co., (supra) where the High Court had found an arbitration agreement covering the disputes, and existence of differences, and it had held the dispute liable to be referred to arbitration in terms of the agreements entered into between the parties, took into consideration the circumstances therein that for the purpose of getting an arbitrator appointed, a letter dated the 16.04.1976 was sent by the applicant to the addl. Chief Engineer, Allahabad and therefore, cause of action to apply for under S. 20 of the Act arose on April 16, 1976 and in that view of the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was right in holding the claim for reference having been made within three years commencing from April 16, 1976 while the application therein was filed on December 18, 1976. (14) Having been benefitted by the enlightments derived from the aforesaid identical circumstances, I am of the opinion that in the case at hand,the application claiming for reference under Section 20 of the Act was filed within three years commencing from 23.3.1976 when, as stated earlier, the appellant sent letter demanding a reference of all the questions in dispute and differences to the arbitration in accordance with the condition of the contract, and the application was filed on February 19, 1979. (15) In Union of India vs. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co. (supra), also, the Company accepted final bills and gave no claim declaration as has been done in the case at hand, but, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under: — "It is true that on completion of the work, right to get payment would normally arise and it is also true that on settlement of the final bill the right to get further payment gets weakened but the claim subsists and whether it does subsists, is a matter which is arbitrable." In this view of the observation and proposition, quoted ibid, the findings arrived at by the subordinate Judge under issue No. 1 are not sustainable as it crept a legal infirmity. In fact, the subordinate Judge, while dealing with application under Section 28 of the Act should have refrained from expressing opinion on the merits of the dispute. The only thing which had to be seen for a court while considering the application under Section 20 of the Act, was to see whether an alleged dispute between the parties had to be referred for arbitration or not? There was absolutely no justification for the subordinate Judge to have commented as under : — ^^esjs fopkj esa ,DthfcV&6 ij , Vw ch ^^vUMj izksVsLV** fy[kk x;k gS og dksbZ vFkZ ughas j[krk gS vkSj mlls ;g Hkh izdV ugha gksrk fd izkFkhZ dh dksbZ jde foizkFkhZ ds vuqca/k ds laca/k esa ks"k jgh gks vkSj mldk dksbZ fookn i{kdkjksa ds chp esa gksA (16) At the cost of repelition, I may say that in the instant case, there had been an arbitration agreement and the differences existed; there was assertion of claim and refusal of the same. Thus, the dispute was liable to be referred to arbitration in terms of the agreements entered into between the parties, as claimed for by the appellant in application dated the 19.02.1979 having been filed within three years commencing from the 23.03.1976 when the appellant sent a letter to the Railway for the purpose of getting an arbitrator appointed and referring the dispute for arbitration. (17) The subordinate court was in error in dismissing the application under Section 20 of the Act. (18) In the result, this appeal must succeed and is hereby allowed. The judgment dated the 1.11.1980 is set aside. The District Judge, Jaipur City is directed to make an order under Sec. 20 of the Act and give consequential directions in respect of the same. The costs of this appeal would be costs in the arbitration proceedings.