JUDGMENT S. P. Rajkhowa, J: This appeal is directed against the order dated 10th October 1985 passed by a Learned Single Judge in Civil Order No. 13461(W) of 1981. By the impugned order the Learned Single Judge has dismissed the Civil Order and vacated all interim orders. 2. The salient facts in the writ petition are that premises No. 28/1, Gariahat Road, originally belonged to the mother of the writ petitioner Smt. Kamala Bala Devi, wife of Late Harihar Mukherjee. By a Registered Deed of Gift dated 28th March 1958 Kamala Bala Devi transferred all her rights, title and interest in respect of a portion measuring about 6 cottahs 4 chittacks and 39 sq. ft. of the said permises No. 28/1, Gariahat Road, Calcutta to the petitioner (fully described in para 4 of the petition). Sometime thereafter the petitioner constructed a building in the suit premises in accordance with the plan sanctioned by the Corporation of Calcutta and after construction he has been residing there with the member of his family (paragraph 1) of the petition). Thereafter on or about 21st March 1981 he was surprised to receive a purported notice numbered 2999 dated 19th March 1081 from the respondent No. 1 intimating him that his property being premises No. 28/1B, Gariahat Road, Calcutta has been requisitioned and that portion will be taken over on 25th March 1981 at 2.30 p.m. with the help of police (Para 10 of the petition). The petitioner then challenged the validity of the said notice by an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution before this Court and obtained an interim order restraining the respondents from taking any action pursuant to the notice. The Civil Order was disposed of on 21st April 1981 by a Learned Single Judge who directed the petitioner to make a representation before the respondent who would dispose of the same and shall not take any action till the said matter was disposed of. Liberty was also given to the petitioner to move this Court again if he feels aggrieved by the order of the authority. Pursuant to the said order of the Learned Single Judge, the petitioner made a representation before respondent No.1 on 27th April 1981 and the respondent No.1 disposed of the representation with the following observation, "The land is urgently required for a bonafide public purpose viz. Pursuant to the said order of the Learned Single Judge, the petitioner made a representation before respondent No.1 on 27th April 1981 and the respondent No.1 disposed of the representation with the following observation, "The land is urgently required for a bonafide public purpose viz. for the purpose of maintaining supply and services essential to the life of the community and for the creation of better living conditions in urban areas and for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto". 3. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the application challenging the whole proceeding of requisition and acquisition and also the order passed by respondent No. 1 mainly on the following grounds: (1) That the purported notice numbered 2999 dated 19th March 1981 is illegal, inoperative and void ad initio in as much as it has neither disclosed the purpose for which the premises have been requisitioned nor the satisfaction of the Government to the effect as has been envisaged in Sec. 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 (Act-II of 1945); (2) that no notice u/s 3(2) of Act-II of 1945 was served upon the petitioners; (3) that the requisition is not valid under the law as the requirement is not for a public purpose; (4) that the Act-II 1948 is a temporary law and any permanent requisition and/or acquisition of immovable property under the said Act is neither permissible nor legal; (5) that the suit premises not being included within the scheme No. LXXII of the Calcutta Improvement Trust, the impugned requisition order is wholly bad in law and that the impugned requisition cannot be also sustained on the purported plea of amendment of this scheme as there have been no gazette notification of such amendment in terms of the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act 1911; (6) that the Calcutta Improvement Act 1911 is a special statute, designed for improvement of the city of Calcutta and the provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 are general provisions for requisition and acquisition of property for various purposes enumerated in the said Act, and, therefore, the general provisions cannot over-ride the special provisions made under the Calcutta Improvement Act and that Act is a complete code for acquisition of for the purpose of Calcutta Improvement Trust. 4. Calcutta Improvement Trust, respondent No. 2 filed affidavit-in-opposition running into several pages. 4. Calcutta Improvement Trust, respondent No. 2 filed affidavit-in-opposition running into several pages. It has been stated that considering the urgency in the implementation of scheme No. LXXII which was published in the Official Gazette dated 2.1.1959, the State Govt. directed the Land Acquisition Collector to requisition various properties including the vacant land belonging to the petitioner as per provision of the West Bengal Land (Requisitions and Acquisition) Act 1948. It is stated that at all material times, the requisitioned property which is a piece of land belonging to the petitioner is a vacant land adjacent to the building and structure standing or existing thereon and the possession of the said land has been handed over to the Calcutta Improvement Trust by the Land Acquisition Collector and the date of delivery of the possession was on or about 15.7.1981. It is further stated that the specific purpose of taking over of the said vacant land is to construct, inter alia on the suit property, housing accommodation for the general public which will form part of the entire complex and the said complex provides for establishing shopping and office spaces, recreation facilities, play-ground, housing and other community facilities ete. ete. which come under the expression "civil centre". Detailed statements have been made regarding scheme undertaken by the Calcutta Improvement Trust and it is stated that the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 being a special statute providing for procedure relating to the implementation of the said Act, the provisions of the same are applicable or/are attracted or/are enforceable on its own strength to the local body or authority such as the Calcutta Improvement Trust. 5. Affidavit-in-reply in answer to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 2 has also been filed. 6. After hearing the parties the Learned Single Judge has held that all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner' having failed, the civil order is dismissed. 7. Mr. 5. Affidavit-in-reply in answer to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 2 has also been filed. 6. After hearing the parties the Learned Single Judge has held that all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner' having failed, the civil order is dismissed. 7. Mr. Ganguly, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that in view of the provisions contained in the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 acquisition of land for the purpose of Calcutta Improvement Trust (for short C. I. T.) must be made in accordance with the express provisions of the said Act, which is a special law, and not in accordance with the provisions of West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 (for short Act-II of 1948) which is a general law about the requisition and acquisition. This contention, as will appear from the discussions below, is the trump card played by the learned counsel during his argument. By citing various rulings, he has built up his arguments to bring home the point that the acquisition of the land in question was not permissible under the provisions of Act-II, 1948. 8. Learned Counsel has referred to AIR 1931 P. C. 149, Secretary at State vs. Hindustan Co. operative Insurance Society Ltd. In this case observations are made as to how the statues should be interpreted. It has been observed that it is an accepted rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second. The independent existence of the two Acts, viz. Land Acquisition Act and Calcutta Improvement Act is, therefore, recognised; despite the death of the parent Act its off-spring survives in the incorporating Act. Though no such saving clause appears in the General Clauses Act the principle involved is still applicable. It was further observed that where certain provisions from an existing Act have, been' incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition. While making these observations, Privy Council quoted from 'exparte St. sepulchre' (1864)33 L. J. Ch. While making these observations, Privy Council quoted from 'exparte St. sepulchre' (1864)33 L. J. Ch. 372 in which it was held that if the particular Act gives in itself a complete rule on the subject matter, the expression of that rule would undoubtedly amount to an expection of the subject matter of the rule out of the General Act." 9. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1963 S. C. 1072 Patna Improvement Trust vs. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi. It is a decision of 4-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. In this case land was acquired under Land Acquisition Act, (1894) for Patna Improvement Trust. Notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the State Govt. after passing of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act (1951). The Notification was held to be valid (as per majority view; Subha Rao-J dissenting). S. 71 of the Bihar Act 35 of 1951 which modifies the Land Acquisition Act, itself states that for the purpose of acquisition of land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, that Act (Land Acquisition Act) shall be subject to the modification specified in the Schedule. Therefore, even for the purpose of acquiring land for the Trust the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act as modified is contemplated. It does not exclude the Land Acquisition Act, on the contrary it makes it applicable but subject to its modifications and exceptions. This majority view rather helps not the appellant but the respondent. However, the learned counsel for the appellant has tried to draw sustenance from the dissenting judgment given by Subha Rao-J who has observed that a General Act must yield to a Special Act dealing with a specific subject matter and that if an Act directs a thing to be done in a particular way, it shall be deemed to have prohibited the doing of that: thing in any other way. Under the Act, the Trust is authorised to implement the improvement schemes in a particular way and for the purpose of implementing them to acquire land in a prescribed manner. Under the Act, the Trust is authorised to implement the improvement schemes in a particular way and for the purpose of implementing them to acquire land in a prescribed manner. If that be so, the Trust is bound to implement the scheme in the manner prescribed and cannot resort to any other method, that is to say, it can acquire land for Trust purposes only by resorting to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as modified and incorporated by reference in the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that although majority view in a judgment is binding yet a dissenting view has its own value and cannot be brushed aside. The appeal in AIR 1963 S. C. 1072 arose out of the decision in, Shreemati Lakshmi Devi vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1962 Patna 460, In that case Patna High Court ruled that in view of the special provisions made in S. 71 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trusts Act, read with the Schedule, the State Govt. has no authority to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act and publish the notifications under section 4 of that Act for the• purpose of an Improvement Trust. The principle applicable to a case of this description is generalia specialibus non-derogant and therefore, it has ruled that the notifications of the State Govt. under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisitions of land for the Improvement Trust were ultra vires. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 S. C. 1077 has not reversed the principle of law decided in AIR 1962 Patna 460, but has pointed out in para-5 that the Bihar Act 35 of 1951 makes provision for applying the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 10. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1962 S. C. 1961, Chairman of the Municipal Commissioner, Howrah vs. Shalimar Wood Products Pvt. Ltd. In this case the scope of S. 38 of the West Bengal Fire Services Act (18 of 1950) and S. 386 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (3 of 1923) as applied to Howrah Municipality came up for discussions. A 3-Judge Bench has held that S. 38 of Act 18 of 1950 does not repeal S. 386 of Act 3 of 1923. In this case Supreme Court has relied on AIR 1931 P. C. 149 (supra). 11. A 3-Judge Bench has held that S. 38 of Act 18 of 1950 does not repeal S. 386 of Act 3 of 1923. In this case Supreme Court has relied on AIR 1931 P. C. 149 (supra). 11. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1975 S. C. 17, Bolani Ores vs. State of Orissa and Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. vs. R.T.O. Ballery (Mysore). In this case reference was made to Collector of Customs, Madras vs. Nathella Sampathy Chetty, (AIR 1962 S. C. 316) and New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Asst. Collector of Central Exercise, Allahabad (AIR 1971 S. C. 454). In both these cases AIR 1931 P. C. 149 was sought to be relied upon. But in both, AIR 1931 P. C. 149 was distinguished. It does not appear to us whether the Supreme Court in Bolani Ores either relied or not on AIR 1931 P. C. 149. 12. Learned Counsel has referred to AIR 1979 S.C. 798 , Mahindra and Mahindra vs. Union of India. It is a case under Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices Act (54 of 1969). In this case interpretation of S. 55 of the Act, the effect of amendment of S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the right of appeal and the applicability of S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act (10 of 1987) cropped up for discussion. It was observed that if there is mere reference to a provision of one Statute in another without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears, S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act would apply and the reference would be construed as a reference to the provision as may be in force from time to time in the former Statute. But if a provision of one Statute is incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in the former Statute or even its total repeal would not affect the provision as incorporated in the latter Statute. It was further observed that the grounds specified in the then existing S. 100 C. P. C. were incorporated in S. 55 and the substitution of the new S. 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated. Section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. 13. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1979 S. C. 65, U. P. State Electricity Board vs. Hari Shankar Jain. Section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. 13. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1979 S. C. 65, U. P. State Electricity Board vs. Hari Shankar Jain. In para 8 of this reported judgment Supreme Court has discussed the principle of generalia Specialibus non-derogant and has observed as follows: "The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this; In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament." 14. Learned counsel has referred to (1921) All England Law Reports 79 (re-print), Black Pool Corporation vs. Starr Estate Co. Ltd. By Section 70 of a Local Act, the Black Pool Improvement Act, 1917, the respondents were to sell and the Black Pool Corporation were to buy certain land at a price to be determined, in default of agreement, by arbitration as provided by the Lands Clauses Acts as modified by the Local Act, and it was provided that the provisions of the section should apply for the benefit and protection of the respondents. By Section 1(1) of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919; where land is authorised to be acquired compulsorily by any Govt. Department.........any question of disputed compensation.........shall be determined in the manner provided by the Act. The question was whether compensation was to be assessed under the General Act of 1919 or the Local Act of 1917. It was held that the general language of the Act of 1919 ought not, in absence of clear works, to be construed as over-riding the special provisions of Section 70 of the Local Act. 15. By referring to the aforesaid reported decisions, the learned counsel has submitted that for the acquisition of the suit land for the purpose of Calcutta Improvement Trust by taking recourse to the provisions under the Act II of 1948 the respondents have acted illegally. 16. On the point of notice the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the provision of Section 3(1) of Act II of 1948 has not been complied with. 17. Learned counsel has referred to 1979 (II) C.H.N. 349. 16. On the point of notice the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the provision of Section 3(1) of Act II of 1948 has not been complied with. 17. Learned counsel has referred to 1979 (II) C.H.N. 349. Tarak Nath Sen vs. First Land Acquisition Collector. In this case it was held that subsection, (2) of Section 3 of the Act makes it manifest that, the, Order of requisition must be served in any event on the owner and in addition requires that it should be also served on the occupier. In this case the admitted position was that the required notice had .not been served and so it was held that there has been a breach of the mandatory requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. 18. Learned counsel has referred to 1981(1) C.L.J. 29 , Smt. Sudhira Bala Roy vs. State of West Bengal. In this case possession of the requisitioned premises had been taken forcibly with police help without serving prior notice in writing and it was held that such action was illegal. 19. Learned counsel has also referred to 1987(1) C.L.J. 218 District Magistrate, North 24 Parganas vs. M/s. Himal Enterprises. It was a case under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (5 of 1947). This case follows the principle in 1981(1) C.L.J. 20, (supra). 20. Learned counsel has referred to 1989 (1) C.L.J. 214 , Syed Fateyab Ali Meerza vs. Union of India. In this case also it is held that a notice under s. 3(1) of the Act II of 1948 is mandatory and that notice must be served when the requisition is sought to be made in respect of a lawn, upon the persons residing in the house to which the lawn appertains and that notice serviced upon the Darwan of the Trust is not valid. 21. Lastly on the point of non-service of notice, the learned counsel has submitted that the defect of non-service of notice cannot be curd by a subsequent consideration of representation on the ground that nothing new could have been said by the petitioner. 21. Lastly on the point of non-service of notice, the learned counsel has submitted that the defect of non-service of notice cannot be curd by a subsequent consideration of representation on the ground that nothing new could have been said by the petitioner. He has pleaded the oft-repeated principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to have been done and has referred to AIR 1981 S.C. 136 S. K. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan where it has been held that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. 22. Mr. Shibaji Mitra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted that acquisition of land under Act II of 1948 for the purpose of C.I.T. is not illegal and that this issue has been well-settled by various pronouncements of this Court. 23. Learned counsel has referred to a Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1972 Calcutta 8, Mihir Sarkar vs. First Land Acquisition Collector. There is no dispute that the Act II of 1948 provides for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for public purpose and the Division Bench has held that where the two statutes covered the same field there is no constitutional bar which prevents the application of one or the other. In this reported case the Division Bench relied upon the decision of Assam High Court (now Gauhati High Court) as reported in AIR 1969 Assam 18, Nadir Shah vs. State of Assam wherein a similar point was involved. Land was acquired under the Assam Land (Requisition and, Acquisition) Act 1948. 24. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1973 Calcutta 478, State of West Bengal vs. Asitendra Nath Mitra. In this case a Division Bench of this Court has held that the Calcutta Improvement Act is not a self-contained Statute. For an identical purpose land can be acquired directly under the Land Acquisition Act or under that Act as modified by the Calcutta Improvement Act. It was further held that the State is the acquiring authority. 25. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1973 S.C. 689 , Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vithal Rao. It is seen that Nagpur Improvement Act is pari materia with Calcutta Improvement Act of 1911. It was further held that the State is the acquiring authority. 25. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1973 S.C. 689 , Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vithal Rao. It is seen that Nagpur Improvement Act is pari materia with Calcutta Improvement Act of 1911. In this case before the Supreme Court the first point which was raised was, whether it is the State which is the acquiring authority or it is the Improvement Trust which is the acquiring authority under the Improvement Act. The answer is given by a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the following words, "It seems to us that it is quite clear, especially in view of Section 17 A as inserted by para 6 of the schedule, that the acquisition will be by the Govt. and it is only on payment of the cost of acquisition to the Govt. that the lands vest in the Trust. It is true that the acquisition is for the Trust and may be at its instance, but nevertheless the acquisition is by the Govt." (Para 18) Thereafter Supreme Court goes on to say, "If this is so, then it is quite clear that the Govt. can acquire for a housing accommodation scheme either under the Land Acquisition Act or under the Improvement Act." 26. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1963 S.C. 1077 Patna Improvement Trust vs. Smt Laksmi Devi. We have already discussed this ruling hereinbefore along with other rulings referred to by the Learned counsel for the appellant. 27. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1936 Calcutta 249, Radha Nath Maity vs. Krishna Chandra Mukherjee. In this case a Division Bench has held that acquisition of land made by the Calcutta Improvement Trust under the Calcutta Improvement Act amounts to acquisition made by or on behalf of Government. 28. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1968 S.C. 244 , Collector, Akola vs. Ram Chandra. In this case land was requisitioned under s. 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (23 of 1948) and the acquisition proceeding was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 28. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1968 S.C. 244 , Collector, Akola vs. Ram Chandra. In this case land was requisitioned under s. 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (23 of 1948) and the acquisition proceeding was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. In that context Supreme Court has held that the exercise of power under the Requisitioning Act does not exhaust or make incompatible the exercise of power under the Land Acquisition Act after requisitioning land under s. 5(1) of the Act 23 of 1948 does not and cannot mean abuse of the power under the provisions of the Act." 29. Learned Counsel has referred to AIR 1986 Calcutta 86, Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta vs. Nityanand Paul. It was a case under West Bengal Govt. Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act (19 of 1976). A Division Bench deciding the case has held that the Trust for the Improvement of Calcutta is a Govt. Undertaking within Section 2(b) of the Act and the premises held by it is Govt. premists within Section 2(a) 30. On the point of notice, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to AIR 1982, Calcutta 509, Dr. Nilkamal Bazboruah vs. State of West Bengal. In this case there were two owners in respect of the requisitioned premises. The Darwan was authorised to accept communication on behalf of both the owners. But the Darwan refused to accept the order of requisition when it was tendered to him. On his refusal the order was affixed on the outer door of the requisitioned premises. Under the facts and circumstances it was held it amounts to effective service on both the owners. It was further held that the acquisition order is not invalid on the ground of not giving a hearing to owner. In this connection the learned counsel has further submitted that pursuant to the order passed by a learned Single Judge on 21st April 1981 the writ petitioner made a representation before the respondent No. 1 in respect of the said notice of requisition No. 2999 dated 19th March 1991 and he reconsidered the whole case on the basis of the representation and on being satisfied that the land was urgently required for a bonafide public purpose, rejected the representation vide order dated 4.5.1981. Learned counsel has further drawn our attention to para 1 of the representation itself wherein the petitioner has admitted the receipt of the said notice on 21st March 1981 and, therefore, contention of the writ petitioner that no notice was served falls through. 31. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised another point that the C.I.T. is a company within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, without complying with the provision of Chapter-VII of the Act, acquisition of land for C.I.T. is not possible. On this point the learned counsel has referred to AIR 1981 S.C. 1964, State of Punjab vs. Raja Ram. In this case Supreme Court has held that the Food Corporation of India is a Company within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act. As against this argument, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to AIR 1983 S.C. 670, The Workman, Food Corporation of India vs. Food Corporation of India. It has been held at para-17 that the Food Corporation of India is an instrumentality of the State comprehended in the expression 'other authority' in Art. 12 of the Constitution. Similarly in AIR 1986 S.C. 1571 , Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. Brojonath Ganguly, Supreme Court has held that the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd., though Government Company under s. 617 of the Companies Act, is the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that when a subsequent Bench having co-ordinate jurisdiction is absolutely convinced that the decision of an earlier Bench is erroneous then the latter Bench is not bound by the earlier decision. The learned counsel has relied on AIR 1990 Calcutta 135, Pieco Electronics. vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi. 33. The learned counsel for the respondent does not agree to the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant on this point. He has cited AIR 1986 S.C. 806 . Union of India vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. It was a case under Central Exercise and Salt Act 1944. In this case a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has made salutary observation on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and on co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Benches. He has cited AIR 1986 S.C. 806 . Union of India vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. It was a case under Central Exercise and Salt Act 1944. In this case a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has made salutary observation on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and on co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Benches. It has been held that where a decision is given by a Bench of two Judges, a co-ordinate Bench cannot differ from the decision of the earlier Bench and if the subsequent Bench finds itself unable to agree with the earlier decision then it should refer the earlier decision to a larger Bench. Learned counsel has referred to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 1455 , G. K. Dudani vs. S. D. Sharma. In a terse language Supreme Court has ruled that a Division Bench of a High Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the Supreme Court and that High Court should take the words in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the sense in which they were used and apply to the facts before it. Learned counsel has referred to one more decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1976 S.C. 844 , Ram Jiyan vs. Smt. Phoola (Dead). In this case Supreme Court has ruled that whether a Division Bench decision is given in an appeal from an original suit or in a writ petition the ratio is binding on the subsequent Division Bench. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed yet another point, that the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired are not essential to the life of the community and has relied upon the observation of this Court in the case of Syed Fateyab Ali Meerza vs. Union of India reported in 1989(1) C.L.J. 214 (supra). It was observed in this case that the construction of quarters for Government officers and Ministers is not a purpose warranting requisition and that it cannot be equated to the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It was observed in this case that the construction of quarters for Government officers and Ministers is not a purpose warranting requisition and that it cannot be equated to the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. However, countering this line of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the elucidation of the Clause 'any land for any purpose' given by the Supreme Court in Collector, Akola vs. Ram Chandra, AIR 1968 S.C. 244 (supra). Supreme Court has observed that the words 'any land for any public purpose' are wide enough to include any purpose of whatsoever nature and do not contain any restriction regarding the nature of that purpose. It places no limitation on the competent authority as to what kind of public purpose it should be for the valid exercise of its power nor does it confine the exercise of that power to a purpose which is temporary only. It is for the requisitioning authority to judge and not for a court of law to decide how best the land is to be used. Learned counsel for the respondent has further referred to AIR 1972 S.C. 2683 , Smt. Venkatamma vs. City Improvement of Trust Board, Mysore. In this case the question arose as to whether acquisition of land for shopping sites amounts to public purpose. The Supreme Court has answered this question by observing that merely because the shopping sites would be let out to private individuals to erect shops thereon it cannot be said that the land is not being acquired for a public purpose. Such acquisition would be for a public purpose as the shops would cater to the needs of the persons living in the locality. Relying on these rulings, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even the commercial purpose of the C.I.T. is also public purpose. 35. Such acquisition would be for a public purpose as the shops would cater to the needs of the persons living in the locality. Relying on these rulings, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even the commercial purpose of the C.I.T. is also public purpose. 35. Lastly learned counsel for the respondent has raised the point that the amended writ petition at the appellate stage should be dismissed in limine as the petitioner is seeking illegaliy to introduce matters of legal submissions/arguments having no factual foundation or legal basis which was filed after a lapse of more than 6 years from the date of filing of the main writ application with a view to defeating or frustrating the public interest project of the respondent C.I.T. Learned counsel has referred to AIR 1979 S.C. 1713 , Babu Singh vs. Union of India. In this case a notice issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was challenged on the ground of delay and laches. The Supreme Court has held that where a writ petition challenging a notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was filed nearly 6 years and one month after the publication of the impugned notice and about 5 years after the award and no explanation was offered why the writ petition was filed after such an inordinate delay and after the entire process of acquisition was over, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed in limine on account of delay. If a person allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceeding on the basis of that notice under s. 4 and declaration under s. 6 were valid and then attacked the notification on the ground which were available to him at the time when the notification was published, it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The length of delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done within the interval on the basis of the notification and declaration, and, therefore, a challenge to a notification under s. 4 and a declaration under s. 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. If it is not so done the petition is liable to be dismissed. If it is not so done the petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the appellant has however submitted that no new matter has been introduced in the amended writ petition to spring a surprise on the respondents and no extraneous matter has been introduced. 36. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel of both the parties and the rulings cited by them in support of their respective contentions discussed hereinbefore we come to the following conclusions; Although for some purposes the Calcutta Improvement Trust may be construed as a Company within meaning of Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act on the basis of the decision in AIR 1981 S.C. 1964 (supra) nonetheless relying on AIR 1985 S.C. 670 , and AIR 1986 S.C. 1571 we hold the view that the C.I.T. is an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of 'other authority' in Article 12 of the Constitution. It is true that the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 is a special statute and Section 69 of this Act has authorised the Board constituted under the Act to acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for carrying out any of the purpose of this Act. Section 3 of West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 has given the power upon the State Government to requisition land if the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Relying on the decision is AIR 1972 Calcutta 8, AIR 1973 S.C. 689 and AIR 1968 S.C. 244 , we hold that, as the Act-II of 1948 and the Act of 1911 covered the same field of requisition and acquisition there is no constitutional bar to prevent the application of one, or the other in the matter of requisition and acquisition of land for the purpose of the C.I.T. Although the acquisition is for the Trust, nevertheless the acquisition is by the Govt. and initiation of the land acquisition proceeding by issuing notification under s. 3(1A) of Act-II of 1948 cannot mean abuse of the power under the provisions of the Act. and initiation of the land acquisition proceeding by issuing notification under s. 3(1A) of Act-II of 1948 cannot mean abuse of the power under the provisions of the Act. The notification of requisition could not be served upon the writ petitioner/owner as he was not found at the time of service by the process server and so the same was served by hanging on the door of the premises. However, the improvement scheme was published long ago in the official gazette and the writ petitioner had received notice of acquisition No. 2999 dated 19th March 1981. The writ petitioner felt aggrieved at the so-called hasty action of the Land Acquisition Collector and he came up before this Court in its writ jurisdiction. Pursuant to representation before respondent No. 1 who heard the petitioner and rejected the representation giving reasons of such rejection. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that thereafter the possession of the acquired land had been handed over to the Calcutta Improvement Trust on or about 15.7.1981. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the requisition and acquisition proceeding was bad in law for the defect of notice. The scheme for improvement of Calcutta had already been published in the official gazette. Quite large area was covered by the scheme and lands were acquired accordingly. The suit land is a part of the lands covered by the scheme. As already stated, the purpose of such requisition and acquisition is to maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Under the scheme for the improvement of Calcutta, the acquired lands including the suit land will be used for public purposes' viz. housing accommodation for general public, establishment of shopping centers and office spaces. recreation facilities, play ground etc. The Apex Court has ruled that it is for the requisitioning authority to judge and not for a court of law to decide how best the land is to be used. So we hold that the purposes for which the lands are acquired for the C.I.T. constitute services essential to the life of the community worked out by the Trust. As regards the amended writ petition we hold the view that it has not made a complete departure from the earlier one. 37. In the result we db not find any merit in this appeal to interfere with the order impugned. As regards the amended writ petition we hold the view that it has not made a complete departure from the earlier one. 37. In the result we db not find any merit in this appeal to interfere with the order impugned. The appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed. The order impugned is affirmed. We make no order as to costs. Shamsuddin Ahmed, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.