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1992 DIGILAW 432 (ALL)

SRI ASHOK KUMAR GUPTA v. METAL GOODS PRIVATE LTD.

1992-03-31

R.S.DHAVAN

body1992
RAVI S. DHAVAN, J. ( 1 ) THE court has heard learned counsel for the parties present on two matters in detail : (a) on the matter relating to the state of the present proceedings after filing of Special Appeal no. 15 of 1991, and (b) what should be the proceedings henceforth before this court. ( 2 ) THE special appeal was filed on May 4, 1991. It was filed against the proceedings as recorded by this court dated March 26, 1991, regarding a proposed compromise. The case remained pending awaiting the result of the compromise, should there be any. The only aspect on the record of the special appeal which is relevant for this court is the interim order which had been granted. It is reproduced below : " respondents counsel not present though served. In the circumstances, the recording of compromise in O. S. No. 561 of 1985 on the file of the First Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi, is stayed for a period of two weeks, if not already recorded. List the special appeal on 17th May, 1991. (Sd.) B. P. J. R. C. J. (Sd.) R. R. K. T. J. 6-5-1991. " ( 3 ) ON the terms of the interim order, it is implied that if the compromise has been recorded no impediment has been put upon it by the appellate court. If the compromise has not been recorded then the process of its being recorded was to remain in abeyance for two weeks. Today, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ravi Kant, submits that he will revert back to the trial court in reference to the order of this court dated March 26, 1991. ( 4 ) ANOTHER aspect that needs to be noticed by this court is the matter relating to the institution of a special appeal arising out of the proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956. In a matter arising out of this Act and in the matter of the winding of a company, an appeal is provided by the Act itself. It is not that an order or decision given in the proceedings under the Act is not available. The appeal is provided by Section 483 of the Act ; it says : " 483. In a matter arising out of this Act and in the matter of the winding of a company, an appeal is provided by the Act itself. It is not that an order or decision given in the proceedings under the Act is not available. The appeal is provided by Section 483 of the Act ; it says : " 483. Appeal from any order made, or decision given in the matter of the winding up of a company by the court shall lie to the same court to which, in the same manner in which, and subject to the same conditions under which appeals lie from an order or decision of the court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. " ( 5 ) THIS implies that should an appeal be filed in the matter of the winding up of a company, it will not be a special appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court, but under section 483 of the Act aforesaid. ( 6 ) THE appeal which has been presented by the petitioner was against proceedings which permitted parties to enter into a compromise and permitted the trial court to look into the compromise and pass such orders as may be necessary and just. No party was prevented from not entering into a compromise nor any party was precluded from objecting to the compromise. This court never gave any direction nor any decision finally disposing of the company petition. If that be the case then the question does arise whether the special appeal is maintainable against an order which is not a judgment. ( 7 ) THE court does expect the registry at the Stamp Reporters office to discharge its obligation to report on court fees, limitation and cognizability so that the appellate court has the benefit of the stamp Reporters report. No such report is available. What is surprising is that the Stamp reporter when questioned on how he evaded a report on the cognizability of the appeal, candidly" expressed ignorance both on the Rules of the High Court, and a Full Bench decision of the High Court, interpreting the circumstances in which a special appeal is maintainable. No such report is available. What is surprising is that the Stamp reporter when questioned on how he evaded a report on the cognizability of the appeal, candidly" expressed ignorance both on the Rules of the High Court, and a Full Bench decision of the High Court, interpreting the circumstances in which a special appeal is maintainable. According to the Full Bench decision in the matter of Notified Area Committee v. Sri Ram singhasan Prasad Kalwar, AIR 1970 All 561 , a special appeal shall lie only against a judgment finally deciding a case, in effect, holding that an appeal against an interlocutory order will not lie. ( 8 ) APART from the Full Bench decision, for the Stamp Reporter, on the cognizability or the maintainability of a special appeal, the Rules of the Court are clear. Section 3 of Part I, Chapter I defines special appeal. It reads : " special appeal" an appeal from the judgment of one judge. " ( 9 ) THERE cannot be a special appeal under the Rules of the Court which is not against a judgment. The rule is one of prudence, guaranteeing continuity of proceedings subjecting only a judgment to appeal. The provision of an appeal, special appeal, as it is called under the Rules of the Court, 1952, rested in principle on what was ordained in the Letters Patent of 1866. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent clearly spells out the parameters of an appeal. It says, in reference to the context : " 10. Appeal to the High Court from judges of the court.-- And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature Allahabad from the judgment. . . of one judge of the said High Court. . . " ( 10 ) THE special appeal in the Rules of the Court, 1952, cannot even be entertained, if it is not against a judgment. Such is the law on this aspect in the Charter which has established this High court, a provision preserved in principle, in the Rules of Court, even today. ( 11 ) BUT the occasion to seek an ad interim direction from this court has arisen because the applicants have not met with any success in the special appeal which they had filed. ( 11 ) BUT the occasion to seek an ad interim direction from this court has arisen because the applicants have not met with any success in the special appeal which they had filed. The record and the law standing thus, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he shall revert back to the trial court in accordance with the order of this court dated 26th March, 1991. ( 12 ) TODAY, the petitioner desires that the court consider the Application A-3 filed on November 23, 1991, seeking an ad interim order that the sale deeds be set aside and the properties restored to the company. Let it be not misunderstood for the purposes of record that for more than a year the petitioner stalled the proceedings before this court on a special appeal which did not lie, and today it is accepted that the special appeal will not hold. while, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the special appeal did not lie, and the appeal in no uncertain terms sought stay of the proceedings before this court, a stay which was not granted, reverting back to this court, the applicants, simultaneously, seek further interim orders from the court. There cannot be confusion in proceedings before two courts. Thus, as the applicants counsel contends, let the applicants go to the trial court on the consideration of the proposed compromise. This court will consider this prayer on the interim orders sought after the applicants appear before the trial court. After all, the trial court will in any case report to this court on the compromise proposed. ( 13 ) TODAY parties submit that they agree to present themselves before the trial court on April 15, 1992, parties are further agreed that this matter may come up before this court, next on May 5, 1992. List before this court on May 5, 1992. ( 14 ) LET this order be laid by the Registrar before the Honble Chief Justice for his considered attention. .