JUDGMENT 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for an order: – "(a) A declaration that the provisions of Regulation 8 of the Calcutta Port Trust (Licensing of Stevedores) Regulations, 1987 is ultra vires the Constitution of India and thus illegal, invalid and void. (b) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding and directing the respondents and each of them, their servants and/or agents to forthwith, revoke, recall and/ or cancel the said impugned order passed by he respondent no. 2 being Annexure-E hereof and to refrain from giving effect thereto or from taking any steps in terms thereof or thereunder and to act in accordance with law. (c) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of certiorari directing the respondents and each of them, their servants and/or agents to forthwith transmit and/or certify the records relating to the said impugned order being Annexure-E hereof and of all purported proceeding initiated and/or steps taken on the basis thereof or thereunder so that the same may be quashed and/or set aside and conscionable justice might be rendered. (d) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting the respondents from giving effect to or further effect to or taking any steps or further steps in terms of or pursuant to the said impugned order passed by the respondents no. 2, being Annexure-E hereof. (e) An appropriate writ, order or direction do issue for production of all relevant records and for protection of all the rights of the petitioners and for granting the petitioners such relief as in the circumstance of the case shall be just and proper. (f) Injunction restraining the respondents from giving effect to or further effect to or taking any steps or further steps in terms of or pursuant to the said impugned order passed by the respondent no. 2 being Annexure-E hereof till the disposal of this application." 2. The petitioner no. 1 case is that the petitioner no. 1 carries on business of Stevedores, inter alia, at the Port of Calcutta since 1851. The said company has branches all over the country. 2 being Annexure-E hereof till the disposal of this application." 2. The petitioner no. 1 case is that the petitioner no. 1 carries on business of Stevedores, inter alia, at the Port of Calcutta since 1851. The said company has branches all over the country. The further case of the petitioners are that the loading and discharge of cargo to and from vessels in the Port of Calcutta are done through combined operation of Stevedores and the Calcutta Port Trust. The workers suddenly went on wild cat strike on and from 23.10.1992, which has completely stalled all work at the Calcutta Port since 23.10.1992. 3. On 22.10.1992, vessel M.V. Eagle Breeze arrived at the port of Calcutta carrying about 400 containers and the petitioner company was engaged for doing stevedoring work. 23.10.1992, when the representatives of the petitioners went to submit a requisition for booking of registered workers working in second and third shifts on 23.10.1992, on the said vessel M.V. Eagle Breeze, they were prevented by the workers and their associates from entering the Call Stand where booking are taken and made. However, ultimately, the petitioner succeeded in booking the registered employees/workers for the third shift on 23.10.1992 and first shift on 24.10.1992. The Chief Clerk or the Senior Supervisor was not available in view of the strike and in view of that and inspite of the best efforts and desire the petitioners were unable to carry out the stevedoring work on the vessel M.V. Eagle Breeze. The further case of the petitioners is that no other Stevedores was also able to carry out any stevedoring work at the Calcutta Port since the second shift on 23.10.1992. On 24.10.1992, at about 2 A.M. the petitioner was surprised to receive a notice dated 23.10.1992. The said notice was replied to by the petitioners letter dated 24.10.1992 and the reply was handed over by Sri. A.K. Sen an employee of the petitioner company to the respondent no. 4 personally at 3:30 P.M. 4. On 24.10.1992 at about 4:30 P.M an employee of the petitioner company found a sealed envelope in the Letter Box and after opening the same it was found that an order was passed on 24.10.1992, by the respondent no. 2 wherein the respondent no. 1 has appointed the respondent no. 4 personally at 3:30 P.M. 4. On 24.10.1992 at about 4:30 P.M an employee of the petitioner company found a sealed envelope in the Letter Box and after opening the same it was found that an order was passed on 24.10.1992, by the respondent no. 2 wherein the respondent no. 1 has appointed the respondent no. 5 to enquire and to report on certain matters referred to in the said order and pending such enquiry the respondent no. 2 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Rule 8 of the Regulation suspended the stevedoring licence of the petitioner no. 1 for a period of one month with immediate effect. The said order dated 24.10.1992, passed by the Chairman, Calcutta Port Trust is set out here-in-below: – "CALCUTTA PORT TRUST No. Administration/7343/92-94/STV ORDER M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd. 13-A, St. George Terrace, Hastings, Calcutta-700 022 1. Whereas a report has been received from the Container Terminal Manager, Calcutta Port Trust informing that M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Stevedores appointed by M/s. Forbes, Forbes & Campbell to work on board M.V. Eagle Breeze did not make arrangement to commence work on the vessel in the second shift after she was berthed at 'D' NSD on 23.10.1992 and also did not work in third shift of 23.10.1992 and first shift of 24.10.1992 causing loss to the Port. 2. And Whereas as a result of above action by M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd., workers of Dock Labour Board have subsequently refused to accept booking for working on other vessels, now berthed at Calcutta Port causing further loss to the Port. 3. Now therefore the undersigned has appointed Shri J.K. Mukherjee Docks Manger, Calcutta Port Trust to enquire into the matter and furnish a report forthwith. 4. Pending the aforesaid enquiry, the undersigned in exercise of powers granted under Clause 8 of the Calcutta Port Trust (Licensing of Stevedores) Regulations, 1987 hereby orders suspension of the stevedoring licence granted in favour of the said M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd., for a period of one month with immediate effect. Sd/- Illegible Chairman Calcutta Port Trust." 5. The petitioners case is that the said order is arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and in excess of jurisdiction without the authority of law. 6. Pvt. Ltd., for a period of one month with immediate effect. Sd/- Illegible Chairman Calcutta Port Trust." 5. The petitioners case is that the said order is arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and in excess of jurisdiction without the authority of law. 6. The case of the respondents is that the vessel M.V. Eagle Breeze under the agency of F.F.C. was first vessel planned to work at 'D' NSD from the afternoon shift of 23.10.1992 and since the entire operation of container vessel by use of Calcutta Port Trust equipment was being undertaken for the first time. The authority apprehended resistance from the workers of private agencies who had so far performed such container handing operating on shore and a technical security measures were taken around 'D' NSD by mobilizing CIST and police force to avoid any resistance at any corner. 7. The vessel M.V. Eagle Breeze was berthed at 14:50 hours on 23.10.1992 and the respondents were surprised that not arrangement was made by Stevedore, M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd., to work in the vessel in the second shift. The Terminal Manager and the Traffic Manager were present around 19 hours but the petitioner company could not give any satisfactory reply as to why the Stevedore did not arrange for the work on the vessel on the second shift Capt. Joarder of M/s. E.C. Bose & Co. Pvt. Ltd., came there and was asked to book the gang for the third shift of 23.10.1992 and the first shift of 24.10.1992. The Gang Members and Derrick Fitters were directly involved in handling the containers were present but no Dock Clerical and Supervisory Staff was available on Board for which the vessel could not start loading and unloading of containers. The Stevedores failed and neglected to start the stevedoring work intentionally and took the flimsy plea of strike, which according to the respondents had nothing to do with working on the vessel in question by the writ petitioner no. 1. The C.P.T. invested heavy amount to develop the terminal for better handling of container ships for which adverse reports were galore from the Overseas Shipping Companies about the delay in vessel operation, but the petitioner intentionally failed and neglected to start the work so as to frustrate the CPT's introduction of the use of containers. 8. 1. The C.P.T. invested heavy amount to develop the terminal for better handling of container ships for which adverse reports were galore from the Overseas Shipping Companies about the delay in vessel operation, but the petitioner intentionally failed and neglected to start the work so as to frustrate the CPT's introduction of the use of containers. 8. The further case of the respondents is that there was no impediment on the part of the writ petitioner no. 1 to make arrangement or to give direction to the workers for working in the vessel as per programme, but only to frustrate the whole programme the petitioners tock the flimsy plea of strike and did not carry on stevedoring work. For the lapses and negligence of the writ petitioners the Port Trust will sustain direct lose of revenue amounting to Rs. 11,72,000/-. The further case of the respondents as made in Annexure-A to the affidavit affirmed by Rathindra Shankar Gupta on 9.11.1992 is that the respondent Port Trust will suffer a loss of approximately Rs. 10,000/- per shift. 9. Mr. Mallick, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners, submitted that the Port suffered no loss for non-functioning and/or non-starting of the stevedoring work of the vessel in question. It is submitted by Mr. Mallick that the workers were not available and specially the persons who were to take the hazira of the workers and/or to record the attendance of the workers were not present, and because of the strike the stevedoring work could not commence. So there was no intentional laches on the part of the petitioners and as such the notice dated 24.10.1992 has been served with a mala fide intention. The object of serving the notice is that the father of the petitioner no. 2 Partha Sadhan Bose is the Chairman of the stevedores Association and the said Association have challenged the validity and/or legality of the decision of the respondent no. 1 to eliminate the existing stevedores from the work of stuffing/de-stuffing of containers at the new shed in the Containers Complex in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed before this Court (The Master Stevedores & Other vs. The Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta & other) and the said application is pending. 1 to eliminate the existing stevedores from the work of stuffing/de-stuffing of containers at the new shed in the Containers Complex in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed before this Court (The Master Stevedores & Other vs. The Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta & other) and the said application is pending. The respondents were on the look out of some plea to harass the petitioners and though there was a strike and there was no working condition on 23.10.1992 and 24.10.1992 and as a matter of fact, no other stevedore concerned could function, the respondent no. 2 singled out the petitioner no. 1 for the purpose of suspending the stevedoring licence so as to compel the petitioner no. 2 to desist from raising protest by way of filling writ application before this Court, Mr. Mallick refers to Rule 8 and 9 of the Calcutta Port Trust as published on 21.12.1987 which are set out hereunder: – "8. Power of Chairman to suspend a licence pending enquiry – The Chairman may, pending enquiry, suspend for a period not exceeding there months, the licence issued to a Stevedore, if he finds it expedient and necessary to do so in the interest of the port. 9. Cancellation/Suspension of Licence: – (1) The Chairman may at any time suspend for such period as he may, deem fit, or cancel the licence issued to a Stevedore for violation of any of the terms of the licence or for any of the reasons listed below: – (i) Violation of safety precautions. (ii) Low productivity. (iii) Lack of supervision over stevedoring workers. (iv) Improper and unsafe handling of packages. (v) Misrepresentation or misstatement of material fact. (vi) The stevedore being adjudged insolvent or going into liquidation. (vii) Causing obstruction to any work in the port. (viii) Sub-letting of work to any other individual or parties. (ix) Any misconduct which in the opinion of the Chairman warrants such cancellation or suspension. (2) No stevedoring licence shall be cancelled or suspended until the stevedore has been given a reasonable opportunity for showing cause why his licence should not be cancelled or suspended and reasons for such cancellation or suspension have been recorded." 10. It is submitted by Mr. Mallick that Rule 8 is ultra vires as by virtue of the said rule the principle of natural justice has been violated. It is submitted by Mr. Mallick that Rule 8 is ultra vires as by virtue of the said rule the principle of natural justice has been violated. The said rule authorities the Chairman of the Port Trust to suspend a stevedore not exceeding there months without giving any opportunity of being heard. Mr. Mallick further submits that from the order of suspension dated 24.10.1992 passed by the Chairman, Calcutta Port Trust, it is clear that the facts and circumstance disclosed from the said notice, does not show any ground or reason for which it was expedient and necessary to suspend the petitioner and/or any interest of the Port was violated. Mr. Mallick submits that so far as the interest of the Port is concerned, the Port Trust loses nothing. Because of the strike the stevedoring work could not start on 23.10.1992 and by the illegal order dated 24.10.1992 the petitioners licence was suspended as a result of which the vessel was diverted to Haldia. Ultimately after obtaining an interim order the vessel came back to Calcutta Port and the containers were unloaded and the normal work started after the strike was called off by the workers. 11. Mr. Bachawat on behalf of the respondents very strongly contended that Rule 8 gives an absolute power to the Chairman to suspend the stevedoring licence pending enquiry and what impelled the Chairman to pass such an order cannot be a subject matter of enquiry by this Court. It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application and the application has been filed only to has the Port Authorities. To maintain the discipline within the Port, the Chairman had to pass the order dated 24.10.1992 and the said order was in accordance with Rule 8 which authorities the Chairman to suspend the stevedoring licence upto a period of there months pending enquiry. When attention of the learned Advocate for the respondents was drawn to the fact that the order dated 24.10.1992 was passed by Chairman Port Trust on the basis of a report received from the Container Terminal Manager, Mr. Bachawat at the initial stage appearing with Mr. When attention of the learned Advocate for the respondents was drawn to the fact that the order dated 24.10.1992 was passed by Chairman Port Trust on the basis of a report received from the Container Terminal Manager, Mr. Bachawat at the initial stage appearing with Mr. Hirak Mitra , took a stand that the respondents were not bound to produce the report as it is a confidential report and the Chairman has acted on the basis of the said report and it was too early to call for the report and/or inspect the same. However, a direction was given to the respondents to produce the report and all other papers showing the functioning on 23.10.1992 and 24.10.1992 and at long last two reports were bought by one of the officers of the Calcutta Port Trust one a signed report by the Container Terminal Manager and the other typed report without bearing any signature. Both the reports were kept under a scaled cover and at a later stage the sealed cover was opened and Mr. Hirak Mitra appearing for the respondents gave a copy of the report to Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner. It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that on the basis of the report the Chairman had suspended the stevedoring licence of the petitioner no. 1 which cannot be questioned before this Court at this stage. Mr. Bachawat relics on a decision in the case of Sundareshan vs. Superintendent of Police, Kolar, 1984 Labour Law Journal 133, and submits that the power is exercisable at the discretion of the authority on whom it is conferred, but it has to be exercised bona fide. It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that in the instant case that power is exercisable under Rule 8 and the Chairman acted bona fide and to protect the interest of the Port and to maintain discipline had to suspend the stevedoring licence of the petitioner no. 1 Mr. Bachawat also relies on a decision in the case of S. Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 . It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that whether the act of the Chairman was bona fide or not, it is for the petitioners to satisfy this Court that the said act was not bona fide. The respondents have no duty to discharge that the Chairman acted bona fide. It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that whether the act of the Chairman was bona fide or not, it is for the petitioners to satisfy this Court that the said act was not bona fide. The respondents have no duty to discharge that the Chairman acted bona fide. The Court should presume that what the Chairman did, he did bona fide and it is for the petitioners to satisfy the Court that the Chairman action was not bona fide. Mr. Bachawat also refers to decision in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Jai Singh Dixit, 1975(2) SLR 754, where it has been held: – "In view of the majority opinion, the answer to the question of law involved is as below:– Suspension pending inquiry under 49A of the U.P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule or Rule 1A of the U.P. Punishment and Appeal Rules can be ordered at any stage prior to or after the framing of charges, when on objective consideration the authority concerned is of the view that a formal departmental inquiry under Rule 55 and 55A of the C.C.A. Rule or Rule 5 and 5A of the U.P. Punishment and Appeal Rules is expected, or such an inquiry is proceeding. At what stage the power under the above rules can be exercised shall always depend on the facts and circumstance of each case." Mr. Bachawat also relies on a decision in the case of Balvantrai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 and submits that on a general principle the Government like other employer has the right to suspend a public servant pending departmental enquiry and as such the Chairman was within his right to suspend the stevedoring licence. Mr. Bachawat also relies on a decision in the case of The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs & other vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 823 , wherein it has been held: – "The order in this case dated 31.7.1964, shows that serious allegations of corruption and malpractices had been made against the respondent and he was also reported to have contravened the provisions of the All India Service Conduct Rules and enquires made by the Government of Bihar into the allegations had revealed that there was a prima facie case mad out against him. Merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent, as compared to Rule 7 which contains phrase like the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the starting of such proceeding we cannot hold that the situation in the present case had not reached a stage which called for an order of suspension. In substance disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started against an officer when complaints about his integrity or honestly are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case has been made out against him for framing of charges. When the order of suspension itself shows that Government was of the view that such a prima facie case for departmental proceeding had been made out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceeding were contemplated makes no difference. Again the fact that in other rules of service an order suspension may me made when disciplinary proceeding were contemplated should not lead us to take the view that a member of an All India Service should be dealt with differently. The reputation of an officer is equally valuable no matter whether he belongs to the All India Service or to one of a humbler cadre. It is the exigency of the condition of service which requires or calls for an order of suspension and there can be no difference in regard to this matter as between a member of an All India Service and a member of a State Service or a Railway Service." 12. This decision has been cited in ignorance of the fact that this decision stands overruled by the Supreme Court in P.R. Nayak vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 552. 13. Mr. Bachawat also relies on Sunil Kumar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, 78 CWN 567; Amulya Ratan Mukherjee vs. Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Railway & other, AIR 1961 Cal 40 and The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Shri Brahm Dutt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 and submits that a master has got absolute right to suspend the employee pending enquiry and in a case of suspension by the Master the employee cannot come before this Court and challenge the order of suspension at the initial stage. 14. Mr. 14. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioners, referred to Rules 8 & 9 of the Calcutta Port Trust Notification No. 442 and submitted that in case of Rule 9 if there is any violation of any of the terms of the licence or for any of the reasons mentioned in sub-rules (1) to (9) then and then only there can be suspension of the stevedoring licence. Mr. Gupta further referred to Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 9 and submitted that before canceling and/or suspending a Stevedore, a reasonable opportunity for showing cause is a condition precedent and thereafter the authority should record the reasons for such cancellation or suspension. In other words, Rule 9 provides a complete procedure as to how stevedoring licence can be cancelled and/or suspended whereas Rule 8 does not provide any such procedure. It is submitted by Mr. Gupta that Rule 8 is ultra vires as the said rule is in contravention with the principle of natural justice and to penalize a party without having an opportunity of being heard. In the alternative, it is submitted that Rule 8 postulates such circumstance which is of such a nature that the authority considers it expedient and necessary to suspend the licence for the interest of the port, and such requirements and/or reasons must be reasons of very grave type not covered by sub-rule (1) to (9) of Rule 9. 15. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta also referred to the report and in the said report it is stated that as the Dock Clerical Supervisory Staff did not attend to take attendance of the other categories of staff the work could not started. In the said report it further appears that 50 workers under the Stevedores went on board the M.V. Tiger River and inspected the C.D.L.B. workers to leave the vessel. C.D.L.B. workers booked on M.V. Tiger River at 5 NSD left the vessel at 9 hours on 23.10.1992 resulting in suspension on the work for the rest of the shift. In the said report it is further mentioned that M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. the Stevedores of the M.V. Tiger River berthed on 5 NSD did not book any gang in the second and third shifts of the 23.10.1992 and the said firm, M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. In the said report it is further mentioned that M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. the Stevedores of the M.V. Tiger River berthed on 5 NSD did not book any gang in the second and third shifts of the 23.10.1992 and the said firm, M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. booked one gang M.V. Tiger River and all the categories of workers attended excepting Dock Clerk Supervisory Staff and for such non-attendance of the Supervisory Staff attendance of the rest of the category of the staff could not be taken and no Stevedores representative was available. It is further submitted by Mr. Gupta that no action has been taken against M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. or any other Stevedores and the petitioner no. 1 has been singled out by the respondents. It is submitted that it was a preplanned action of the respondents to penalize the petitioners as the petitioner no. 2 father is the President of the Stevedoring Association and is looked upon with high esteem by all the Stevedores in India. The respondents wanted to penalize the petitioner company so as to teach a lesson and to create a terror on all the Stevedores in India. 16. Mr. P.K. Mallick, on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the inauguration of the container terminal was made by Shri Jagdish Titler, Hon'ble Minister of Surface Tramps it on 8.9.1991, which appears in Annexure-B at page 28 of the affidavit affirmed by Debabrata Joarder on 5.11.1992. It is submitted by Mr. Mallick that from the said date i.e. from 8.9.1991 till 23.10.1992 no work of loading and unloading of container terminal was done. In other words, the said terminal remained idle for one year one month and 15 days and on 23.10.1992, when there was a strike in the Port and the workers were not available, the respondent no. 2 maliciously with a purpose behind issued the notice dated 24.10.1992 suspending the licence of the petitioner. It is submitted by Mr. Mallick that the said act is not only illegal but high handed as it is apparent on the face of it that there was no functioning or no loss for one year one month and 15 days and the entire suffering loss etc. occurred, according to the respondent no. 2, only on the second and third shifts of 23.10.1992, and first shift of 24.10.1992. 17. Mr. occurred, according to the respondent no. 2, only on the second and third shifts of 23.10.1992, and first shift of 24.10.1992. 17. Mr. Aloke Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the Calcutta Port Trust, was asked by the Court as to whether it is factually correct that no loading and unloading of the container terminal took place from 8.9.1991 to 23.10.1992, whereupon Mr. Banerjee, upon taking instruction from the officer of the Calcutta Port Trust, who was present in Court, admitted that no such work could be done during that period for various reasons. 18. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner also submitted that there was no enquiry as contemplated in Rule 8 but the Chairman of the Port Trust has appointed Shri J.K. Mukherjee, Dock Manager, to furnish a report, which cannot be termed an enquiry within the meaning of Rule 8 of the Calcutta Port Trust Notification No. 442 and, as such, the order is bad on the face of it. 19. It is further submitted that from the impugned order it appear that the Chairman acted on the face of a report received from the container terminal Manager. At the time of hearing two reports were placed one by the Container Terminal Manager and the other by some other person, which is a report on M.V. Eagle Breeze at DNSD. The said report is on a electrical Typewriting Machine bearing no signature. Further, at the time of hearing the Port authority produced a report written by some person and it is submitted that the typed report was the reproduction of the said handwritten report. However, it is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner that the entire action was taken on the basis of the report of the Container Terminal Manager and from the said report it is clear that there was no fault of the Stevedore and no reasonable person with due diligence could have suspended the stevedoring licence of the petitioners had he applied his mind over the subject and/or over the report which was alleged to have been placed before him. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that from the order dated 24.10.1992 it is clear that the Chairman acted without any application of mind and the whole and the sole object of the Chairman is to put a sear on the stevedoring licence of the petitioners and he was hunting for some evidence and without any evidence on the basis of a purported report, which discloses nothing, the order was passed arbitrarily and mala fide. 20. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Chairman, if he wants to act under Rule 8 must from an opinion and on the basis of the opinion he has to suspend the stevedoring licence and if a person has acted on the opinion, then the person should have come forward and filed and affidavit before this Court stating what are the facts and circumstance which compelled him or was considered by him for the purpose of forming an opinion and to take action. Rule 8 presupposes that the condition should be such which should be expedient and necessary for the interest of the Port. But, in the instant case, it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that no where it has been spelt out as to what was expedient and what was necessary. The entire thing is a farce and was made for the purpose of suspending the stevedoring licence of the petitioner without any basis or reason. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that had the Dock Labour Board produced the register it would have shown who were the workers present on 23.10.1992 and 24.10.1992, then the Court could have got a clear picture about the difficulty of the petitioner to work on 23.10.1992 and 24.10.1992 and whether the work could not be commenced because of the laches and/or intentional act of the petitioner no. 1 or it was beyond their control to act on those days. It is further submitted that there was no dispute of the fact that to there was strike of the general workers. The learned Advocate referred to the Annexure annexed at page 51, of the petition dated 23.10.1992 and also paragraph 12 of the affidavit affirmed by Partha Sadhan Bose on 2.11.1992 and it is submitted that requisition was made for two Tally Clerks but no clerk was available on 23.10.1992. The learned Advocate referred to the Annexure annexed at page 51, of the petition dated 23.10.1992 and also paragraph 12 of the affidavit affirmed by Partha Sadhan Bose on 2.11.1992 and it is submitted that requisition was made for two Tally Clerks but no clerk was available on 23.10.1992. Requisition was made for one Tindel G.P. Mazdoor but the said Mazdoor was not provided as requisitioned. The petitioner also requisitioned for two Crane Drivers which would appear from page 51 of the petition but was not provided and instead thereof two Winch Drivers who had no roll whatsoever to play were provided. From the averments made in page 12 of the affidavit of Partha Sadhan Bose, it is clear that the persons who were required to function so that the work could be commenced on 23.10.1992, were not available and, as such there was no fault on the part of the Stevedores. On the contrary, the workers were not available and Stevedores were helpless under the said situation and was made victim by the respondent no. 2, which would have been clear from the facts and circumstance of the case. It is further submitted that the respondent had not brought the Dock Labour Board Register to show which workers were present and which workers were not present, though the Chairman of the Port Trust who is also the Chairman of the Dock Labour Board and the respondents wanted to take shelter on the point that since the Dock Labour Board has not been made party there is no question of proceeding that record. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that no action has been taken against M/s. T.P. Roy Chowdhury & Co. or any other company but the petitioner no. 1 has been singled out, which act shows the mala fide nature of the action and exposes the design of the respondent no. 2. 21. The learned Advocate for the petitioner also referred to the circular/announcement dated 23.10.1992. No. SG/5(a) Pt. VI, which runs as follows: – "TO ALL REGISTERED DOCK WORKERS 1. The traffic handing by registered dock workers in the Calcutta Dock System has been deceasing gradually over the years due to non-availability of adequate traffic in the Port. This has resulted under-utilization of Port resources and as such rendered the registered dock workers idle which is neither desirable for acceptable. 2. The traffic handing by registered dock workers in the Calcutta Dock System has been deceasing gradually over the years due to non-availability of adequate traffic in the Port. This has resulted under-utilization of Port resources and as such rendered the registered dock workers idle which is neither desirable for acceptable. 2. All concerned should therefore, work together to bring back the goodwill of the Port as well as dock workers so that we can create an atmosphere of confidence in the mind of the shipping to generate more traffic for this Port which will in tern generate more employment opportunities for the dock workers. 3. At such juncture a group of unregistered workers, with the passive support of a cross section of registered workers has threatened the registered workers to stop the work and leave the working ships in the day shift 23.10.1992. As a result of such unwanted action on the part of those irresponsible unregistered workers, the work in the entire Port has been paralised. This has aggravated the situation and the image of the workers has been furnished by such action. This shows that a handful of persons under threat and correction have not only stopped the vessel work in a shift but has also prevented the representative of the registered employees to enter inside the Booking Office of the Board at Old Call Stand for submitting requisitions, thereby the cargo handing work in the entire port in the afternoon shift of 23.10.1992 has also been hampered. 4. The observation is not only unwanted but also unfortunate and as such should be tackled by the registered workers courageously to bring back their goodwill and confidence. It is expected that the registered workers should not support such action and should not join hands with the unregistered workers to stop the Port operation. 5. All the registered workers are therefore advised to report to the Booking Section for accepting booking as usual and to continue the work so that the normalcy is restored forthwith. 6. In the event of not responding to the appeal made as above or to take recourse of not receiving the booking or leaving the working shifts without any reasons it would be viewed seriously and the administration would reluctantly be compelled to take appropriate disciplinary measures including imposition of wage-out reduction in minimum guaranteed wages etc. 7. 6. In the event of not responding to the appeal made as above or to take recourse of not receiving the booking or leaving the working shifts without any reasons it would be viewed seriously and the administration would reluctantly be compelled to take appropriate disciplinary measures including imposition of wage-out reduction in minimum guaranteed wages etc. 7. It is expected that all the registered workers should co-operate with the administration and respond to the appeal spontaneously in the greater interest of the Port as well as Dock workers." 22. It is clear from the said circular circulated by Mr. R.N. Sanyal, Deputy Chairman, Calcutta Dock Labour Board that because of the irresponsible act of the un-registered workers the work of the Port has been paralised. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that after the said circular was published and circulated, which speaks of the situation prevailing on 23.10.1992, how the Chairman could take the present action when there was admittedly no work could be commenced at the Calcutta Port because of the strike? 23. So far as the loss is concerned, it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that no loss was caused to the Port of Calcutta as it is stated at page 12 of the affidavit of Capt. Joarder and as per provisions of the Major Port Trust Act of the Calcutta Port Trust berth hire charges are realized at the prescribed rates, which is in terms of U.S. Dollars and such charges are inclusive of the charges for the Cranes, Derricks and charges for providing Chains and Shackles wherever necessary and such charges are realized on the gross registered tonnage of a vessel. Therefore, the rate which was payable to the Calcutta Port Trust has already been paid. Furthermore, loading and unloading was done partially at the Calcutta Port and thereafter the ship was diverted to Haldia Complex where unloading work was also done. So far as Haldia Dock Complex and Calcutta Port is concerned, they are under the administration, control and financial discipline of the Calcutta Port Trust. As such, there was no question of any financial loss to the Calcutta Port Trust so far as M.V. Eagle Breeze is concerned. It is submitted that Mr. Bachawat's submission relying upon Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition there was loss of Rs. As such, there was no question of any financial loss to the Calcutta Port Trust so far as M.V. Eagle Breeze is concerned. It is submitted that Mr. Bachawat's submission relying upon Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition there was loss of Rs. 10,000/- per shift is not tenable because there could not be any loss by the Calcutta Port Trust. 24. The principles upon which an order of suspension of an employee is made under the service rules or regulations are not applicable in case of suspension of Stevedores licence under which the petitioner was carrying on business of Stevedores inasmuch as in case of suspension of an employee by the employer, the employer is bound to pay subsistence allowance and it well settled principles of that in the absence of an agreement or a provision for limiting the amount of subsistence allowance, the employer had to pay full amount of salary even during the period of suspension. In case of suspension of licence under which one is carrying on business there is no scope for compensating the loss sustained during the period of such suspension. It is a drastic measure which is provided in the rule without providing any sufficient guideless or safe-guards. There is no check upon possible injustice that might result from an improper exercise of the power of suspension of a licence by providing any appeal etc. 25. It was contented that in the instant case the power of suspension has been conferred upon the Chairman who has been given the absolute power to suspend the license and as such, an order cannot be subject matter of judicial review. 26. This presumption that when the power conferred by the higher authority does not any longer hold good in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 , wherein the Supreme Court have said that there is need to minimize the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however, high placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however, high placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. Individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumstance and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational, History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. Hence, the absence of guidelines cannot be defended on the ground that the discretion is vested in high authorities. 27. It was further observed that the Supreme Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi Kumari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 537 , where the Supreme Court have held that conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. All person entrusted with any such power have to bear in mind its necessary concomitant which alone justices conferment of power under the rule of law. 28. It is confirmly established principle that absence of adequate reasons to justify the action amounts to a clear case of arbitrariness. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its Officers. Even in case of exercise of discretion it has to be exercised objectionable, rationales, intelligible, fairly and non-arbitrary when it effects public interest See Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Muddi, AIR 1991 SC 1902 . 29. In the instant Rule 8 conferred and absolutely unfettered by the Chairman. Even in case of exercise of discretion it has to be exercised objectionable, rationales, intelligible, fairly and non-arbitrary when it effects public interest See Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Muddi, AIR 1991 SC 1902 . 29. In the instant Rule 8 conferred and absolutely unfettered by the Chairman. There is no reasonable safeguard there is no check upon possible improper exercise of the power of suspension. 30. It is said that the granting of licence in nothing but a privilege. If summarily taking away of Right is unjust, the same is true of taking away of a privilege. In Bell vs. Burson, 402 US 535 (1971), it was held that once drivers licence are issued, as in petitioner case, their continued possession may be come essential in the pursued of livelihood. Suspension of issues licence thus involves state action adjudicate important interest of the licence in such a case licence are not to be taking away that procedure due process required by he 14th amendment. 31. Citizen right to carry the trade or business may be under a licence cannot be taken away merely I desire an Officer who might have been occupying a top position. Turing to the facts of this case it was clearly exhibited before me that the action was taken by the Chairman was without any reasonable ground. Absence of adequate reasons makes action arbitrary. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi Kumari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), it was also held public policy based provision for non-communicating or assigning of reasons for the decision does not mean their decision can be made without any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power to take decision is given so it is well settled principle that even when the authority is authorised to take action without assigning any cause. In that case it was held that without assigning any cause is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause' it merely mean that reason that the termination is made need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee non-assigning the reason or non-action thereof may be based on public policy but termination of appointment without existence of cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be terminated and therefore, against public policy so under the said power appointment may be terminated without communicating the reason. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will which may be terminated by the authority at any time without the existence or without any cogent reason. It is crystal clear that the power of suspension exercised arbitrarily and on the face of it mala fide. It is also evident that the Chairman did not apply its mind before taking such a drastic action concerning livelihood of a person who is carrying a business of stevedores. Action must be based on discernible and reasonable principle. Action uniformed by reason is arbitrary, caprices and mala fide. 32. I have carefully considered the facts and circumstance of the case and it appears that the provisions of rule 8 would be applicable in an extreme case which does not come within the purview of rule 9, that is, a case of grave nature and the reasons are such which compel the authority concerned to take recourse to rule 8. The impugned order is on the basis of a report received from the Container Terminal Manager, Calcutta Port Trust. I have carefully gone through the report of the Container Terminal Manager and also the Circular of the Deputy Chairman, Calcutta Dock Labour Board and the same supports the case of the petitioner and I do not find any reason for which drastic steps under rule 8 could have been taken recourse to. The fact remains that there was a general strike on 23.10.1992 and of the persons who were requisitioned by the petitioner for commencing the stevedoring work some persons did not attend and there was no negligence on the part of the stevedore in not commencing the stevedoring work rather it was beyond the control of the stevedore, i.e. the petitioner; but the respondent no. 2 inspite of having the report and the circular of the Deputy Chairman passed the impugned order which can be termed nothing but not bona fide. There was no circumstance for which the Chairman found it expedient and necessary to do so in the interest of the Port. Suspension of the stevedoring licence could have been passed if there were some circumstance which compelled the authority concerned as otherwise the acts of the stevedore will prejudice the pending enquiry. In the interest case there was no such case. Suspension of the stevedoring licence could have been passed if there were some circumstance which compelled the authority concerned as otherwise the acts of the stevedore will prejudice the pending enquiry. In the interest case there was no such case. However, I am not considering the vires of rule 8 as no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of the Union of India and the said point need not be considered is disposing of the present writ application. So that point is left open. Whether the act of the Chairman was bona fide or not, I hold that it is for the port authority to place facts and circumstance before this Court so as to justify as to whether the said order of the Chairman was passed bona fide. It is not for the petitioner to prove before this Court that the Chairman acted without any bona fide. In Halsbury's Law of England 4th Revised Edition at para 74, it is observed that "The exercise of a statutory power is invalid unless the repository of that power has acted honestly and in good faith. The deliberate promotion of a purpose, be it public or private alien to that for which the power was conferred is to be regarded as an act of bad faith……….where a prima facie case of misuse of power has been made out, it is open to a Court of law to draw the inference that unauthorized purpose have been pursued if the competent authority fails to adduce any grounds supporting the validity of its conduct." 33. I also find much substance in the argument of Mr. Mallick. The very fact that a particular dock was not in use for one year one month and fifteen days and thereafter on 23.10.1992 when the ship reached the Port at 4:50 P.M. and the stevedoring work could not be started because of the reasons which were beyond the control of the petitioner, goes to show that the order of this nature should not and ought not to have been passed by the Chairman after singling out the petitioner though from the facts and circumstance placed before the Court it is clear that no other stevedores could work on that day. On consideration of the facts and circumstance of the case it is clear that the petitioner has been able to make out a strong prima facie case for the intervention of this Court. 34. In this case the order of suspension of the licence was not made bona fide and/or to sub-serve any public interest. It the work in question could not be performed by a persons admittedly for reasons beyond his control, he cannot be held guilty and this order of suspension was irrational, unjust and in any event beyond the sense of proportion. Situation did not warrant taking such an action. Right to carry on one business cannot be made dependent upon the sweet will or pleasure of the Chairman of the Port Trust. Every activity of the State have a public element in it had it must be based on good and sufficient reason. Its validity is dependent on reasonableness and public interest. If it fails to satisfy this twin test, it would be liable to be struck down as unconstitutional See Kasturilal vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1990 SC 1992. The order of suspension was on the face of it unreasonable, arbitrary and whimsical and as such the same is cancelled and set aside. The writ petition succeeds to the extent indicated above. 35. There will be no order as to costs. 36. Mr. Bachawat prays for stay of operation of the order. In view of my findings, I do not find any ground for praying for stay. The prayer is considered and rejected. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of the judgment or the usual undertaking.