Santosh Kumar Jain @ S. C. Jain v. Sumer Chand Jain
1992-11-26
R.N.SAHAY
body1992
DigiLaw.ai
Order : The question for consideration in this Civil Revision application preferred by the defendant nos. 4 and 5 in Title Suit No.1/82 is whether the order of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh dated 20.4.1992 whereby he has permitted partial compromise of the suit between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 suffers from material irregularity and therefore liable to be revised in the exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. 2. The plaintiffs-opposite party instituted a Title Suit No. 1/82 in the court of the Sub- ordinate Judge, Hazaribagh for adjudication and declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit properties which they claimed to have purchased by means of a deed of sale dated 21.8.1980. The case as made out in the plaint is that the properties compromised under Holding No. 373 and 374 ward No.9 of Hazaribagh Municipality was possessed by one Zamir Uddin who by registered deed of sale dated 27.9.36 transferred it in favour of Meghraj Sanganeria. Subsequently pursuant to a compromise recorded in T.S. No. 4 of 1947 one Puran mall Sanganeria purchased the suit property in the Benami name of his daughter Smt. Gini Bai poddar, (defendant no. 6 in the suit) who thereafter through her attorney sold and transferred the land in favour of the plaintiff and thus the plaintiff has become land-lord of the suit premises. It is further alleged that the defendant no. 1 who was living alongwith Purao Mal Sanganeria in the suit premises was merely a licencee. It is further alleged that the claim of defendant no.1 Radha Devi, that she is widow of Puranmal was false and it is further alleged that the petitioner who are defendant nos. 4 and 5 are tenants in a portion of the suit premises and they had filed an application before the House Controller in relation to the dispute of the ownership between Radha Devi and Gini Bai Poddar and asserted that unless title to receive the rent was decided by the House Controller, they may be permitted to deposit the rent in the treasury. The plaintiffs have claimed eviction for the defendant petitioner on the ground of transfer of their tenancy and default in making payment of rent with the landlord. 3. The defendant nos.
The plaintiffs have claimed eviction for the defendant petitioner on the ground of transfer of their tenancy and default in making payment of rent with the landlord. 3. The defendant nos. 1 to 3 filed written statement contested the suit alleging interalia on the plea that the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-Joinder of necessary parties. According to these defendants, Meghraj Sangenaria who purchased the suit property in 1936 had no title or interest over the suit property as he was benamidar of his widow Ratna Devi could not derive any title. The compromise decree in T.S. No. 44/47 did not confer any right, title on Ratna Devi and Puranmal Sanganeria. Gini Bai was not the real owner and Puranmal Sanganeria alone was the owner of the property and after his death his widow had title over the property. The sale executed on behalf of Gini Bai was invalid. 4. Sofar these petitioners are concerned, according to their written statement, the sale deed in favour of defendant no.6 was invalid. The defendant had never attorn the defendant no. 6 as the land-lord and the tenancy was created by Puranmal in the capacity of owner in favour of the petitioner no. 1 on a monthly rental of Rs. 100/- As defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were demanding rent from the petitioner after the death of Puranmal and who claimed ownership of the property, the petitioner flied an application under section 16(2) and (3) or the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act 1977 before the Rent Controller, Hazaribagh for a direction to deposit the rent into the State Treasury till the rival claims or the plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 to 3 was adjudicated by the court. The petition filed by the plaintiff was allowed by the Rent Controller and the petitioner are depositing rent in treasury. 5. In the month of March, 1982, a joint compromise petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiff-defendant nos. 1 to 3 with a prayer that the decree be passed on the compromise. The petitioners objected to the compromise and prayed that the suit be decided as a whole. The trial court accepted the compromise by the impugned order. 6. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the trial court acted with material irregularity in accepting the compromise petition.
The petitioners objected to the compromise and prayed that the suit be decided as a whole. The trial court accepted the compromise by the impugned order. 6. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the trial court acted with material irregularity in accepting the compromise petition. It is submitted that the compromise was entered with malafide intention only for the purpose to disentitle the petitioner to defend the suit. 7. Shri Sheonath has placed a strong reliance in the case of Smt. Rani Bai Vrs. Jaduran: A.I.R. 1969 SC 1118 in support of his plea that if partial compromise is prejudicial to the other contesting parties it cannot be allowed. This decision does not support the contention of the petitioner. In the case before Supreme Court one of the plaintiffs entered into compromise with the defendants and prayed for withdrawal of the suit. The Supreme Court held on the basis of the above compromise, the suit of the remaining plaintiff could not be dismissed. This is not the case here. 8. It has been held in A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 57 that a compromise to which some of the parties alone are parties is not invalid. In A.I.R. 1927 Cal. :193 it has been held that a compromise to which some of the parties to a suit alone are parties the court has a discretion to reject the compromise. But as held in A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 193 and A.I.R. 1926 Oudh. 222 of the interest of several parties to the suit are inseperable, it is not open to some of them above to compromise the matter. This is also not the case here. 9. There is no question for prejudiced to the petitioner on account of the compromise. The petitioner is not debarred from raising the question of title notwithstanding the compromise entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 to 3. It has been held in A.I.R. 1952 Mys : 134, A.I.R. 1965, Mys. : 244 and A.I.R. 1966 : Punjab 3. that the compromise by some of the parties alone cannot affect the position of other parties to the suit. They are neither bound by it nor are entitled to enforce it. 10. In the instant case, the petitioner cannot complain of any prejudice by the compromise recorded by the Court between the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 to 3.
that the compromise by some of the parties alone cannot affect the position of other parties to the suit. They are neither bound by it nor are entitled to enforce it. 10. In the instant case, the petitioner cannot complain of any prejudice by the compromise recorded by the Court between the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 to 3. The order of the Subordinate Judge, therefore, is perfectly within the jurisdiction and does not suffer from any material irregularity. This application is accordingly dismissed but without costs. Application dismissed.