JUDGMENT 1. This is an application for revocation of leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent after, however, the defendants have filed their written statements and after two interlocutory application have been fought out between the parties. 2. For the purpose of deciding whether the plaint should be rejected outright by revocation of leave and whether the suit should be held to be a suit for land situate wholly outside the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, which are the submission of the defendants, the plaint has to be accepted as it stands. The defendants have submitted that even on that basis, accepting the plaint as it is, the same would appear clearly to be a suit for land, and since the land is at Lake Road outside the local limits, the suit must forthwith fail and the leave already granted must be revoked. 3. The plaintiff on the other hand has submitted that the suit is not a suit for land and is in reality a suit in person for such personal relief's as grant of a decree of specific performance and grant of an order for personal injunction against transfer of property. The have sold that the prayer for declaration of voidness of the subsequent agreement entered into by and between the defendants in respect of the said same property is also a claim in the nature of claim for or in relation to land. 4. It appears from a whole reading of the plaint that the plaintiffs case today is that they are in possession and do not need to obtain a decree possession from the Court. Paragraph 12 of the plaint states specifically that they are in vacant possession of one portion of the premises and also goes on state that the plaintiff has spent huge amounts while negotiating with other tenants for obtaining vacant possession from them. 5. A part of the agreement of which specific performance is sought for by the plaintiffs is set out in paragraph 11 of the plaint and one clause of the said agreement is to the effect that the vendor shall make over possession of the said premises simultaneously with execution of the said presents. 5. A part of the agreement of which specific performance is sought for by the plaintiffs is set out in paragraph 11 of the plaint and one clause of the said agreement is to the effect that the vendor shall make over possession of the said premises simultaneously with execution of the said presents. If this part of the agreement is read along with fact that the execution of the said agreement i.e. the said presents is not denied and further that no possession is claimed for by the plaintiff, the position which emerges is that the plaintiff in possession of the property and does not claim for the came over again in the suit. 6. Whether a suit for specific performance of an agreement for conveyance of land is a suit for land or not would depend upon the terms of the agreement itself and several other factors. 7. It is settled law that a decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale of land simpliciter is not a suit for land although the same would ultimately cause a transfer of title of the land. The case of Debendra vs. Southern Bank Limited, AIR 1960 Cal 626 , is an authority for this proposition. 8. There is, however, now a binding decision of the Supreme Court to this effect that plaintiff might elect to treat his prayer for specific performance as containing a prayer for possession of the land in respect of which specific performance is sought. That case of Baboo Lall vs. Hazari Lall, AIR 1982 SC 818 . 9. In case the agreement for which specific performance is sought contains a clause apart from an agreement for conveyance of title that the land itself would be handed over by the vendors to the vendees, then and in that event, the claim for specific performance of the whole agreement would include within it a claim for possession of land, thus converting it into a suit for land. A Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Debabrata Tarefdar, 87 CWN 54, is an authority for the said proposition. 10. A Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Debabrata Tarefdar, 87 CWN 54, is an authority for the said proposition. 10. Another recent Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Brijmohan Lall Rathi, AIR 1992 Cal 67 , has however clarified that in case a claim for specific performance is made in a suit, the same cannot automatically be regarded as a suit for land even if no possession is asked for by the plaintiff. 11. The joint reading of the above two Division Bench judgments would lead up to this result that, in case of an agreement for sale or conveyance of land, where there is no specific clause which agree upon delivery of possession to be given subsequent to the execution of the said presents, even a prayer simpliciter for specific performance of the agreement can be treated at the choice of the plaintiff either as a prayer containing inbuilt in it a prayer for possession of the land (like in the above Supreme Court Case) or it might be treated as a suit simpliciter for specific performance of the said agreement merely in person, on the line of the judgment given in Brijmohan Lall Rathi's Case. 12. In the instant case before us there is no clause in the agreement which calls for delivery of possession subsequent to the agreement and possession, if any that was to be had on the agreement was to be had at the time of execution of the presents. Execution of the agreement is admitted. 13. The plaintiff accordingly has a choice in this case either to treat the claim for decree for specific performance of its agreement dated 20.12.1985 as containing a prayer for possession inbuilt within it, or to treat it as a claim simpliciter for specific performance of the agreement. On the basis that the plaintiff is in possession of the property (which has been submitted to be the true construction of the plaint on the part of the plaintiffs) the plaintiff has, at least for the purpose of the present application, chosen to treat the claim for specific performance as a claim simpliciter in person and not relating to possession of land. Under those circumstance, the suit cannot fall at this stage, at least in relation to the claim for the decree for specific performance which is claim (b) in the plaint. Under those circumstance, the suit cannot fall at this stage, at least in relation to the claim for the decree for specific performance which is claim (b) in the plaint. 14. In so far as the claim for perpetual injunction restraining transfer by the defendants is made, the same would lose all usefulness if and when the decree for specific performance is granted and the conveyance itself is executed. The said prayer for injunction, although made in the plaint is, therefore, in the nature of substantially and interlocutory relief which would have no ultimate permanent bearing. Furthermore, the claim is wholly made against the defendants in person and as such would not be relating to any title, possession, control or management of the land itself shorn of the defendants themselves. The order of injunction, even if granted for the interim period pending final determination of the suit, would be an order restraining the defendants and the defendants alone. The Division Bench judgment in the case of Mayapore Math, AIR 1983 Cal 420 , would not, in my opinion, be an authority for the proposition that a suit for injunction restraining alienation of land would be a suit for the land itself, even if such interim restraint is clearly made only in aid of a final relief for a specific performance of an agreement for sale simpliciter. 15. The third ground on which the suit was sought to be made out as a suit for land was that a declaration in respect of the subsequent agreement of 20.8.1989 has been sought for in that it is claimed to be void and it is claimed that the same should be delivered up and cancelled. It was submitted that as recorded in said subsequent agreement an earnest money of Rs. 5,000/- had been paid and under section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act the said earnest money from charge upon the land. It was argued that in case the claim for declaration of voidness and delivery up and cancellation is granted it would have the effect of removal of charge over land and thus convert the suit into a suit for land. 16. The Division Bench judgment reported in 89 CWN 509, was referred to in that regard but, with respect, that case would not really be helpful at all in deciding this point for the purpose of the present application. 16. The Division Bench judgment reported in 89 CWN 509, was referred to in that regard but, with respect, that case would not really be helpful at all in deciding this point for the purpose of the present application. The question there was concerning compulsory registrability of an assignment of the rights under an agreement for sale of land, in spite of the original agreement being not compulsorily registrable, but the same does not arise for determination here. 17. In case the agreement dated 20.8.1989 is adjudged to be void and the same is thus decreed to be delivered up and cancelled, it would in that event be decreed that the agreement had actually never come into being. In case two parties agree by way of a valid contract for sale of land and earnest money is paid thereupon then the Transfer of Property Act by operation of law creates a charge upon the land for the earnest amount. If, however, the personal decree as against the persons seeking to covenant amongst themselves, invalidates the agreement which had been sought to be brought into being, in that case the agreement itself does not come into operation, so that by reason of the personal decree the possibility of the operation of the Transfer of Property Act is eliminated from the very beginning. A delivery up and cancellation of the agreement would also be a decree not in relation to land but in relation to an instrument brought about between persons who are defendants in the suit in question. The perishing of any money change as a consequence thereof would be purely ancillary, and by no means the main object or primary purpose of the suit or the decree thereon. 18. It has also been argued on behalf of the defendants that the subsequent agreement is a collusive and fraudulent agreement and that the earnest amount of Rs. 5,000/- is a mere pittance in relation to the total consideration amount or Rs. 16 lakh. On the other hand it has been argued on the part of the defendants that the plaintiff, though it had paid Rs. 50,000/- as earnest money for its agreement, has taken book the money when it was tendered by account payee cheque and has enchased the said cheque. The plaintiff in its turn submitted that the encashment was made by an employee who broke faith with the plaintiff. 50,000/- as earnest money for its agreement, has taken book the money when it was tendered by account payee cheque and has enchased the said cheque. The plaintiff in its turn submitted that the encashment was made by an employee who broke faith with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has alleged fraud and collusion as between the defendants in the bringing about of the later agreement and has alleged that the came was brought about only in a wrongful attempt to defeat the rights of the plaintiff under the first agreement. These, of course, are matters to be decided in the suit and do not strictly concern me in the decision of this application. 19. On the above basis I come to the conclusion that none of the three prayers for specific performance, injunction or declaration of voidness of agreement or the prayer for cancellation thereof is substantially to be construed as primarily intended for direct relief in relation to possession, control, title or management of the land although the same might be indirect results of the decree that might be passed hereon, as might indeed be the result of a decree in a suit for specific performance simpliciter too. 20. The plaintiff also cited the case of Chittaranjan Mukherjee, 87 Cal LJ 420, for supporting the proposition that after filling of the written statements and after contestation of two interlocutory applications the stage is not proper for revocation of leave by way of an application and the point, if any, should be left open for trial. Since, however, the parties have argued the matter in full and I have come to a decision that the suit is not a suit for land the point is being decided by me rather than leaving the parties free for a second round of full arguments at a later stage. 21. The conclusion, accordingly, is that the suit is not a suit for land. Even if a portion only of the claims is a claim not for land, the suit would even then have survived for that portion in case the plaintiff elected to leave the other portion out of the purview of the suit. The question however, does not arise as the entirely of the suit is maintainable in this Court. 22. Under these circumstance, there will be no order on this application. Costs of this application are assessed at 500 Gm. The question however, does not arise as the entirely of the suit is maintainable in this Court. 22. Under these circumstance, there will be no order on this application. Costs of this application are assessed at 500 Gm. but shall abide by the result of the suit. All parties to act on a signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.