Manikuntala Sarkar v. Asiatic Society — 1992 DIGILAW 403 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 7.1.1992 passed by the learned Judge dismissing the writ application. The appellate/petitioner filed a writ application challenging the Office Order No. 60 dated 29.7.1991 passed by Smt. Supriya Acharyya, Administrator of Asiatic Society whereby the appellant/petitioner was relieved from discharging the functions of public Relations Officer and that she was directed to carry on her duties as Assistant Public Relations Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600/-. 2. The case of the appellant/petitioner is that the appellant/petitioner was initially appointed as Receptionist-Cum-Telephone Operator in the Asiatic Society in the year 1981 in the pay scale of Rs. 500-1100/- and that in the year 1985 she was appointed as Assistant Public Relations Officer in the scale of pay of Rs. 425-800/- and the said pay was revised and from April 1985 she was drawing the salary in the scale of pay of Rs. 1400-2600/-. 3. The Asiatic Society was founded on 15.1.1984 as an Institution in Calcutta and it is the oldest institution in this part of this country. In the year 1984 the Central Government passed an Act known as Asiatic Society Act of 1984 to declare the said Institution to be an Institution of national importance and to provide for a Society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. The election of the office bearer of the Council of Asiatic Society held on 4.5.1987 was set aside by the then President of the Society and that challenging the validity of the said action a writ petition was filed and ultimately the writ petition succeeded and against that an appeal was taken out. When the appeal was taken out, the Division Bench of this Court, on an application filed by the Central Government, by an order dated 5.5.1988 appointed Dr. Asim Dasgupta, Director of National Library as an Administrator of the said Society and he was directed to perform all the functions of the Council and the office bearers of the Society including the President, Secretary, Treasurer or any other office bearers of the Society. The power and duties of all of them were directed to be solely and exclusively exercised by the Administrator. The power and duties of all of them were directed to be solely and exclusively exercised by the Administrator. In the said order it was further provided that "It is made clear that no other person shall interfere with the working of the management of the affairs of the Society and no other person shall exercise any power whatsoever in connection with the Society except to the extent as may be by any order this court." 4. Thereafter the said Administrator was directed to be assisted by a Special Officer Sri Sankar Mitra, an advocate of this Court. By another order dated 8.6.1988 the Division Bench formed an Advisory Committee to enable the administrator to seek advice in connection with the administrative and academic matters of the Society except certain matters. On 29.8.1989 the Division Bench of this Court passed an order in connection with the report of the Special Officer dated 28.8.1989 seeking direction in connection with circular and memorandum issued by the Government of India in relation to the action to be taken of 'Bharat Bandh' and in that connection the Division Bench directed the Administrator and the Special Officer to ignore the said circular on the ground that the Asiatic Society was neither a Ministry nor a Department of the Government of India nor an attached office of any such Ministry or Department and accordingly the said direction of the Central Government was not binding upon the Asiatic Society. Ultimately, the Division Bench of this court appointed Smt. Supriya Acharyya in place and stead of Dr. Asim Dasgupta as Administrator. 5. The Central Government set up a works study team and that the said works study team appointed by the Central Government submitted a report with regard to the staff pattern of the said society. It is not necessary to go into the details of the said report on the works management study of the Asiatic Society. The said report of the works management study of the Asiatic Society made various recommendations. But the recommendation relevant for the purpose of appeal is the public relation unit. After considering the sanctioned strength of the public relation unit and the works load, the said Committee made the following observation: – "It is recommended that this unit be taken out of the Administration Division and attached with the Office of the Director/Administrator. But the recommendation relevant for the purpose of appeal is the public relation unit. After considering the sanctioned strength of the public relation unit and the works load, the said Committee made the following observation: – "It is recommended that this unit be taken out of the Administration Division and attached with the Office of the Director/Administrator. We also consider it appropriate that the A.P.R.O. is given a scale of pay of Rs. 2000-3500 and designated as P.R.O." 6. Accordingly, the sanctioned post of Assistant Public Relations Officer was abolished and the said post was upgraded and designated as Public Relations Officer with the pay scale of Rs. 2000-3500/-. Similar other recommendations were made in respect of various other posts. Some posts were abolished and some posts were upgraded and designated. On 5.9.1990 the said works study Team report was placed before the Division Bench of this court and the Division Bench of this Court directed to convene the meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Asiatic Society appointed by this court to ascertain the views of the members of the Works Study Team and the Advisory Committee of Asiatic Society including the Administrator Smt. Supriya Acharyya passed a resolution on 8.9.1990 accepting the recommendation of the works study team including the recommendation of the Joint Administrators and ultimately on 11.9.1990 the Division Bench of this court approved and accepted the Works Study report in terms of the resolution of the Advisory Committee of which Supriya Acharyya is one of the member and directed its implementation with effect from 1.9.1990. On 23.8.1990 Sri L.S. Narayanan, Joint Secretary and Financial Adviser, Ministry of Human Resource Development Department of Culture, Government of India addressed a letter to Sri A.C. Kar, Joint Administrator (Acting), Asiatic Society in which it was stated that the report finally revised was sent for necessary action and in the said letter it was stated please let us know the action taken by you on the report in due course. 7. After the order was passed by the Division Bench of this court on 14.9.1990, an office Order No. 75 was issued redesignating the post of Assistant Public Relation officer as Public Relation Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-3500/- and Accordingly, the appellant-petitioner assumed the charge of the post of Public Relations Officer. 7. After the order was passed by the Division Bench of this court on 14.9.1990, an office Order No. 75 was issued redesignating the post of Assistant Public Relation officer as Public Relation Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-3500/- and Accordingly, the appellant-petitioner assumed the charge of the post of Public Relations Officer. After lapse of about 11 months by the impugned officer Order No. 60 dated 29.7.1991 Supriya Acharyya, Administrator passed the following order: – "Smt. Manikuntala Sarkar is hereby relieved from discharging the functions of the Public Relations Officer. She is, however, directed to carry on her duties as the Assistant Public Relations Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600/- until further orders." 8. Mr. Samaraditya Pal, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that in the instant case on the basis of the Work Study Team's report the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer was abolished and the said post was upgraded and that after the said report was accepted by the Advisory Committee of which Smt. Acharyya was a party and was present and that thereafter the Division Bench of the High Court accepted and directed the implementation of the said report and thereafter the Government of India forwarded the report for implementing the same and that the appellant who was originally holding the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer was appointed in the said upgraded post of Public Relation Officer. After the appointment of the appellant in the post of Public Relation Officer the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer stood abolished pursuant to the Work Study Team Report in this behalf which was accepted and implemented by all concerned. It was submitted that after the appellant was placed in the said upgraded post of Public Relation Officer, the appellant could not be removed from the said post on any ground whatsoever. It was further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the respondent no. 2 have no authority and/or jurisdiction to pass the impugned order removing the appellant from the post of Public Relation Officer and directed her to move to the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer which was abolished altogether. In this connection Mr. It was further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the respondent no. 2 have no authority and/or jurisdiction to pass the impugned order removing the appellant from the post of Public Relation Officer and directed her to move to the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer which was abolished altogether. In this connection Mr. Pal have also submitted that some other posts were also upgraded and the incumbent concerned in the post which was upgraded was also posted in the upgraded post but this person had not been brought in the said upgraded post. But in the case of the appellant a peculiar stand was taken by the respondent no. 2 Mr. Pal relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway vs. L.M. Kashri, AIR 1974 SC 1889 , wherein in the Supreme Court have held that even in case where as wrong pay scale have been given, before cancellation of the said order a hearing must be given to the persons likely to be affected. Mr. Pal further submitted that when the Division Bench of this Court appointed the respondent no. 2 to act as an Administrator of the said Society and when the Society was being run by appointing an Administrator in that event the said Administrator could not act in a manner which is contrary to and/or inconsistent with the orders passed by the Division Bench and in any event before taking such action it was incumbent on the part of the said respondent no. 2 the Administrator to obtain leave from this Court. Mr. Pal further submitted that the Administrator cannot take a stand that the Division Bench of this Court had passed orders illegally and that the order passed by this Court were void on any ground whatsoever. Mr. Pal further submitted that the Financial Advisory Committee was not and could not be in existence when there was no existence of the Council of the said Society and when the said Society was being run or administered through an Administrator appointed by this Court. Mr. Pal further submitted that in any event the order passed by this court cannot be said to be invalid as the same has not been approved by the Financial Advisory Committee of the said Society. Mr. Mr. Pal further submitted that in any event the order passed by this court cannot be said to be invalid as the same has not been approved by the Financial Advisory Committee of the said Society. Mr. Pal further submitted that it was not a creation or upgraded the post not by this court or by the Administrator but because of the report of the Work Study Team appointed by the Central Government and when the Central Government have directed implementation of the said recommendation and when the said recommendation was implemented, it could not be alleged that the implementation of the said report was illegal as the sanction of the Central Government was not obtained before creation of some post consigning some financial implication. 9. Affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent no. 2, Smt. Supriya Acharyya have stated that she had cancelled an erroneous order on the ground; Firstly, because the work study Team did not recommend creation of the post of Public Relation Officer, upgrading the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer. Secondly, it was submitted that the appellant was given promotion by creating a Post which was not sanctioned by the work Study Team and not approved by the Central Government and no financial burden could be assumed by the Asiatic Society without the approval of the Financial Sub-Committee and sanction of the Central Government. Thirdly, the appointment of the appellant as Public Relation Officer was made ignoring the seniority list or in other words it was her case that before such appointment in the Post of P.R.O., all persons senior to the petitioner should have been considered. It was further submitted that as in the meeting of the Advisory Committee the Financial Adviser of the Government of India, Department of Culture was not present in that meeting and as such acceptance of the report by the Advisory Committee was itself invalid. It was also alleged that the appellant bad manipulated the affairs of the society to her advantage in the matter of such appointment and that certain complaints were received from certain employees of the Society as background of passing the impugned order. It was also alleged that the appellant bad manipulated the affairs of the society to her advantage in the matter of such appointment and that certain complaints were received from certain employees of the Society as background of passing the impugned order. It was further alleged that she had taken this action as she has been directed by the Advisory Committee to enquire into the matter and to take action and under such circumstances it was submitted that there was no question of giving any hearing to the appellant in view of the fact that she had no right to the post of Public Relation Officer. 10. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Asiatic Society had submitted that the Central Government sanction all moneys for the purpose of running of the said Society in view of the provision of Section 4 of the Asiatic Society Act, 1984 and relied upon provision of Article 112 of the Constitution of India and relying upon Article 112 of the Constitution of India it was submitted that when the Central Government make estimates of the expenditure of the Asiatic Society of India and when such an expenditure is passed by the Parliament, in that event no post could be upgraded having any some financial burden which is incompatible with such estimates and expenditure made and sanctioned in accordance with Article 112 if the Constitution or in other words it was sought to be submitted that when all the expenditures of the society are borne by the Union of India it is being provided in an appropriation of bill and that after appropriation bill is passed according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury such an expenditure is being made form the consolidated fund of India and as such no other authority except the Central Government can take a decision which relates the expenditure of the Society beyond what is provided in the appropriation bill. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submitted that neither the Division Bench of this Court nor the Administrator nor the Advisory Committee of the Society cannot have any power to take decision for any expenditure in excess of what provided in such appropriation bill. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submitted that in this background upgradation of the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer and the creation of post of Public Relation Officer was void as violative of the constitutional mandate. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submitted that in this background upgradation of the post of Assistant Public Relation Officer and the creation of post of Public Relation Officer was void as violative of the constitutional mandate. Secondly, it was submitted that when something is void and illegal there is no question of giving any opportunity of being heard the principal of natural justice according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury will come into play when concerned if somebody has acquired in the benefit illegally and wrongfully, the authority has got it power to set right the wrong and in such a case principal of natural justice cannot have any application. Next is was submitted by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that no financial expenditure by creating or upgrading post could be made by the Society without the approval of the Financial Advisory Committee which is Constituted under regulation 4(a) of the Asiatic Society Regulation. It was submitted irrespective of the fact whether the Council is there or not and irrespective of the fact whether this court is administering the Society through Administrator or not, the Financial Sub-Committee is a permanent Committee and that Committee exists and without the approval of the said Sub-Committee no expenditure could be lawfully made by the Society or the Administrator without the approval of the said Financial Sub-Committee, and that anything done relating to an expenditure of the said Society without the approval of the said Financial Sub-Committee was void. 11. In support of the contention that the appellant had no legal right Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Nand Kishore, AIR 1977 SC 1267, where the person was appointed in substantive capacity in the temporary post and when the temporary post was made permanent, it was held that the appointee does not become permanent. Mr. Roy Chowdhury in support of the contention that the principle of natural justice is not required to be observed, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Junior Doctor's Action Commission vs. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwari, 1990(4) SCC 633 , wherein certain students by practicing fraud and on the basis of a fake order of the High Court obtained admission which was ultimately the same were cancelled on detection that on the basis of the fake order or the court fraud had been practices. B. Sheetal Nandwari, 1990(4) SCC 633 , wherein certain students by practicing fraud and on the basis of a fake order of the High Court obtained admission which was ultimately the same were cancelled on detection that on the basis of the fake order or the court fraud had been practices. Under such circumstance it was held that student who by practicing fraud on the basis of a fake order, obtained admission, they were not required to be heard before cancellation of admission. Reliance was also placed to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 962 , wherein it was held that the promotion given without considering the case of other eligible candidate, was illegal. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma vs. Chancellor, Nagpur University, 1990(4) SCC 58. In that case because of the change of the position of law consequent upon a decision of the Supreme Court, certain actions were rendered illegal and in that circumstance, it was held that when there is a change in the position of law and not on account of demerits or misdemeanor of individual cause, natural justice would not apply. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submitted that in the instant case, the impugned order was validly passed in view of the fact that the office order no. 75 was void, illegal and inoperative on the ground that the said post was not sanctioned. The approval of the standing finance committee was not obtained. The Division Bench of this Court directed the implementation of the order but did not direct creation of the post and the post cannot be created entailing financial burden without the approval of the standing finance committee as well as the approval of the Central Government, or in other words, it was sought to be submitted that the approval of the Central Government is necessary in view of the Asiatic Society Act of 1984 under which the Central Government makes payment of the entire expenditure of the Asiatic Society and as such post has not been validly created and consequently the Administrator has correctly passed the impugned order. 12. 12. The Asiatic Society is registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act and the object of the Society is to organize, initiate and promote researches in humanities and sciences in Asia, so that in the words of Sit William Jones, the founder of the Society the bounds of its investigations will be the geographical limits of Asia and within these limits its queries will be entended to whatever is performed by man or produced by nature. The object of the Society read with the provisions of the Asiatic Society Act, 1984 made it abundantly clear that the Society being an Institution of national importance, is discharging public duties and there is no difficulty in holding that writ lies against the Asiatic Society. Section 4 of the Asiatic Society Act, 1984 provides for the purpose of enabling the Society to discharge efficiently its functions, including in particular those relating to research, literary, library, scientific and musicological activities, collection of manuscripts, coin and art objects and the publication of periodicals, books and other literature, the Central Government may, after due appropriation made by parliament by law in this behalf, pay to the society in each financial year such sums of money as the Government considers necessary by way of grants, loans or otherwise. 13. Section 7 of the said Act provides prior approval of the Central Government necessary for certain action by Society. The Society shall not, except with previous approval of the Central Government: – (a) After, extend or abridge any of the purpose for which it has been established or for which it is being used immediately before the commencement of this Act or amalgamate itself either wholly or partially with any other institution or society. (b) Alter or amend in any manner the memorandum or regulations. (c) Sell or otherwise dispose of any property acquired by the Society with money specifically provided for such acquisition by the Central Government, provided that no such approval shall be necessary in the case of any such movable property or class of movable property as may be specified by the Central Government in this behalf by general or special order. (d) Be dissolved. (d) Be dissolved. Section 13 of the said act provides power of Central Government to assume functions of control – (1) If, in the opinion of the Central Government: – (i) The Society without just or reasonable cause has made default in giving effect to any direction issued under sub-section (6) of section 10 or section 12. (ii) The Council of the Society has exceeded or abused the powers in relation to the Society or any part thereof, the Central Government may, by written order, direct the Society within a period to be specified in the order to show cause to the satisfaction of the Central Government against the making of any appointment referred to in sub-section (2). 14. From the aforesaid provisions it does not appear to us that in respect of creation of post any prior sanction of the Central Government was necessary. In this connection, it may be pointed out that in some cases where by the letter dated 3.5.1988 the Deputy Financial Advisor, Government of India, Ministry Resources Development, Department of Education took exception in granting UGC scale of pay is respect of Assistant Librarians who are not qualified. From this it is evident as a matter of fact that the Central Government had not taken any exception to the upgradation of the appellant/petitioner to the post of Public Relations Officer. In the instant case, the said committee was appointed by Central Government and it is on the basis of the recommendation of the Central Government, the Division Bench of this Court directed the matter to be considered by the Advisory Committee of the Asiatic Society and after the Advisory Committee approved the said report, the Division Bench directed the same to the implemented with effect from the particular date. In the meantime the Central Government also forwarded a copy of the said report to the Society with a clear direction to implement the same and to inform the Central Government about the action taken on the basis of the said report. This in our view clearly shows that the upgradation of the appellant from the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer to the Public Relations Officer was made on the basis of the recommendation and order of the Central Government which was directed to be implemented by the Division Bench of this Court. This in our view clearly shows that the upgradation of the appellant from the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer to the Public Relations Officer was made on the basis of the recommendation and order of the Central Government which was directed to be implemented by the Division Bench of this Court. The argument that was sought to be made that in view of the provisions of Regulation 4A of the said Society, the Council cannot take such a decision in the absence of recommendation made by the Standing Finance Committee cannot be accepted. The Standing Finance Committee under the rules were required to be formed by some of the of the members of the Council and that when there was no Council in the eye of law and when the affairs of the Society were managed by this Court by appointing an administrator, and when the administrator was directed to discharge all the powers and functions of the said Society and when the Division Bench of this Court directed that no other authority shall discharge any power and function, in that event, in our view, it cannot be said that Standing Finance Committee which could be in existence in law, was required to give permission before implementing the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court and/or before implementing the order of the Central Government in this behalf. We are of the view that it is a case of implementation of the said committee's report on the basis of the recommendation and direction of the Central Government and pursuant to the order of the Division Bench of this Court, when the appellant was upgraded to the post of Public Relations Officer in terms of office order no. 75 which was not open to the administrator to characterize the said upgradation as illegal, invalid, void and abinitia. After all, the administrator was appointed by this court and that the administrator was a party to the decision for implementing the said committee's report and that it was not open to the administrator to cancel the follow up action taken in terms of order passed by this court. After all the Administrator was discharging powers and functions entrusted by this court and that the order passed by this court was binding upon the Administrator. In any event, the Administrator acted illegally and without jurisdiction in revoking office order no. After all the Administrator was discharging powers and functions entrusted by this court and that the order passed by this court was binding upon the Administrator. In any event, the Administrator acted illegally and without jurisdiction in revoking office order no. 75 and reverting, the appellant to the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer, the post which was abolished by the said committee. We are of the view that since it is a question of upgradation of post, the question of consideration of any other person on the basis of the alleged seniority list did not and could not arise at all. The Work Study report made it abundantly clear that they were not creating a new post but upgradation to the post of public Relations Officer. We are surprised to know the stand taken by the Administrator through the affidavit-in-opposition and which is highlighted by Mr. N.C. Roy Chowdhury that the appointment of the appellant to the post of Public Relations Officer was illegal as other persons were not considered before such appointment. Such a stand is preposterous. The case cited by Mr. Roy Chowdhury does not apply to the facts and circumstance of the case. It is not a case where the office order no. 75 was passed in violation of the provisions of law of that the appellant has practiced fraud and/or by practicing fraud the appellant obtained such appointment. The appellant has no hand in the matter and it is not understood how it could be said that the appellant had practiced a fraud. It further appears to us that the action taken by the Administrator by passing the impugned order was on the face of it illegal, arbitratory and in violation of the principle of natural justice. The validity of the order publicly made had to be sustained on the fact appearing in the order. No reason was given why the Administrator thought it fit that the office order no. 75 was void and illegal. The reason disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition clearly indicates that the Administrator has taken into consideration in the matter which are all extraneous. The attempt of the Administrator to sustain her action in revoking the office order no. 75 was not passed bona fide. 75 was void and illegal. The reason disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition clearly indicates that the Administrator has taken into consideration in the matter which are all extraneous. The attempt of the Administrator to sustain her action in revoking the office order no. 75 was not passed bona fide. We are of the view that the Administrator acted illegally in taking such action without the knowledge or the approval of the Division Bench of this Court under whose order the said report was directed to be implemented. There was no financial advisory committee and as such the plea of the Administrator that as there was no approval by the Standing Finance Committee, the order was void, cannot be accepted. After all the Administrator is not at competent to decide that the order passed by this court was void and illegal. It is firmly established principle that even if an order is void, the same has to be set aside by any proceeding and in this connection reference may be made to well-known passage to Lord Radcliffe in the case of Smith vs. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1956) AC 736, that "An order, even if not make in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceeding are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as affective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders." This observation of Lord Radcliffe was following by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1991 SC 2219. Accordingly, merely saying that the order is void, did not confer power upon the Administrator to set aside the office order no. 75 and to revert the appellant to the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer which remains abolished. It is firmly established principle that an order passed in violation of the principle of natural justice is a nullity. 15. From various provisions of the Asiatic Society Act, 1984 it is crystal clear that Asiatic Society was not under the supervision and control of the Central Government. It is firmly established principle that an order passed in violation of the principle of natural justice is a nullity. 15. From various provisions of the Asiatic Society Act, 1984 it is crystal clear that Asiatic Society was not under the supervision and control of the Central Government. It is an Autonomous body and that the Central Government considering the object of the Asiatic Society may give such money as the Central Government may consider necessary by way of grants, loans or otherwise and that under section 7 of the said Act, the Society cannot sell or dispose of any property acquired by the Society with the money provided by the Central Government and in such a case, the approval of the Central Government is necessary. All these provisions clearly establish that the said society is an autonomous body and not under supervision and control of the Central Government as submitted by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. We are further of the view that the Administrator appointed by this court had no authority and/or jurisdiction to revoke and cancel an order which was passed by her under specific order passed by this Court. The post of Public Relations Officer was created on the basis of the recommendation made by a committee appointed by the Central Government and that the Central Government directed its implementation and further wanted to know whether the same was complied with or not. Under such circumstance, when this court directed the same to be implemented and after the same was implemented and the appellant was appointed in the post of Public Relations Officer, it was not at all open to the Administrator to cancel that order on the ground that the order passed by this court was illegal on the ground that the said decision was taken in the absence of the recommendation of the Standing Finance Committee which had no and could not have any existence at the relevant point of time. Further the plea taken by the Administrator that the appellant was promoted to the post of Public Relations Officer without considering the case of other senior persons is on the face of it mala fide, inasmuch as, it was a case of abolition in the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer and creation of a post of Assistant Relations Public Officer and consequently, the person who was holding to post of Assistant Relations Public Officer to be posted to the upgraded post of Public Relations Officer. It is not a case of promotion nor there is a question of consideration of other persons. Even assuming it is a case of promotion, in that event, the persons concerned who were holding the lower cadre post, were entitled to be considered. In the instant case, there was only one person occupying the post of Assistant Public Relations Officer and that the said post was simply upgraded in terms of the order of the Central Government. It is not understood how and what circumstance the said Administrator could raise such a plea in support of her action in the facts and circumstance of the case. The stand is wholly mala fide and designated. After all an administrator appointed by this court cannot be allowed to raise any pleas or pretext at her sweet will. The alleged reason given by the said administrator had no actual or factual basis. Further, Smt. Supriya Acharyya appointed as administrator was a party to the decision and that thereafter is was no longer open on her past to cancel the said order without obtaining leave and/or approval of the Division Bench which had appointed the said administrator. In the instant case, the administrator cannot sit over in appeal over the order passed by the Division Bench. We are of the view that the action taken by the administrator was not only plainly wrong, it is arbitrary, mala fide and motivated. Accordingly, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstance of the case, it cannot be said that the office order no. 75 was illegal and void on any ground whatsoever and accordingly office order dated 29.7.1991 passed by the Administrator cancel the office order no. 75 was on the face of it illegal and void. 16. We are of the view that the learned Trial Judge was wrong in holding that the office order no. 75 was illegal and void on any ground whatsoever and accordingly office order dated 29.7.1991 passed by the Administrator cancel the office order no. 75 was on the face of it illegal and void. 16. We are of the view that the learned Trial Judge was wrong in holding that the office order no. 75 was illegal on the ground advanced by the said administrator in this behalf which has been dealt with by us in the fore going paragraphs. We are of the view that the Court below could not appreciate the factual and/or the legal aspect of the matter. We are of the view that the court below was wrong in holding that the Administrator had no other alternative but to pass appropriate order so that such illegal appointments for which there was no sanction either of the Division Bench or of the Central Government would not continue even for a single day. This finding is perverse and cannot be sustained. We have already held that the validity of the office order no. 75 by which the appellant was posted to the upgraded post of Public Relations Officer was valid and cannot be impeached on any ground whatsoever. 17. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and order dated 7.1.1992 passed by the learned Trial Judge in matter no. 2691 of 1991. Office order no. 16 dated 29.7.1991 passed by Smt. Supriya Acharyya, Administrator of the said society is hereby quashed by a writ of certiorari. The appeal is allowed. The writ petition is also allowed without any order as to costs. All parties to act on the signed xerox copy of the judgment on usual undertaking.