JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, Member - This reference arises out of an order dated 7.1.1986 and 10.3.1986 passed by the A. S.D.O. Shahjahanpur in case No. 59 u/Sec. 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in respect of the land situate in village Narainpur Karma Patti, pergana Kanth Tehsil Sadar, District Shahjahanpur. 2. The facts of the case are that Smt. Sitabo widow of Manoo filed a suit against Lekhraj, Ved Ram, Murli and Sita Ram impleading the Gaon Sabha and the State of U.P. as necessary parties. The suit was decreed by the learned trial court on 17.9.1968. A first appeal filed against this order was dismissed on 25.8.70. The second appeal was allowed by the Board of Revenue on 15.1.1980 and the case was remanded back to the learned trial court for retrial. On 7.6.1982, Daya Ram Singh filed an application under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Section 151, C.P.C. claiming to be the legal heir and representative of Smt. Sitabo. The contentions were supported by an affidavit sworn in by Smt. Ram Lali wife of Ved Prakash. She claimed to be the guardian of Daya Ram Singh. Lekhraj filed objection against the substitution application alleging that the suit stood abated as no timely steps were taken for substitution. Smt. Sitabo died on 25.6.1981 and the application was given on 7.8.1982. The right of heirship as claimed by the applicant Daya Ram was also challenged. On 17.7.1982, the learned trial court stayed the proceedings on the ground that a review application against the Board's order was pending. This review petition was dismissed by the Board on 4.4.1985. The learned trial court allowed the substitution application on 7.1.1986 in favour of Daya Ram. Aggrieved by this order Lekhraj and others preferred a revision before the Divisional Commissioner. The learned Addl. Commissioner has made a reference recommending to set aside the order of the learned trial Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the revisionist has urged to accept the reference. His contention is that the limitation for filing the substitution application is 90 days and if no timely step is taken for substitution, the suit would stand abated. He refers to the Article 120 of the Limitation Act. Sri Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the revisionist has urged to accept the reference. His contention is that the limitation for filing the substitution application is 90 days and if no timely step is taken for substitution, the suit would stand abated. He refers to the Article 120 of the Limitation Act. In support of his argument, he has placed: reliance on 1979 ALJ 1985, 1991 R.D. 340 and 1985 Civil Cases 127. The contention of Sri S. Kumar, learned counsel for the Opp. Party is that the limitation is 3 years and that lenient view needs be taken where minors are involved. Relying on 1987 R.D. 298 and AIR 1983 S.C. 355 . His last submission is that wheres the learned trial court allows substitution application, the appellate court has no jurisdiction. 4. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced before me and have also perused the record. Under Article 120 Part 10 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period for filing an application for substitution is 90 days. It has been held in Raghunandan Prasad v. Ganga dhar 1978 ALJ 85 by the Hon'ble Satish Chandra, C.J. of the Allahabad High Court that if no application u/Sec. 5 nor even a prayer for condonation of the delay is filed, the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed. In Shyam Sunder v. D.D.C. 1967 R.D. 331, it has beer: held by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court that 'accepting the cost will not confer the jurisdiction to any court which did not possess it and as there can be no conferment of jurisdiction either by consent or by waiver, the petitioner cannot be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction as regards the setting aside of the order merely on the ground that he had accepted certain sum of money as costs'. In Ram Nath Singh v. Achhaibar Singh 1991 R.D.340, the Board of Revenue has held that each days delay will have to be satisfactorily explained and want of diligence of substitution on the part of the appellant is fatal'. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also cited in 1957 R.D. 411 wherein it has been held that control of all the judicial matter is vested in the Board of Revenue. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also cited in 1957 R.D. 411 wherein it has been held that control of all the judicial matter is vested in the Board of Revenue. Consequently, where-ever there is an illegal exercise of discretion by one of the subordinate courts, it is the duty of the Board of Revenue to correct it once the record is before the Board." 5. It is clear from the Article 120 Part 10 of the Limitation Act that an application for substitution is to be more within 90 days and not 3 years. I have respectfully gone through the ruling given in Surat and others v. Bhrigu Nath and others 1989 R.D. 298by the Hon'ble A.P. Misra, J. of the Allahabad High Court. The matter before the Hon'ble High Court was whether Article 120 or Article 137 would be applicable in the case pending before it. His Lordship has observed that Article 120 of the Limitation Act provides limitation of 90 days for substituting heirs. The article is applied to such proceedings which are referred therein. It is significant that Article 137 which is residuary Article provided for all other application. Thus the applications which are not covered under Article 120 can be covered under Article 137. In the present case, since the applicant who had applied for substitution is neither the plaintiff nor the defendant, neither the appellant nor the respondent on the date on which he made such an application, it cannot be urged that they may be treated to be the persons covered under Order XXII to be respondents in the appeal." 6. It is clear from the above observation that Article 120 is applicable where the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or the deceased defendant or respondent is to be substituted Article 137 is applicable to those cases only which are not covered by Article 120. In the instant case, Smt. Sitabo was the plaintiff. When she died, the application for substitution was filed much beyond limitation period. So, the present case will be governed by Article 120 and not by Article 137. The facts of the case under reference are altogether different. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the Opp. party is of no help to him. When she died, the application for substitution was filed much beyond limitation period. So, the present case will be governed by Article 120 and not by Article 137. The facts of the case under reference are altogether different. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the Opp. party is of no help to him. Similarly, the argument that the defendant received the costs awarded by the learned trial court also carries no weight in view of the ruling referred to above, reported in 1967 R.D. 331. 7. In the result, this reference is accepted, the revision petition is allowed and the order of the learned trial court is set aside. 8. This order shall govern reference Nos. 18 and 19 of 1988/89/Shahjahanpur.