ORDER ABDUL HADI, J. - This tax revision by the Revenue is against the order of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madras, in Tribunal Appeal No. 1086 of 1980, deleting the assessment under section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 on a turnover of Rs. 27,668.12. This case relates to assessment year 1977-78. The said turnover, as originally assessed by the assessing officer, was Rs. 32,231. But in the first appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was reduced to the abovesaid figure and the said reduced figure was also deleted by the Tribunal as it stood in the assessment. The said turnover relates to purchase of lime shell made by the assessees/respondents (not supported by bills) which was subsequently converted into poultry shell grit, after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 2,780 as charges for grinding the same. As per section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, as it stood in the abovesaid assessment year purchase tax is levied if a dealer purchases from a registered dealer or any other person any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act) in circumstances in which no tax is payable under section 3, 4 or 5 as the case may be and "consumes" such goods in the "manufacture" of "other goods" for sale. Admittedly, no tax was payable at the purchase transaction of the assessees under section 3, 4 or 5 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. That is why the assessees were charged to tax on the abovesaid purchase under section 7-A on the ground that the assessees have consumed the said lime shell purchased in the manufacture of the abovesaid shell grit, and sold it as poultry feed. The finding of the Tribunal was that the assessees purchased the abovesaid lime shell and only powdered it as poultry feed and that the original lime shell and the converted shell grit could not be taken as different commodities and that hence, there was no "manufacture" of "other goods". The Tribunal, though deleted the abovesaid turnover on the abovesaid reasoning, sustained the penalty levied under section 22(2) of the Act on the assessees (as reduced by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to a sum of Rs. 86) on the ground that the assessees have collected excess tax of Rs. 86 illegally without authority. The Tribunal, though deleted the abovesaid turnover on the abovesaid reasoning, sustained the penalty levied under section 22(2) of the Act on the assessees (as reduced by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to a sum of Rs. 86) on the ground that the assessees have collected excess tax of Rs. 86 illegally without authority. Now, the only question before us is about the deletion of the abovesaid turnover and whether there is consumption of the abovesaid lime shell in the manufacture of other goods for sale, so as to attract section 7-A. The Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) argues that the Tribunal below erred in holding that there was no manufacture in the conversion of the abovesaid lime shell into shell grit and that they were not two different goods. She relied on State of Tamil Nadu represented by Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Bharat Dairy Farm, Vanjipalayam [1991] 81 STC 332 (Mad.); (1992) 1 MTCR 590. The question there was whether cream converted into butter by the process of stirring, brought into existence any different commercial commodity than the original one and whether manufacturing process was involved in the abovesaid conversion. In that context it was held relying on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka [1986] 63 STC 239 that there was no consumption of cream in the process of converting it into butter and that, therefore, section 7-A was not attracted to the said case. Though, factually, the said decision went in favour of the assessee in that case, the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) relied on the principle reiterated there and urged that if the said principle was applied to facts of the present case, tax under section 7-A would necessarily get attracted. In that connection, she drew our attention to paragraph 11 of the said judgment where the said principle is stated as follows : "..... it is only when the change or a series of changes take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct commodity that it can be said that a new commodity, distinct from the original, has come into being. it is only when the change or a series of changes take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct commodity that it can be said that a new commodity, distinct from the original, has come into being. The test is whether in the eyes of those dealing in the commodity or in commercial parlance the processed commodity is regarded as distinct in character and identity from the original commodity." So, the submission of the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) is that in the commercial parlance shell grit, which is used as a poultry feed, is different from the original lime shell and that hence the abovesaid conversion is manufacture of another commodity, attracting the abovesaid provision under section 7-A. She also drew our attention to State of Andhra Pradesh v. Balaji Poultry Agencies [1991] 82 STC 353 (AP), wherein also it was, inter alia, held that the shell grit was poultry feed. So, according to her, shell grit is a different commodity from ordinary lime shell and though, according to the Tribunal the abovesaid conversion process involved only grinding of the lime shell into powder, the converted product, namely shell grit, should be taken to have been "manufactured" from-out of lime shell. She also pointed out that as much as Rs. 2,780 has been incurred as expenses for such conversion. She also relied on the decision in the judgment dated August 7, 1991 of a Division Bench of this Court in Tax Case Appeal No. 735 of 1982. - Decan Limeshell & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer which has been also reported in [1992] 87 STC 29; (1992) 2 MTCR 258. In that decision also lime shell was converted into lime powder. The process of conversion in that case consisted of burning the lime shell along with coal and thereafter removing the coal dust therefrom. In that context, this Court held that keeping in view the series of changes when lime shell was burnt along with coal, coal dust was removed and the resultant product was crushed to be made into powder, the lime powder was a new and distinct commercial article for the manufacture of which lime shell had been consumed. In that context, this Court held that keeping in view the series of changes when lime shell was burnt along with coal, coal dust was removed and the resultant product was crushed to be made into powder, the lime powder was a new and distinct commercial article for the manufacture of which lime shell had been consumed. She also relied on [1988] 69 STC 320 (Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd.) wherein the Supreme Court held that paddy and rice are two distinct commodities and milling of paddy involved a manufacturing process. No doubt, in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63, relied on by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that although a degree of processing was involved in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit, the commodity continued to possess its original identity notwithstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing and thereafter canning it. She submits that the principle adopted in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC) is not different from that adopted in the abovesaid Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka [1986] 63 STC 239 (SC). Only on its application to the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court held that the pineapple slices were not in commercial parlance, treated differently from the original pineapple fruit. But the learned Additional Government Pleader submits that that is not so in the present case since the abovesaid shell grit is treated in commercial parlance as a different commodity from the lime shell and so the Tribunal erred in coming to the conclusion it reached. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the assessees/respondents argues that the process involved was only grinding lime shell into powder and that process, by itself, could not be termed "manufacture". He also seeks to distinguish the above referred to decision reported in [1992] 87 STC 29 (Mad.); (1992) 2 MTCR 258 (Decan Limeshell & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu) by pointing out that there the lime shell was actually burnt with coal and subsequently the coal dust was removed and that the lime shell thus went through some changes. On the other hand, he submits, that in the present case the lime shell was only powdered or grinded. We have considered the rival submissions. v. State of Tamil Nadu) by pointing out that there the lime shell was actually burnt with coal and subsequently the coal dust was removed and that the lime shell thus went through some changes. On the other hand, he submits, that in the present case the lime shell was only powdered or grinded. We have considered the rival submissions. Even though as per the finding of the Tribunal that the conversion process in the present case involves only grinding lime shell into powder, the resultant product is treated as a different commercial commodity so we see very much force in the arguments of the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) and the decisions cited by her. Therefore, we are of the view that the Tribunal erred in holding that shell grit was not a different commodity from the original lime shell. Admittedly, the original lime shell could not be used as poultry feed. Only when it is converted into shell grit, it can be used as poultry feed. Therefore, the shell grit cannot be equated with the original lime shell and treated as one and the same commodity. In commercial parlance also, it is treated only as a different commodity. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal in so far as it deleted the abovesaid turnover of Rs. 27,668.12 is set aside and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in that regard is restored. The tax case is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.