Judgment :- MISHRA, J. 1. The Government of Tamil Nadu and the Registrar of this Court have appealed against an order by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 256 of 1989. The learned Single Judge has held that the Government Order in G.O.Ms No. 809/Home (Courts-I), dated 25-3-1986 and the notification of the second respondent No. 9/86, dated 3-4-1986 suffered from the vice of unfair discrimination and/or violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution and accordingly issued a Writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the same and a writ in the nature of mandamus to reinstate the writ petitioner/respondent in service with all attendant benefits. 2. The writ petitioner/respondent in this appeal was appointed as temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate by the first respondent, Vide G.O.Ms. No. 3104/Home, dt. 10-12-1982 under R. 13 of the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service Rules which were then in force (the Rules have since been repealed and Judicial Second Class Magistrates have since been upgraded in the regular cadre of District Munsif-cum-Magistrate). She joined as a Judicial Second Class Magistrate at Kulithalai in Tiurchirappalli District and from there she was transferred to Aruppukkottai in Kamarajar District and again as Judicial Second Class Magistrate, III, Vellore. The first appellant by G.O.Ms No. 809 dated 25-3-1986 ordered the termination of the service of the petitioner. The order of termination runs as follows: “Under R. 13(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service Rules, the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby terminates the temporary services of Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi as temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate in the Judicial Department in the Tamil Nadu Slate Magisterial Service, 2. The Registrar, High Court, Madras is requested to terminate the temporary services of Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi as temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate. By Order of the Governor Sd.- T.V. Venkataraman, Special Commissioner & Secretary to Government” In pursuauce thereof the second appellant issued a notification No. 9/86, dated 3-4-1986 relieving the writ petitioner/respondent with effect from the date of service of the notification. This Notification (No. 9/86) runs as follows: “ROC. No. 22/85. Con.E1. Notification No. 9/86 Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi, Judicial Second Class Magistrate No. III, Vellore, who had been appointed temporarily as Judicial Second Class Magistrate in G.O.Ms. No. 104, Home, dated 10-12-1982, and whose services in Judicial Department have been terminated in G.O.Ms. This Notification (No. 9/86) runs as follows: “ROC. No. 22/85. Con.E1. Notification No. 9/86 Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi, Judicial Second Class Magistrate No. III, Vellore, who had been appointed temporarily as Judicial Second Class Magistrate in G.O.Ms. No. 104, Home, dated 10-12-1982, and whose services in Judicial Department have been terminated in G.O.Ms. No. 809, Home (Cts), dated 25-3-86, is relieved with effect from the date of service of this Notification. Sd.- S. Janarthanam, Registrar, High Court. Madras, dated 3-4-1986” 3. It is not in dispute that on the date of the impugned order the writ petitioner/respondent was holding the post of temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate under R. 13(e) of the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service Rules, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’, the Government had the right to terminate the services of the Writ Petitioner at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. It is however stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition that the petitioners services were not terminated on the ground of any unsatisfactory service or loss, or confidence but for the reason of alleged misconduct for which a regular enquiry was necessary. The learned single Judge has found on the basis of the materials produced before him that the order was not an order of termination simpliciter but amounted to punishment. 4. To appreciate how the learned single Judge has come to the aforesaid conclusion we may extract from his judgment only such facts which are not disputed and which alone are relevant for judging whether the first appellant exercised the statutory power to terminate the services of a temporary employee, or the order as found by the learned Judge was intended to and in effect punish/punished the petitioner. The learned single Judge has stated as follows: “A perusal of the file shows that on 1-6-84, one Boopathi, President of Aruppukottai People Organisation, Aruppukkottai sent a petition to the Chief Justice. High Court, Madras, with a copy to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aruppukottai, Sivagangai containing several allegations against the petitioner. The allegations in the petition in brief are that the petitioner received bribe at the rate of Rs. 25 and above through one Vasanthakumar, Head Clerk and Thiru Manickavasagam, Clerk, Judicial II Class Magistrates Court, Aruppukkottai. A list of cases wherein the petitioner has released the accused after receiving the bribe amount of Rs. 100 to Rs. The allegations in the petition in brief are that the petitioner received bribe at the rate of Rs. 25 and above through one Vasanthakumar, Head Clerk and Thiru Manickavasagam, Clerk, Judicial II Class Magistrates Court, Aruppukkottai. A list of cases wherein the petitioner has released the accused after receiving the bribe amount of Rs. 100 to Rs. 500 was also given and it was further alleged in the petition that the petitioner was in the habit of disposing of the cases without examining witnesses and even without issuing summons to police favouring the party who has bribed her. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sivaganga, who received the petition from the said Boopathy on 6-6-1985 forwarded the same to the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras, for necessary action. The Special Officer, Vigilance Cell of High Court, Madras, on receipt of the petition and the letter from the Chief Judicial Magistrate submitted a note to the Chief Justice referring to the allegations of corruption made in the petition sent by the said Bhoopathi against the petitioner. In the note submitted by the Special Officer he also referred to the telegram sent by the Bar Members of Aruppukottai Bar Association praving for not reposting the petitioner to Aruppukottai after the expiry of the maternity leave granted to the petitioner. The Special Officer prayed for orders from the Chief Justice as to whether the Registry may be required not to repost the petitioner to Aruppukottai after the expiry of the maternity lease and whether a probe may be made with regard to the allegations made against her. On 1-10-1985 on the office-note submitted by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court. Madras, referring to the various complaints of corruption received against the petitioner, the then Chief Justice passed an order stating that the service of the petitioner may be terminated by an order of termination simpliciter. Thereupon the second respondent sent a D.O. Letter No. 22/86, dated 4-10-1985 to the Special Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Home Department, requesting that the orders of the Government may be obtained terminating the service of the petitioner in the Judicial Department in the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service. On the basis of the D.O.Lr. No. 22/85 dt. 4-10-1985 received from the second respondent, the 1st respondent passed the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 809 terminating the temporary service of the petitioner.” 5. On the basis of the D.O.Lr. No. 22/85 dt. 4-10-1985 received from the second respondent, the 1st respondent passed the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 809 terminating the temporary service of the petitioner.” 5. A Bench of seven Judges of the Supreme Court has in the case of Samshar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR1974 S.C. 2192 touched upon almost every aspect of a person in the judicial service of the State, the control that the High Courts are required to exercise under Art. 235 of the Constitution of India and the powers that the High Courts and the Governments of the States exercise with respect to the service conditions of the Judicial Officers. Dealing with the aspect of the case how the termination of the appointment of a probationer in service or a temporary employee in service should be viewed by the Courts, the Supreme Court took notice of the case-law on the subject beginning from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 S.C. 36 and the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Gopikishore Prosad A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689, State of Orissa v. Ram Narain Das AIR 1961 S.C. 177 , Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 S.C. 531 , R.C. Banerjee v. Union of India AIR 1963 S.C. 1552 . Chempaklal G. Shah v. Union of India AIR 1964 S.C. 1854 , K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra AIR1971 S.C. 998 and The State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk AIR 1971 S.C. 1011 and stated the law in these words: “No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated”, it, can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.” Elucidating further the Supreme Court has said. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.” Elucidating further the Supreme Court has said. “Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved i n this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry, But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services a re terminated without following the provisions of Art. 311(2) he can claim protection.” The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the fact of holding an inquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really byway of punishment. A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Art. 311(2). A preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee has been held not to attract Art. 311. On the other hand, a statement in the order of termination that the temporary servant is undesirable has been held to import an element of punishment, and thus if the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment, then a probationer is entitled to attract Art. 311. “The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive.” 6. All that the Court, therefore, has to see in such a situation is whether the order, though unexceptionable in form is made following a report of misconduct. If it is found that the order although unexceptionable in form, is made following a report based on misconduct, it will amount to an order of punishment and attract Art. 311 of the Constitution. 7. The rule that in cases of termination/removal from service, it should be seen that the order in reality is a punishment, though ostensibly removal in terms of contract of service has been applied also to cases where Art. 311 is not attracted but there is either protection of Arts, 14 and 16 of the Constitution or of one or the other statute. This rule of piercing or lifting the veil of the order of termination has been applied in right earnest all through by the Courts and in one of the latest judgments of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp. (I) S.C.C. 600 one of the learned Judges has reiterated this principle in these words: “It is undoubtedly true as contended, by Sri Bhasin, learned counsel for the intervenor, that it is open to the authorities to terminate the services of a temporary employee without holding an enquiry. But in view of the march of law made, viz., that it is not the form of the section but the substance of the order is to be looked into, it is open to the court to lift the veil and pierce the impugned action to find whether the impugned action is the foundation to impose punishment or punishment or is onl y motive. A larger bench of seven Judges of this Court Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab 1972 (1) SCC 814 = 1972 (3) SCR 606 elaborately considered the question and laid down the rule in this regard. The play of fair play is to secure justice procedural as well as substantive. The substance of the order, the effect thereof, is to be looked into. Whether no misconduct, spurns the action or whether the services of a probationer is terminated without imputation of misconduct is the test. The play of fair play is to secure justice procedural as well as substantive. The substance of the order, the effect thereof, is to be looked into. Whether no misconduct, spurns the action or whether the services of a probationer is terminated without imputation of misconduct is the test. Termination simpliciter, either due to loss of confidence or unsuitably to the post may be a relevant factor to terminate the services of a pr obtainer. But it must be hedged with a bona fide over-all consideration of the previous conduct without being tainted with either mala fide or colourable exercise of power or for extraneous considerations. Such actions were upheld by this Court. The action must be done honestly with due case and prudence.” 8. Another learned Judge has, in the same judgment pointed out that, “Art. 14 is the general principle while Art. 311(2) is a special provision applicable to all civil services under the State. Art. 311(2) embodies the principles of natural justice but proviso to Cl. (2) of Art. 311 excludes the operation of principles of natural justice engrafied in Art. 311(2) as an exception in the given circumstances enumerated in the three clauses of the proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Art. 14 read with Arts. 16(1) and 311 are to be harmoniously interpreted that the proviso to Art. 311(2) excludes the application of the principles of natural justice as an exception; and the applicability of Art. 311(2) must, therefore, be circumscribed to the civil service and be construed accordingly. In respect of all other employees covered by Art. 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Art. 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Art. 14 and other relevant Articles, like Art. 21 must be allowed to have full play with out any inhibition, unless the statutory Rules themselves, consistent with the mandate of Arts, 14, 16, 19 and 21 provide, expressly such an exception.” 9. The learned single judge has been aware of the above principle as stated by the Supreme Court in Government Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa AIR 1979 S.C. 429 that the protection under Arts. The learned single judge has been aware of the above principle as stated by the Supreme Court in Government Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa AIR 1979 S.C. 429 that the protection under Arts. 14 and 16(1) will be available even to a temporary government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced even though the competent authority had the discretion under the conditions of service governing the employee concerned to terminate the latters employment without notice. For, according to the Supreme Court, such a direction has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play and not capriciously. Bereft of a rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is the very antithesis of the rule of law on which our democratic polity is founded. Aroitrary invocation or enforcement of a service condition terminating the service of a temporary employee may itself constitute denial of equal protection and offend the equality clause in Arts. 14 and 16(1), a rule which is once again reiterated by the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi Trans-Port Corporations case (supra). 9-A. In Samsher Singhs case (supra) the Supreme Court has pointed out how acting upon a complaint a vigliance enquiry was conduced against a probationer and how in those circumstances the Court found that the order which ostensibly purported to terminate the services of a temporary employee by purported exercise of a statutory power was in the nature of a stigma and punishment and thus hit by the all pervasive doctrine of equality under Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India and the special protection to the persons holding civil service under Art. 311 thereof. 10. In the instant case, the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell of the High Court, on receipt of the petition and the letter from the Chief Judicial Magistrate submitted a note to the Chief Justice which referred to the allegations of corruption made in the petition. In the note submitted to the Chief Justice the Special Officer also referred to the telegram sent by the Bar members of Aruppukottai Bar Association praying for not reposting the Writ Petitioner to Aruppukottai after the expiry of the maternity leave granted to the writ petitioner/respondent. In the note submitted to the Chief Justice the Special Officer also referred to the telegram sent by the Bar members of Aruppukottai Bar Association praying for not reposting the Writ Petitioner to Aruppukottai after the expiry of the maternity leave granted to the writ petitioner/respondent. He prayed for orders from the Chief Justice as to whether the registry may be required not to repost the Writ Petitioner to Aruppukottai after the expiry of the maternity leave and whether a probe may be made with regard to the allegations made against her. On 1-10-1985 on the office-note submitted by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, referring to the various complaints of corruption received against the writ petitioner/respondent the then Chief Justice passed an order stating that the services of the writ petitioner/respondent may be terminated by an order of termination simpliciter. Thereupon, the second appellant sent a D.O. Letter (No. 22/85) dated 4-10-1985 to the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government, Home Department, requesting that orders of the Government may be obtained terminating the services of the Writ Petitioner in the Judicial Department in the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service. On the basis of. the D.O. Letter dated 4-10-1985 received from the second appellant the first appellant passed the impugned Government Order, G.O.Ms. No. 809 terminating the temporary service, of the writ petitioner. These facts are not in dispute It is thus a case of the decision taken to terminate the services of the Writ Petitioner/respondent on the complaints of corruption received against her. The decision to take action under the rule empowering the Government to terminate the service of a temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate was used as a cloak to avoid a regular probe into the allegations and to get rid of the writ petitioner/respondent without affording the opportunity of being heard and without there being any material to substantiate the allegations. 11. For the reasons aforementioned the only proper order on the facts and in the circumstances of this case is to quash G.O.Ms. No. 809 Home (Cts. I) Department dated 25-3-1986 of the first appellant and Notification No. 9 of 1986 dated 3-4-1986 of the second appellant and to direct reinstatement of the writ petitioner/respondent in service. The learned single judge thus has fallen in no error in ordering as above. There is no merit in the appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. I) Department dated 25-3-1986 of the first appellant and Notification No. 9 of 1986 dated 3-4-1986 of the second appellant and to direct reinstatement of the writ petitioner/respondent in service. The learned single judge thus has fallen in no error in ordering as above. There is no merit in the appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The appellants are accordingly directed to implement the order.