Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE pertinent facts in brief giving rise to the present petition are as under. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm incorporated on 4th November 1953 having four partners. On the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 hereinafter referrred to as the said Act the petitioner firm filed form no. 1 under section 6 of the said act through one of its partners namely Pravinchandra Mulchand. The said form listed the properties held by the firm. On 26th March 1982 the competent authority issued notice under section 8 (3) together with the draft statement in respect of the properties held by the firm and this was served upon the said partner Pravinchandra Mulchand. Thereafter after a hearing the competent authority issued on 9th August 19x4 the final statement under section 9 of the said act. The factual finding recorded was to the effect that the firm held 2 741. 21 sq. mts. of vacant land and deducted therefrom 1 500 sq. mts. being the maximum permissible holding of vacant land leaving 1 241. 21 sq. mts. as excess vacant land. This order passed by the competent authority is at annexure B to the petition. This finding of the competent authority was challenged by the firm by way of an appeal under section 33 of the said act on 26th October 1984. The firm came to be dissolved on 26th August 1985. The Urban Land Tribunal after hearing the parties dismissed appeal by its judgment and order dated 27th June 1988 at annexure E to the petition. The petitioner firm challenges in the present petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India the aforesaid orders at annexures B and E to the petition. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner initially attempted to raise a controversy as regards the nature and character of the entity which had filed the said form no. 1. He sought to dispute that the said form no. 1 was of or by the partnership firm. However once the facts were established this contention was not seriously pressed. This situation was accepted in as much as the form no. 1 in fact filed was particularly as regards the partnership firm and was filed by a partner of the firm such partner acting for and on behalf of the firm. However once the facts were established this contention was not seriously pressed. This situation was accepted in as much as the form no. 1 in fact filed was particularly as regards the partnership firm and was filed by a partner of the firm such partner acting for and on behalf of the firm. An examination of the said form no. 1 not only discloses the aforesaid fact but also discloses that the said form does not disclose any assets which were not of the firm and further that form does not disclose any assets claimed by the said partner Pravinchandra Mulchand to be of his individual ownership of holding. Thus it is established that the said form pertains to the assets of the said partnership firm on the relevant date. ( 3 ) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was to the effect that certain properties were situated in what is known as green belt and that therefore they should have been excluded from the computation of vacant land by virtue of an order of the State Government dated 12th December 1979. The properties which are sought to be excluded from the computation on this ground consist of survey no. 150 of village Kotharia District Rajkot and particularly plot nos. 28 42 and 41 thereof each plot admeasuring 347. 64 sq. mts. This contention was specifically negatived by the competent authority on a specific finding of fact namely that although the said land is within the green strip included in the master plan the said land is neither agricultural land nor is it in fact used for agricultural purposes. In fact these plots have since long been converted to non-agricultural use and were shown as non- agricultural lands even when the firm purchased these plots as early as on 24 August 1965. This contention also has been independently examined in appeal by the Urban Land Tribunal and after confirming the finding of the competent authority the Tribunal has further proceeded to hold that not only is the land designated for non-agricultural use but is in fact being used for non-agricultural purpose namely for residential use and construction. In view of these concurrent findings of fact this contention cannot be accepted. 3. In view of these concurrent findings of fact this contention cannot be accepted. 3. 1 When the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon an order of the State Government dated 12th December 1979 in support of his contention for exclusion of the lands covered in the green belt it was pointed out that the said order was totally irrelevant so far as the petitioner firm is concerned inasmuch as the same was an order on the adjudication of some other distant land qua some other persons This order was not an order in rem establishing any general principle ( 4 ) THE next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was to the effect that a deduction of 75 sq. yards ought to have been allowed to the petitioner since this area is to be lost to the petitioner due to the implementation of the town planning scheme no 4 of Rajkot. It is stated that this area is lost from survey no 382 and in particular plot no. 39. yards ought to have been allowed to the petitioner since this area is to be lost to the petitioner due to the implementation of the town planning scheme no 4 of Rajkot. It is stated that this area is lost from survey no 382 and in particular plot no. 39. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this context conceded that this contention was not urged before the competent authority Although this contention was raised before the Tribunal it did not find favour and was not accepted for the simple reason that no evidence was available on the record of the case and no evidence was offered before the Tribunal to sustain this contention Thus this being a finding of fact the same cannot be interfered with in the present petition particularly in the absence of an iota of evidence ( 5 ) THE next contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the draft statement should have been served on all the individual partners of the firm rather than merely on one of such partners In this context the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon the provisions of section 8 (3) read with rule 5 1 am unable to read into either of these provisions any such requirement as contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner The fact remains that the draft statement was served on the legal entity which filed the form namely the partnership firm through the very agency through whom such form was filed namely its partner Pravinchandra Mulchand This aspect of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been decided by this court in the case of Patel Gordhan Kadvabhai and others vs. Competent Authority and Additional Collector Rajkot and others reported in 29 (1) GLR page 121 Thus even this contention requires to be rejected ( 6 ) THE next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the agricultural land situated in an agricultural zone should have been excluded from the computation of vacant land According to the petitioners this land consists of survey nos. 172 174 and 175/2 admeasuring in aggregate 64162 sq. mts. 172 174 and 175/2 admeasuring in aggregate 64162 sq. mts. The learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that this contention was neither raised nor urged before the competent authority However when then same was urged in appeal before the Tribunal the Tribunal found as a factual aspect that this land is neither agricultural nor is it actually used for agricultural purpose In fact it has been plotted out for residential purposes The Tribunal further observed that the actual inquiry as to the state of the land indicate that it is open land and in the opposite plot construction is under way for industrial purposes Moreover this specific land has been included in the master plan and therefore the same would not be covered by the definition of agricultural land Since these are the findings of fact it would not be proper to interfere with the same in the present petition ( 7 ) THE last contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is as to the fact that the particular land disclosed in form no. 1 and dealt with by the competent authority forms part of the assets of the firm The various partners in particular the four partners each having 1/4th share in the partnership are therefore entitled to 1/4th share in the assets of the firm In other words each partner is a co-owner in respect of disclosed assets of the firm in particular on the basis of this submission the argument further proceeds to invoke the application of section 4 (5) of the said act It is contended that on a true and correct interpretation of section 4 sub-section 5 each of the partners of the partnership firm is entitled to a separate unit in the aggregate assets of the firm on the particular facts of the case it is contended that the total assets of the firm should be divided into five units one for the firm and four units in respect of four partners. In the alternative it is suggested that atleast four units can be allowed one in respect of each partner. This submission is based firstly upon the interpretation placed upon section 4 sub-section (5) of the said act by the learned counsel for the petitioner and also on the further submission that each of the partners in his turn would be entitled to file a separate form no. This submission is based firstly upon the interpretation placed upon section 4 sub-section (5) of the said act by the learned counsel for the petitioner and also on the further submission that each of the partners in his turn would be entitled to file a separate form no. 1 in respect of his own individual share in the assets of the firm. This contention is sought to be supported with reference to the interpretation of section (5) of the partnership act where certain commentaries in text books have been referred to with a view to establish that the firm is not a legal entity. However these submissions proceed entirely on an erroneous approach. ( 8 ) IT must be noted that the said act is a special piece of legislation and that therefore for the purpose of the said act special definitions have been created and laid down in the act itself. Section 2 (i) of the said act defines person as so to include an individual a family a firm a company or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. This definition has been interpreted in a number of decisions whereby its true meaning as also the intention of the legislature is nc longer in doubt. This definition of person is not merely an inclusive definition but is in a sense an artificial definition conferring legal identity upon the various entities or bodies contemplated by the definition. Thus it is not possible to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that for the purposes of section 4 sub-section (5) the firm must be treated separately from its partners and separate legal identities should be assigned to each of them. 8. 1 This submission also cannot be acceded to in view of the contrary view clearly established in a number of decisions of this court. 8. 2 In the case of Minish K. Sheth and others vs. State of Gujarat and others reported at 26 (1) GLR page 202 this court has held specifically that under seciton 4 sub-section (5) of the said act several partners of a firm are not entitled to hold in an agglomeration area as many units of land as there are partners. Paras 25 and 26 of the said decision clearly provide ample justification for the decision. 8. Paras 25 and 26 of the said decision clearly provide ample justification for the decision. 8. 3 This view has further been reinforced by another decision of this court in Special Civil Application No. 1582 of 1983 decided on 27th March 1984 (Coram: A. P. Ravani J.) Para 6 of this decision once again provides ample justification for the view taken and also draws support from the earlier decision referred to hereinabove. ( 9 ) YET another decision relevant to this aspect is the decision of this court in the case of M/s. Central Engineering Works vs. Competent Authority and Additional Collector Rajkot and another reported in 30 (1) GLR page 650. 9. 1 In the context of these decisions it is by now well established that the partnership firm must be regarded to be a separate person or an individual legal entity so far as the provisions of this act are concerned. Since the firm is an individual entity and the firm has in fact filed the prescribed form under section 6 of the said act it is the holding of the firm which is required to be taken into consideration and not the holdings of its partners. No doubt if the partners in their individual and personal capacity (and not as partners) hold another land they would be required to fill in separate forms as required by section 6 of the act. It is in the adjudication of their holdings as individuals that their share of the land held by them as partners is required to be included in their individual holdings by virtue of section 4 (5) of the said act. Thus the net conclusion is that for the purposes of the said act a partnership firm is separate person having a distinct legal capacity and being a different legal entity from its partners If such a firm is found to hold excess vacant land then such excess land would vest in the State Government 9. 2 In the premises aforesaid even the last contention taken on behalf of the petitioner must fail. So far as the computation of the holdings of the partnership are concerned clearly the partners would not be entitled to a separate unit nor would they be entitled to claim exlcusion from the total holdings of the partnership at the rate of 1 500 sq. mts. of land per partner. So far as the computation of the holdings of the partnership are concerned clearly the partners would not be entitled to a separate unit nor would they be entitled to claim exlcusion from the total holdings of the partnership at the rate of 1 500 sq. mts. of land per partner. ( 10 ) THUS none of the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are sustainable This petition must therefore be rejected and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs Interim relief is vacated. ( 11 ) AS regards Civil Application No 1643 of 1991 filed in the main Special Civil Application it is urged that the heirs of one of the deceased partners namely Anopchand Mulchand had applied for permission to the competent authority under section 26 of the said act for permission to sell certain properties specified in the application. It appears that the competent authority has rejected this application by its order dated 9th July 1991 only on the ground that the present petition was pending in this court and an interim stay had been granted. Obviously this decision is not a decision on the merits of the application. Since the petition is no longer pending having been decided by the present order it is necessary and also in the interests of justice that the said application be considered by the competent authority on merits It is therefore directed that the order of rejection of the said application by order of rejection of the said application by order dated 9th July 1991 is quashed and set aside and the competent authority is directed to hear and decide the said application on merits and according to law In view of this direction no further orders are required on the Civil Application which stands disposed of with no order as to costs petition Dismissed. .