Judgment : Banerjee, J. : This is an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge dated 7th April, 1989 in Civil Rule No. 10875(W) of 1988. By the said order the learned Trial Judge allowed the writ application filed by the respondent/opposite party which was filed challenging the order of dismissal dated 25th March, 1986 and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 8th June, 1986. 2. In the writ application there was a prayer for a direction upon the appellant, Central Bank to make payment of the retiremental benefits payable to the respondents. The writ petitioner/opposite party joined in the service of the appellant Bank in December 1947 and he was promoted to the post of Junior Officer in October 1971 and on 14th May, 1982 he was transferred to Tufangunj as Deputy Chief Manager (Branch Manager of the Central Bank of India, Tufanganj Branch). The Chief Manager of the appellant Bank by the memo dated 29th September, 1984 directed the writ petitioner/opposite party to explain certain irregularities regarding the functions of Tufanganj Branch, with reference to his visit as Tufanganj on September 27, 1984. After receipt of the said memo the writ petitioner/opposite party submitted a reply explaining the facts and circumstances in support of the action taken. Thereafter the writ petitioner/opposite party was transferred as Assistant Branch Manager to Jalpaiguri. While the writ petitioner was posted at Jalpaiguri a memorandum dated 11th June, 1984 was issued by Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager of the appellant Bank who was the Disciplinary Authority at the relevant time. In the said letter dated 11th June, 1985 it was alleged that by the said memo the writ petitioner/opposite party was called upon to explain certain facts of omission and commission committed by him as Branch Manager, Tufanganj. The allegation was that he had incurred Rs. 5,181.90 p. for the year 1984 towards entertainment expenses which was not in conformity with the Bank’s rules an that for such expenses he had not taken confirmation from higher authority. The said Regional Manager issued another memo dated 12th, June, 1985. The writ petitioner duly replied to the said memo by a letter dated 22nd June, 1986. 5,181.90 p. for the year 1984 towards entertainment expenses which was not in conformity with the Bank’s rules an that for such expenses he had not taken confirmation from higher authority. The said Regional Manager issued another memo dated 12th, June, 1985. The writ petitioner duly replied to the said memo by a letter dated 22nd June, 1986. By the letter dated 2nd of July 1985 the writ petitioner/opposite party was informed that the reply given by him was unsatisfactory and in the said letter it was further stated that after receiving the Audit Report another memo indicating some specific irregularity committed by the writ petitioner/opposite party was going to be issued. On or about 3/8th October, 1985 the Regional Manager who issued the memorandum containing Articles of charges against the writ petitioner/opposite party. By the said memo the writ petitioner/opposite party was directed to submit point-wise written explanation in respect of all charges specified in the said memo. The writ petitioner/opposite party was further directed to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken for his misconduct. It was further provided that in case no written reply was submitted disclosing point-wise explanation within seven days of receipt of the said memo matter would be decided ex-parte. The said memorandum dated 3/8th October, 1985 was sent by the Regional Manager who were earlier appointed himself as a Disciplinary Authority and also issued a memo dated 11th June, 1985 and the memo dated 12th February, 1985 and on October 29, 1985 the Regional Manager also wrote to the petitioner informing that he would have to submit his written explanation latest by November 15, 1985 failing which it would be presumed that he had no explanation to Officer. By the letter dated 12th November, 1985 the writ petitioner. prayed for inspection of the records lying at Tufangunj Branch which; were maintained during his tenure as Branch Manager in the said Bank in order to enable him to prepare his reply to the said memorandum. By the letter dated 12th November, 1985 the writ petitioner. prayed for inspection of the records lying at Tufangunj Branch which; were maintained during his tenure as Branch Manager in the said Bank in order to enable him to prepare his reply to the said memorandum. Despite the said prayer for inspection of the records same was not given for inspection and without inspection of the records the writ petitioner had to submit his reply dated 28th November, 1985, While denying the allegations as made against the said articles of charges the writ petitioner stated in the said reply that he had not sanctioned any irregular advances during the period between 1983 and 1984 by misrepresenting facts in sanction proposal and that the advance was made according to the minimum requirement of the borrower for development of Retail Trade Business and it was within the notice of the Central Office, Cooch Behar for which regular proposals were made and that he had submitted pre and post inspection Report prepared in terms of the procedure after obtaining reports from local market about business integrity and good-will of the applicants. Thereafter by an order dated 19th February, 1986 the writ petitioner/opposite party was suspended from service with effect from 19th February, 1986. By the said letter he was informed that it was decided by the Bank to hold departmental enquiry into his conduct. By the said order of suspension it appears that Shri J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager charged the writ petitioner/opposite party by abusing his official position as Branch Manager of the said Branch by making advances in violation of the norms and procedures. A fresh charge-sheet was also served upon the respondent/opposite party containing charges' which were identical to the articles charges framed by the earlier memo dated 3rd August, 1985 issued by the Regional Manager, Mr. J. Bhattacharjee who was the same officer who had issued the memorandum dated 11th June, 1985 as Disciplinary Authority. The second charge-sheet dated 21st February, 1986 was however issued by Mr. K. K. Mukherjee, Deputy General Manager of the Bank. Subsequently by a letter dated 4th of March 1986 the said Mr. K. K. Mukherjee. Deputy General Manager appointed the said Mr. The second charge-sheet dated 21st February, 1986 was however issued by Mr. K. K. Mukherjee, Deputy General Manager of the Bank. Subsequently by a letter dated 4th of March 1986 the said Mr. K. K. Mukherjee. Deputy General Manager appointed the said Mr. J. Bhattacharjee Regional Manager as the Enquiry officer who was the same officer who had signed the first memorandum of charges dated 11th June, 1985 in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority and also issued the charge-sheet dated 3/8th October, 1985. The said Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager had also issued a suspension order in which it was stated that the writ petitioner/opposite party had flouted the norms and procedures of lending policy of the Bank with mala fide intention. Thereafter on 8th of March 1986 a notice was issued to the writ petitioner/opposite party by the said Enquiry Officer which was received by the writ petitioner on 10th March, 1986 stating that the preliminary hearing would be held at the Regional Office at Cooch Behar on 13th of March 1986 at 12.00 noon. At the said meeting the writ petitioner attended and it was decided that the next hearing of the enquiry would be held from the 20th March, 1986 at the Regional office at Cooch Behar. The writ petitioner defence representative Mr. Amitava Bhattacharjee made a written prayer on 13th March, 1986 for extension of time for 15 days in order to prepare his defence on behalf of the writ petitioner which was summarily rejected by the said Shri J. J. Bhattacharjce, Enquiry officer. The writ petitioner by a letter dated 13th March, 1986 addressed to the Disciplinary Authority Shri K. K. Mukherjee challenged the impartiality of Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee, the Enquiry officer and prayed for the appointment of a impartial and independent person as an Enquiry Officer and it was stated that the writ petitioner/opposite party reasonably apprehended that the Disciplinary Authority could not be conducted impartially by the said Enquiry Officer. The said request for changing the Enquiry Officer was also turned down Thereafter the enquiry proceeding commenced from 20th March, 1986 During the course of the enquiry proceedings the writ petitioner's defence representative submitted a list of witnesses whose presence were necessary to prove and establish the innocence of the writ petitioner. The said request was also turned down by a letter dated 22nd March, 1986. The said request was also turned down by a letter dated 22nd March, 1986. Finally by the order dated 25th March, 1986 issued by the Disciplinary Authority which was communicated to him by the memo issued by the Regional Manager. Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee dated 27th March, 1986 the writ petitioner was dismissed from the service. The dismissal order was served upon the writ petitioner only 5 days prior to his retirement from the service of the Bank which was due on 31st March, 1986. The Enquiry Officer held enquiry on 21st and 22nd March, 1986 and on 25th March, 1986 he was dismissed from service on 2nd May, 1986. The writ petitioner/opposite party preferred an appeal and that the said appeal was dismissed by the order dated 8th July, 1986. The said order of dismissal and the said order of the Appellate Authority was the subject matter of challenge before the learned Trial Judge. 3. After considering the rival contention of the parties the learned Trial Judge took up the following questions for consideration: "(a) Whether the bias of the Regional Manager vitiated and invalidated the proceedings ? (b) Whether entire proceedings including the enquiry report, the order of the disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appellate Authority are violative of the said Regulations? (c) Whether the entire disciplinary proceedings and the order of the appellate authority arc wholly illegal on the ground of nonobservance or fairness and violation of the rules of natural justice ? (d) Whether the findings of the Inquiring officer and the Appellate Authority travelled for beyond the charges or in other words, whether the findings of the enquiry officer and the appellate order stood at variance with the charges." 4. The learned Trial Judge on the basis of the materials on record round that there was not only a reasonable apprehension of bias but there was in fact actual bias as enquiry was conducted by a person viz. Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager who had a "capsuled mind". The learned Trial Judge on the basis of the materials on record round that there was not only a reasonable apprehension of bias but there was in fact actual bias as enquiry was conducted by a person viz. Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager who had a "capsuled mind". It was found by the learned Trial Judge that the Enquiring Officer as Regional Manager went on issuing show cause notice charging the writ petitioner for commission of certain acts illegally and the said Regional Manager kept the Disciplinary Authority informed all the progress of the proceedings and that under such circumstances from the materials on record it was found that the said Enquiring Officer prior to his appointment of an Enquiring Officer at prejudge issues. The records that was produced before the Court indicated that the Regional Manager before his appointment as Enquiring Officer made prior utterness and also exposed his pre-judgment of the issues against the writ petitioner/opposite party. It was found by the Court below that the role of the Regional Manager clearly indicated that he had even before his appointment as Enquiring Officer expressed adverse comments and disclosed pre-conceived notion as it would appear from the letter/note 1st August, 1985. Even before the issue of show cause notice an appointment of the, Enquiry Officer he found the writ petitioner was responsible for many irregularities in the advances and thereby acted as a complainant The learned Trial Judge dealt with the principal of bias extensively on the facts of the facts appearing from the records and applying the same on, the basis of principal law laid down by various case laws. 5. The question as to whether the Bank Regulations and in Particular Regulation 6(5), Regulation 6(9). Regulation 6(10) Regulation 6(21)(i) were violated of the principal of natural justice and fair play in conducting the enquiry, the learned Trial Judge have found on the basis of evidence and materials on record that the charges were serious in nature but could not be proved in the proceedings. It was found by the learned trial Judge that the finding of the Enquiring Officer with regard to the alleged guilty was in respect of allegations which were not there in the charge-sheet. It was found by the learned trial Judge that the finding of the Enquiring Officer with regard to the alleged guilty was in respect of allegations which were not there in the charge-sheet. The enquiry proceeding was conducted in a hot hest and the learned Trial Judge found that the finding of the Enquiring Officer were not supported by evidence and that the learned Trial Judge had held that the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was illegal for the reason that the action and proceedings taken is thoroughly misconceived and arbitrary. It was found by the learned Trial Judge that the. Appellate Authority did not apply it's mind to issue raised in the appeal and the appeal of dispose of the appeal in the mechanical manner. In the enquiry proceeding the petitioner/opposite party was denied reasonable opportunity of being heard. The inspection of records and documents were not given and the course of action that was taken had resulted insubstantial failure of justice. It was further held by the learned Trial Judge that the Disciplinary Authority did not apply it's mind to the materials on record. 6. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the memo dated 11th June, 1985 issued by Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee who was subsequently appointed as an Enquiry Officer, was not a charge-sheet but it was in the form of a letter asking for an explanation and as the Enquiry Officer had no occasion to issue charge-sheet earlier as such there could not be any question of bias against the Enquiry Officer. Similarly, the letter dated 3/8th October, 1985 was not in the form of a charge-sheet according to the rules and as such the same cannot be termed as a charge-sheet. It was further submitted that those letters containing explanations were not charges. The last charge sheet was issued by Mr. K.K. Mukherjee which was the real charge sheet. It was further submitted that mere reasonable suspicion of bias was, not enough for invalidating the proceedings. The conduct of 'the Regional' Manager against whom the bias has been alleged was not inhibited by any kind of bias which would operate as disqualification to act as a Enquiring Officer. K.K. Mukherjee which was the real charge sheet. It was further submitted that mere reasonable suspicion of bias was, not enough for invalidating the proceedings. The conduct of 'the Regional' Manager against whom the bias has been alleged was not inhibited by any kind of bias which would operate as disqualification to act as a Enquiring Officer. The mere challenge that the Regional Manager issued certain show cause notices as the superior and/or controlling, officer of the writ petitioner/opposite party would not otherwise render him incompetent to act as Enquiring Officer. It was submitted that on the basis of the facts no charge of bias could be made against the said Enquiring officer. It was further submitted that it is a well settled principal that Disciplinary Authority may also held enquiry and as such there was nothing wrong in asking explanation by the Enquiry Officer before his appointment as Enquiring Officer. It was submitted that the writ petitioner/opposite party failed to being out any material to show that the Enquiring Officer was biased towards him. Merely issuing a notice asking the writ petitioner/opposite party to show cause on the basis on certain allegations and imputation cannot be said to be readily assume but the same be proved by a person alleging the same. On the question of holding, the enquiry in haste it was submitted that the Enquiring Officer as regards the, allegations with regard to the directive given by the Disciplinary authority directed the Enquiring Officer that the enquiry must be completed within two days because of the fact that the writ petitioner/opposite Party was going to retire very shortly. The writ petitioner/opposite party was due to retire after the closing of 31 March, 1986 and if the Disciplinary proceeding was not completed within the said period in that event the entire disciplinary proceeding would have lapsed as, the same could not be held after cessation of master and servant relationship. It was further submitted that from the conduct of the writ petitioner/opposite party it would be evident that he adopted all devices so that the disciplinary authority would not be completed prior to his retirement. It was further submitted that from the conduct of the writ petitioner/opposite party it would be evident that he adopted all devices so that the disciplinary authority would not be completed prior to his retirement. Lastly it was submitted that the departmental authorities are the sole judge of the fact and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which could be examined by the writ Court. It was further submitted that there was legal evidence to show that the charge leveled against the writ petitioner has been proved. It was pointed out that the learned Trial Judge was observed the presenting officer was not witness and no author of the exhibit placed and he was allowed to place all persons and documents without any proof. In this connection it may be mentioned here that it is well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act and the standard proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings. It was next submitted that the writ petitioner/opposite party was given all the opportunities that were required to be given and as such the proceedings could not be stated to have been vitiated on the ground of violation of natural justice. 7. On behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner it was submitted by Mr. Samaraditya Pal, the learned Counsel that the Enquiring Officer Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee, Regional Manager was biased and on such the entire proceeding was vitiated on account of holding of (he said departmental proceeding by the said Enquiring Officer. It was submitted that apart from issuing show cause notice holding the petitioner's guilty of allegation even before initiation of a departmental proceeding. The said Enquiring Officer as a Disciplinary Authority in his confidential memo dated 21st of January 1986 on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Trial Judge. It was stated that the writ petitioner/opposite party also "defrauded loan proceeds in collusion with borrowers and thereby made personal gains as per the circumstantial evidence and anonymous complaints". This according to Mr. Pal clearly indicated dosed and biased bind of the said Enquiring officer inasmuch as there was no charge of collusion and/or making personal gains and no anonymous complaint was disclosed at the enquiry. In this connection Mr. This according to Mr. Pal clearly indicated dosed and biased bind of the said Enquiring officer inasmuch as there was no charge of collusion and/or making personal gains and no anonymous complaint was disclosed at the enquiry. In this connection Mr. Pal had also submitted that from the facts and circumstances of the case it was abandontly clear that the Enquiring Officer was biased. In this connection reference was made in the case of (1). Re Godden reported in (1971) 3 All ER page 20 wherein Lord Denning MR had the occasion to consider a similar circumstance in the case of Chief Medical Officer, Crosbie Brown to put on Chief Inspector Godden on sick leave after forming an opinion that the Chief Inspector is suffering from a mental disorder and that thereafter a Medical Board was constituted in which Dr. Crosbie Brown was also included as Member. In that context, Lord Denning MR observed "that brings me to the first question was it proper for the kept Police authorities to refer for decision this question to Dr. Crosbie Brown? I must say I think it was not. Dr. Crosbie Brown was disqualified from acting. He had already expressed an opinion adverse to Chief Inspector Godden. As early as 23rd July, 1970. Dr. Crosbie Brown had said that the Chief Inspector was suffering from a mental disorder. Dr. Crosbie Grown acted on that opinion by putting him on sick leave. He was put his opinion on affidavit. He has committed himself to a view in advance of the enquiry. I think it would be impossible for Dr. Crosbie Brown who is just a general medical practitioner and not a consultant to bring a completely impartial mind to bear on the minter. In any event, to the person affected by it, Chief Inspector Godden, it must inevitably appear that Dr. Crosbie Brown cannot bring in impartial judgment to bear on the matter. If he was to decide the matter, justice would not be seen to be done. In view of the additional material before us (which was not before the Divisional Court) I hold that Dr. Crosbie Brown is disqualified." 8. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of S. Parthasarathi v. State of A. P. reported in AIR SC 2701. In view of the additional material before us (which was not before the Divisional Court) I hold that Dr. Crosbie Brown is disqualified." 8. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of S. Parthasarathi v. State of A. P. reported in AIR SC 2701. This decision is an authority on the question of allegation of bias against the Enquiring Officer and it was held following after considering an English series decision on those point that the real likelihood bias was the proper test and that a real livelihood of bias had to be nude to appear not only from the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining but from such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course of his inquiries. It was held that "the Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias of the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry, nevertheless there must be real likelihood of bias surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring Officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision." 9. In this case reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) State of U. P. v. Md. Mooh reported in AIR 1953 SC 86 where it was made clear that if an Enquiring Officer adopts a procedure which is contrary to the rule of the natural justice, the ultimate decision on report of enquiry is liable to be quashed. 10. Reference was also placed to the decision of King's Bench in the case of the (3) Kind v. Sussex. Justices reported in (1924) K.B. 256 these of all Court decision where the principal that justice missing only to be done but same to be done. 10. Reference was also placed to the decision of King's Bench in the case of the (3) Kind v. Sussex. Justices reported in (1924) K.B. 256 these of all Court decision where the principal that justice missing only to be done but same to be done. This was a case "arising out of a collision between a motor vehicle belonging to the applicant and one belonging to W., a summons was taken out by the police against the applicant for having driven his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public. At the hearing of the summons the acting clerk to the justices was a member of the firm of solicitors who were acting for W., in a claim for damages against the applicant for injurises received in the collision. At the conclusion of the evidence the justice retired to consider their decision, the acting clerk retiring with them in case they should to be advised on any point of law. The justices convicted the applicant, and it was stated on affidavit that they came to that conclusion without consulting the acting clerk, who in fact abstained from referring to the case". 11. Accordingly, it was held by Lord Hewart, C.J. that because of the presence of the acting clerk when the justices retired to consider their decision that "while that is so, a long line of ceses shows that it is not merely of some importance hut is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be, done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism which he might not properly have made or offered the question is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspect as to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal mutter. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done but upon that might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. 12. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done but upon that might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. 12. In our view if the Enquiring Officer before he was appointed as an Enquiring Officer had occasion to collect materials and forwarded the same to the Higher Authority and on the basis of the materials so collected the formed an adverse opinion about the delinquent officer that the delinquent had defrauded loan proceed with the borrowers and thereby made personal gains as per the Circumstantial evidence and anonymous complaints. In that event it is cristal clear that the Enquiring Officer had occasioned to collect and consider the evidence at pre-enquiry stage, and he had formed an, unalterably closed mind and that in the instant case the delinquent on the very beginning objected to the appointment of the sail Enquiring Officer on the ground of biased but the appellant rejected the same. Under such circumstances we agree with the view expressed by the learned Trial Judge that the Enquiring Officer was biased and was disqualified and applying their decision on which the learned Trial judge had relied on by us. We have no other option but to hold that the Enquiring Officer with the enquiry report has been vitiated because of the bias of the Enquiring Officer. 13. Apart from the above facts the learned Trial Judge was also referred to the memo of the Regional Manager, Shri J.J. Bhattacharjee to Central Office, Bombay dated 1st August, 1985 in which Shri Bhattacharjee who was the enquiring officer informed the head office before the charges were framed that writ petitioner/opposite party was to be responsible for many gross irregularities in advances by the undersigned during his Branch visit in the last year and that his explanation have not been found satisfactory…….." By another memo dated 8th October, 1985 the said Regional Manager observed that in respect of serious acts of omission and commissions committed by Mr. S. M. Kushari while working as Branch Manager of our Tufanganj Branch......" These materials along with other materials clearly established beyond all reasonable doubt to the Enquiring officer had a unalterably closed mind from the very beginning and it was not possible an the part of the said Enquiring Officer to bring an impertial judgment to bear in the matter and justice would not be same to be done if enquiry to be allowed to be conducted and continued and completed by such an Enquiring Officer who had on the very beginning closed and biased mind. 14. It was not a case that there was a mere case of likelihood of bias but the fact disclosed that the Enquiring Officer was actually biased but far the purpose of disqualification if it is found that there is real likelihood of bias and not actual bias. With regard to the question of violation of the Bank Regulations concerned the learned Trial Judge has dealt with the matter extensively :- "Regulation 6(3) provides that after communication of charges the employees should be required to submit his written statement of defence within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority (not exceeding 15 days) or within such extended time as may be granted by such authority. 15. The learned Judge has referred to the, specific dated in relation to the conduct of the proceedings. It appears that the petitioner received the charge sheet on 6th March, 1986. At 3-20 P.M. on 10th March, 1986 the petitioner received notice directing him to appear before the enquiry Officer on 10th March, 1986 far preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing on 20th March, 1986 was representative of the petitioner informed the Enquiry Officer that he had not received copies of the documents. The Enquiry was concluded an 22nd March, 1986, the petitioner's defence representative made a written prayer far extension of time for 15 days in other to prepare his defence. This was summarily rejected and turned down. The learned Judge has held that in the facts and Circumstances there has been violation of Regulation 6(3) and Regulation 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulations. 16. The learned Judge has also found clear violation of Regulation 6(21). Regulation 6(21) provides how the Enquiry Report is to be prepared arid what it should contain. 17. The learned Judge has held that in the facts and Circumstances there has been violation of Regulation 6(3) and Regulation 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulations. 16. The learned Judge has also found clear violation of Regulation 6(21). Regulation 6(21) provides how the Enquiry Report is to be prepared arid what it should contain. 17. The learned Judge has found that the Enquiry Report did not at all comply with the requirement of Regulation 6(21) (1) inasmuch as : "a) he did not discuss and assess the evidence. b) he did not give the reasons for the findings. 18. As it is a clear case of contravention of the Regulations concerned which are not merely technical violation but has resulted in substantial failure of justice. Admittedly the Enquiring Officer did not comply with the requirement of the Regulation 6(21) (i) and as such the enquiry proceedings was vitiated. 19. The learned Judge also found that the writ petitioner had been found guilty of offence with which he was not charged, namely loss to the extent of Rs. 1,35,000/-. 20. The learned Judge also found that the Enquiry Officer treated the show cause Memos dated 12th June, 1985, 2nd July, 1982, 3/8th October, 1985. Appendix II to the charge-sheet dated 21st February, 1986 as well as financial and audit report as evidence without any basis whatsoever. Particularly in relation to the Balance sheet financial report and audit report the learned Judge found that the author of these reports was not called as witness and nobody gave evidence to substantiate the contents thereof. 21. The learned Judge found that the order of Disciplinary Authority was vitiated by reason of the fact that the Enquiry Report itself suffered from the above lacunae and as such the Disciplinary Authority did not have proper materials before it to consider the question of punishment. The Regulations provide that the Disciplinary Authority must have regard to the findings and make finding on the basis of the records of the enquiry. In the very nature of things arising in the facts and circumstances of the case the Disciplinary Authority could not have considered and in fact, did not consider the relevant materials and as such the order of punishment was totally illegal and void. 22. In the very nature of things arising in the facts and circumstances of the case the Disciplinary Authority could not have considered and in fact, did not consider the relevant materials and as such the order of punishment was totally illegal and void. 22. As far as the Appellate Authority is concerned the learned Judge referred to Rule 17(ii) of the Regulations which provided that the Appellate Authority was to consider whether the findings were justified, whether penalty was excessive and/or inadequate and thereafter to pass appropriate orders. 23. The learned Judge held that the Disciplinary Authority should consider and "pass appropriate order" - there are enough indication of the intention of the said. Regulation that the Authority must give reasons. The Appellate Authority failed to do so. 24. The learned Trial Judge have also held that in arriving at the conclusion that the writ petitioner/opposite party was guilty of causing loss to the bank. The Enquiring officer as well as the, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had made a jurisdictional error inasmuch as there was no charge in this regard and in this case the authorities had travelled beyond the charge and found the petitioner guilty of some allegations' in respect of which no charge was framed. The proceeding was concluded in hot haste presumably bears of the ground that the petitioner/opposite party was going to retire within a very few days and in our view, shortness of time could not authorise the authority concerned to dispense with the requirements of the statutory rules and the principal of natural justice. Accordingly, the appeal fails. In this case within a day or two from the date of passing of the order of dismissal the writ petitioner/opposite party had attained the age of superannuation and as such that there was no question of any reinstatement because the appellant had already retired. Now the only question that was left was to restore the retirement benefits. The question is whether three days before retirement from service the authority concerned could have adopt such a proceeding just on the verge of retirement. We may add that the modern welfare state believes it to be for people's own good that they should not be exposed to any risk of being overreached. The question is whether three days before retirement from service the authority concerned could have adopt such a proceeding just on the verge of retirement. We may add that the modern welfare state believes it to be for people's own good that they should not be exposed to any risk of being overreached. Thus in (4) Guardians of Salford Union v. Dewhurst (1926) AC 619 the House of Lords held that an employer could not contract out of a statutory duty to pay a pension. The reason was expressed by Pollock M R (P 664) in some what quaint language - ".........the public should be safeguard from the melancholy spectacle of seeing a man who had done work and been in a responsible position during years of his life, suffering from poverty and distress by reason of the fact that no adequate provision had been made to enable him to spend his latter years in reasonable comfort." and at the very beginning of the hearing of the appeal we requested the parties to give a particulars about the retirement benefits which the respondent/writ petitioner could get in case disciplinary proceeding was not started and what was the dues of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant had granted some House Building Loan, Daughter's marriage loan as also certain loans from Provident Fund. The appellant submitted before us the following particulars :- 1. Provident Fund : (a) Employees Contribution Rs. 50,202.00 (b) Employers Contribution including VPF and CDS Rs. 55,005.80 2. Gratuity Rs. 55,575.00 3. Leave Encashment due, Rs. 20,000.00 4. Difference in salary for suspension period. Rs. 3,900.00 Rs. 1,84,762.80 Less : P. F. A/C (own contribution) Rs. 55,085.80 Rs. 1,29,677.00 Less : Loan : i) House Building Loan Rs. 48,620.01 ii) Daughter's Marriage Loan Rs, 17,676.78 iii) Provident Fund. Rs. 3,517.65 (-) Rs.69,814 44 Rs. 59,862.56 and that in terms of the said statement of account, the writ petitioner/opposite party would get a sum of Rs. 59,862.56 p. from the appellant if no proceeding was initiated and/or if the appeal fails. We tried to settle the dispute initially by adjustment of accounts and in this case a sum of Rs. 3,517.65 (-) Rs.69,814 44 Rs. 59,862.56 and that in terms of the said statement of account, the writ petitioner/opposite party would get a sum of Rs. 59,862.56 p. from the appellant if no proceeding was initiated and/or if the appeal fails. We tried to settle the dispute initially by adjustment of accounts and in this case a sum of Rs. 59,862.56 p. was due and payable to the writ petitioner/opposite party and if the appeal was allowed to be prosecuted that would expenditure of money much more what have been payable to the employee concern but the appellant stated that they want to press the appeal on merit and that was the reason. We heard the appeal and gave our decision on the merit. But it would have been better if the matter has settled at the very beginning and accordingly we direct the appellant to pay the said sum of Rs. 59,862.56 p. with interest @ 12% from the date of his attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 31st, March, 1986 by the end of February 1993. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the above direction. Bhattacharjee, J. : I agree.