STATE OF GUJARAT v. ASHISH B. GANDHI — 1992 DIGILAW 412 (GUJ)

B. J. SHETHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Application is filed by the State of Gujarat for cancelling the bail order dated 12 passed by Mr. S. M. Pirzada learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Ahmedabad in Criminal Mis. Application No. 1535 of 1982 releasing the respondent-accused on bail for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498a of I. P. C. ( 2 ) COMPLAINANT-NAVINCHANDRA father of the deceased Mamta lodged the complaint on 7- 7-92 before the Maninagar Police Station against (1) his son-in-law Ashish and (2) Ansuyaben mother-in-law of deceased Mamta which was registered by the police for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498a of I. P. C. Ansuyaben is also the cousin of the complainant i. e. daughter of his natural aunt. Thus the parties were not only known to each other but also closely related to each other. The marriage of deceased Mamta and Ashish took place on 20-2-92 at Ahmedabad. Complainant Navinchandra is resident of Delhi. After the marriage for the first time Mamta went to Delhi at her parent place on 15-5-92 and stayed there upto 5-6-92 for about 20 days. At Delhi she told her father (complainant) that she was tortured by the accused by saying that she was not modern and forward that she did not know proper English that she also did not know how to cooking. She was asked to arrange for Rs. 25 0 She also stated to her father that her husband is having illicit relations with other woman and therefore also she was ill-treated by her husband. It is also staled in the complaint that on 22-6-92 accused Ashish had written a letter to the complainant and called his in-laws to come immediately by the first available train to Ahmedabad and he also asked them not to try to contact him either on phone or by letter. Thereafter a letter dated 27 or 28 June addressed by the deceased Mamta was received by the complainant by which she had asked her parents to come immediately to Ahmedabad and to take her away by giving any excuse. She also staled in that letter that the she was mentally tortured by the accused and efforts were made to give her divorce. Thereupon the complainant contacted Mamta on phone. At that time accused Ansuyaben-mother-in-law of deceased told him that there was nothing serious. She also staled in that letter that the she was mentally tortured by the accused and efforts were made to give her divorce. Thereupon the complainant contacted Mamta on phone. At that time accused Ansuyaben-mother-in-law of deceased told him that there was nothing serious. And therefore he did not go to Ahmedabad immediately and they thought they would go to Ahmedabad at their convenience. But on 3-7-92 he received a telephonic message from Shri Vinodbhai Shah maternal uncle-in-law of deceased Mamta that Mamta died due to burns injuries so they shall come to Ahmedabad as early as possible. On that very day they left for Ahmedabad and after making proper inquiry about the incident on 7-7-92 i. e. after tour days of the incident the complainant lodged the complaint againt his son-in-law and mother of his son-in-law for the aforesaid offences before the police. ( 3 ) WHEN the accused were arrested is not borne out from the record of this case. But it seems that they must have been either arrested on 7th or 8th as on 8-7-92 they have filed bail application before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Ahmedabad for releasing them on bail which was rejected by the learned Magistrate on the ground that he had no jurisdiction. ( 4 ) NOW before deciding this application a few material events are required to be staled which are as under: (1) The present accused alongwith his mother Ansuyaben-co-accused filed a common bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992 before the Court of learned Addl. City Sessions Judge. That application was filed on what date is not borne out from the record. However it must have been filed any time prior to 17 because Criminal Misc. Application No. 1535 of 1992 was filed by the present respondent-accused for releasing him on bail on 17 wherein it is staled that earlier bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992 was withdrawn as not pressed from the Court of Mr. R. M. Atodaria learned Addl. City Sessions Judge. It also appears from the record that Mr. Atodaria learned Addl. City Sessions Judge had granted bail to accused Ansuyaben in that Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992. However the order passed by Mr. Application No. 1451 of 1992 was withdrawn as not pressed from the Court of Mr. R. M. Atodaria learned Addl. City Sessions Judge. It also appears from the record that Mr. Atodaria learned Addl. City Sessions Judge had granted bail to accused Ansuyaben in that Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992. However the order passed by Mr. Atodaria learned Judge releasing the accused Ansyuaben on bail and dismissing the bail application of the accused Ashish as not pressed is also on the record of this case. Be that it may. (2) On 17-7-92 as stated above the respondent-accused Ashish filed fresh Criminal Misc. Application No. 1535 of 1992 again before the leaned Judge Mr. Atodaria. In that application it was staled that his bail application was not pressed as on that day the post-mortem notes were not available. On 21-7-92 Mr. Atodaria learned Judge issued notice to P. P. and made it returnable on 22-7-92. (3) On 7-8-92 Mr. Pirzada learned Addl. City Sessions Judge released the accused Ashish on bail on certain terms and conditions without assigning reasons. (4) On 12-8-92 learned Judge Mr. Pirzada passed a reasoned order running into about 23 typed pages which is under challenge in this application by the State. (5) On 7-9-92 further statement of the complainant came to be recorded wherein he has stated that two letters (1) dated 22-6-92 addressed by the accused Ashish and (2) dated 27 or 28/06/1992 addressed by the deceased Mamta are not traceable because either they must have been torn by somebody or went in Pasti. Therefore he is unable to produce those letters before the police. (6)THIS present Application for cancellation of bail is dated 25-9-92 which is filed in the office of this Court on 28-9-92. On 29-9-92 this Court issued Rule and made it returnable on 13 On 13-10-92 fresh notice of Rule was issued and it was made returnable on 21-10-92. However this matter could be heard only today. Mr. N. M. Amin learned Advocate appeared for the respondent-accused in this case. (7) Meanwhile charge-sheet is filed as stated by learned Advocate Mr. Amin. And the learned Magistrate has also committed the case to the Court of Sessions againt the accused. ( 5 ) AL this stage it would be proper to set out the reasons recorded by the learned Judge Mr. (7) Meanwhile charge-sheet is filed as stated by learned Advocate Mr. Amin. And the learned Magistrate has also committed the case to the Court of Sessions againt the accused. ( 5 ) AL this stage it would be proper to set out the reasons recorded by the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada for releasing the respondent-accused on bail which are as under: (1) On page 13 in para 8 of his order he has considered non-production of two letters by the complainant (i) dated 22-6-92 written by accused Ashish and (ii) dated 27 or 28/06/1992 written by deceased Mamta to the complainant till 7-8-92 (though that reasoned order is dated 12-8-92 ). At page 14 after discussion he held that at this stage it is a matter of debate whether the fact regarding those letters can be believed or not. (2) At page 14 para 9 though he has staled that at the stage of deciding bail application it is not proper for the court to analyse or discuss the evidence even then he has come to the conclusion: But at the same time necessary evidence in form of statements is required to be appreciated as he was of the opinion that otherwise now can the court reasonably exercise discretion? He has also come to the conclusion that as the Sessions Judge he has the same powers which the High Court has under Section 439 of the Cr. P. C. and even though the offence is punishable with death or life imprisonment in such offences also even if there is a prima facie case the Sessions Judge can exercise his judicial discretion in favour of the accused for releasing him on bail. (3) After observing as aforesaid at page 15 para 10 he has discussed the following circumstances for releasing the accused on bail: (I) Aforesaid two letters are not produced by the complainant in spite of the repeated opportunities given to him to produce the same. (II) The incident look place in the house of the accused between 9. 0 a. m. to 9. 30 a. m. on 3-7-92. At that time the accused Ansuyaben and Ashish wore out of their house as Ansuyaben had gone to School to attend her duty as Head-Mistress at 6. 30 a. m. and Ashish had reached the site for attending his duty as Supervisor. 0 a. m. to 9. 30 a. m. on 3-7-92. At that time the accused Ansuyaben and Ashish wore out of their house as Ansuyaben had gone to School to attend her duty as Head-Mistress at 6. 30 a. m. and Ashish had reached the site for attending his duty as Supervisor. He was informed at his office on phone that his house was set on fire due short circuit. (III) Deceased closed the door from inside the house and committed suicide in her room by pouring kerosene on her body. (IV) On 20-2-92 marriage took place between deceased Mamta and accused Ashish. Thereafter from 15-5-92 to 5-6-92 deceased Mamta stayed at Delhi with her parents and came back to Ahmedabad. Thus the period during which Mamta stayed with the accused at his house cannot be said to be long. (V) In the complaint the complainant has staled that deceased Mamta was tortured by the accused by calling her not modern and forward and by saying that she was not knowing English and not knowing cooking and also by asking her to bring Rs. 25 0 However it is not borne out from the statements of Arunaben-mother of the deceased and Amit brother of the deceased that why and for what that amount of Rs. 25 0 was demanded and there is nothing on record to show whether any arrangement was made by the complainant to pay the said amount and the complainant and other witnesses have also remained silent on that point in their statement. (VI) Complainant and accused Ansuyaben were closely related to each other as Ansuyaben is his cousin sister i. e. daughter of his maternal uncle. The accused is the Civil Engineer and working as the Supervisor in one construction company his younger brother is serving in Dahod Polytechnic and his mother Ansuyaben is holding a responsible post of Head-Mistress of the School and his father is Assistant Manager of a Nationalised Bank. Thus the entire family of the accused Ashish is highly educated and well to do. Therefore whether they will demand Rs. 25 0 from the deceased Mamta that story is probable or not requires consideration. (VII) Whether the deceased Mamta was knowing cooking or not is not borne out from the statements of the complainant and his wife Arunaben. They have not staled that she was expert in cooking. Therefore whether they will demand Rs. 25 0 from the deceased Mamta that story is probable or not requires consideration. (VII) Whether the deceased Mamta was knowing cooking or not is not borne out from the statements of the complainant and his wife Arunaben. They have not staled that she was expert in cooking. Therefore if she was not knowing cooking well then as per mother-in-law if sometimes she had told her about cooking and instructed accordingly that would not lead the deceased Mamta to commit suicide. (4) At page 18 para 11 he has discussed the conduct of the complainant after receipt of the letters and appreciated his evidence. (Except saying in terms that the evidence of the complainant is not reliable he has staled everything.) (5) At page 21 of his order he has staled that he has got discretion under Section 439 of Cr. P. C. and in reasonable manner he has to exercise his jurisdiction and he is using that in favour of the accused Ashish who hims if is educated and coming from educated family and serving as Supervisor in one Engineering Firm and if no order rejecting his bail application is passed then it will adversely affect his career. (6) At page 22 of his order he has referred to judgment of the Division Bench of this court in case of Ranchhodbhai and Others and also the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Shyama Devi v. State of West Bengal reported in 1987 (2) Crimes page 325 for deciding the bail application in favour of the accused but without any discussion as to how they are applicable. He has also relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this court reported in 1990 (2) GLH (UJ) page 11 for coming to the conclusion that the presumption under Section 113a of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be raised without there being any evidence on the record to that effect. ( 6 ) FOLLOWING grounds are taken in this Application for cancellation of bail: (1) The first and foremost ground which is raised in this application is that once earlier bail application preferred by the respondent accused was withdrawn as not having been pressed (in absence of fresh grounds within a period of less than one week) the learned Judge ought not to have entertained the fresh bail application. Not pressed or withdrawal of the petition amounts to dismissal as laid down by this court in a case reported in 1992 (1) G. L. R. page 121 and by the Supreme Court in 1990 S. C. (Crimes) 126. (2) The learned Judge ought not to have drawn the adverse inference for not producing two letters by the complainant as the investigation was in progress and it was too premature for the learned Judge to conclude the same at that stage. (3) There was evidence regarding illtreatment meted out to the deceased Mamta by the accused and therefore prima facie offence is committed under S. 306 as well as S. 498a of I. P. C. (4) The deceased committed suicide within a period of less than five months of the marriage and therefore presumption under Section 113a of the Indian Evidence Act ought to have been raised against the accused by the learned Judge in this case. (5) In fact though the police has not registered the offence against the accused under Section 304b of I. P. C. and yet not submitted its report against the accused for offence punishable under Section 304 the evidence on record suggests that Section 304 will be attracted in view of Section 113a of the Evidence Act. (6) In view of the judgment of this court reported in 1992 (1) G. L. R. page 3 the accused who is charged with the serious offence punishable under Section 306 of I. P. C should not have been granted bail as the bride burning cases are on rise and it seems that brides are meant for burning and kerosene is meant for burning brides. ( 7 ) MR. Amin learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused has vehemently submitted that this Court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused in this application for cancellation of bail by the State as the considerations for grant of bail and cancelling bail are totally different. ( 7 ) MR. Amin learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused has vehemently submitted that this Court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused in this application for cancellation of bail by the State as the considerations for grant of bail and cancelling bail are totally different. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirathsinh Jadeja v. State of Gujarat reported in A. I. R. 1984 Supreme Court 372 and submitted that the bail can be cancelled only if it pointed out that after the accused is released on bail he has tried to misuse his liberty by tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or tried to jump the bail and would not make himself available to face the trial against him. In this case it is not the case of the State that the respondent-accused has either tried to jump the bail or tamper with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. He has also strongly relied upon the reasons given by the learned Judge in his order. He has further pointed out that after the learned Judge passed the reasoned order on 12 further statement of the complainant was recorded on 7-9-92 in which he has not tried to come out with a case that those two letters either might have been torn by somebody or might have gone in Pasti. This shows that the complainant has filed false complaint against the accused after 4 days of the incident only with an ulterior motive to harass the accused. He further submitted that the investigation is over and the police has already filed the charge-sheet against the accused. Not only that but the learned Magistrate has also committed the case to the Sessions Court againt the accused and therefore after a period of nearly more than 4 months of grant of bail it would not be proper for this court to cancel the bail granted in favour of the respondent-accused. ( 8 ) IN my opinion the impugned order granting bail passed by the learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Mr. ( 8 ) IN my opinion the impugned order granting bail passed by the learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Mr. Pirzada is required to be set aside and the bail granted in favour of the respondent-accused is required to be cancelled forthwith firstly on the ground that once the earlier application of the respondent-accused was not pressed and the same was withdrawn it amounts to an order of dismissal and in absence of fresh ground or change in circumstances the accused should not have been released on bail by the learned Judge. This point is directly covered by the judgment of this court in the case of Shyamdutt Upadhyay v. State of Gujarat reported in 1992 (1) G. L. R. page 121 (= 1992 (1) GLH 258 ). As staled earlier it may be noted that after the bail application of the original accused was rejected by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 8-7-92 they had moved bail application being C. M. A. No. 1451 of 1992 before the City Sessions Court Ahmedabad which was withdrawn as not pressed qua the present respondent-accused before the learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Mr. Atodaria prior to 17-7-92. On 17 the respondent-accused preferred fresh bail application being C. M. A. 1535 of 1992 on which learned Judge Mr. Atodaria had issued notice on 21 and made it returnable on 22-7-92. But surprisingly the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada first only passed an order dated 7-8-92 of releasing the accused on bail on certain terms and conditions and subsequently on 12-8-92 passed the reasoned order. In that order the learned Judge has not at all dealt with the aspect of the earlier bail application having been withdrawn as not pressed by the respondent-accused. It was not open to the learned Judge to go into the merits of the case and decide the same. Because once the earlier bail application was withdrawn it has to be presumed that all possible contentions must have been raised before the court and the court was not inclined to accept the same and release the accused on bail and therefore only the bail application was not pressed by the Advocate for the accused at that time. Because once the earlier bail application was withdrawn it has to be presumed that all possible contentions must have been raised before the court and the court was not inclined to accept the same and release the accused on bail and therefore only the bail application was not pressed by the Advocate for the accused at that time. Under these circumstances if the court has allowed to withdraw that petition it is nothing but an order of dismissal and therefore in absence of any change in circumstances or any fresh grounds the learned Judge ought not to have entertained the bail application and decided the same on merits and released the respondent-accused on bail. Therefore only on this ground the impugned order passed by the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada releasing the accused on bail is required to be set aside. ( 9 ) ON merits also the impugned order passed by the learned Judge is required to be quashed. The reasons assigned by him for releasing the accused on bail are set out by me in para 5 of this judgment. His order runs into 23 type pages. He has discussed and appreciated the prosecution case at the investigation stage as if he was deciding the sessions Case after the regular trial. Except staling that the evidence of prosecution witnesses is not reliable he has stated everything against the prosecution. He entered the area which was not permissible to him at this stage. ( 10 ) IT was not open for the learned Judge to raise doubts about the non-production of the two letters by the complainant. He was conscious that while deciding the bail application it was not proper for the court to analyse or discuss the evidence. He has observed in his order to this effect. But thereafter he has proceeded to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as he was of the opinion that otherwise the court cannot reasonably exercise its discretion. That was a wholly wrong approach adopted by the learned Judge. Merely because the respondent-accused was away when the incident took place that itself would not absolve the husband from the liability of offence punishable under Section 306 I. P. C. if otherwise there is enough evidence againt him. In fact the deceased committed suicide in her bed room after closing the house from inside at about 9 to 9. Merely because the respondent-accused was away when the incident took place that itself would not absolve the husband from the liability of offence punishable under Section 306 I. P. C. if otherwise there is enough evidence againt him. In fact the deceased committed suicide in her bed room after closing the house from inside at about 9 to 9. 30 a. m. and that too within less than a period of 5 months of her marriage. These circumstances were enough to raise presumption under Section 113a of the Evidence Act against the respondent-accused. Without applying his mind the learned Judge has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in 1990 (2) GLH (UJ) page 11 which was cited by the learned Advocate for the accused. It seems that he has simply relied upon the statement of the learned Advocate and he has not even cared to minutely go through that judgment. In fact in that case the wife had committed suicide after 10 to 12 years of her marriage and in appeal this court in the facts of that case observed that Section 113a of the Evidence Act would not apply. That is not the case here. Social status of the accused which is heavily relied upon by the learned Judge is of little help to the accused. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. V. Rayanim reported in AIR 1990 S. C. 626 the Supreme Court has clearly held in para 6 of its judgment that This court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations such as status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and the relevancy of materials on record this court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice. This case is therefore squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. The learned Judge has granted bail on totally irrelevant considerations and regardless of the nature of the accusations and relevancy of materials on record. Therefore this court would not hesitate to interfere with the impugned order of bail and to cancel the same for the ends of justice. ( 11 ) ONCE it has come out in the statement of the complainant that the respondent-accused had demanded Rs. Therefore this court would not hesitate to interfere with the impugned order of bail and to cancel the same for the ends of justice. ( 11 ) ONCE it has come out in the statement of the complainant that the respondent-accused had demanded Rs. 25 0 it would be a case under Section 304b I. P. C. It is true that the complaint is registered against the accused under Section 306 I. P. C but Section 304b I. P. C. can be added at any time during the course of the trial also. However the learned Judge has totally overlooked that aspect. Whether the deceased was knowing cooking or not is wholly irrelevant. I fail to understand how the learned Judge has touched that aspect. The learned Judge has of course referred to the judgment of this court in Ranchhodbhais case and also to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Shyma Devis case. But except referring to the same he has not at all discussed their facts. How they are applicable in the facts of this case is also not staled. In fact going through the said judgments I find that they are not at all applicable to the facts of this case. Thus the reasons assigned by the learned Judge for releasing the accused are not germane. Therefore the said order is required to be quashed. ( 12 ) MR. Amin the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused has submitted that after the accused was released on bail by the learned Judge a period of more than four months has passed. Meanwhile the police has not only filed the charge-sheet against the accused but the learned Magistrate has also committed the case against the accused to the Court of Sessions and it is not alleged in this petition that after the accused was released on bail he has misused his liberty either by tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or by attempting to jump the bail and he has complied with all the conditions imposed by the learned Judge while releasing him on bail. Therefore this court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused. It is true that a period of more than four months has passed after the order passed by the learned Judge releasing the respondent accused on bail. Therefore this court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused. It is true that a period of more than four months has passed after the order passed by the learned Judge releasing the respondent accused on bail. The reasoned order was passed on 12-8-92 by the learned Judge and the same order has been challenged by the State before this court on 28 on receiving its certified copy. On 29 this petition was admitted and ordered to be heard on 13-10-92. Thereafter fresh notice of rule was issued and it was made returnable on 21 Thereafter there was a Diwali vacation and finally this matter is heard today. In fact due to backlog of the cases this matter could not be heard carry. In any case merely because a period of four months has expired after the release of the respondent accused on bail that itself is not a ground for not cancelling the bail by this court if other wise this court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order is bad and is required to be set aside. In the same manner merely because charge sheet is now submitted and the case is committed to the court of Sessions against the accused and the Sessions Case is likely to commence soon they are also no grounds for not interfering with the impugned order of bail. There are number of Sessions Cases where even though the accused are refused bail they are not tried immediately. In such type of cases the accused who are denied bail have remained in jail some time for one year or more. But it happens in some case in which the accused is released on bail not only the investigation is completed early but the cases are also committed to the Court of Sessions and they are disposed of soon. This is not proper. In this case after the respondent-accused was released on bail when one more further statement of the complainant came to be recorded he has come out with the case that those two important letters either might have been torn by somebody or went in Pasti. It may be true or it may not be truee. Therefore the impugned order passed by the learned Judge has to be set aside. It may be true or it may not be truee. Therefore the impugned order passed by the learned Judge has to be set aside. I have found that lower courts are very liberal in their approach while deciding bail applications of the accused persons who are involved in very serious and heinous offences like Sections 306 304 or 302 of I. P. C. which are not only committed against the individual but also against the society as a whole. Because of that such accused persons have become fearless and have feeling that they can commit any type of serious and heinous offence but nothing is going to happen to them. They are not going to be kept in jail as the courts are there to release them on bail and once they are out on bail the obvious result is that of acquittal at the end of trial. Thus a bail order is the first step towards acquittal and though the Courts impose condition of not tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in most of the cases that happens and either the witnesses do not come forward to depose against the accused or if they come before the court they turn hostile and ultimately the accused is acquitted. Therefore Court should not ordinarily grant bail to accused persons who are charged with aforesaid serious offences. ( 13 ) STATUTE has given discretion to the court under Sections 437 and 439 of Cr. P. C. to release accused persons who are charged with non-bailable offences. Thus the discretion has been vested in the courts to release the accused on bail. When the discretion is to be exercised by the court in which it is vested it has to exercise the same with great care and caution and not in one and all cases. It should be exercised in very good and deserving cases in favour of the accused persons considering the overall circumstances of the case. If the court has discretion then it has to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of course. After all crime is a revolt against the whole society and attack on the civilization of the day. The order is the basic need of any organized civilized society. Attempt to disturb that order affects the society and the community. Law and order can effectively be maintained by punishing the criminals. After all crime is a revolt against the whole society and attack on the civilization of the day. The order is the basic need of any organized civilized society. Attempt to disturb that order affects the society and the community. Law and order can effectively be maintained by punishing the criminals. A criminal can be punished only when the prosecution is able to lead evidence and prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt but if the witnesses do not support the prosecution case because of fear of the accused or for any other reason the crime would go unpunished and the criminal would be encouraged. In the ultimate analysis it is the society which suffers. Respect for law has to be maintained in the interest of the society and discouragement of a criminal is one of the ways to maintain it. Therefore ordinarily court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the accused persons who are charged with the offences u/ss. 302. 304b 306 I. P. C and other serious offences which are against the society. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with the judgment I must stale that in the case of Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Another reported in (1987) 2 SCC page 684 the Supreme Court has held that where earlier bail applications of the accused was already rejected by a Judge of the High Court subsequent application should also have been placed before the same Judge. The Supreme Court has further held that If successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges there would be conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of courts time. Judicial discipline requires that such matters must be placed before the same Judge if he is available for order. The same view has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its later Judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Buddhikota Subha Rao. reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 605 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.)126. In that case also successive bail applications of the accused were rejected on merits. The same view has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its later Judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Buddhikota Subha Rao. reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 605 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.)126. In that case also successive bail applications of the accused were rejected on merits. The Supreme Court held that once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in fact situation. Change in fact situation means a substantial change which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. In such a situation the proper course was to direct that the matter be placed before the same Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the courts time as Judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency. Relying upon the aforesaid Judgment of the Supreme Court in Buddhikota Subha Raos case (supra) in case of Arvindkumar J. Gupta v. State of Gujarat reported in 1990 (1) G. L. R. 623 (= 1992 G. L. H. 442) this court has also taken same view. Incidentally at this stage it may be staled thatthat in that case bail application was filed by the accused who-was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498a of I. P. C. Disposing of that case this Court has also observed that Otherwise also such offences are on the increase and if bail applications in such serious offences are taken lightly it will have its impact on the society. Accordingly the bail application of that accused was rejected by this Court. Accordingly the bail application of that accused was rejected by this Court. ( 15 ) AFORESAID two decisions of the Supreme Court (i) Shahzad Hasan Khans case and (ii) Buddhikota Subha Raos case clearly lay down that judicial discipline requires that successive bail applications on the same subject must be placed before the same Judge for its disposal. In this case as staled earlier the earlier bail application of the respondent-accused was rejected on any date between 8-7-92 to 16-7-92. And within a period of less than a week a fresh bail application was moved on the ground that when previous bail application was not pressed post-mortem notes were not available before the Sessions Court on 17-7-92. It was rightly placed before the learned Judge Mr. Atodaria who issued notice on 21-7-92 and made it returnable on 22 But for any reason it was not decided by him on that day and on 7-8-92 Mr. Pirzada heard and released him on bail and gave reasons for it on 12-8-92. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court it would have been proper if the subsequent bail application was decided by learned Judge Mr. Atodaria if he was available and not by Mr. Pirzada. It has also come to the notice of this Court that in a bail application filed before a court by the accused persons which was rejected by the learned Judge separate bail application filed by the co-accused was granted by another learned Judge on same material and those accused were released on bail. Thus conflicting orders were passed by different Judges. Judicial discipline requires that subsequent application must be placed before the same Judge if he is available for passing orders. Such practice or convention would also prevent abuse of the process of the court. It will also prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking and it will maintain consistency. Otherwise the litigant would attempt before every Judge till he gets order to his liking which may shake the confidence. Therefore the subordinate courts will see to it that subsequent bail application filed by other accused or same accused also be placed before the same Judge who has disposed of the first bail application of a co-accused of the case if the learned Judge is available for passing the orders. Therefore the subordinate courts will see to it that subsequent bail application filed by other accused or same accused also be placed before the same Judge who has disposed of the first bail application of a co-accused of the case if the learned Judge is available for passing the orders. If the learned Judge who passed the order in earlier petition is not available for few days hearing of such bail application can wait for some time till the learned Judge is available. It is only in case in which the learned Judge has either retired or transferred to any other District or he has proceeded on long leave for more than a period of two or three months only in such cases the subsequent bail application of other accused or same accused may be placed before other Judge. ( 16 ) IN any case the impugned order passed by the learned Judge releasing the respondent-accused on bail in this case is required to be set aside on the ground that the learned Judge was not justified in releasing the accused on bail in absence of any change in the circumstances or fresh grounds when the earlier bail application of the respondent-accused was rejected as having not been pressed and also on the ground that on irrelevant considerations he has released the respondent-accused on bail regardless of the nature of the accusations and relevancy of materials on record. ( 17 ) ACCORDINGLY this petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated 12-8-92 passed by the learned City Sessions Judge Ahmedabad releasing the respondent-accused on bail is quashed and set aside. The bail granted in favour of the respondent-accused stands cancelled. Nonbailable warrant to be issued against the respondent-accused. I. O. to see to it that the respondent-accused is immediately arrested pursuant to the non-bailable warrant. Request of Mr. Amin learned Advocate appearing for the accused to stay the operation of this order for three weeks from today cannot be granted because it would nullify the effect of the order of cancelling bail. Therefore this request is rejected. Rule made absolute. .