Judgment :- The above Application was filed by the third plaintiff Bommisetti Vasundhara, wife of the first plaintiff Bommisetti Varadarajan (died) to revoke the Vakalath given to Mr. R. Krishnaswami, Advocate for the present applicant (third plaintiff). The plaintiffs 1 and 2, Bommisetty Varadarajan and Pachipeelusu Subrahmanyam appointed and retained Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna as their lawful attorney to do the following acts, deeds and things: (i) To institute legal proceedings for the recovery of possession of the property bearing Door No. 29 (old), New No. 11, Mahalakshmi Street, T. Nagar, Madras-17 from Vyramuthu and Brothers and other alienees from them; (ii) To sign, verify the pleadings, appoint Advocate, give deposition, enter into compromise and to do all other acts, deeds and things that are necessary for the successful completion and termination of the proceedings; (iii) To file affidavits, applications, appeals, revisions, etc., connected with the said property and do all other acts, deeds and things that are necessary for the successful completion of the proceedings; (iv) And we do hereby confirm and ratify that the acts and things done by our said attorney, as acts, deeds and things done by us personally.” The Power of Attorney Deed was executed on 3-12-1989 in the presence of Mr. N. Gopalakrishna Gupta, a Notary Public, Ongole, Andhra Pradesh. The said Power of Attorney Agents of plaintiffs 1 and 2 filed the present suit, C.S. No. 107 of 1981 on the file of this Court by engaging Mr. R. Krishnaswamy as the counsel for the plaintiff. Bommisetti Varadarajan died pending suit. On his death, his wife Bommisetti Vasundhara was impleaded as third plaintiff as per order in Application No. 3738 of 1984 dated 30-6-1985. She executed an irrevocable power of Attorney in favour of Mr. R. Krishnaswamy as the counsel for the plaintiff. Bommisetti Varadarajan died pending suit. On his death, his wife Bommisetti Vasundhara was impleaded as third plaintiff as per order in Application No. 3738 of 1984 dated 30-6-1985. She executed an irrevocable power of Attorney in favour of Mr. M.A. Venkata Krishna, whom her late husband appointed him as his Power of Attorney and her lawful attorney to do the following acts, deeds and things; (i) To institute legal proceedings for the recovery of possession of the property bearing door No. 29 (old), new No. 11, Mahalakshmi Street, T. Nagar, Madras-17 from Vyramuthu and brothers and other alienees from them; (ii) To sign, verify the pleadings, appoint, Advocate, give deposition enter into compromise and to do all other acts, deeds and things that are necessary for the successful completion and termination of the proceedings; (iii) To file affidavits, applications, appeals, revisions etc., connected with the said property and do all other acts, deeds and things that are necessary for the successful completion of the proceedings. (iv) And I, do hereby confirm and ratify that the acts, deeds and things come by my said Attorney as acts, deeds and things done by me personally.” The said Power of Attorney was executed on 18-5-1982. The said Power of Attorney of the third plaintiff in turn engaged and retained Mr. R. Krishnaswamy, as Advocate to appear on his behalf in the same suit. The Power of Attorney was duly signed by the third plaintiff Bommisetti Vasundhara and duly certified by Mr. N. Gopalakrishna Gupta, Notary Public, Ongole Town, Andhra Pradesh. 2. On the same date, the third plaintiff entered into an Agreement with her power of Attorney Agent Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna with reference to the agreement of sale executed by her husband in favour of Mr. M.A. Venkata Krishna on 3-12-1980 with the following alterations: (1) No. 2 (Mr. M.A. Venkata Krishna) agreed to pay an advance of Rs. 2000/- and he paid Rs. 2000/-accordingly to No. 1 (Bommisetty Vasundhara) this day. (2) After the disposal of the suit. No. 2 has to pay No. 1 Rs. M.A. Venkata Krishna on 3-12-1980 with the following alterations: (1) No. 2 (Mr. M.A. Venkata Krishna) agreed to pay an advance of Rs. 2000/- and he paid Rs. 2000/-accordingly to No. 1 (Bommisetty Vasundhara) this day. (2) After the disposal of the suit. No. 2 has to pay No. 1 Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only); (3) The remaining conditions in the agreement D/3-12-1980 between the husband of No. 1 and No. 2 remain unaltered.” The said agreement was duly signed by the third plaintiff and the Power of Attorney and duly certified by the very same Notary Public on 18-5-1982. It is useful to refer the two other agreements of sale executed by the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in favour of the said Mr. M.A. Venkata Krishna on 3-12-1980 respectively. Both the deeds contain identical terms and clauses. It is stated in the Agreement of Sale dated 3-12-1980 executed by the first plaintiff, Bommisetty Varadarajan describing himself as vendor in favour of Venkatakrishna describing him as purchaser that the said Bommisetti Varadarajan and Pachipulusu Subrahmanyam (Plaintiffs 1 and 2) are the joint and absolute owners of the vacant site bearing (old No. 29), New No. 11, Mahalakshmi Street, Madras, which was inherited by them from Bommisetty Kotirathnamma under her will, dated 29-5-1964 and that Mr. Venkatakrishna was authorised to institute and continue the proceedings against one Vairamuthu and others for removal of encroachments made by them and also to take steps in a Court of law for setting aside certain documents alleged to have been executed by Vairamuthu and for recovery of possession of the suit property in C.S. No. 107 of 1981. The two important clauses in the said Agreement are worth to be noticed: (1) The Vendor agrees to sell to the purchaser and his nominees the vacant site described in the schedule for a consolidated price of Rs. 42,000/- (Rupees forty two thousand only) The purchaser has to bear the expenses for legal proceedings against vairamuthu and registration expenses for the sale deed of schedule property. 42,000/- (Rupees forty two thousand only) The purchaser has to bear the expenses for legal proceedings against vairamuthu and registration expenses for the sale deed of schedule property. (2) The registered sale should be got executed by the Vendor in favour of the purchaser after paying the sale consideration within six months after the termination of the legal proceedings against Vairamuthu; (3) The documents of title relating to the schedule property have been handed over to the purchaser.” The said Agreement of sale was signed by both the Vendor and the purchaser respectively and certified by N. Gopalakrishna Gupta, Notary Public Ongole Town, Andhra Pradesh on 3-12-1980. Same is the agreement of sale executed by the second plaintiff Pachipulusu Subrahmanyam in favour or Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna describing himself as the vendor and describing Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna as the purchaser. This document was also executed on 3-12-1980 and signed by both parties in the presence of the Notary Public, Mr. N. Gopalakrishna Gupta. As stated above after the death of her husband Bommisetti Varadarajan, the third plaintiff Bommisetti Vasundhara executed as irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna and appointed him as her lawful Attorney to institute legal proceedings for recovery of possession of the subject matter of the property in C.S. No. 107 of 1981 on the file of this Court. The petitioner/3rd plaintiff now seeks to revoke the General Power of Attorney given to Mr. Venkatakrishna on 18-5-1982. 3. Under instructions from Bommisetti Vasundhara the petitioner herein, her Advocate Mr. M.V. Krupasagar, Advocate, Ongole issued a registered notice, dated 20-6-1991 to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna, No. 19, Sambasivam Street, T. Nagar, Madras-17 in which address the said Venkatakrishna was formerly residing as could be seen from the address mentioned in the irrevocable Power of Attorney, dated 18-5-1982. It appears that the said notice sent by the Lawyer to the above address has been returned with an endorsement not found. After the return of the notice, an Affidavit was filed under S. 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order 19 rule 1 of C.P.C. by the petitioner in the present suit stating that the notice sent by her on 20-6-1991 was returned as the addressee is not found in day time. After the return of the notice, an Affidavit was filed under S. 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order 19 rule 1 of C.P.C. by the petitioner in the present suit stating that the notice sent by her on 20-6-1991 was returned as the addressee is not found in day time. It is also stated that the General Power of Attorney Agent of the petitioner is prosecuting the litigation without informing the stage of the case and also acting detrimental to her interests and to cause loss and harm to her and hence the General Power of Attorney given to him on 18-5-1982 is to be revoked. She also prayed that she may be permitted to continue the proceedings by herself, since the said Venkata Krishna is no longer her General Power of Attorney Agent. This affidavit is dated 21st July, 1991 and also duly affirmed in the presence of Mr. N. Gopalakrishna Gupta, Notary Public, Ongole. A memo also was filed on behalf of the third plaintiff in C.S. No. 107 of 1981 stating that she is not having good health and suffering from high blood pressure and other ailments and hence, she is not interested to proceed with these proceedings. In paragraph 3 of the said memo, it is stated that she is giving up all her claims in this suit against the defendants and not pressing the proceedings with regard to her rights and claims with regard to her half share in the suit schedule property only. Therefore it was prayed that this Court may be pleased to dismiss the suit against the defendants 2 to 7 as not pressed with regard to her half share in the schedule property without costs. The said memo was signed by the third plaintiff in Telugu and her signature was identified by her Advocate Mr. M.V. Krupasagar on 26-7-1991. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of Application No. 3663 of 1991, it is stated that the petitioner has revoked the Power of Attorney given to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna by issuing a notice to him on 20-6-1991 and that the Vakalath given to Mr. R. Krishnaswamy by the said Venkatakrishna should be revoked and in his place she wants to appoint the present counsel Rangabashyam and M.V. Kripasagar. 5. At the time of hearing, it was complained by Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna by issuing a notice to him on 20-6-1991 and that the Vakalath given to Mr. R. Krishnaswamy by the said Venkatakrishna should be revoked and in his place she wants to appoint the present counsel Rangabashyam and M.V. Kripasagar. 5. At the time of hearing, it was complained by Mr. R. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second plaintiff (Pachiapulusu Subrahmanyam), on behalf of the General Power Attorney Agent, Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna that the notice dated 20-6-1991 said to have been sent by the present Advocate from Ongole and the memo dated 26-7-1991 and the affidavit filed under S. 139 C.P.C., dated 21-7-1991 have not yet been served on him and that therefore he was not in a position to file any reply thereto. On 31-7-1991, I passed the following order: “The second plaintiff Pachipulusu Subramanyam is present in Court to-day and he was examined by Court. He said he gave a Power of Attorney to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna and that the power of attorney is still in force and has not been revoked by him. This statement given by the second plaintiff in the box is recorded. 2. The third plaintiff Bommisetti Vasundhara is also present in Court. She was also examined by the Court. She said in the witness box that the power of attorney given by her to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna has been revoked by her since according to her the said power of attorney is acting detrimental to her interest. This memo is also served on the learned counsel Mr. R. Krishnaswamy who is appearing on behalf of the Power of Attorney Agent. Mr. Krishnaswamy want to file a counter to this memo also. Time is granted till 6-8-1991. 3. Likewise, an affidavit filed by the third plaintiff under S. 139, C.P.C. read with Order 19, Rule 1 and a true copy of the registered notice sent by Mr. M.V. Krupasgar, Advocate ate Ongole to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna, Power of Attorney Agent by registered post and the returned cover with acknowledgment is also produced in this court. This copy of the registered notice sent by Mr. M.V. Krupasagar, Advocate, Ongole on 20-6-1991 was also served on Mr. Krishnaswamy, who received the same in Court to-day. He wants time for filing his reply to the same. Hence, the matter is adjourned to 6-8-1991 for filing counter and reply. This copy of the registered notice sent by Mr. M.V. Krupasagar, Advocate, Ongole on 20-6-1991 was also served on Mr. Krishnaswamy, who received the same in Court to-day. He wants time for filing his reply to the same. Hence, the matter is adjourned to 6-8-1991 for filing counter and reply. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 will appear before this court on the next hearing on 6-8-1991.” 6. Thereupon Mr. R. Krishnaswamy filed a counter affidavit on behalf of Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna, the Power of Attorney Agent of the first respondent as well as the plaintiff in the suit. The following are his legal contentions: (a) The Power of Attorney has been acted upon and it cannot be revoked under any circumstances; (b) The notice dated 20-6-1991 was sent to an address where the Power of Attorney resided till December, 1980 and thereafter he moved his residence to No. 56, Strotten Muthiah Mudali Street, Madras-1 The third plaintiff has in fat mentioned the present address in the power of Attorney given to him on 18-5-1982. Therefore, the notice has been sent to him with ulterior motives. (c) The first plaintiff by an agreement of sale dated 3-12-1980 agreed to sell his share over the said property to him. The first plaintiff was entitled to half share over the said property. As per the terms of the agreement, he had to bear the expenses for the legal proceedings against the defendants in the suit and stamp and registration charges. The first plaintiff has also confirmed the power of Attorney given to him for the purpose of conducting the legal proceedings against the defendants in the suit. After his death, the present petitioner was brought on record as the third plaintiff in the suit and she executed an irrevocable power of attorney for continuing the legal proceedings already initialed in respect of the suit property and all other connected cases. (d) On the same day, an agreement of sale was entered into between him and the petitioner herein for the sale of the share of Varadharajan. The agreement entered into on 18-5-1982 also confirmed the earlier agreement dated 3-12-1980 entered into between parties. Therefore, the Power of Attorney given to him by both the plaintiffs are coupled with interest , acted upon and cannot be revoked. The agreement entered into on 18-5-1982 also confirmed the earlier agreement dated 3-12-1980 entered into between parties. Therefore, the Power of Attorney given to him by both the plaintiffs are coupled with interest , acted upon and cannot be revoked. The present act by the applicant to cancel the power of attorney granted to him is only with a view to deprive him of the rights over the suit property. The petitioner has with ulterior motive of selling away the property to some third party, thereby violating the obligations cast upon her on the agreement has filed the present applications. Therefore, the attempted revocations is in breach of the terms of the agreement of sale dated 18-5-1982. (e) The reference to the notice alleged to have been issued on 20-6-1991 and the affidavit filed by the appellant under S. 139 C.P.C. are totally inconsistent. It is absolutely false that the proceedings came to an end long time back. (f) Under these circumstances the Vakalath given by the Power of Attorney Agent of the plaintiff to the present counsel Mr. R. Krishnaswamy cannot be revoked.” 7. The petitioner filed a reply affidavit through M.V. Krupasagar and Rangabashyam Advocates. The petitioner denied the allegations contained in the counter affidavit and stated that the Power of Attorney is not coupled with interest, that the power of attorney is not coupled with interest, that the power of attorney given by her is very specific, that the General Power of Attorney Agent has obtained the power only to prosecute the proceedings and that since it is not coupled with interest, the petitioner can revoke the power given to him to conduct the suit proceedings at any point of time. According to her, the agreement of sale cannot create any interest to Mr. M.A. Venkatakrishna in the suit property, which is a false document and having no legal sanctity. It is now created to prolong the litigation and to cause loss and damage to the petitioner. In any event a Power Agent cannot dictate terms to the Principal. The Power Agent has to act only as per the instructions of the principal and the power delegated to him and when the principal is not interested to continue the litigation, she cannot be forced by others to continue the litigation against her will. 8. In any event a Power Agent cannot dictate terms to the Principal. The Power Agent has to act only as per the instructions of the principal and the power delegated to him and when the principal is not interested to continue the litigation, she cannot be forced by others to continue the litigation against her will. 8. The only point that arises for consideration in this case is whether the Power of Attorney given by the petitioner is coupled with interest acted upon and can be revoked or not. 9. I have heard the arguments of Mr. Krupasagar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner herein and Mr. R. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the General Power or Attorney Agent. Mr. Krupasagar in support of his contentions, extracted above contended that if the terms of the agreement are not complied with the remedy open to the Power of Attorney Agent is to file a suit for specific performance and that the principal has got a right to revoke the power, whenever he/she wants. In support of his contentions, Mr. Krupasagar cited the following three decisions reported in: 1. Ismail Mohammed v. Baubhai Musabhai 1900-2 Bom. L.R. 118;’ 2. Mutharasu Thevar v. Mayandi Thevar 1968 Mad. 333 = 1968 II M.L.J. 74; and 3. Venkanna v. Atchutaramanna , AIR 1932 Mad. 542. Ismail Mohameds case 1 was a case of the plaintiffs son who was managing the suit and his pleader made an agreement with one of the documents that should the plaintiff be successful in his suit with regard to certain land in possession of that defendant, then the plaintiff should purchase the said land from that defendant for Rs. 300/-. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Candy held that this agreement was not a compromise under S. 375 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, but was a contingent contract to purchase, and was such binding on the plaintiff. The question was whether the plaintiff agreed to accept Rs. 300/- from Daudbnai and whether Rs. 300/- were deposited with Gulabdas, Pleader in that case. The defence was that the plaintiff was not entitled to anything. Before the disposal of the case, defendant No. 8 went to the plaintiffs pleader Mr. Gulabdas and asked for a compromise. It was then arranged that Rs. 300/- from Daudbnai and whether Rs. 300/- were deposited with Gulabdas, Pleader in that case. The defence was that the plaintiff was not entitled to anything. Before the disposal of the case, defendant No. 8 went to the plaintiffs pleader Mr. Gulabdas and asked for a compromise. It was then arranged that Rs. 300/- should be deposited by her with her pleader, and if there was a decree in favour of the plaintiff, the latter was to take the money and allow the land to remain with (Daudbhai) her, and if he failed the money was to be returned to defendant No. 8. In the said decision, it was held as under: “The plaintiffs son who was managing the suit and his pleader made an agreement with one of the defendants that should the plaintiff be successful in his suit with regard to certain land in possession of that defendant, then the plaintiff should purchase the said land from that defendant for Rs. 300/- Held , that this agreement was not compromise under S. 375, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, but was a contingent contract to purchase, and was, as such, binding on the plaintiff.” Garapati Venkannas case AIR 1938 Mad. 542 was a case, where under Venkatasubba Rao, J. held as under: “Some revisioners executed a power of attorney in favour of a stranger authorizing him to conduct a suit on their behalf and providing that when the property, the subject matter of the suit, would be recovered he would be entitled to certain share in it. such authority was not coupled with interest and hence the principle of S. 202 did not apply. Held, further that even if the transaction was an unfair and unconscionable bargain, that was a question between the assignors and the assignee, and so long as the deed stood, it was no concern of the third party that the assignors might have a grievance against the assignee. Held also that the document did not create an immediate transfer, but contemplated the coming into existence of a future deed which was to effect the transfer.” Mutharasu Thevars case 1968 Mad. Held also that the document did not create an immediate transfer, but contemplated the coming into existence of a future deed which was to effect the transfer.” Mutharasu Thevars case 1968 Mad. 333 = 1968 II M.L.J. 74 is a Judgment of our High Court rendered by T. Ramprasadarao, J. (as he then was), wherein it was held as under: “S. 202 of the Indian Contract Act inter alia provides that where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of agency the agency cannot in the absence of an express contract, he terminated to the prejudice of such interest. In the present case, the agent has been appointed only to expand for the litigation to be and already sponsored by him and to have the right in the future to mortgage or sell the property of the principals for reimbursement of expenses incurred by him. Does the agency create an interest in the subject matter, which is the sine quo non to make the power an irrevocable one? Held, that the power of attorney incidentally provides for an assurance that the agent can have recourse to the properties of the principals for advances made by him. The word (uruthi), in the circumstances of this case would rather mean assurance and cannot be equated to the expression ‘security. Therefore the recitals in the power of attorney in question do not create an irrevocable agency, in the agent entitling him to object to the relief viz., to revoke the vakalat given by him, asked for by the principles. Held also, that, the principal has the right to have his Counsel to conduct his litigation notwithstanding the fact that the agency in question is irrevocable or not.” 10. However, in my view, this Judgment is distinguishable on the facts of the present case which I will deal with in the later part of this Judgment. 11. Per contra Mr. R. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent drew my attention to the decision reported in Seth Loon Karan v. I.E. John AIR 1969 S.C. 73 and strongly relied on the same in support of his case. He also tried to distinguish the Judgment of Ramprasada Rao, J. (as he then was) referred to supra. Seth Loon Korans AIR 1969 S.C. 73 case is directly on point. He also tried to distinguish the Judgment of Ramprasada Rao, J. (as he then was) referred to supra. Seth Loon Korans AIR 1969 S.C. 73 case is directly on point. In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court was indebted to a Bank. He executed a power of attorney in favour of the Bank authorising the Bank to execute a decree obtained by the debtor against the third person and credit the realisations to the debtors account. The Bank levied execution of the decree. The execution application was filed in the name of the appellant, but it was signed by the manager of the Bank as his power of attorney holder. The appellant objected to the execution. The Supreme Court held as follows: Held, on the tenor of the document as well as form its terms (i) that the power given to the Bank was a power coupled with interest and same was irrevocable in view of S. 202 of Contract Act. That the Bank was merely authorised to act as agent of the appellant and the appellant continued to be the owner of the amount due under the decree and therefore the bank was not assignee of the decree in law. The power, however, constituted a equitable assignment of the amount due under the decree or so much of that amount as was necessary for discharging the debts due to it. That on the strength of the equitable assignment in its favour, the Bank could execute the decree, in view of provisions of S. 146 of C.P. Code. That the contentions of the appellant that thee being no assignment of decree in favour of the bank, it had no locus standi to execute decree and the executing Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and continue proceeding and that the decree being in his name his agent (Bank) could not proceed with its execution as he wanted to take proceedings in his own hands were legal contentions and High Court was not right in brushing them aside on the ground of not taking them in pleadings or for not urging them before Executing Court.” The Supreme Court approved the decision given by the Patna High Court in Prahlad P.D. Modi v. Tikaitni Faldani Kumari AIR 1956 Pat 233 and followed its earlier Judgment in Jugal Kishore Saraj v. Ram Cotton Co., Ltd. AIR 1955 S.C. 376 . 12. Applying the above ratio, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the Power of Attorney in question is a power coupled with interest and if it is so whether the same is revocable, in view of S. 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). I have extracted above the salient features and the relevant clauses in the agreement in question. There is hardly any doubt that the power given by the petitioner in favour of Mr. Venkatakrishna is a power coupled with interest. That is clear both from the tenor of the document as well as from its terms contained in the agreement. S. 202 of the Contract Act provides that where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the detriment of such interest. In the instant case, the agency is created for valuable consideration and authority is given to effectuate a security or to secure interest of the agent and hence in my view such authority cannot be revoked. The document itself says that the power given to Mr. Venkatakrishna is an irrevocable power of attorney. This was not denied by the petitioner herself. The two documents executed by the petitioner appointing the General Power of Attorney was on the same date viz., 18-5-1982. The irrevocable power of attorney executed in favour of Mr. Venkatakrishna has permitted and authorised the said power of attorney agent to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of possession of the property bearing new door No. 11, Mahalakshmi Street, T. Nagar, Madras-17 and other alinees from them. Mr. Venkatakrishna was also authorised to sign, verify the pleadings, appoint Advocate, give depositions, enter into compromise and to do all other acts, deeds and things that are necessary for the successful completion and termination of the proceedings. The deed also specifically states in paragraph 4 that all the acts, deeds the things done by the power of attorney agent are confirmed and ratified as acts deeds and things done by the petitioner personally. On the very same date, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the General Power of Attorney Agent. The deed also specifically states in paragraph 4 that all the acts, deeds the things done by the power of attorney agent are confirmed and ratified as acts deeds and things done by the petitioner personally. On the very same date, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the General Power of Attorney Agent. A specific reference was made to the agreement of sale expected by the petitioners husband in favour of Venkatakrishna on 3-12-1980, where under the husband of the third plaintiff Bommisetti Varadarajan has also referred to the Power of Attorney given by him in favour of Venkatakrishna to institute and continue the proceedings against Vairamuthu and others for recovering the possession of the suit property. He has further agree to execute the register the sale deed for the property described in the schedule in favour of Venkatakrishna, the purchaser after termination of the legal proceedings against Variamuthu and others. He has agreed to sell to the purchaser and his nominees the vacant site (present suit property) for a consolidated price of Rs. 42,000/-. He has further agreed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of Venkatakrishna, the purchaser after paying the sale consideration within six months after the termination of the legal proceedings against Vairamuthu. The documents relating to the suit property were also handed over by the petitioners husband to the purchaser. While ratifying the clauses contained in the agreement of sale dated 3-12-1980, the present petitioner executed a fresh agreement on 18-5-1982 with two additional clauses. The agreement of sale dated 18-5-1982 refers to the payment of advance of Rs. 2000/- as consideration and the receipt of the same by the petitioner herein on 18-5-1982, and after the dismissal of the suit, the power of attorney agent Mr. Venkatakrishna has to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs. 50000/- and that the remaining conditions in the agreement between the husband of the petitioner herein and the power of attorney agent, Mr. Venkatakrishna remain unaltered. Thus, it is seen that the agency in favour of Mr. Venkatakrishna has been created for valuable consideration and hence, in my view, such an authority cannot be revoked. 13. 50000/- and that the remaining conditions in the agreement between the husband of the petitioner herein and the power of attorney agent, Mr. Venkatakrishna remain unaltered. Thus, it is seen that the agency in favour of Mr. Venkatakrishna has been created for valuable consideration and hence, in my view, such an authority cannot be revoked. 13. In Mutharasu Thevars Case , Ramaprasada Rao, J. observed that the agents power to be in charge of family litigation in the that case permitted the agent to expend for litigation and to have the right to mortgage or sell the property of the principals for reimbursement of the expenses so incurred. His Lordship said: There can be no doubt that the principal has authority to revoke the vakalatnama of his counsel. He has a right to do so when he has lost confidence in him. In other words, the client can revoke his vakalatnama, if he has no confidence in his counsel.” But this is different from stating that Ex. A1 is revocable. His Lordship construed the word Uruthi as mere assurance and not as security, when the agent was to have recourse to the property to reimburse himself for the expenses incurred. Irrespective of the connotation of the word ‘Urithi’ the rest of the sentence allowing agent to have recourse to the property to reimburse himself for expenses is nothing but giving the property as security. This is affirmed. That is what ‘Unthi’ actually means. In my view, this is an irrevocable authority. Cancellation of vakalatnama in a case has nothing to do wit h this term in Ex. A1. The words in Ex. A1 are: “Besides conducting the said proceedings, in view of the fact that you need urithi for repaying to you the amount which you have hitherto spent for the said proceedings and for spending in future, we have executed this power. You will incur expenses therefor, and in the matter of managing our family properties and clearing the encumbrances thereon. For the purpose of recouping yourself all the expenses, we authorise you to mortgage or sell our properties.” 14. It would thus appear that the above case is clearly an agency coupled with interest. The agent has to recoup expenses incurred before and after the date of the execution of Ex. A1, inclusive of paying off prior encumbrances by resort to sale or mortgage of the properties. It would thus appear that the above case is clearly an agency coupled with interest. The agent has to recoup expenses incurred before and after the date of the execution of Ex. A1, inclusive of paying off prior encumbrances by resort to sale or mortgage of the properties. The benefit, the consideration and the interest of the agent in the subject matter are all very clear. The properties to be sold or mortgaged are really the security for the agents dues. In my opinion, the finding of his Lordship Mr. Justice Ramaprasada Rao (as he then was) that Ex. A1 is revocable is not in order. Hence, I respectfully disagree with the finding of the learned Judge on this point. His finding that the vakalathnama is revocable is right on the facts of that case as that is altogether a subsequent independent agreement. The reasoning of his Lordship that the provision for reimbursement etc., is only incidental is also in my view, with great respect to the learned Judge not correct. In Seth Loon Karans case AIR 1969 SC 73 the Supreme Court held that the power given under similar circumstances was a power coupled with interest. Guided by this ruling, I hold that the power given in the instant case is undoubtedly, a power coupled with interest for the reasons stated infra. 15. In this context, it is useful to restate the Rule, as propounded by Bowstead: “Where the authority of an agent is given by deed or valuable consideration for the purpose of effectuating any security or of protecting or securing any interest of the agent, it is irrevocable during the subsistence of such security or interest. But it is irrevocable merely because he has an interest in the exercise of it or has a special property in, or lieu for advances upon the subject matter thereof.” Thus, I hold that the power of attorney clearly amounted to an equitable assignment of the rights under the contract in favour of the power of attorney holder Mr. Venkatakrishna and that there could be no doubt that the document created an agency coupled with interest within the meaning of S. 202 of the Contract Act. Venkatakrishna and that there could be no doubt that the document created an agency coupled with interest within the meaning of S. 202 of the Contract Act. In Prahlad P.D. v. T.F. Kumari 1956 Patna 233, a Division Bench of Patna High Court held as under: “Contract Act (1872) S. 202 Agreement by A that debts raised by B for A were to be realised out of certain estate belonging to A-Agreement creates agency of irrevocable character. Where A under a document agreed that the debts raised by B for her (A) were to be realized out of the collections made by him (B) from certain estate, that in substance amounts to an allocation of the funds to be appropriated towards the repayment of the debts, and all the elements that are necessary to constitute an agency of an irrevocable character are present in that document even though that may not be described as such. The right accrues to B on the very date when the document is executed.” Applying the principles that emerge from these authorities to the facts stated in the documents, referred to above, I hold that the contention of Mr. R. Krishnaswamy as to the nature of right to Venkatakrishna the Power of Attorney Agent is well founded. He is also right in his submission that the right accrued to his client on the very same date when the document was executed and the advance of Rs. 2000/- paid to the petitioner herein. All the elements that are necessary in law to constitute an agency of an irrevocable character are present in that document. The decision reported in M. John Kotaiah v. A. Divakar AIR 1985 AP 30 was also cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to say that mere description of power of attorney as irrevocable is immaterial and that assignment of interest in subject matter to agent must be simultaneous with creation of power in him. The decision reported in M. John Kotaiah v. A. Divakar AIR 1985 AP 30 was also cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to say that mere description of power of attorney as irrevocable is immaterial and that assignment of interest in subject matter to agent must be simultaneous with creation of power in him. Learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above decision in paragraph 24 has relied on the Judgment referred to by me in Loon Karan Sethias case AIR 1969 S.C. 73 and held that the decision of the Supreme Court would go to show that the interest created in favour of the agent was not in the proceeds of the exercise of the power but simultaneously with the creation on the power and that cases is clearly distinguishable than the one arising under the case of John Kotaiahs case AIR 1985 A.P. 30 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. Paragraph 866 in Halsburys Laws of England can also be usefully extracted hereunder: “ Future Copy right : Whereby an agreement made in relation to any future copy right, and signed by or on behalf of the prospective owner of the copy right, the prospective owner come purports to assign the future copyright wholly or partially to another, then, if on the coming into existence of the copyright, the assignee or person claiming under him would otherwise be entitled as against all others to require the copy right to be vested in him wholly or partially, the copyright on coming into existence vests in the assignee or his successor in title without further assurance. Where the person who would otherwise he entitled has died before the copyright has come into existence, the right to it devolves as if it had subsisted immediately before death and he had then been its owner. Future copy right means copyright which will or may come into existence in respect of any future work or class of works or other subject matter or in any future events. Future copy right means copyright which will or may come into existence in respect of any future work or class of works or other subject matter or in any future events. Prospective owner is construed accordingly and, in relation to any such copyright, includes a person prospectively entitled to it by virtue of such an agreement as is mentioned above.” Likewise paragraph 2125 in Chitty on Contract can also be noticed: Powers of attorney - A power of attorney is an authority to one person to act in the stead of another, and the donor of such a power is liable to third parties for any acts of the donee within the scope of the power. A power of attorney must be created be deed. By S. 4(1)of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1971, where such a power is expressed to be irrevocable and is given to secure (a) a proprietary interest of the donee of the power; or (b) the performance of an obligation owned to the donee, then, so long as the donee has that interest or the obligation remains undischarged, the power shall not be revoked (i) by the donor without the consent of the donee; or (ii) by the death, in capacity or bankruptcy of the donor, or if the donor is a body corporate, by its winding up or dissolution.” Thus, it is seen that the power in question is expressed to be irrevocable and is given to Mr. Venkatakrishna to secure an interest of the donee and so long as the donee has that interest or the obligation in the property and the same remains undischarged, the power shall not be revoked by the donor without the consent of the donee. S. 186 of the Indian Contract Act says that the express authority may be in writing or even oral. If oral, evidence is necessary to establish it. If in writing, the written words speak for themselves. There is no need for any particular form. Any informal writing will do. An implied contract, on the other hand, has necessarily to be proved by the circumstantial evidence of an agreement. The surrounding facts and the conduct of parties may be the basis for such an inference of implied agency. The yard-stick in such matters depends on the circumstances of each particular case. 17. Any informal writing will do. An implied contract, on the other hand, has necessarily to be proved by the circumstantial evidence of an agreement. The surrounding facts and the conduct of parties may be the basis for such an inference of implied agency. The yard-stick in such matters depends on the circumstances of each particular case. 17. Express authority in writing is also postulated and made mandatory in statutory provisions, for example Order 3, Rules 1, 2 and 4, Code of Civil Procedure (appointment of Pleader). The Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Rules of Practice enjoin a particular form of Vakalatnama for the appointment of a pleader, Advocate or Attorney. Powers of attorney may be: (1) General power: (2) Special Power or (3) Particular Power. The first category of general power permits the agent to do all the acts for the principal and generally to act in the business of the agency. The second category of special power enables an agent to enter into a single transaction consisting probably of several incidental acts, e.g., selling a house or borrowing on a mortgage. A particular power is confined only to a single act, e.g. presenting a document before a Registrar for registration. As already mentioned authority conferred on an agent may be e xpress. Statute enjoins express conferral of authority e.g. appointment of a vakil or attorney to appear or act for any person should be in writing as enjoined under Order 3, Rule 4, C.P.C., This authority cannot be revoked at the clients mere will. Likewise, S. 32 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, requires that a person other than a party to the document cannot present a document for registration except by a power of attorney executed and authenticated as presented by that statute.” 18. Order 3, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure deals with recognised Agents and Pleaders. The right to practice conferred on Advocates includes the right to plead as well as to act in all the Courts. Order 3, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure deals with recognised Agents and Pleaders. The right to practice conferred on Advocates includes the right to plead as well as to act in all the Courts. Order 3, Rule 2 deals with recognised agents of parties by whim such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are: “(a) Persons holding powers of attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties; (b) Persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance application or act is made or done in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorized to make and do such appearances, applications and acts.. A registered power of attorney is admissible in evidence to prove the agency under S. 85 of the Indian Evidence Act and unless its genuineness is suspected in which case proof of its execution can be called for Order 3, Rule 4, C.P.C. deals with appointment of a Pleader. The appointment of a pleader must be in writing like vakalatnama and that writing must be executed by the party or by a person acting on his behalf under the authority of a power of attorney unless the person making the appointment is the recognised agent of the party. Any person may hold a power of attorney and as such attorney may sign a vakalatnama, and appoint a pleader to appear for this principal. Once he has accepted the brief and the client has paid his fee, he continues to represent the client and he is responsible for the conduct of the case. He is, no doubt, entitled to terminate his status as a pleader of the client but that cannot done orally. It must be done in writing with the permission of the Court in the manner laid down by clause (2) of Rule 4 of Order 3. A perusal of Order 3, Rule 4 discloses that if practitioner who filed vakalat on behalf his client has not given consent, leave of the Court is necessary to terminate his appointment as an advocate in the case. A perusal of Order 3, Rule 4 discloses that if practitioner who filed vakalat on behalf his client has not given consent, leave of the Court is necessary to terminate his appointment as an advocate in the case. Though Order 3, Rule 4 is silent about the power of the Court to determine any question disputed between the parties Courts have construed this provision empowering the Court to pass an appropriate order while granting leave to the client to terminate the appointment of his counsel. The enquiry is clearly summary and the court cannot make an elaborate adjudication on the seriously disputed questions of fact and law. The appointment of a pleader may be put an end to by the client or the pleader; but in either case it can be done only with the leave of the Court. The object of the rule in insisting upon the prior leave of the court is to ensure that the work of the Court is not dislocated by a sudden cancellation of a vakalat or withdrawal from a case by an Advocate. In order to decide when the relationship of client and pleader terminates, the Court must look to the ordinary law which regulates the contract between master and servant and not to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19. S. 201 of the Indian Contract Act deals with termination of agency. The said Section is reproduced hereunder: An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or a gent dying or becoming of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.” S. 202 of the Indian Contract Act refers to restrain on termination of agency where the agent has an interest in the subject matter. The provisions under S. 201 of the Indian Contract Act deals with termination of agency under several heads. We are concerned in the present case only with the termination of agency by the principle of revocation. It is a question of fact to determine as to whether an agency has in fact been revoked by the principles. The provisions under S. 201 of the Indian Contract Act deals with termination of agency under several heads. We are concerned in the present case only with the termination of agency by the principle of revocation. It is a question of fact to determine as to whether an agency has in fact been revoked by the principles. The principal may revoke the authority at any time before it is exercised, subject to the provisions in Ss. 202 to 207. If the revocation is wrongful or premature, the principal becomes liable to the agent by way of compensation. It is solely governed by the terms in the agreement made with the principal. The power of revocation of authority by the principal cannot be arbitrarily exercised. S. 202 of the Indian Contract Act is reproduced hereunder: Termination of agency, where agent has an interest in subject matter : Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms subject matter of agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest. This provision supplied the exception to the rule of revocation postulated in S. 201. Where in the subject matter of the agency, the agent acquires an interest by virtue of the very authority, e principal cannot revoke the agency, unless there is a contract to the contrary. This test to be applied for finding out whether a power of attorney given to an agent is irrevocable or not is to see whether the primary object giving the power was for the purpose of protecting or securing any interest of the agent. 20. As pointed out by me above on the facts of this case that the Power of Attorney was given to Mr. Venkatakrishna by the plaintiff and the petitioner herein is coupled with interest and was acted upon and hence, the same cannot be revoked. Before concluding certain developments that have taken place in this case may also to be noticed. On 29-11-1990, the trial of this suit commenced. After the closure of the evidence of the power of Attorney Agent Mr. Venkatakrishna D.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined Mr. Irwin Aron Advocate was also examined as Court witness on 11-3-1991. Afterwards, summons were issued to Dhanapal and Narayanan who are the brokers to give evidence as Court witness regarding other probate proceedings in O.P. No. 177 of 1987. After the closure of the evidence of the power of Attorney Agent Mr. Venkatakrishna D.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined Mr. Irwin Aron Advocate was also examined as Court witness on 11-3-1991. Afterwards, summons were issued to Dhanapal and Narayanan who are the brokers to give evidence as Court witness regarding other probate proceedings in O.P. No. 177 of 1987. The matter was getting adjourned and compromise talk was proposed. At the stage, notice dated 20-6-1991 as stated above was also sent to the wrong address and at the direction of this Court, notice and other connected proceedings were given to Mr. R. Krishnaswamy. Hence, in my opinion, the present act of the petitioner (3rd plaintiff in the suit) to cancel the power of attorney granted to the respondent is only with a view to deprive the respondent of the right over the suit property, and that the applicant has with ulterior motive of selling away the property to some third party thereby violated the obligations cast upon her on the agreement. Therefore, in my view, the attempted revocation is in breach of the terms of the agreement of sale dated 18-5-1982. 21. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the power of attorney given by the petitioner cannot be revoked since it is not only an irrevocable power of attorney but also coupled with interest and was acted upon. In consequence thereof, the vakalat given by the said power of attorney agent to the present counsel Mr. R. Krishnaswamy cannot also be revoked. Under these circumstances, Application No. 3663 of 1991 is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.