Judgment :- M. Srinivasan. J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by a second show cause notice issued on 8 May 1992 by his employer. According to the petitioner, an order of suspension was passed against him on 21 September 1990, on the basis of certain charges and the chargesheet was framed on 22 October 1990. There was also a criminal proceeding before Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, who by his judgment dated 30 April 1991, acquitted the petitioner holding that the charges were not proved. Thereafter the second respondent held the inquiry and issued notice on 8 May 1992, enclosing a copy of the inquiry findings. The proposed punishment was also mentioned in the notice and the petitioner was called upon to make his representation within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. At that stage, the petitioner has come forward with this writ petition for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records and quashing the charges framed earlier against him. 2. The main contention of the petitioner is that the substance of the present charge in departmental inquiry is the same as the charge framed against him in the criminal proceedings under S.75 (2) of the City Police Act, and, therefore, it is not open to the respondent to hold an inquiry after the petitioner is acquitted by the criminal Court. I do not agree with the petitioner that the substance of the two charges is the same. While in the criminal Court, the charge is that he is guilty of the offence under S.75 (2) of the City Police Act. In the departmental inquiry, the substance of the charger is that he used filthy and slang language while abusing all the superiors and that he is guilty of misconduct within the meaning of the Service Rules. Hence, the charge framed against him departmentally has to be considered independently of the findings of the criminal Court. Hence, there is no substance in the contention that the departmental inquiry cannot proceed against him. 3. The inquiry has proceeded and a second show cause notice has been issued to him calling upon him to make his respondents as to why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. Hence, there is no substance in the contention that the departmental inquiry cannot proceed against him. 3. The inquiry has proceeded and a second show cause notice has been issued to him calling upon him to make his respondents as to why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. It is open to the petitioner to make his representations and it ultimately they are negatived and an order is passed against the petitioner, then there will be sufficient time for him to take proceedings against such order either by way of appeal if an appeal is available or by other appropriate proceedings. At this stage, the contention of the petitioner that there is no proper inquiry or that he was not given copes of the deposition of the witnesses or that he was not furnished with other relevant documents, cannot be considered. That can be considered only after final orders are passed. 4. The next contention of the petitioner is that there is inordinate delay in resuming the department proceedings against the petitioner. Accordingly to him, the chargesheet was issued on 22nd October 1990 and the second show cause notice is issued only on 8 May 1992, i.e. after a period of one year. It is contended that there is inordinate delay after the issue of chargesheet and it is not open to the respondents to hold departmental inquiry after the expiry of a period of one year. There is no merit in this contention, as it is seen that the inquiry is over and the second show-cause notice has been issued to him, because it is not as if the inquiry has commenced only after a period of one year. Even otherwise, the charges having been already framed, the contention is unsustainable. 5. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. George Verghese. [1990 T. L. N. J. 294]. In that case, the misconduct took place between 14th March 1974 and 20th March 1975. The charge memorandum was framed on 9th April 1981. 5. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. George Verghese. [1990 T. L. N. J. 294]. In that case, the misconduct took place between 14th March 1974 and 20th March 1975. The charge memorandum was framed on 9th April 1981. The Division Bench pointed out that no disciplinary action was taken for a period of about 6 years and the taken for a period of about 6 years and the fact that the authorities waited for the criminal proceedings to be concluded, will not enable them to initiate proceedings departmentally against the employee after a period of six years. That judgment has no relevance whatsoever to the present case. 6. My attention is drawn to the judgment in Tirunelveli Tuticorin Electricity Supply Company, Ltd. Tirunelveli v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Anr. 1975 I(LLJ) 304]. The learned Judge held that when a complaint has been the subject matter of proceedings in a criminal Court and the criminal Court has come to the conclusion with reference to the said complaint, it is not open to any domestic tribunal to come to a contrary conclusion with regard to the identical subject-matter in a domestic inquiry. I have already held on the facts that the subject matter is not identical and, therefore, there is no question of the present inquiry being barred by virtue of the order of the criminal Court. 7. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment in Jeevan Prakash Pandurang Mokashe v. State Bank of India & Anr. [1983-II L. L. N. 250]. In that case, it was held that the principle of res judicata applies, when a person is subjected to a proceeding over a year for determination of the same question on the same facts. Which are decided already in another proceeding. On the facts of the case, I have taken the view that it is not a case of identical charge and the substance of the charge is different and, therefore the ruling will not apply.8. Learned counsel invites my attention to the decision in Abdulla A Latifishah v. Bombay Port Trust & Ors. [1992 - 1 LLN 314]. On the facts of the case, I have taken the view that it is not a case of identical charge and the substance of the charge is different and, therefore the ruling will not apply.8. Learned counsel invites my attention to the decision in Abdulla A Latifishah v. Bombay Port Trust & Ors. [1992 - 1 LLN 314]. It is held in that case that once an employees is honourably acquitted and completely exonerated at the criminal trial, normally the port trust could not have started and proceeded with the departmental inquiry, unless there were strong and sound reasons to do so. Even the passage set out above shows that the departmental inquiry is not completely barred and if there are sufficient reasons therefor, it could be proceeded with. In the present case, the substance of the charge is different and, therefore, there is no error in the proceedings taken against the petitioner. There is no merit in the writ petition. It is dismissed.