Judgment 1. THIS writ petition is directed against the order of superannuation of the petitioner to be effective on the 30th September, 1992. The petitioner joined service as a senior staff nurse in Durgapur Steel Plant under the respondent no. 1 the Steel Authority of India on the 25teh May, 1959. At the time of joining the service she declared her date of birth as 30th September, 1935. According to that date of birth she has to retire on the 30the September, 1993, but by notice dated 31-12-91 which is annexure-G to the writ petition steps were taken by the Steel Authority of India to Superannuate her on the 30th September, 1992. It is the case of the petitioner that in support of the declaration made by her at the time of entering the service she also submitted an affidavit affirmed by her uncle on the 30the November, 1960 declaring the date of her birth as 30the September 1935 as her parents were dead at that time. The petitioner passed the Matriculation examination of the University of Calcutta is 1949 and Annexure - A to the writ petition is the xerox copy of her Matriculation certificate granted by the University of Calcutta in 1949. She passed the Matriculation examination as a private candidate. The Matriculation certificate however does not show her age and the gaps in the certificate meant for entering the age are crossed whatever may be reason as to why the gaps meant for entering the age in the matriculation certificate have been crossed, the fact remains that no age of the petitioner has been mentioned in her Matriculation certificate. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that at the relevant time it was the practice of the University of Calcutta not to record the age of female students in their Matriculation certificates. It is evident that the necessity of furnishing affidavit in support of the declaration of the date of birth of the petitioner arose obviously because the Matriculation certificate of the petitioner did not record her age. Annexure B to the writ petition is the xerox copy of the affidavit affirmed by Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee, the uncle of the petitioner declaring that the date of birth of the petitioner was 30the September, 1935. 2. Annexure B to the writ petition is the xerox copy of the affidavit affirmed by Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee, the uncle of the petitioner declaring that the date of birth of the petitioner was 30the September, 1935. 2. IT is the case of petitioner that upto 1977 there was no problem but in that year it became necessary for her to obtain a certificate about the date of her birth recorded in the office record in connection with her Life Insurance proposal and accordingly she made an application before the respondents no. 2, the General Manager (P), Durgapur Steel Plant in this regard when she was asked by the Authority to appear before the medical board for verification of her age/date of birth. It seems that she appeared before the medical board under protest. Annexure-D to the writ petition is a representation dated 26th February, 1977 in the matter wherein she recited that at the time of joining her service as staff nurse in 1959 she declared her date of birth as 30th September, 1935 in the Declaration Form and also referred to the affidavit sworn in the matter in 1960 in support of her date of birth. She also stated in her representation that she would appear before the medical board as an obedient employee but any difference with or deviation from the date of birth declared by her and supported by affidavit would not be acceptable to her. By a letter dated the 22nd March, 1977 which is a part of Annexure-E to the writ petition, the petitioner was informed by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Durgapur steel Plant that her age had been assessed at 42 years 6 months on 3rd March, 1977 by the Special Medical Board and accordingly her date of birth had been recorded as falling on 3rd September 1934. Now giving effect to the said assessed date of birth the Authority concerned has fixed her date of superannuation as the 30th September, 1992. It is the petitioner's case that after receiving the said information about the assessment of her date of birth from the Deputy Chief Medical Officer, she submitted a representation to the general Manager (P), Durgapur Steel Plant, a xerox copy of which is a part of annexure-E to the date of her birth. It is the petitioner's case that after receiving the said information about the assessment of her date of birth from the Deputy Chief Medical Officer, she submitted a representation to the general Manager (P), Durgapur Steel Plant, a xerox copy of which is a part of annexure-E to the date of her birth. It is the contention of the petitioner that inspite of her such objection and representation against the assessment of age communicated by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer the notice of her superannuation has been issued now without giving her any opportunity of hearing. It is also the contention of the petitioner that all the doctors were not present in the medical board and by mere physical verification age has been assessed taking into consideration that the petitioner could not have passed the matriculation examination at the age of about. 14 years. Indeed it has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that if the petitioner's declaration about her date of birth is line she seems to have appeared in the matriculation examination at the age of 13 years 6 months which it is difficult to believe. In my opinion that is only a probability aspect of the matter and it is not unknown that some students prosecute their studies at a comparatively early age which might have been the case with the petitioner. It is also the case of the petitioner that accepting the date of birth declared by her and supported by affidavit the Authority concerned issued her identity Card showing her date of birth as 30th September, 1935 which is annexure-C to the writ petition. The respondents on the other hand have relied on the age verification certificate of the medical board which form part of the Annexure-A to the affidavit -in- opposition. The said verification certificate appears to have been signed on 3rd March, 1977 by three Medical Officers of three different departments, namely, Dentistry, Surgery and Radiology. It is stated in the said certificate that in the opinion of the said Medical Officers the 'present age' of the petitioner appeared to be 42 years 6 months or, the 3rd march, 1977. The date of birth, if calculated on that basis, falls on the 3rd march, 1934. It is stated in the said certificate that in the opinion of the said Medical Officers the 'present age' of the petitioner appeared to be 42 years 6 months or, the 3rd march, 1977. The date of birth, if calculated on that basis, falls on the 3rd march, 1934. Now one of the questions raised on behalf of the petitioner is whether it is possible to say, with any degree of precision, the exact age of an adult person on any particular date even by ossification test. It is however submitted that in this case no ossification test of the petitioner was done and her age was assessed only by visual appreciation and that too, not by all the medical officers whose signatures appears m the assessment certificate. It is the contention of the respondents on the other hand that in the Leave Travel concession application filed in the year 1970 the petitioner stated her age as 30 years (which however supports nobody's case) and again in an application for advance for purchase of motor vehicle in 1985 she stated her date of birth as 3rd September, 1934 (vide annexures B and C respectively to the affidavit-in-opposition). In her affidavit -in- reply the petitioner has stated that in the leave Travel Concession application her age was stated by mistake but in the application for advance for purchase of motor vehicle she originally recorded her date of birth as 3rd September, 1935 but the Authority refused to accept the application and accordingly she had to file another application in proper form incorporating her date of birth as 3rd September, 1934 on being compelled to do so else her application would not have been accepted. 3. ONE of the arguments made on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioner can not now at this belated stage raise the question of her age in a writ petition when she was informed as far back as in 1977 about the finding of her age and date of birth by the medical board. In this connection, the respondents also have relied upon an office circular dated the 20th June, 1987 issued by the steel Authority of India which is Annexure-X to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. In this connection, the respondents also have relied upon an office circular dated the 20th June, 1987 issued by the steel Authority of India which is Annexure-X to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 wherein it is stated that it has been decided that no dispute can henceforth be raised Over the date of birth of an employee during the last 5 years of his/her service and such matters will not be entertained. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has attracted my attention to a. few judicial pronouncements in support of his submission that a petitioner can approach the court for proper relief even at the stage at which the present petitioner has approached the court. In this connection he has referred to the decisions in Sadananda Sen vs. State of West Bengal Cal. LT, (1) H. C. 76, Sishu Ranjan Das vs. Commissioner of Police, 1979 (2) C. L. J. 428, Bhanu Sashi Das Dey vs. State of West Bengal 93 C.W.N. 895. From the materials placed it is evident that the petitioner at the time of her entry in the service as far back as in 1959 made declaration of her date of birth as the 30th September, 1935 obviously for service record and in corroboration there of an affidavit was affirmed by the uncle of the petitioner in 1960. The Authority also issued an Identity Card in favour of the petitioner showing therein her date of birth as the 30th September, 1935 which is in conformity with her declaration about her date of birth. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that entry of the date of birth in the Identity Card is not an official version of the appropriate authority about the date of birth and it was mentioned therein as supplied by the petitioner herself. Without entering into the question whether such a plea is valid the fact remains as is indicated by the said Identity Card that even at the initial stage the petitioner declared her date of birth as the 30th September. 1935 and this was recorded in the official record and at any rate no controversy was raised by the Authority at that stage. 1935 and this was recorded in the official record and at any rate no controversy was raised by the Authority at that stage. Subsequently about 18 years after she joined the service she was asked to appear before the medical board for verification of her age and that too when the petitioner herself applied to the authority for certifying her age on the basis of office record for the purpose of use of the same in connection with Life Insurance proposal. She appeared before the medical board under protest and then when the office of the Chief medical Officer communicated to her the assessment of her age made by the medical board, she submitted a representation before the General Manager (P), durgapur Steel Plant in the matter. That was not replied to by the Authority concerned nor was any hearing given to her over the matter. In the circumstances, it is nothing unnatural for the petitioner to be labouring under an impression that either her representation had been accepted by the Authority or at any rate that was pending far consideration before the Authority concerned. Therefore, she had no occasion to approach the court earlier till she received the notice of superannuation. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that there is no good reason for holding that the writ petition is liable to be defeated by reason of delay. The mere communication of the assessment of her age by the medical board from the office of the Chief Medical Office is not sufficient to say that there was delay in approaching the court, particularly when the petitioner submitted a representation before the Authority concerned against the assessment of the medical board and the Authority concerned did not inform her anything about her representation in the matter. 4. IT is also significant to note that it is not a case where the official record did not contain any entry about the date of birth of the petitioner till the medical board made the assessment about 19 years after her entry in the service. 4. IT is also significant to note that it is not a case where the official record did not contain any entry about the date of birth of the petitioner till the medical board made the assessment about 19 years after her entry in the service. Her service record contained a declaration about the date of her age from the very beginning and that was not only supported by an affidavit sworn and filed soon after her entry into the service but was also treated by the authorities as an accepted part of office record as is evident from the fact that in her Identity Card issued by the Authorities the same date of birth was also recorded. If any alternation of that date was subsequently considered necessary by the Authority concerned by reason of any supervening or intervening circumstances such as the assessment of age by a medical board about 18 years after her entry in the service, it is only fair and reasonable that the authority concerned should have given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing before alteration of the date already recorded in the service book and then the formal decision taken in the matter should have been communicated to the petitioner instead of taking her by surprise by issuing superannuation notice after long years on the basis of the assessment report of the medical board against which she had submitted a representation. That hearing should be given by the Authority concerned in disputed cases of date of birth under the rule of Audi Alteram Partem has been emphasised in the decision of this court in Shibu Krishna Banerjee vs. D. N. A. A., 1990 Lab. I. C. 187. In the present case the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing before changing her date of birth in the official record on the basis of an intervening medical report appearing in the scene about some long 18 years after the initial declaration of the age of the petitioner and recording of the same in her service record. In the present case the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing before changing her date of birth in the official record on the basis of an intervening medical report appearing in the scene about some long 18 years after the initial declaration of the age of the petitioner and recording of the same in her service record. Now coming to the question how far the Authority concerned would be justified in superseding the declaration of the petitioner about her age made at the time to her entry in the service and the supporting affidavit on the basis of medical report subsequently obtained it may be noted without any fear of contradiction that the medical opinion about the age of a person, more so in the case adults, can never be certain to the extent of telling the exact age of a person on a particular date. On the basis of physical features and factors such as teeth, height, weight etc, even if it is possible for medical experts to make an approximate assessment about the age of an adult, such assessment can never pronounce the exact age on any particular date. But it is generally accepted that a more reliable assessment about age can be made by conducting ossification test. It is however the contention of the petitioner that in her case no ossification test was made. However even case of the petitioner it will still have to be considered whether it is possible on the basis of any such ossification test to arrive at a sure finding of the exact age of the person concerned on a particular date, namely, the date on which the ossification test was conducted. It is now a settled test (i.e., radiological examination) it is difficult to pin point the exact age of a person on a particular date. In Jayamala vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR. 1982 SC. 1297, the supreme Court observed thus at page 1299:- "however, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side". 5. In Jayamala vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR. 1982 SC. 1297, the supreme Court observed thus at page 1299:- "however, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side". 5. THEREFORE if any medical opinion is obtained about the age of a person the same should not be taken as an assertion of the exact age of a person on a particular date as a medical or scientific truth but such opinion should be taken only as a probable age indicating that the actual age of the person concerned may be some where within the range of a year or two on either side. In the present case, if we look to the medical report which is a part of Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition, we will find that the report only purports to express 'opinion' that the present age of the person concerned 'appears to be' 42 years 6 months on the date of examination. The expression 'appears to be clearly shows that the medical opinion in the matter is not a definite assertion but only indicates a probable age with the possibility of variation within some unignorable range of elasticity. In view of the accepted medical and legal views that even the best medical opinion about the age of a person is subject to variation of one or two years, we will find that the medical report in this case does not dislodge the declaration of age made by the petitioner and rather lends considerable support to such declaration in as much as the difference between the age opined by the medical assessment and the age declaration in as much as the difference between the age opined by the medical assessment and the age declared by the petitioner and affirmed by affidavit is only one year which falls within the range of the acknowledged possibility of variation of the age calibrated by medical opinion. The different between the medical assessment and the declared age of the petitioner being only one year and the medical opinion being flexible both by reason of the expression present age appears to be as used in the medical report as well as in view of the acknowledged medical and judicial views in the matter in favour of allowing a margin of variation of a year or two, the medical opinion in this case, far from contradicting the same with any decisive credence, rather supports the petitioner's declaration of her date of birth by bringing the declared date of birth within the sweep of the variational amplitude of medical opinion. 6. THERE may however be cases where the medical opinion may expressly or by implication purport or indicate that the age opined marks only the minimum or the maximum possible age of the person on a particular date representing the lowest or the highest point, as the case may be, in the scale of possible variation of the age medically assessed in the case. The medical opinion in the present case is not one of that nature. The medically assessed age in the present case is therefore exposed to the susceptibility of variation on either side. Consequently such an opinion of age can not be taken to supplant the declared date of birth falling within the range of variation of the medical opinion, particularly where the incumbent concerned submitted a representation against such medical opinion but no hearing was given to her and no finding on her representation was recorded or communicated by the authority concerned to the petitioner. In the circumstances, it is plainly an act of arbitrariness on the part of the Authority concerned to do what they did in respect of both substantive and procedural aspects of the matter. The superannuation notice dated the 31st December, 1991 so far as it relates to the present petitioner in Item No. 17 thereof showing the date of superannuation of the petitioner as 30th September 1992 can not therefore be sustained and the same is hereby struck down. The superannuation notice dated the 31st December, 1991 so far as it relates to the present petitioner in Item No. 17 thereof showing the date of superannuation of the petitioner as 30th September 1992 can not therefore be sustained and the same is hereby struck down. For reasons elaborately discussed by me there being no good and sufficient reason to ignore the date of the petitioner's birth as declared by her at the time of entering the service which is supported by affidavit and which rather falls within the probability range of medical opinion, I direct that the respondents shall treat the declared date viz. the 30th September, 1935 as the date of birth of the petitioner for the purpose of her superannuation as well as for purpose of office record. The date of the petitioner's superannuation shall be counted from 30th September, 1935 and accordingly she will be superannuated on the 30th September, 1993. If the petitioner has already been superannuated on the basis of the notice dated the 31st December, 1991 she shall be forthwith reinstated in service and for the interim period from the 1st October, 1992 till the date of reinstatement the petitioner shall be deemed to have been in actual service and shall be paid all her emoluments admissible as such. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly. No cost is however ordered.