SUNIL KUMAR GUM, J, J. ( 1 ) THESE revisional applications 104 in number have been filed for quashing the prosecutions pending against M/s. Tata Davy Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the company) under section 276b of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and against its Managing Directors under section 276b read with section 278b of the said Act ( 2 ) THERE are two groups of cases pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The first group consists of 26 cases being Case No. C/ 1026/90,1027/90,1033/90 to 1042/90 pending in the 14th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate and Cases No. C/1057/90 to 1059/90, 1062190 to 1072190 pending in the 6th Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. In these cases the company accused No. 1 is being prosecuted for failure to pay the taxes deducted at source and P. Sen accused No. 2 the Managing Director of the company is being prosecuted as the principal Officer- in-charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. This group of cases has given rise to Criminal Revisions No. 2286/91 to 2310 (A) of 1991. The second group consists of 78 cases being Cases No. C/993/90 to 1025/90 and 1028/90 to 1032/90 pending in the 14th Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and Case No. C/1043/90 to 1056/ 90, 1060/90, 1061/90 and 1073/90 to 1096/90 pending in the 6th Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. In these cases the company is being prosecuted for failure to pay taxes deducted at source and Dr. P. K. Chowdhury Managing Director is being prosecuted as the principal Officer-in- charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. This group of cases has given rise to Criminal Revision No. 2420/91 to 2497 of 1991. ( 3 ) MR. Guha learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has argued that as section 276b of the said Act prescribed compulsory imprisonment, the company being a justice person cannot be prosecuted and sent to jail on conviction under the said section. He has also argued that as the Managing Director is not the principal Officer of the company, he cannot be prosecuted in that capacity for non-payment of taxes deducted at source. He has also argued that as the Managing Director is not the principal Officer of the company, he cannot be prosecuted in that capacity for non-payment of taxes deducted at source. He has also argued that though the company failed to deposit the tax deducted at source within the statutory period, still it deposited the same within the year 1988, i. e. before initiation of the instant prosecutions and that in view of the decision in the case of Hooghly Docking and Engineering Company, and the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Sri Anup Kumar v. State of West Bengal no post payment prosecution can lie against the compatly,or its principal Officer. ( 4 ) MR. Ghosh learned advocate appearing for the State has opposed these revisions. ( 5 ) IN all these cases the company is being prosecuted under section 276b of the said Act for its failure to pay the tax deducted at source from the salaries of its employees. The said section prescribes rigorous compulsory imprisonment for the offence. It has been repeatedly held by Division Benches of this Court and also by the Division Bench of other Court that the company being a juristic person cannot be sent to jail on conviction. In the case of M/s. Kusum Products Ltd. v. S. K. Sinha3 the Division Bench of this Court has held that a company or a juristic person cannot possibly be sent to prison and that it is not open to a Court to impose a sentence of fine or not to award any punishment if the Court finds a company guilty under section 277 of the said Act which also prescribes compulsory imprisonment. It has further been held that if the Court does so, it would be altering the very scheme of the Act and usurping the legislative function. ( 6 ) THAT decision was followed by the Division, Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd; v. B. C. , Goel. Another Division Bench of this Court in case of East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Mondal5 has held that the punishment of imprisonment could not be imposed upon a company or a juristic person. Another Division Bench of this Court in case of East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Mondal5 has held that the punishment of imprisonment could not be imposed upon a company or a juristic person. Relying upon that aforesaid decisions, this Court by its judgment dated 24/7/1991 in Criminal Revisions No. 1202 of 1986 and 1203 of 1986 has held that the company being a juristic person cannot be punished with imprisonment and that the punishijlent of compulsory imprisonment as provided under section 276b cannot be imposed upon the company which is a juristic person. This Court was also of the view that as no such compulsory imprisonment could not be imposed upon the company accused, the continuation of the proceedings under section 276b of the said Act against the company accused amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court and should, therefore, be quashed. ( 7 ) I see no reason to take a different view. As such I hold that the company being a juristic person cannot be prosecuted under section 276b of the said Act and sent to jail on conviction and that continuation of the instant proceedings against the company amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and that such proceedings should, therefore, be quashed so far as they relate to the company. ( 8 ) NEXT let me consider whether the Managing Directors of the company i. e. , P. Sen and Dr. P. K. Chowdhury can be prosecuted as a principal Officer in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. In the first group of cases P. Sen Managing Director was made an accused as principal Officer in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. But it is not disputed that he died during pendency of the cases and prior to filing of the instant revisions. Since he is no more in the land of living, this accused P. Sen cannot be prosecuted any further and the prosecution against him should, therefore, be quashed. ( 9 ) IT is seen that Dr. P. K. Chowdhury Managing Director has been roped in as a principal Officer incharge of and responsible, to the company for conduct of its business. ( 9 ) IT is seen that Dr. P. K. Chowdhury Managing Director has been roped in as a principal Officer incharge of and responsible, to the company for conduct of its business. He can be proceeded against provided he is the principal Officer of the company as alleged by the prosecution. ( 10 ) NOW let me see who is the principal Officer of the company. For this reference may be made to section 2 (35) of the said Act which defines who are the principal Officer. According to this definition the secretary, treasurer, manager or agent of the authority, company, association or body is the principal Officer. The Managing Director has not been included in this definition. But under sub- clause (b) of clause (35) of section 2 of the said Act, an) person connected with the management or administration of the company upon whom the assessing Officer has served a notice of his intention of treating him as the principal Officer thereof is also a principal Officer. But it is not the case of the prosecution that assessing Officer served any such notice upon the Managing Director nor is there anything on record to show that the assessing Officer ever served any notice of its intention of treating the Managing Director as the principal Officer of the company. ( 11 ) THUS it is clear that the Managing Director of the company in the instant case is not the principal Officer as defined under clause (35) of section 2 of the said Act. Since Dr. P. K. Chowdhury, Managing Director is not the principal Officer of the company, he, in my opinion, cannot be proceeded against under section 276b read with section 278b of the said Act. That being so the prosecution against him is also liable to be quashed. ( 12 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the company defaulted in depositing the taxes deducted at source within the statutory period. It is not disputed and also admitted in the petitions of complaint that the company has made delayed deposits of the taxes deducted at source. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that all these defaults are made in the year 1988 and that the defaulted amounts were also deposited in the same year. It is not disputed and also admitted in the petitions of complaint that the company has made delayed deposits of the taxes deducted at source. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that all these defaults are made in the year 1988 and that the defaulted amounts were also deposited in the same year. From the averment in the petition of complaint it also appears to this Court that these defaulted amounts were deposited ill course of the year 1988. In the case of Rooghly Docking and Engineering Company (supra), a learned Judge of this Court sitting singly held that when the entire amount payable was paid up, though beyond the period prescribed, but before the prosecution was launched, such post payment prosecution was to be quashed. In the case of Pranati Textiles v. The State- the Division Bench of this Court dissented from this view. But till the dissenting judgment of the Division Bench in 1989, the decision in the case of Rooghly Docking and Engineering Company (supra) held the field. In the case of Anup Kumar v. State of West Bengal (supra), the said Division Bench has observed as follows: every person in this State has the obvious right to govern himself and to regulate his acts according to the law as enunciated by this Court, until the same is altered in due course, judicial or legislative. At the relevant period, therefore, the accused could have repelled a criminal prosecution on the strength of the later but pre-prosecution payment on the strength of Rooghly Docking and Engineering Company (supra ). Not only a sentence pf imprisonment, but even of fine, if unpaid, would result in deprivation of personal liberty and such deprivation can, under the mandate of article 21 of the Constitution, be effected only act cording to the procedure which is reasonable, right, fair and just. We have no doubt that it cannot be in any way reasonable, right, just or fair for-us to lay down a law in particular manner and then to change our view and convict a person for some act which, at the material time and until we have ruled differently, could not, according to our view then prevailing, warrant criminal prosecution. We have no doubt that it cannot be in any way reasonable, right, just or fair for-us to lay down a law in particular manner and then to change our view and convict a person for some act which, at the material time and until we have ruled differently, could not, according to our view then prevailing, warrant criminal prosecution. ( 13 ) FROM the above decision of the Division Bench it is clear that the decision in Rooghly, Docking and Engineering Company (supra) held the field till 1989 when the Division. Bench of this Court dissented from the said decision. As such the Division Bench is of the view that no post payment prosecution would lie in view of the decision of the Rooghly Docking and Engineering Company (supra) till that-decision was dissented from in 1989. In the instant cases default was made in 1988and the defaulted amount was also deposited in 1988. The instantt cases were filed in 1990. Since the aforesaid deposits were made in 1988, when the decision in Rooghly Docking and Engineering Company (supra) was holding the field, the instant prosecutions launched after such payment do not lie as per decision of the Division Bench as referred to above. In view of the said decision this Court also holds that the instant prosecutions do not lie and should be quashed. ( 14 ) THUS in any view of the matter, the instant revisions succeed and are hereby allowed. Cases no. C1993190 to 1042190 pending in the 14th Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate calcutta are hereby quashed: ( 15 ) CASES No. C/1043/90 to 1096/90 pending in the 6th Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta are hereby quashed. ( 16 ) THIS judgment shall govern Criminal Revisions No. 2286/90 to 2310 (A)/91 and Criminal Revisions No. 2420/90 to 2497/91. Copies of this judgment be sent to the learned Magistrate concerned as expeditiously as possible. Revision allowed.