JUDGMENT The appellant was admittedly a tenant of the respondent in respect of the suit accommodation. He suffered a decree for ejectment on the ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (in short, the "Act"), from both the Courts below. In this second appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to paragraph 1 of the plaint and submitted that the respondent could not claim himself to be the owner of the suit accommodation, because the land was purchased in the name of the respondent's minor son Inosdas on 14.9.1984. The house was also constructed after obtaining sanction from the Municipal Corporation, Raipur in the name of his minor son Inosdas. Under these circumstances, by virtue of section 4 (1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, (in short, "Benami Transactions Act"), the suit for ejectment by the respondent as owner of the suit accommodation was not maintainable. Reliance was placed in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 . It was further submitted that as there is no estoppel against law, the admission of the appellant in his written statement that the respondent was the owner and landlord of the suit accommodation is of no consequence. It was also argued that the finding of the Courts below about existence of bona fide need of the respondent for the suit accommodation was perverse and that even otherwise a decree for ejectment under section 12(1)(e) of the Act could not be passed as the respondent was not the owner of the suit accommodation for the reasons aforesaid. I find no substance in any of the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant had taken the suit accommodation on rent from the respondent. He was also paying rent to him. Accordingly by virtue of section 116 of the Evidence Act he is estopped from challenging the title of the respondent over the suit accommodation. It is not in dispute that the appellant had taken the suit accommodation on rent from the respondent. He was also paying rent to him. Accordingly by virtue of section 116 of the Evidence Act he is estopped from challenging the title of the respondent over the suit accommodation. Further "landlord" as defined in section 2 (b) of the Act means" a person, who, for the time being, is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodation were let to a tenant and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord." As the respondent was receiving rent from the appellant he was landlord of the suit accommodation and entitled to maintain a suit for ejectment in respect of the suit accommodation. This provision would show that a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide need can be obtained by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof. Further, if he is not the owner thereof for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. Even accepting the argument, if we take it that the accommodation was held by the respondent for the benefit of his minor son, the need advanced by the respondent was also that of the son as member of his family. It may also be said that the respondent was a member of the family of his minor son and in that capacity also he was entitled to obtain possession of the suit accommodation. I also find that in the present case the alleged transaction may be said to be coming within the exception given under sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act. I also find that in the present case the alleged transaction may be said to be coming within the exception given under sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act. Accordingly for all these reasons, I find no substance in the contention that the suit for ejectment by the respondent on the ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act was not maintainable, because he was not the owner of the suit accommodation for the reasons advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant does not require any discussion at length in the light of the aforesaid facts and further in the light of the fact that case was not between landlord and tenant. Both the Courts below have returned a concurrent finding based on evidence on record, that the need of the respondent for the suit accommodation is genuine. This is a finding of fact and as I find no perversity in the finding, it calls for no interference in this second appeal. AIR 1989 SC 1247 distinguished. Appeal dismissed.