A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners were working as turners in the cement and chemical factory of respondent-Company. Their services were terminated by notice dated 5/02/1981 It was stated in the notice that the management decided to close the mechanical workshop from 9-2-1981 and therefore their services are terminated from 6-2-1981. The workmen were also informed that on any working day they may go to the office of the Company during working hours and receive the amount as may be reasonable due to them. In the notice it is also stated that the Accounts Department was instructed to make payment of one months wages since the workmen were being immediately relieved. The workmen were informed that if any articles belonging to the Company were with the workmen they should hand over the same and obtain clearance. Each workman felt aggrieved by the order of termination of his service and raised industrial dispute. Reference being Reference No. 612/81 (Umakant C. Acharya); 826 (Pravinchandra Naran) and 827/81 (Girdhar Karsan Jethava) were made by the appropriate Government and the disputes were referred to the Labour Court Rajkot. ( 2 ) IN all the three references the dispute was as to whether the workmen should be reinstated on their original posts with full backwages. Since common questions of facts were involved in all the three references at the request of the parties common evidence was recorded and common judgment and award was passed by the Labour Court. After hearing the parties the Labour Court ordered to dismiss all the three references as per its award dated 31/12/1982 The petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of this award and they pray to quash and set aside the same and also for other consequential reliefs. ( 3 ) IN the statement of claim filed by the petitioners-workmen it was alleged that they were serving as turners in the company for about twelve years before the termination of their services on 5 with effect from 6-2-1981; that the workmen had replied by notice dated 7/02/1981 and requested the company to continue them in service. But the company did not comply with the same. But the company did not comply with the same. It was the case of the workmen that there was breach of the provisions of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and they were retrenched unlawfully without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Hence the prayer for reinstatement with full backwages. On behalf of the Company it was contended that since the mechanical workshop of the company which was an independent and separate unit was closed the services of the petitioners were terminated; that the respondent-Company has not committed breach of any of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act; that after the services were terminated the workmen were offered alternative employment but the workmen have not accepted the same. The workmen as well as the respondent-Company led evidence before the Labour Court. On behalf of the petitioners all the three workmen examined themselves while the respondent-Company examined the factory manager Mr. Rakhi. The Labour Court examined the question as to whether it was a case of illegal termination of service or it was a case of relieving the workmen due to closure of one independent and separate unit of the Company. After hearing the parties the Labour Court came to the conclusion that it was a case of relieving the workmen due to closure of one separate independent unit of the Company and that there was no contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. ( 4 ) IN the aforesaid background the question to be determined is: Is it a case of unlawful retrenchment or is it a case of closure of an independent separate unit of the respondent-Company and therefore the action of the company relieving the workmen is legal and proper. In other words it needs to be examined as to whether mechanical workshop of the company can be said to be an independent separate unit of the company ? ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners submits that it was the case of the respondent-Company that the petitioners were working in the workshop. This workshop was a separate independent unit and the same has been closed. Therefore the burden was upon the respondent-Company to prove that the mechanical workshop in which the petitioners were working was a separate independent unit and that it was closed. This workshop was a separate independent unit and the same has been closed. Therefore the burden was upon the respondent-Company to prove that the mechanical workshop in which the petitioners were working was a separate independent unit and that it was closed. It is submitted on behalf of respondent-Company that it was for workmen to prove that it was a case of unlawful retrenchment and this burden cannot be thrown on the respondent-employer. In support of this submission learned Counsel for the respondent-Company has relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in 1987 (2) Labour Law Notes 968 and 1988 (1) Labour Law Notes 329. Reliance is also placed on certain observations made by Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Visu Cement P. Ltd. v. Mazdoor Sangh 20 GLR 561. ( 6 ) IN our opinion it is not necessary to determine as to on whom the burden to prove certain assertions lay. In the instant case both the sides have led evidence. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi reported in AIR 1960 SC 100 the burden of proof really means two different things. It means sometimes that a party is required to prove an allegation before judgment can be given in its favour; it also means that on a contested issue one of the two contending parties has to introduce evidence. The burden of proof is of importance only where by reason of not discharging the burden which was put upon it a party must eventually fail. Where however parties have joined issue and have led evidence and the conflicting evidence can be weighed to determine which way the issue can be decided the abstract question of burden of proof become academic. The same principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India reported in AIR 1984 SC 880. Therein it is stated that the question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side. In such a contingency the party on whom the onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Therein it is stated that the question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side. In such a contingency the party on whom the onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Where however evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the question in issue abstract considerations of onus are out of place and truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties. In view of the position of law settled by the Supreme Court the question as to on whom the burden to prove certain facts lay pale into insignificance because in this case both the sides have led evidence and the Labour Court has decided the case after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties. Hence let us examine the central issue arising in the case. ( 7 ) IT is an undisputed position that in the mechanical workshop there were only six workmen working as turners. The services of all the six workmen were terminated by notice dated 5/02/1981 with effect from 6/02/1981 Three of them have been absorbed in service in factory/plant of the respondent-Company while three of them i. e. the petitioners herein have not been absorbed. It is also an undisputed position that in the notice of termination of services dated 5-2-1981 closure of mechanical workshop is the only reason mentioned. For the first time it is stated in the reply dated 11/02/1981 that there was closure of one separate unit. As far as the evidence on this point is concerned evidence is that of the factory manager Mr. Rakhi who has stated that in the beginning of the year 1981 the management desired to close independent factory workshop. Except this bare statement there is nothing on record to show that the mechanical workshop of respondent-Company was one separate independent unit so as to attract the provisions of Section 25 of the Act which relates to closure of an undertaking. As indicated hereinabove since both the sides have led evidence the question of burden of proof places into insignificance. Except this bare statement there is nothing on record to show that the mechanical workshop of respondent-Company was one separate independent unit so as to attract the provisions of Section 25 of the Act which relates to closure of an undertaking. As indicated hereinabove since both the sides have led evidence the question of burden of proof places into insignificance. The only question which is required to be decided is: Was there evidence on record on the basis of which any reasonable man could come to the conclusion that mechanical workshop was a separate undertaking so as to attract the provisions of Section 25-FFF of the Act ? ( 8 ) IN this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Employees Union v. Management reported in (1986) 2 SCC 624 . In that case the company was having three different divisions: (1) the pharmaceutical division at Worli having 110 workmen; (2) the Laboratory and Dyes Division at Trombay having 60 workmen and (3) Marketing and Sales Division at the address of the Companys registered office at Churchgate having 90 workmen. The company was sold out in the year 1984. The new management decided to close down the Marketing Division at Churchgate and took appropriate necessary actions in that behalf. This action was challenged. Question arose as to whether the Marketing Division at Churchgate can be said to be separate independent undertaking. While deciding this question the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Workmen reported in AIR 1960 SC 56 ; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen reported in AIR 1973 SC 878 and Workmen v. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1974 SC 1132 in para 16 of the judgment the Supreme Court reproduced the test laid down in the case of Associated Cement Company case which reads as follows:"what then is one establishment in the ordinary industrial or business sense ? The question of unity or oneness presents difficulties when the industrial establishment consists of parts units departments branches etc. If it is strictly unitary in the sense of having one location and one unit it is one establishment. Where however the industrial undertaking has parts branches departments units etc. The question of unity or oneness presents difficulties when the industrial establishment consists of parts units departments branches etc. If it is strictly unitary in the sense of having one location and one unit it is one establishment. Where however the industrial undertaking has parts branches departments units etc. with different locations near or distant the question arises what tests should be applied for determining what constitutes one establishment. Several tests were referred to in the course of arguments before us such as geographical proximity unity of ownership management and control unity of employment and conditions of service functional integrity general unity of purposes etc. It is perhaps impossible to lay down any one test as an absolute invariable test for all cases. The real purpose of these tests is to find out the true relation between the parts branches units etc. If in their true relation they constitute one integrated whole we say that the establishment is one; if on the contrary they do not constitute one integrated whole each unit is then a separate unit. How the relation between the units will be judged must depend on the facts proved having to the scheme and object of the statute which gives the right of unemployment compensation and also prescribes disqualification therefor. Thus in one case the unity of ownership management and control may be the important test; in another case functional integrity or general unit may be the important test; and in still another case the important test may be unity of employment. Indeed in a large number of cases several test may fall for consideration at the same time". After referring to the aforesaid test the Supreme Court considered as to whether the Churchgate division formed part of the industrial establishment of the Company namely the Trombay factory so as to constitute the Trombay factory and the Churchgate division one establishment ? The Supreme Court applying the aforesaid test held that the Trombay factory and the Churchgate division were one establishment. ( 9 ) WHAT is important for the purpose of this case is as to what are the tests to be applied for determining the question as to whether a particular division/unit is a separate independent undertaking or not. The Supreme Court applying the aforesaid test held that the Trombay factory and the Churchgate division were one establishment. ( 9 ) WHAT is important for the purpose of this case is as to what are the tests to be applied for determining the question as to whether a particular division/unit is a separate independent undertaking or not. Some of the tests enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of Association Cement Company are: geographical proximity unity of ownership management and control unity of employment conditions of service functional integrity general unity of purpose etc. As observed by the Supreme Court the real purpose of this test is to find out the true relation between the parts branches units etc. ( 10 ) HERE references may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. S. Production Agencies v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana reported in AIR 1979 SC 170 . In that case the company had two factories one at Bombay and the other at Ballabhgarh. The dispute related to Ballabhgarh factory. The factory was divided into two sections - manufacturing section and packing material making sections. Manufacturing section comprised of two sub-sections namely chemical section and boiler section. Packing material making section again was composed of two sub-sections one manufacturing containers and the other painting of the containers. In that case the workmen concerned were employed in painting section. Since the factory decided to buy centainers from the market it also decided to close down its packing material making section but continued the painting sub-section. On account of this decision the services of the workmen were terminated. In the aforesaid context questions arose as to whether the section in which the workmen were working was a separate independent undertaking. In para 22 of the judgment the Supreme Court inter alia observed as follows:"the expression undertaking is not defined in the Act. It also finds its place in the definition of the expression industry in S. 2 (j ). While ascertaining the amplitude of the expression undertaking in the definition of the expression industry noscitur a soclis canon of construction was invoked and a restricted meaning was assigned to it in Bangalore Sewerage Board v. Rajappa AIR 1978 SC 548 . It also finds its place in the definition of the expression industry in S. 2 (j ). While ascertaining the amplitude of the expression undertaking in the definition of the expression industry noscitur a soclis canon of construction was invoked and a restricted meaning was assigned to it in Bangalore Sewerage Board v. Rajappa AIR 1978 SC 548 . While thus reading down the expression in the context of Section 25-FFF it must mean a separate and distinct business or commercial or trading or industrial activity. It cannot comprehend an infinitesimally small part of a manufacturing process". ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court the question arises: Has the Labour Court committed an error in holding that the mechanical workshop of the respondent-Company was separate independent undertaking ? The Labour Court proceeded on the footing that there was oral assertion by the factory manager in his deposition that mechanical workshop was separate and independent unit and there was no cross-examination to this statement. From this oral assertion without any other material on record the Labour Court jumped to the conclusion that the case of the Company that the mechanical workshop was separate undertaking was established. We are afraid this course was not permissible to the Labour Court. ( 12 ) THE Labour Court ought to have examined the question: As to whether mechanical workshop of the company was a separate and distinct business of commercial or trading or industrial activity of the company ? The Labour Court has not examined this question at all. Thus the Labour Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and it has proceeded to decide the case by applying the incorrect principles of law and by drawing impermissible inference. Moreover it is also not correct to say that the assertion made by the factory manager has remained uncontroverted. We have been taken through the evidence recorded by the Labour Court. In cross-examination question has been put to the factory manager as to whether the Ranavav Cement Factory has been closed or not to which he has answered in the negative. Even assuming for a moment that the statement made by the factory manager has not been controverted it cannot be said that mere assertion without any other evidence whatsoever was sufficient to warrant inference that the mechanical workshop was a separate undertaking. Even assuming for a moment that the statement made by the factory manager has not been controverted it cannot be said that mere assertion without any other evidence whatsoever was sufficient to warrant inference that the mechanical workshop was a separate undertaking. It is a proved fact that in the mechanical workshop there were only six employees working as turners; that the workshop was situated in the same factory premises; that the management was common; that ownership of the factory was common. Simply because the workshop is separate from the factory or the plant it cannot be said that it was a separate undertaking. It is not even asserted by the factory manager in his deposition that the mechanical workshop of the company was a separate and distinct business or commercial or trading or industrial activity of the company. If it is not separate and distinct activity of the company it does not satisfy the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of A. S. Production Agencies (supra ). ( 13 ) IT is difficult to understand on what basis the Labour Court persuaded itself to accept the bare assertion made by the factory manager. The Labour Court ought to have examined the question as to whether there was separate and distinct business commercial trading or industrial activity when the Company operated its mechanical workshop adjoining to the factory plant wherein only six turners were engaged ? The Labour Court ought to have examined as to whether the tests laid down by the Supreme Court have been satisfied or not ? On this point no evidence whatsoever is led by the Company. The Labour Court has not referred to any of the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court for determining the question as to whether the establishment/undertaking is separate or not ? If one were to apply the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court for determining this question the inference is obvious that mechanical workshop which is an incidental activity of the manufacturing process can never be said to be separate independent undertaking. ( 14 ) HERE reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A. S. Production Agencies (supra ). ( 14 ) HERE reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A. S. Production Agencies (supra ). In that case the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that it could not be said that painting section was a recognised sub-section eligible for being styled as a apart of the undertaking. The Supreme Court further observed that if such mini-classification is permitted it would enable the employer to flout Section 25f of the Act with impunity. In the instant case also if workshop which is ordinarily an adjunct to the main manufacturing activity is permitted to be styled as a separate undertaking it would lead to mini classification which would enable the employer to frustrate the provisions of Section 25f of the Act. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the decision of the Labour Court that it is a case of closure of a separate independent unit cannot be sustained and the same is required to be reversed and set aside. Once this conclusion is reached the question arises as to whether there is compliance with the provisions of Section 25f of the Act ? ( 16 ) AS stated in the notice of termination of services amount of retrenchment compensation and one months wages have not been paid to the workmen. What is offered is legally reasonable dues and one months wages. What does it mean by legally reasonable dues is not stated. Therefore strictily speaking there is no offer of the amount of retrenchment compensation and there is offer only of one months wages. Even assuming for a moment that there is offer of amount of retrenchment compensation then also it cannot be said that mere offer of the amount of retrenchment compensation and of the amount of one months wages is sufficient for compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Marginal note of section 25-F of the Act itself indicates that the conditions mentioned therein are conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. Conditions mentioned in clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are mandatory. Marginal note of section 25-F of the Act itself indicates that the conditions mentioned therein are conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. Conditions mentioned in clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are mandatory. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha reported in AIR 1960 SC 610 and again reiterated in the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1964 SC 1617 . ( 17 ) IN the case of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) the Supreme Court held that the requirement prescribed by Section 25-F (b) (payment of requisite amount of retrenchment compensation) is a condition precedent for retrenchment of workmen. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the conditions precedent are satisfied. In the case of Bombay Union of Journalists (supra) question arose as to whether the requirement of Section 25-F (c) was mandatory or directory. In that context the Supreme Court examined its earlier decisions and in paragraph 10 of the judgment observed that the conditions prescribed in clause (c) of Section 25-F of the Act cannot be given the same treatment as it is given to the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. In para 12 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:"there is a proviso to Section 25-F (a) which lays down that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of services. Clause (a) of Section 25-F therefore affords a safeguard in the interests of the retrenched employee; it requires the employer either to give him one months notice or to pay him wages in lieu thereof before he is retrenched. Similarly clause (b) provides that the workman has to be paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months. It would be noticed that this payment has to be made at the time of retrenchment and this requirement again provides a safeguard in the interests of the workman; he must be given one months notice or wages in lieu thereof and he must get retrenchment compensation as prescribed by clause (b ). It would be noticed that this payment has to be made at the time of retrenchment and this requirement again provides a safeguard in the interests of the workman; he must be given one months notice or wages in lieu thereof and he must get retrenchment compensation as prescribed by clause (b ). The object which the legislature has in mind in making these two conditions obligatory and in constituting them into conditions precedent is obvious. These provisions have to be satisfied before a workman can be retrenched. The hardship resulting from retrenchment has been partially redressed by these two clauses and so there is every justification for making them conditions precedent". ( 18 ) IN the case of State Bank v. N. S. Money reported in AIR 1976 SC 1111 in para 8 of the judgment the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of Section 25-F he cannot be retrenched without payment at the time of retrenchment of the amount of compensation computed as prescribed therein read with Section 25-B (2 ). Thus in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that the conditions prescribed in clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are mandatory. Non-compliance of these conditions render the action as illegal and void. This is the view taken by the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of M. P. Ramanandi v. Gujarat Slate Warehousing Corporation reported in 1985 GLH 421 . In view of this settled legal position the facts of the case be examined. ( 19 ) IN the instant case at the time of retrenchment no payment either that of one months wages or that of retrenchment compensation has been made. Therefore there is breach of both the conditions mentioned in clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. In the instant case there is no payment of wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice as required by clause (a) nor there is any payment of the retrenchment compensation as required by clause (b ). Learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the ease of D. T. Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal reported in AIR 1985 SC 1503. Learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the ease of D. T. Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal reported in AIR 1985 SC 1503. Therein the question arose as regards compliance with the povisions of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. In the context of the facts of the case and while interpreting the provisions of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act the Supreme Court observed that proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) does not mean that the wages for one month should have been actually paid because in many cases the employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal but cannot force the employee to receive the payment before dismissal becomes effective. In the instant case there is no tender of the amount. All that has been done is to make vague offer as regards payment of amount which may be reasonably and legally due without specifying as to what is reasonably and legally due to the workmen and what they were supposed to receive. It is not stated in the notice of termination of service that they will receive the amount of retrenchment compensation and what that amount would be. In view of such vague offer it cannot be said to be a valid offer nor can it be said to be a valid tender of the amount of retrenchment compensation to the workmen as required under clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. In view of this position the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D. T. Undertaking (supra) is also of no help to the respondent. Once the conclusion is reached that it is not discontinuation of service on account of closure of an independent undertaking the case would fall within the purview of Section 25-F of the Act. As indicated hereinabove the conditions precedent for effecting retrenchment of workmen have not been complied with. hen the consequential order of reinstatement has got to be passed. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent requested that in this case order of reinstatement be not passed but compensation be ordered to be paid to the workmen. We see no reason why inevitable consequences of retrenchment being held illegal and void should not follow in the instant case also. Therefore the request for not granting reinstatement is rejected. . We see no reason why inevitable consequences of retrenchment being held illegal and void should not follow in the instant case also. Therefore the request for not granting reinstatement is rejected. . ( 21 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Labour Court has not examined the question of fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Section 25-F of the Act in proper context. In his submission there is not sufficient evidence on this issue. Therefore it is submitted that the case should be remanded to the Labour Court. There was ample opportunity given to both the sides to lead evidence. Both the sides should have led evidence which they thought fit. Be it noted that the retrenchment has taken place in the month of February 1981. Reference was made to the Labour Court in the year 1982. It was decided some time in 1982 and thereafter the matter has remained pending in this Court for a period of about a decade. The evidence as regards the fulfilment of conditions precedent to retrenchment would be within the possession and knowledge of the respondent-Company. If one were to apply the principles of Evidence Act then also it was the duty of the respondent-Company to produce relevant evidence. Even today it is not the case of the respondent-Company that it was not in possession of the evidence as regards fulfilment of the condition precedent to retrenchment. If the party in possession of best evidence which would throw light on the issue in controversy withholds the same it cannot turn around and submit after a period of about a decade that the case be remanded to the lower forum and that it may be granted an opportunity to lead evidence. On the contrary in such circumstances as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Katkar v. Mohmad Haji Latif reported AIR 1968 SC 1413 adverse inference is required to be drawn against such party. In this case the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the court may draw adverse inference if he withholds; important document in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. In this case the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the court may draw adverse inference if he withholds; important document in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. The Supreme Court further observed that it is not a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. In view of this position we do not see merits in the submission that the case should be remanded to the Labour Court. ( 22 ) IT is not shown that during the period from the date of termination of their services till today the workmen have been gainfully employed. Nothing on the record is produced to show that any of the three workmen was gainfully employed during this period. In absence of any evidence on this point it has got to be presumed that the workmen have remained forcefully unemployed all throughout this period. Therefore they are entitled to receive the amount of full backwages. ( 23 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The award passed by the Labour Court in Reference (LCR) No. 612/81 626 and 627/81 is quashed and set aside. The petitioners-workmen are held to have been retrenched without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and they are ordered to be reinstated in service with full backwages. The amount of backwages shall be computed as if they were continuously in service and were entitled to all the benefits had they not been relieved from service. The amount of backwages shall be paid to each of the petitioners latest by 31/03/1992 If the same is not paid by 31/03/1992 the amount of backwages shall carry interest of the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date of judgment till the date of payment. It is clarified that if the amount is paid before 31/03/1992 no amount of interest will be required to be paid. The workmen shall be reinstated by the respondent-Company on their original posts. It is clarified that if the amount is paid before 31/03/1992 no amount of interest will be required to be paid. The workmen shall be reinstated by the respondent-Company on their original posts. In case the posts of turners (that is the original posts ) are not available at this point of time they will be reinstated on similar posts carrying same wages and identical benefits immediately. The petitioners-workmen shall be granted all the benefits as if they continued in service all throughout. Rule made absolute accordingly. ( 24 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel for the respondent requests that the operation and implementation of the judgment and direction given hereinabove be stayed for a period of eight weeks so as to enable the respondent-Company to challenge the legality and validity of the same before the Supreme Court. In facts of the case the request cannot be acceded to. Hence the request refused. .